A feature of industrialization in the USSR was. Sources of industrialization

Industrialization- the process of accelerated development of industry, primarily heavy industry, the transformation of the country's economy into an industrial one. In the USSR in the late 1920s and 1930s, industrialization was carried out at an accelerated pace due to excessive exploitation of the population.

Industrialization is a set of measures for the accelerated development of industry adopted by the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) during the second half of the 20s to the end of the 30s. Proclaimed as a party course by the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) (1925). Carried out mainly through the transfer of funds from agriculture: first thanks to the “price scissors” for industrial and agricultural products, and after the proclamation of a course to speed up industrialization (1929) - through surplus appropriation. A feature of Soviet industrialization was the priority development of heavy industry and military-industrial complex. In total, 35 industrial giants were built in the USSR, a third of which were built in Ukraine. Among them are Zaporizhstal, Azovstal, Krammashstroy, Krivorizhbud, Dneprostroy, Dnipaluminbud, Kharkov Tractor, Kiev Machine Tool, etc.

Proclamation of a course towards industrialization

The industrial development of the USSR in the mid-1920s reached pre-war levels (1913), but the country lagged significantly behind leading Western countries: significantly less electricity, steel, cast iron, coal and oil were produced. The economy as a whole was at the pre-industrial stage of development. Therefore, the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b), held in December 1925, proclaimed a course towards industrialization.

Goals of industrialization in the USSR

The main goals of industrialization in the USSR were proclaimed:

• ensuring economic independence and independence of the USSR;
• elimination of the country's technical and economic backwardness, industrial modernization;
• creation of a technical base for the modernization of agriculture;
• development of new industries;
• strengthening the country's defense capability, creating a military-industrial complex;
• stimulating the steady growth of labor productivity and, on this basis, increasing the material well-being and cultural level of workers.

The main features of Soviet industrialization:

• the main sources of accumulation of funds for industrialization were: “pumping” funds from villages to cities; from light and food industry to heavy industry, an increase in direct and indirect taxes; domestic loans; issue of paper money not backed by gold; expansion of vodka sales; an increase in the export of oil, timber, furs and grain abroad;
• the sources of industrialization were actually the unpaid labor of workers and especially peasants; exploitation of many millions of Gulag prisoners;
• ultra-high rates of industrialization, which were explained by the leadership of the USSR by the need to strengthen the country's defense capability against a growing external threat;
• priority was given to the development of military enterprises and the militarization of the economy;
• attempts by the Soviet leadership led by I. Stalin to demonstrate to the whole world the advantages of socialism over capitalism;
• huge-scale transformations were carried out over a gigantic territory, and this raised with extraordinary urgency the question of the development of infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.), the condition of which largely did not meet the needs;
• the development of production of means of production significantly outstripped the production of consumer goods,
• during industrialization, an anti-religious campaign was carried out, churches were robbed for the needs of the Soviet economy;
• exploitation of people's labor enthusiasm was carried out; introduction of “socialist competition” to the masses.

First Five Year Plan

The initial project of Stalin's war-communist assault was the first five-year plan adopted by the PKP (b) in 1928. In the same year, the five-year plan began (1928/1929-1932/1933 pp.). its main task was to “catch up and overtake Western countries” in their economies. The development of heavy industry was recognized as the most important plan, which envisaged its growth by 330%.

In 1928-1929 pp. The volume of gross output of Ukrainian industry increased by 20%. At that time, the Soviet economy still felt the impulses of the NEP, which ensured high growth rates. The successes of the first year of the Five-Year Plan in the USSR against the backdrop of the deep economic crisis that gripped the capitalist world in 1929 created in the leadership of the USSR the illusion of the possibility of a sharp leap from economic backwardness to the ranks of industrialized states. Such a jerk required extreme exertion of strength.

The November plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1929 made the decision “to accelerate the development of mechanical engineering and other branches of large-scale industry at any cost.” Plans for 1930-1931 pp. a 45% increase in industry was envisaged, which meant “storming”. It was an adventure doomed to failure.

It was quite natural that the First Five-Year Plan was not fulfilled. Therefore, when its results were summed up, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (would) prohibited all departments from publishing statistical data on this matter.

In the second half of the 1920s, the most important task of economic development was the transformation of the country from an agricultural to an industrial one, ensuring its economic independence and strengthening its defense capability. An urgent need was the modernization of the economy, the main condition of which was the technical improvement of the entire national economy.

Industrialization is the process of accelerated development of industry, primarily heavy industry, the transformation of the country's economy from agricultural to industrial. In the USSR in the late 1920s and 1930s, industrialization was carried out at an accelerated pace due to excessive exploitation of the population.

Industrialization is a set of measures for the accelerated development of industry adopted by the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) during the second half of the 20s to the end of the 30s. Proclaimed as a party course by the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) (1925), carried out mainly by pumping funds from agriculture: first thanks to “price scissors” for industrial and agricultural products, and after proclaiming a course to speed up industrialization (1929 g.) - through surplus appropriation. A feature of Soviet industrialization was the priority development of heavy industry and the military-industrial complex. Particular attention was paid to the development of such industries as metallurgy, mechanical engineering, and energy. In total, 35 industrial giants were built in the USSR, a third of which were built in Ukraine. Among them are Zaporizhstal, Azovstal, Krammashstroy, Krivorizhbud, Dneprostroy, Dnipaluminbud, Kharkov Tractor, Kiev Machine Tool, etc.

Proclamation of a course towards industrialization

The industrial development of the USSR in the mid-1920s reached pre-war levels (1913), but the country lagged significantly behind leading Western countries: significantly less electricity, steel, cast iron, coal and oil were produced. The economy as a whole was at the pre-industrial stage of development. Therefore, the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b), held in December 1925, proclaimed a course towards industrialization.

Goals of industrialization in the USSR

The main goals of industrialization in the USSR were proclaimed:

ensuring economic independence and independence of the USSR;

elimination of the country's technical and economic backwardness, industrial modernization;

creation of a technical base for the modernization of agriculture;

development of new industries (mainly heavy);

strengthening the country's defense capability, creating a military-industrial complex;

stimulating the steady growth of labor productivity and, on this basis, increasing the material well-being and cultural level of workers.

Features of Soviet industrialization

The main features of Soviet industrialization:

the main sources of accumulation of funds for industrialization were: “pumping” funds from villages to cities; from light and food industry to heavy industry, an increase in direct and indirect taxes; domestic loans; issue of paper money not backed by gold; expansion of vodka sales; an increase in the export of oil, timber, furs and grain abroad;

the sources of industrialization were actually the unpaid labor of workers and especially peasants; exploitation of many millions of Gulag prisoners;

ultra-high rates of industrialization, which were explained by the leadership of the USSR by the need to strengthen the country's defense capability against a growing external threat;

priority was given to the development of military enterprises and the militarization of the economy;

attempts by the Soviet leadership led by I. Stalin to demonstrate to the whole world the advantages of socialism over capitalism;

huge-scale transformations were carried out over a gigantic territory, and this raised with extraordinary urgency the question of the development of infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.), the condition of which largely did not meet the needs;

the development of production of means of production significantly outstripped the production of consumer goods,

during industrialization, an anti-religious campaign was carried out, churches were robbed for the needs of the Soviet economy;

exploitation of people's labor enthusiasm was carried out; introduction of “socialist competition” to the masses.

First Five Year Plan

The initial project of Stalin's military-communist assault was the first five-year plan adopted by the PCP (b) in 1928. In the same year, the five-year plan began (1928/1929-1932/1933 pp.). its main task was to “catch up and overtake Western countries” in their economies. The development of heavy industry was considered the most important. The plan provided for its growth by 330%.

In 1928-1929 The volume of gross output of Ukrainian industry increased by 20%. At that time, the Soviet economy still felt the impulses of the NEP, which ensured high growth rates. The successes of the first year of the Five-Year Plan in the USSR against the backdrop of the deep economic crisis that gripped the capitalist world in 1929 created in the leadership of the USSR the illusion of the possibility of a sharp leap from economic backwardness to the ranks of industrialized states. Such a jerk required extreme exertion of strength.

The November plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1929 made the decision “to accelerate the development of mechanical engineering and other branches of large-scale industry at any cost.” Plans for 1930-1931 a 45% increase in industry was envisaged, which meant “storming”. It was an adventure doomed to failure.

It was quite natural that the First Five-Year Plan was not fulfilled. Therefore, when its results were summed up, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (would) prohibited all departments from publishing statistical data on this matter.

Despite the development of new products, industrialization was carried out mainly by extensive methods, since as a result of collectivization and a sharp decline in the standard of living of the rural population, human labor was greatly devalued. The desire to fulfill the plan led to an overexertion of forces and a permanent search for reasons to justify the failure to fulfill inflated tasks. Because of this, industrialization could not be fueled by enthusiasm alone and required a number of coercive measures. Beginning in 1930, the free movement of labor was prohibited, and criminal penalties were introduced for violations of labor discipline and negligence. Since 1931, workers began to be held liable for damage to equipment. In 1932, forced transfer of labor between enterprises became possible, and the death penalty was introduced for the theft of state property. On December 27, 1932, the internal passport was restored, which Lenin at one time condemned as “tsarist backwardness and despotism.” The seven-day week was replaced by a continuous working week, the days of which, without having names, were numbered from 1 to 5. Every sixth day there was a day off, established for work shifts, so that factories could work without interruption. Prisoner labor was actively used.
The response to the growing negative attitude towards industrialization and the policies of the leadership of the CPSU (b) on the part of part of society, and especially part of the communists, was political repression. Even at the July plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1928, Stalin put forward the thesis that “as we move forward, the resistance of the capitalist elements will increase, the class struggle will intensify.” In practice, this resulted in a campaign against sabotage. The "saboteurs" were blamed for failures to achieve plan targets. The first high-profile trial in the case of “saboteurs” was the Shakhty case, after which charges of sabotage could follow for the enterprise’s failure to fulfill the plan, which led to falsification of statistics.

The main social consequence of industrialization and collectivization was the formation of a massive multi-million core of industrial workers. The total number of workers grew from 8-9 million in 1928 to 23-24 million in 1940. On the other hand, employment in agriculture declined significantly: from 80% in 1928 to 54% in 1940. The freed-up population (15-20 million people) moved into industry.

The policy of forced industrialization plunged the country into a state of general, war-like mobilization and tension. The choice of a forced strategy implied a sharp weakening, if not complete elimination, of commodity-money mechanisms for regulating the economy and the absolute predominance of the administrative-economic system. This version of economic development contributed to the growth of totalitarian principles in the political system of Soviet society and sharply increased the need for the widespread use of administrative-command forms of political organization.

A topic such as the industrialization of the USSR in the 30s arouses keen interest not only among historians, but also among ordinary citizens. In recent years, all residents of most post-Soviet countries have witnessed a noticeable decline in the level of development of industry and their own production. The market is flooded with foreign goods, and this applies not only to complex devices and electronics, but even food and medicine.

Naturally, a logical question arises: how did the leaders in Soviet times manage to relatively quickly raise the country from a backward agricultural territory to a modern state at that time, having everything necessary for a normal life?

All this became possible due to the fact that accelerated industrialization was implemented - the construction in record time of thousands of factories and industrial facilities that provided the state with everything necessary and provided a constant replenishment of its own GDP.

Reasons for Industrialization

The era in question occurred in the 30s, when the country was just trying to recover from the revolution, the First World War, various shocks and internal cataclysms.

It was simply necessary for the following important reasons:

1. The entire civilized world began rapid development and technological leap forward. Germany, the USA, France and other developed powers began to develop rapidly, and if the USSR had not followed their example, this would have led to a significant lag. Then such a huge country would not be able to speak and compete on equal terms with its Western partners and opponents.
2. The situation of working people at that time was assessed more sadly than in pre-revolutionary times under the tsar. People earned very little, unemployment was enormous, and all this could lead to social unrest, riots and serious internal crises. It is clear that the authorities could not allow this to happen.
3. Another goal is to make the Union more competitive in the military sphere. A large area needs to be protected, and this requires science and technology, advanced technology and trained personnel. Otherwise, technically developed states could attack at any moment, and the consequences of this would be sad for the inhabitants of the USSR.

Summarizing what has been said, it should be noted that the super-industrialization of the 30s was caused by necessity and the challenges that faced the country and people.

The main goal of industrialization in the USSR

The country's leadership realistically assessed the state of the USSR and the main sectors of the national economy, and many problems were obvious to them, which were not slow in solving.

The main goals of industrialization were the following:

1. The country had to take a steady course towards scientific and technological development and a technological breakthrough. The main task is to eliminate the technical and economic lag of the Union in the main areas of activity.
2. Creation of a defense industry that provides the military with everything necessary to protect their borders from a potential enemy.
3. Development of heavy industry, metallurgy, construction of our own machines and mechanisms.
4. Gaining independence from other states in terms of the economy and providing everything necessary for people's lives.

These most important tasks were to ensure the country's exit from crisis, poverty and transition to a state of growth and prosperity.

How did socialist industrialization proceed?

Among historians there is no unambiguous attitude towards the peculiarities of industrialization. Many are of the opinion that this event was exclusively coercive, people were put in camps and forced to build factories for free, villagers were driven off the land and sent to work as laborers in factories. But in fact, this view of those events is very biased and does not correspond to reality.

The country needed development, and increasing its industrial potential was equally necessary for both leaders and ordinary people. Unemployment, low incomes, lack of prospects and development - what good could a backward agricultural country offer its inhabitants?

And huge construction projects on a union scale, thousands of factories, factories, scientific institutes solving specific applied problems gave the state a huge impetus and allowed it to become a world leader on an equal footing with the United States in record time.

The modernization of the country took place gradually, but at the same time very rapidly. The first five-year plan, implemented in 1928-1932, was completed ahead of schedule in 4 years, and during this time approximately 1,500 large-scale construction projects were launched, including DneproGES, Uralmash, GAZ, ZIS and much more. The excellent results of the first five-year plan encouraged the country and people to move forward at an equally rapid pace.

Since state propaganda worked no worse than workers in factories, people were invited to work from all media, the advantages of the ongoing industrialization were explained to them, and ambitious goals were proclaimed. It was a great success. In most cases, work went on in 3 shifts, many citizens worked selflessly and for the common cause. This also became a factor in the success of the whole business.

Features of industrialization in the USSR

The main features of the industrialization carried out in the USSR are the following:

1. The main emphasis was on heavy industry, the creation of factories, huge production complexes, which, when fully loaded, provided jobs for 50,000 people or even more.
2. Active measures were taken to educate the population in order to convey to them the meaning of what was happening. Thanks to this, many people approached the matter more consciously and competently.
3. All stages of industrialization were accompanied by the rapid formation of the domestic market and the development of the union economy.
4. In the process of the country's development, not only domestic but also foreign capital was actively used. Many large Western companies actively contributed to the leadership of the USSR, sold equipment to the country and sent trained engineers, scientists and other experienced personnel.

There were other features that can characterize this period. For example, cities experienced a shortage of products, since isolated rural farmers could not provide the country with enough bread and food. Therefore, almost forced collectivization and the formation of large collective farms were carried out.

Questions and answers section

• What are the sources of industrialization in the USSR?

The sources for industrialization were mainly only internal resources possessed by the state. These were incomes from light industry, profits from foreign trade in grain and agricultural products, timber, and precious metals. The resources available in the domestic market were also distributed in favor of the state.

• What was the state of the national economy on the eve of industrialization?

Most agricultural facilities were privately owned, and it was then that the state launched such a thing as collectivization. Small farmers could not meet the needs of the country and they had to be united into large groups to increase labor productivity and use expensive advanced machines and mechanisms. Since the majority of the villagers did not understand this, collectivization was perceived extremely difficult by the people.

• What did the pace of Soviet industrialization depend on?

The concept of “industrialization” meant mainly the active development of heavy industry and the creation of powerful industries. Here, all successes depended on the availability of money for work (usually there were no problems with this), the presence of well-trained personnel (often foreign) in critical areas of work, and the enthusiasm of the workers themselves and their management. Since even the first five-year plan was completed in 4 years, the country did not experience problems with all these aspects.

• What is characteristic of the Soviet model of industrialization?

The main features are the emphasis on heavy industry, metallurgy, energy, mechanical engineering, the chemical industry and the active development of science, the complete absence of external loans and credits, as well as the collectivization of agriculture.

• Can you name the pros and cons of industrialization?

In short, the advantages can be called: reduction of unemployment, transformation of the country from a technically backward one into an advanced economy in the world with a GDP second only to the United States, creation of a powerful military-industrial complex, production of everything necessary with our own efforts and capacities. The downsides are sometimes called the reduction in people's incomes, the liquidation of so-called medium-sized businesses and trade; many excesses have happened locally in relation to ordinary people.

Results of industrialization

There is more than one table on the Internet with similar results, but their meaning can be briefly conveyed as follows.

The main results of the industrialization of the USSR were:

1. The emergence of powerful production facilities of gigantic proportions.
2. The rapid development of the Union and its transition to leadership, after which the entire world community characterized the USSR as an impeccable leader.
3. Rapid GDP growth.
4. The population has become significantly more literate, received an incentive to study and improve education, and illiteracy has been eliminated.
5. There was a mechanization of agriculture and an increase in its efficiency.

It would take a very long time to list the results, since there were actually a lot of them. During those years, the country made a breakthrough unparalleled in history, as a result of which it became a world leader.

Industrialization of the USSR- the process of accelerated expansion of the industrial potential of the USSR to reduce the gap between the economy and developed capitalist countries, carried out in the 1930s. The official goal of industrialization was to transform the USSR from a predominantly agricultural country into a leading industrial power.

The beginning of socialist industrialization as an integral part of the “triple task of radical reconstruction of society” (industrialization, collectivization of agriculture and cultural revolution) was laid by the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy (-). At the same time, private commodity and capitalist forms of economy were eliminated, thus eliminating competition, which led to a decrease in the level of goods produced.

In Soviet times, industrialization was considered a great feat. The rapid growth of production capacity and production volumes of heavy industry (4 times) was of great importance for ensuring economic independence from capitalist countries and strengthening the country's defense capability. At this time, the USSR made a transition from an agricultural country to an industrial one. During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet industry proved its superiority over the industry of Nazi Germany. Since the late 1980s, there have been discussions in the Soviet Union and Russia about the cost of industrialization, which have also called into question its results and long-term consequences for the Soviet economy and society. However, no one denies the fact that the economies of all post-Soviet states to this day function at the expense of the industrial base that was created during the Soviet period.

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Subtitles

GOELRO

The plan provided for the accelerated development of the electric power industry, tied to territorial development plans. The GOELRO plan, designed for 10-15 years, provided for the construction of 30 regional power plants (20 thermal power plants and 10 hydroelectric power stations) with a total capacity of 1.75 million kW. The project covered eight main economic regions (Northern, Central Industrial, Southern, Volga, Ural, West Siberian, Caucasian and Turkestan). In parallel, the development of the country's transport system was carried out (reconstruction of old and construction of new railway lines, construction of the Volga-Don Canal).

The GOELRO project made industrialization possible in the USSR: electricity production in 1932 compared to 1913 increased almost 7 times, from 2 to 13.5 billion kWh [ ] .

Features of industrialization

One of the fundamental contradictions of Bolshevism was the fact that the party, which called itself the “workers” and its rule the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” came to power in an agrarian country where factory workers made up only a few percent of the population, and even then the majority of them were recent immigrants from the village who have not yet completely broken ties with it. Forced industrialization was designed to eliminate this contradiction.

From a foreign policy point of view, the country was in hostile conditions. According to the leadership of the CPSU(b), there was a high probability of a new war with capitalist states. It is significant that back at the X Congress of the RCP(b) in 1921, the author of the report “On the Soviet Republic in Surroundings,” L. B. Kamenev, stated that preparations for the Second World War had begun in Europe [ ] :

What we observe every day in Europe ... testifies that the war is not over, armies are moving, battle orders are given, garrisons are sent to one area or another, no borders can be considered firmly established. ... one can expect from hour to hour that the old completed imperialist massacre will give rise, as its natural continuation, to some new, even more monstrous, even more disastrous imperialist war.

Preparation for war required thorough rearmament. However, it was impossible to immediately begin such rearmament due to the backwardness of heavy industry. At the same time, the existing pace of industrialization seemed insufficient, since the gap with the capitalist countries, which experienced economic growth in the 1920s, increased.

One of the first such rearmament plans was outlined already in 1921, in the project for the reorganization of the Red Army, prepared for the X Congress by S. I. Gusev and M. V. Frunze. The project stated both the inevitability of a new big war and the unpreparedness of the Red Army for it. Gusev and Frunze proposed developing a powerful network of military schools in the country and organizing mass production of tanks, artillery, “armored cars, armored trains, airplanes” in a “shock” manner. A separate paragraph also proposed to carefully study the combat experience of the Civil War, including the units opposing the Red Army (officer units of the White Guards, Makhnovist carts, Wrangel’s “bomb-throwing airplanes,” etc. In addition, the authors also called for urgently organizing the publication in Russia of foreign “ Marxist" works on military issues.

After the end of the Civil War, Russia again faced the pre-revolutionary problem of agrarian overpopulation ( "Malthusian-Marxian trap"). During the reign of Nicholas II, overpopulation caused a gradual decrease in average land plots; the surplus of workers in the countryside was not absorbed either by the outflow to the cities (which amounted to about 300 thousand people per year with an average increase of up to 1 million people per year), or by emigration, or by Stolypin's government program for the resettlement of colonists beyond the Urals. In the 1920s, overpopulation took the form of unemployment in cities. It became a serious social problem that grew throughout the NEP, and by its end it amounted to more than 2 million people, or about 10% of the urban population. The government believed that one of the factors hindering the development of industry in the cities was the lack of food and the reluctance of the countryside to provide the cities with bread at low prices.

The party leadership intended to solve these problems through a planned redistribution of resources between agriculture and industry, in accordance with the concept of socialism, which was announced at the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) and the III All-Union Congress of Soviets in the city. In Stalin’s historiography, the XIV Congress was called the “Congress of Industrialization “However, he made only a general decision on the need to transform the USSR from an agricultural country to an industrial one, without defining the specific forms and rates of industrialization.

The choice of a specific implementation of central planning was vigorously discussed in 1926-1928. Supporters genetic approach (V. Bazarov, V. Groman, N. Kondratyev) believed that the plan should be drawn up on the basis of objective patterns of economic development, identified as a result of an analysis of existing trends. Followers teleological approach (G. Krzhizhanovsky, V. Kuibyshev, S. Strumilin) ​​believed that the plan should transform the economy and be based on future structural changes, production capabilities and strict discipline. Among the party functionaries, the first were supported by N. Bukharin, a supporter of the evolutionary path to socialism, and the latter by L. Trotsky, who insisted on an accelerated pace of industrialization.

One of the first ideologists of industrialization was the economist E. A. Preobrazhensky, close to Trotsky, who in 1924-1925 developed the concept of forced “super-industrialization” at the expense of funds from the countryside (“initial socialist accumulation”, according to Preobrazhensky). For his part, Bukharin accused Preobrazhensky and the “left opposition” that supported him of instilling “military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry” and “internal colonialism.”

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I. Stalin, initially stood on Bukharin’s point of view, but after Trotsky was expelled from the party’s Central Committee at the end of the year, he changed his position to the diametrically opposite one. This led to a decisive victory for the teleological school and a radical turn away from the NEP. Researcher V. Rogovin believes that the reason for Stalin’s “left turn” was the grain procurement crisis of 1927; The peasantry, especially the wealthy, massively refused to sell bread, considering the purchase prices set by the state to be too low.

The internal economic crisis of 1927 was intertwined with a sharp aggravation of the foreign policy situation. On February 23, 1927, the British Foreign Secretary sent a note to the USSR demanding that it stop supporting the Kuomintang-Communist government in China. After the refusal, Great Britain broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR on May 24-27. However, at the same time, the alliance between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists fell apart; On April 12, Chiang Kai-shek and his allies massacred the Shanghai communists ( see Shanghai Massacre of 1927). This incident was widely used by the “united opposition” (“Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc”) to criticize official Stalinist diplomacy as obviously a failure.

During the same period, there was a raid on the Soviet embassy in Beijing (April 6), and British police conducted a search in the Soviet-British joint stock company Arcos in London (May 12). In June 1927, representatives of the EMRO carried out a series of terrorist attacks against the USSR. In particular, on June 7, the White emigrant Kaverda killed the Soviet plenipotentiary in Warsaw Voikov, on the same day in Minsk the head of the Belarusian OGPU I. Opansky was killed, a day earlier the EMRO terrorist threw a bomb at the OGPU pass office in Moscow. All these incidents contributed to the creation of a climate of “military psychosis” and the emergence of expectations of a new foreign intervention (“crusade against Bolshevism”).

By January 1928, only 2/3 of the grain was harvested compared to the level of the previous year, as peasants withheld grain en masse, considering purchase prices to be too low. The disruptions that began in the supply of cities and the army were aggravated by the aggravation of the foreign policy situation, which even reached the point of carrying out a trial mobilization. In August 1927, panic began among the population, which resulted in widespread purchasing of food for future use. At the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (December 1927), Mikoyan admitted that the country had survived the difficulties of “the eve of war without having a war.”

First Five Year Plan

In order to create our own engineering base, a domestic system of higher technical education was urgently created. In 1930, universal primary education was introduced in the USSR, and compulsory seven-year education in cities.

To increase incentives to work, pay became more closely tied to productivity. Centers for the development and implementation of the principles of scientific organization of labor were actively developing. One of the largest centers of this kind (CIT) has created about 1,700 training points with 2 thousand highly qualified CIT instructors in different parts of the country. They operated in all leading sectors of the national economy - mechanical engineering, metallurgy, construction, light and forestry industries, railways and motor transport, agriculture and even the navy.

At the same time, the state moved to a centralized distribution of its means of production and consumer goods; command-administrative management methods were introduced and private property was nationalized. A political system emerged based on the leading role of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), state ownership of the means of production and a minimum of private initiative. The widespread use of forced labor of Gulag prisoners, special settlers and rear militia also began.

In 1933, at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin said in his report that according to the results of the first five-year plan, less consumer goods were produced than necessary, but the policy of relegating the tasks of industrialization to the background would lead to the fact that we do not have it would be the tractor and automobile industries, ferrous metallurgy, metal for the production of cars. The country would be without bread. Capitalist elements in the country would incredibly increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism. Our situation would be similar to that of China, which then did not have its own heavy and military industry, and became the object of aggression. We would not have non-aggression pacts with other countries, but military intervention and war. A dangerous and deadly war, a bloody and unequal war, because in this war we would be almost unarmed before enemies who have at their disposal all modern means of attack.

The First Five-Year Plan was associated with rapid urbanization. The urban labor force increased by 12.5 million people, of whom 8.5 million were migrants from rural areas. However, the USSR reached a share of 50% of the urban population only in the early 1960s.

Use of foreign specialists

Engineers were invited from abroad, many well-known companies, such as Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG And General Electric, were involved in the work and supplied modern equipment; a significant part of the models of equipment produced in those years at Soviet factories were copies or modifications of foreign analogues (for example, the Fordson tractor, assembled at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant).

A branch of Albert Kahn, Inc. was opened in Moscow. under the name "Gosproektstroy" (English) Russian. Its leader was Moritz Kahn, brother of the head of the company. It employed 25 leading American engineers and about 2.5 thousand Soviet employees. At that time it was the largest architectural bureau in the world. Over the three years of Gosproektstroy’s existence, more than 4 thousand Soviet architects, engineers and technicians studied through the American experience. The Central Bureau of Heavy Engineering (CBTM), a branch of the German company Demag, also operated in Moscow.

Albert Kahn's company played the role of coordinator between the Soviet customer and hundreds of Western companies that supplied equipment and advised on the construction of individual facilities. Thus, the technological project of the Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant was carried out by Ford, and the construction project was carried out by the American company Austin Motor Company. The construction of the 1st State Bearing Plant in Moscow (GPZ-1), which was designed by the Kana company, was carried out with technical assistance from the Italian company RIV.

results

At the end of 1932, the successful and early completion of the first five-year plan was announced in four years and three months. Summing up its results, Stalin said that heavy industry fulfilled the plan by 108%. During the period between October 1, 1928 and January 1, 1933, the production fixed assets of heavy industry increased by 2.7 times.

In his report at the XVII Congress of the CPSU(b) in January 1934, Stalin cited the following figures with the words: “This means that our country has become firmly and finally an industrial country.”

The first Five-Year Plan was followed by a Second Five-Year Plan, with somewhat less emphasis on industrialization, and then a Third Five-Year Plan, which was disrupted by the outbreak of World War II.

The result of the first five-year plans was the development of heavy industry, due to which GDP growth during 1928-40, according to V. A. Melyantsev, amounted to about 4.6% per year (according to other, earlier estimates, from 3% to 6 .3%). Industrial production in the period 1928-1937. increased by 2.5-3.5 times, that is, 10.5-16% per year. In particular, the production of machinery in the period 1928-1937. grew at an average of 27.4% per year.

With the beginning of industrialization, the consumption fund and, as a consequence, the standard of living of the population sharply decreased. By the end of 1929, the rationing system had been extended to almost all food products, but there was still a shortage of ration goods, and huge queues had to stand in order to purchase them. Subsequently, the standard of living began to improve. In 1936, ration cards were abolished, which was accompanied by an increase in wages in the industrial sector and an even greater increase in state ration prices for all goods. The average level of consumption per capita in 1938 was 22% higher than in 1928. However, the greatest increase was among the party and labor elite and did not affect the vast majority of the rural population, or more than half of the country's population.

The end date of industrialization is defined differently by different historians. From the point of view of the conceptual desire to raise heavy industry in record time, the most pronounced period was the first five-year plan. Most often, the end of industrialization is understood as the last pre-war year (1940), or less often the year before Stalin's death (1952). If we understand industrialization as a process whose goal is the share of industry in GDP, characteristic of industrialized countries, then the USSR economy reached such a state only in the 1960s. The social aspect of industrialization should also be taken into account, since only in the early 1960s. the urban population exceeded the rural one.

Professor N.D. Kolesov believes that without the implementation of the industrialization policy, the political and economic independence of the country would not have been ensured. The sources of funds for industrialization and its pace were predetermined by economic backwardness and the too short period of time allotted for its elimination. According to Kolesov, the Soviet Union managed to eliminate backwardness in just 13 years.

Criticism

During the Soviet era, communists argued that industrialization was based on a rational and feasible plan. Meanwhile, it was assumed that the first five-year plan would come into effect at the end of 1928, but even by the time of its announcement in April-May 1929, work on its preparation had not been completed. The original form of the plan included goals for 50 industrial and agricultural sectors, as well as the relationship between resources and capabilities. Over time, the main role began to be played by achieving predetermined indicators. If the growth rate of industrial production initially set in the plan was 18-20%, then by the end of the year they were doubled. Western and Russian researchers claim that despite reporting the success of the first five-year plan, the statistics were falsified and none of the goals were even close to being achieved. Moreover, there was a sharp decline in agriculture and in industrial sectors dependent on agriculture. Part of the party nomenklatura was extremely indignant at this; for example, S. Syrtsov described reports about achievements as “fraud.”

Despite the development of new products, industrialization was carried out predominantly by extensive methods: economic growth was ensured by an increase in the rate of gross accumulation in fixed capital, the rate of savings (due to a fall in consumption rates), the level of employment and the exploitation of natural resources. British scientist Don Filzer believes that this was due to the fact that as a result of collectivization and a sharp decline in the standard of living of the rural population, human labor became greatly devalued. V. Rogovin notes that the desire to fulfill the plan led to an environment of overexertion of forces and a permanent search for reasons to justify the failure to fulfill inflated tasks. Because of this, industrialization could not be fueled by enthusiasm alone and required a number of coercive measures. Beginning in October 1930, the free movement of labor was prohibited, and criminal penalties were introduced for violations of labor discipline and negligence. Since 1931, workers began to be held liable for damage to equipment. In 1932, the forced transfer of labor between enterprises became possible, and the death penalty was introduced for the theft of state property. On December 27, 1932, the internal passport was restored, which Lenin at one time condemned as “tsarist backwardness and despotism.” The seven-day week was replaced by a continuous working week, the days of which, without having names, were numbered from 1 to 5. Every sixth day there was a day off, established for work shifts, so that factories could work without interruption. Prisoner labor was actively used (see GULAG). In fact, during the years of the first Five-Year Plan, the communists laid the foundations for forced labor for the Soviet population. All this has become the subject of sharp criticism in democratic countries, not only from liberals, but also from Social Democrats.

Workers' dissatisfaction from time to time resulted in strikes: at the Stalin plant, the plant named after. Voroshilov, Shostensky plant in Ukraine, at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant near Nizhny Novgorod, at the Serp and Molot plant of Mashinotrest in Moscow, Chelyabinsk Tractor Construction and other enterprises.

Industrialization was largely carried out at the expense of agriculture (collectivization). First of all, agriculture became a source of primary accumulation, due to low purchase prices for grain and subsequent exports at higher prices, as well as due to the so-called. “super tax in the form of overpayments on manufactured goods”. Subsequently, the peasantry also provided the labor force for the growth of heavy industry. The short-term result of this policy was a temporary decline in agricultural production. The consequence of this was the deterioration of the economic situation of the peasantry, the Famine in the USSR (1932-1933). Additional expenses were required to compensate for the village's losses. In 1932-1936, collective farms received about 500 thousand tractors from the state, not only to mechanize land cultivation, but also to compensate for the damage from the reduction in the number of horses by 51% (77 million) in 1929-1933. The mechanization of labor in agriculture and the consolidation of scattered land plots ensured a significant increase in labor productivity.

Trotsky and foreign critics argued that, despite efforts to increase labor productivity, in practice average labor productivity was falling. This is also stated in a number of modern foreign publications, according to which for the period 1929-1932. value added per hour of work in industry fell by 60% and returned to 1929 levels only in 1952. This is explained by the emergence of a chronic commodity shortage in the economy, collectivization, mass famine, a massive influx of untrained labor from the countryside and the increase in enterprises of their labor resources. At the same time, the specific GNP per worker increased by 30% during the first 10 years of industrialization.

As for the records of the Stakhanovites, a number of historians note that their methods were a continuous method of increasing productivity, previously popularized by F. Taylor and G. Ford, which Lenin called the “sweatshop system.” In addition, the records were largely staged and were the result of the efforts of their assistants, and in practice they turned out to be a pursuit of quantity at the expense of product quality. Due to the fact that wages were proportional to productivity, the salaries of Stakhanovites became several times higher than the average wages in the industry. This caused a hostile attitude towards the Stakhanovites on the part of the “backward” workers, who reproached them for the fact that their records lead to higher standards and lower prices. Newspapers talked about “unprecedented and blatant sabotage” of the Stakhanov movement on the part of craftsmen, shop managers, and trade union organizations.

The expulsion of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev from the party at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) gave rise to a wave of repression in the party, which spread to the technical intelligentsia and foreign technical specialists. At the July plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1928, Stalin put forward the thesis that “as we move forward, the resistance of capitalist elements will increase, the class struggle will intensify.” That same year, a campaign against sabotage began. The "saboteurs" were blamed for failures to achieve plan targets. The first high-profile trial in the case of “saboteurs” was the Shakhty case, after which accusations of sabotage could follow for the enterprise’s failure to fulfill the plan.

One of the main goals of accelerated industrialization was to overcome the gap with developed capitalist countries. Some critics argue that this lag itself was primarily a consequence of the October Revolution. They point out that in 1913 Russia ranked fifth in world industrial production and was the world leader in industrial growth with an annual rate of 6.1% for the period 1888-1913. However, by 1920, the level of production had fallen nine times compared to 1916.

Soviet propaganda claimed that economic growth was unprecedented. On the other hand, a number of modern studies prove that the GDP growth rate in the USSR (mentioned above 3 - 6.3%) was comparable to similar indicators in Germany in 1930-38. (4.4%) and Japan (6.3%), although they significantly exceeded the indicators of countries such as England, France and the USA, which were experiencing the “Great Depression” during that period.

The USSR of that period was characterized by authoritarianism and central planning in the economy. At first glance, this gives weight to the widespread opinion that the USSR owed its high rate of increase in industrial output precisely to the authoritarian regime and the planned economy. However, a number of economists believe that the growth of the Soviet economy was achieved only due to its extensive nature. Counterfactual historical studies, or so-called “virtual scenarios,” have suggested that industrialization and rapid economic growth would also have been possible if the NEP had remained in place.

It should be noted that during the years of industrialization in the USSR there was an average population growth of 1% per year, while in England 0.36%, in the USA 0.6%, France 0.11%.

Industrialization and the Great Patriotic War

One of the main goals of industrialization was to build up the military potential of the USSR. So, if as of January 1, 1932, the Red Army had 1,446 tanks and 213 armored vehicles, then on January 1, 1934 there were 7,574 tanks and 326 armored vehicles - more than in the armies of Great Britain, France and Nazi Germany combined.

The relationship between industrialization and the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War is a matter of debate. During Soviet times, the accepted view was that industrialization and pre-war rearmament played a decisive role in victory. However, the superiority of Soviet technology over German technology on the western border of the country on the eve of the war could not stop the enemy.

According to historian K. Nikitenko, the built command-administrative system negated the economic contribution of industrialization to the country's defense capability. V. Lelchuk also draws attention to the fact that by the beginning of the winter of 1941, the territory on which 42% of the population of the USSR lived before the war, 63% of coal was mined, 68% of cast iron was smelted, etc.: “Victory had to be forged not with the help of the powerful potential that was created during the years of accelerated industrialization.” The invaders had at their disposal the material and technical base of such giants built during the years of industrialization as the Novokramatorsk and Makeevka metallurgical plants, the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant, etc.

But supporters of the Soviet point of view object that industrialization most affected the Urals and Siberia, while the occupied territories were predominantly dominated by pre-revolutionary industry. They also indicate that the prepared evacuation of industrial equipment to the Urals, Volga region, Siberia and Central Asia played a significant role. During the first three months of the war alone, 1,360 large (mostly military) enterprises were relocated

Introduction.

1. The state of Russia after the revolution, the civil war.

2. Reasons for industrialization, Stalin and his role in industrialization.

3. The essence of industrialization of the five-year state plans, economic programs.

4. Results of industrialization in the USSR.

List of used literature.

Introduction

The task of implementing industrialization, that is, creating a developed industry, Soviet Russia inherited from pre-revolutionary Russia. The first steps in this direction were made in the second half of the 19th century. Industry grew at a high rate at the beginning of the 20th century. The First World War and the Civil War, the devastation of the times of “war communism” threw the country’s economy far back. With the end of the restoration period (1925), the need arose again to complete the process that had begun long ago and was tragically interrupted. At the end of 1925, a course was taken towards industrialization, which included measures to ensure the economic independence of the USSR, priority development of heavy and defense industries, and bridging the gap with Western countries. Difficult questions arose about how to achieve these goals.

By 1927, two main approaches had emerged. The first approach, substantiated by prominent economists: capital for financing industrialization will provide the development of private entrepreneurship, attracting foreign loans, and expanding trade turnover; the pace of industrialization should be high, but at the same time focus on real opportunities, and not on political needs; industrialization should not lead to a sharp drop in the living standards of the population, the peasantry first of all. The second approach, originally formulated by the leaders of the left opposition: it is not possible to finance industrialization from external resources; it is necessary to find funds within the country, pumping them into heavy industry from light industry and agriculture; it is necessary to accelerate industrial growth, to carry out industrialization rapidly in 5-10 years; it is criminal to think about the cost of industrialization; the peasantry is an “internal colony” that will pay for all the difficulties.

1. The state of Russia after the revolution, civil war

The revolutionary events of 1917, the Civil War and capitalist intervention against the young Soviet Republic caused enormous damage to the industrial and economic potential of the country. Industrial production for the period 1918-1921. decreased fourfold. In general, the work of industry was characterized by a sharp decline in the most important quantitative characteristics of development.

During three years of war and internal turmoil, about 4 thousand bridges were destroyed. Events of 1918-1921 caused incomparably more damage to the country than the First World War. The four-year hard times of war plunged the country into a state of chaos and complete stagnation, into a state that can only be defined as a systemic economic catastrophe.

The situation the country found itself in posed a real threat. The potential danger emanating from capitalist states was not a myth, the fruit of the sick imagination of the authorities. Finding themselves face to face with a hostile capitalist environment, the leadership of the Soviet Republic turns its gaze to the only real support - the Red Army. The concept of the relationship between power and the main military force was succinctly and clearly formulated by V.I. Lenin at the XI Party Congress: “We really must be on our guard, and in favor of the Red Army we must make certain heavy sacrifices... Before us is the whole world of the bourgeoisie, which is only looking for forms to strangle us.” Subsequently, the thesis of capitalist danger became the most important justification for many major domestic and foreign policy actions undertaken by the leadership of the Soviet Union.

V.I. Lenin paid great attention to the development of the domestic economy. Already during the Civil War, the Soviet government began developing a long-term plan for the electrification of the country. In December 1920, the GOELRO plan was approved by the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and a year later it was approved by the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The plan provided for the accelerated development of the electric power industry, tied to territorial development plans. The GOELRO plan, designed for 10-15 years, provided for the construction of 30 regional power plants (20 thermal power plants and 10 hydroelectric power stations) with a total capacity of 1.75 million kW. The project covered eight main economic regions (Northern, Central Industrial, Southern, Volga, Ural, West Siberian, Caucasian and Turkestan). At the same time, the development of the country's transport system was carried out (reconstruction of old and construction of new railway lines, construction of the Volga-Don Canal).

The GOELRO project laid the foundation for industrialization in Russia. Electricity production in 1932 compared to 1913 increased almost 7 times, from 2 to 13.5 billion kWh.

Until 1928, the USSR pursued a relatively liberal “New Economic Policy” (NEP). While agriculture, retail trade, services, food and light industry were largely in private hands, the state retained control over heavy industry, transport, banks, wholesale and international trade. State enterprises competed with each other, the role of the USSR State Planning Committee was limited to forecasts that determined the directions and size of public investment.

From a foreign policy point of view, the country was in hostile conditions. According to the leadership of the CPSU(b), there was a high probability of a new war with capitalist states, which required thorough rearmament. However, it was impossible to immediately begin such rearmament due to the backwardness of heavy industry. At the same time, the existing pace of industrialization seemed insufficient, since the gap with Western countries, which experienced economic growth in the 1920s, increased. A serious social problem was the growth of unemployment in cities, which by the end of the NEP amounted to more than 2 million people, or about 10% of the urban population. The government believed that one of the factors hindering the development of industry in the cities was the lack of food and the reluctance of the countryside to provide the cities with bread at low prices.

The party leadership intended to solve these problems through a planned redistribution of resources between agriculture and industrialization, in accordance with the concept of socialism, as stated at the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) and the III All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1925. The choice of a specific implementation of central planning was vigorously discussed in 1926-1928 Proponents of the genetic approach (V. Bazarov, V. Groman, N. Kondratyev) believed that the plan should be drawn up on the basis of objective patterns of economic development identified as a result of an analysis of existing trends. Adherents of the teleological approach (G. Krzhizhanovsky, V. Kuibyshev, S. Strumilin) ​​believed that the plan should transform the economy and be based on future structural changes, production capabilities and strict discipline. Among the party functionaries, the first were supported by N. Bukharin, a supporter of the evolutionary path to socialism, and the latter by L. Trotsky, who insisted on immediate industrialization. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I. Stalin, initially supported Bukharin’s point of view, but after Trotsky was expelled from the party’s Central Committee at the end of 1927, he changed his position to the diametrically opposite one. This led to a decisive victory for the teleological school and a radical turn away from the NEP.

2. Reasons for industrialization, Stalin and his role in industrialization

The decision on industrialization was made in 1925 at the XIV Party Congress. Its task is to make the USSR an industrially independent country and allow it to confront the Western capitalist powers on equal terms. Collectivization provided funds for the development of industry (primarily heavy industry), which simplified the confiscation of grain from the peasants. Many of them fled to the cities and were ready to work for meager wages. The free labor of prisoners was actively used. Masterpieces of art were sold abroad (mainly in the USA) for pennies. There was almost no Western investment due to the USSR's refusal to pay tsarist debts.

Stalin's industrialization was a process of accelerated expansion of the industrial potential of the USSR to reduce the gap between the economy and developed capitalist countries, carried out in the 1930s. The official goal of industrialization was to transform the USSR from a predominantly agricultural country into a leading industrial power. Although the main industrial potential of the country was created later, during the seven-year plans, industrialization usually refers to the first five-year plans.

The beginning of socialist industrialization as an integral part of the “triple task of a radical reconstruction of society” (industrialization, collectivization of agriculture and cultural revolution) was laid by the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy (1928-1932). At the same time, private commodity and capitalist forms of economy were eliminated.

During the pre-war five-year plans in the USSR, a rapid increase in production capacity and production volumes of heavy industry was ensured, which later allowed the USSR to win the Great Patriotic War. The increase in industrial power in the 1930s was considered within the framework of Soviet ideology one of the most important achievements of the USSR. Since the late 1980s, however, the question of the actual extent and historical significance of industrialization has been the subject of debate concerning the true goals of industrialization, the choice of means for its implementation, the relationship of industrialization with collectivization and mass repression, as well as its results and long-term consequences for the Soviet economy and society.

3. The essence of industrialization of the five-year state plans, economic programs

In 1929-1932 The first five-year plan took place, and the second was held in 1933-1937. Old enterprises were reconstructed and hundreds of new ones were built. The most important construction projects are the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (Magnitka), the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station (DneproGes), the White Sea-Baltic Canal (Belomorkanal), the Chelyabinsk, Stalingrad, Kharkov Tractor Plants, the Turkestan-Siberian Railway (TurkSib), etc. The plans were inflated, the deadlines were excessively compressed. , enterprises were put into operation unfinished, which later led to long-term stagnation. Product quality was low.

The enthusiasm of the masses, inspired by the ideas of socialist construction, played a major role. In 1935, the Stakhanov movement began (its founder was miner A. G. Stakhanov) for exceeding plans. The government, demanding that everyone follow the Stakhanovites, doubled production standards. Product quality has decreased.

Nevertheless, during the first five-year plans, a powerful industry was created that made it possible to withstand a future war. However, this was often done contrary to the recommendations of economists; haste led to overexertion of forces. The standard of living has fallen compared to the NEP era.

The main task of the introduced planned economy was to build up the economic and military power of the state at the highest possible pace; at the initial stage, this came down to the redistribution of the maximum possible amount of resources for the needs of industrialization. In December 1927, at the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, “Directives for drawing up the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR” were adopted, in which the congress spoke out against over-industrialization: growth rates should not be maximum, and they should be planned so that failures. Developed on the basis of directives, the draft of the first five-year plan (October 1, 1928 - October 1, 1933) was approved at the XVI Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (April 1929) as a set of carefully thought-out and realistic tasks. This plan, in reality much more intense than previous projects, immediately after its approval by the V Congress of Soviets of the USSR in May 1929, gave grounds for the state to carry out a number of measures of an economic, political, organizational and ideological nature, which elevated industrialization to the status of a concept, the era of the “great turning point”. The country had to expand the construction of new industries, increase production of all types of products and begin producing new equipment.

First of all, using propaganda, the party leadership ensured the mobilization of the population in support of industrialization. The Komsomol members in particular received it with enthusiasm. There was no shortage of cheap labor, since after collectivization, a large number of yesterday’s rural residents moved from rural areas to cities due to poverty, hunger and the arbitrariness of the authorities. Millions of people selflessly, almost by hand, built hundreds of factories, power plants, laid railways and subways. Often I had to work three shifts. In 1930, construction began on about 1,500 facilities, of which 50 absorbed almost half of all capital investments. A number of gigantic industrial structures were erected: DneproGES, metallurgical plants in Magnitogorsk, Lipetsk and Chelyabinsk, Novokuznetsk, Norilsk and Uralmash, tractor factories in Volgograd, Chelyabinsk, Kharkov, Uralvagonzavod, GAZ, ZIS (modern ZIL), etc. In 1935 the first stage of the Moscow metro with a total length of 11.2 km opened. Engineers were invited from abroad, many well-known companies, such as Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG and General Electric, were involved in the work and supplied modern equipment, a significant part of the models of equipment produced in those years in Soviet factories, were copies or modifications of Western analogues (for example, the Fordson tractor assembled in Volgograd). In order to create our own engineering base, a domestic system of higher technical education was urgently created. In 1930, universal primary education was introduced in the USSR, and compulsory seven-year education in cities. Attention was also paid to the industrialization of agriculture. Thanks to the emergence of the domestic tractor industry, in 1932 the USSR refused to import tractors from abroad, and in 1934 the Kirov Plant in Leningrad began producing the Universal row crop tractor, which became the first domestic tractor exported abroad. During the ten pre-war years, about 700 thousand tractors were produced, which amounted to 40% of their world production.

In 1930, speaking at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Stalin admitted that an industrial breakthrough is possible only by building “socialism in one country” and demanded a multiple increase in the five-year plan targets, arguing that the plan could be exceeded for a number of indicators.

To increase incentives to work, pay became more closely tied to productivity. First of all, the drummers at the factories were simply better fed. (In the period 1929-1935, the urban population was provided with ration cards for essential food products). In 1935, the “Stakhanovite movement” appeared, in honor of the mine miner A. Stakhanov, who, according to official information of that time, on the night of August 30-31, 1935, completed 14.5 norms per shift.

Since capital investment in heavy industry almost immediately exceeded the previously planned amount and continued to grow, money emission (that is, the printing of paper money) was sharply increased, and during the entire first Five-Year Plan the growth of the money supply in circulation was more than twice as fast as the growth in the production of consumer goods, which led to rising prices and shortages of consumer goods.

To obtain foreign currency necessary to finance industrialization, methods such as the sale of paintings from the Hermitage collection were used.

At the same time, the state moved to a centralized distribution of its means of production and consumer goods; command-administrative management methods were introduced and private property was nationalized. A political system emerged based on the leading role of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), state ownership of the means of production and a minimum of private initiative.

The first five-year plan was associated with rapid urbanization. The urban labor force increased by 12.5 million, of whom 8.5 million were rural migrants. However, the USSR reached a share of 50% of the urban population only in the early 1960s.

At the end of 1932, the successful and early completion of the first five-year plan was announced in four years and three months. Summing up its results, Stalin said that heavy industry fulfilled the plan by 108%. During the period between October 1, 1928 and January 1, 1933, the production fixed assets of heavy industry increased by 2.7 times. The first Five-Year Plan was followed by a Second, with somewhat less emphasis on industrialization, and then a Third Five-Year Plan, which took place during the outbreak of World War II.

4. Results of industrialization in the USSR

The result of the first five-year plans was the development of heavy industry, due to which GDP growth during 1928-40. amounted to 4.6% per year. Industrial production in the period 1928-1937. increased by 2.5-3.5 times, that is, 10.5-16% per year. In particular, the production of machinery in the period 1928-1937. grew at an average of 27.4% per year.

According to Soviet theorists, the socialist economy was significantly superior to the capitalist one

By 1940, about 9,000 new factories had been built. By the end of the second five-year plan, the USSR took second place in the world in terms of industrial output, second only to the USA (if we consider the British metropolis, dominions and colonies as one state, the USSR will be in third place in the world after the USA and Britain). Imports fell sharply, which was seen as the country gaining economic independence. Open unemployment was eliminated. For the period 1928-1937. Universities and technical schools have trained about 2 million specialists. Many new technologies were mastered. Thus, during the first five-year plan alone, the production of synthetic rubber, motorcycles, wristwatches, cameras, excavators, high-quality cement and high-quality steel was established. The foundation was also laid for Soviet science, which over time took leading positions in the world in certain areas. On the created industrial base, it became possible to carry out large-scale rearmament of the army; During the first five-year plan, defense spending increased to 10.8% of the budget.

During the Soviet era, communists argued that industrialization was based on a rational and feasible plan. Meanwhile, it was assumed that the first five-year plan would come into effect at the end of 1928, but even by the time of its announcement in April-May 1929, work on its preparation had not been completed. The original form of the plan included goals for 50 industrial and agricultural sectors, as well as the relationship between resources and capabilities. Over time, the main role began to be played by achieving predetermined indicators. If the growth rate of industrial production initially set in the plan was 18-20%, then by the end of the year they were doubled. Despite reporting the success of the first five-year plan, in fact, the statistics were falsified, and none of the goals were even close to being achieved. Moreover, there was a sharp decline in agriculture and in industrial sectors dependent on agriculture. Part of the party nomenklatura was extremely indignant at this; for example, S. Syrtsov described reports about achievements as “fraud.”

On the contrary, according to critics of industrialization, it was poorly thought out, which was manifested in a series of declared “turning points” (April-May 1929, January-February 1930, June 1931). A grandiose and thoroughly politicized system arose, the characteristic features of which were economic “gigantomania”, chronic commodity hunger, organizational problems, wastefulness and unprofitability of enterprises. The goal (i.e., the plan) began to determine the means for its implementation. Over time, neglect of material support and infrastructure development began to cause significant economic damage. Some of the industrialization efforts turned out to be poorly thought out from the start. An example is the White Sea-Baltic Canal, built in 1933 with the labor of more than 200,000 prisoners, which turned out to be practically useless.

Despite the development of new products, industrialization was carried out mainly by extensive methods, since as a result of collectivization and a sharp decline in the standard of living of the rural population, human labor was greatly devalued. The desire to fulfill the plan led to an overexertion of forces and a permanent search for reasons to justify the failure to fulfill inflated tasks. Because of this, industrialization could not be fueled by enthusiasm alone and required a number of coercive measures. Beginning in 1930, the free movement of labor was prohibited, and criminal penalties were introduced for violations of labor discipline and negligence. Since 1931, workers began to be held liable for damage to equipment. In 1932, forced transfer of labor between enterprises became possible, and the death penalty was introduced for the theft of state property. On December 27, 1932, the internal passport was restored, which Lenin at one time condemned as “tsarist backwardness and despotism.” The seven-day week was replaced by a continuous working week, the days of which, without having names, were numbered from 1 to 5. Every sixth day there was a day off, established for work shifts, so that factories could work without interruption. Prisoner labor was actively used. All this has become the subject of sharp criticism in democratic countries, not only from liberals, but primarily from Social Democrats.

Per capita consumption rose by 22% between 1928 and 1938, although this increase was greatest among the group of party and labor elites (who fused with each other) and did not affect the vast majority of the rural population, or more than half of the country's population.

The end date of industrialization is defined differently by different historians. From the point of view of the conceptual desire to raise heavy industry in record time, the most pronounced period was the first five-year plan. Most often, the end of industrialization is understood as the last pre-war year (1940), or less often the year before Stalin's death (1952). If we understand industrialization as a process whose goal is the share of industry in GDP, characteristic of industrialized countries, then the USSR economy reached such a state only in the 1960s. The social aspect of industrialization should also be taken into account, since only in the early 1960s. the urban population exceeded the rural one.

conclusions

Industrialization was largely carried out at the expense of agriculture (collectivization). First of all, agriculture became a source of primary accumulation, due to low purchase prices for grain and re-export at higher prices, as well as due to the so-called. “super tax in the form of overpayments on manufactured goods.” Subsequently, the peasantry also provided the labor force for the growth of heavy industry. The short-term result of this policy was a decline in agricultural production: for example, livestock production decreased almost by half and returned to the 1928 level only in 1938. The consequence of this was a deterioration in the economic situation of the peasantry. The long-term consequence was the degradation of agriculture. As a result of collectivization, famine and purges between 1926 and 1939. The country lost, according to various estimates, from 7 to 13 million and even up to 20 million people, and these estimates include only direct demographic losses.

Some critics also argue that, despite the declared increase in labor productivity, in practice average labor productivity in 1932 fell by 8% compared to 1928. These estimates, however, do not tell the full story: the decline was driven by the influx of millions of untrained workers living in poor conditions. By 1940, average labor productivity had increased by 69% since 1928. In addition, productivity varied widely across industries.

List of used literature

1. Verkhoturov D. Stalin’s economic revolution. - M.: Olma-Press, 2006.

2. Industrialization of the USSR 1926-1941. Documents and materials. / Ed. M. P. Kim. - M.: Nauka, 1970.

3. History of Russia. Theories of learning. Under. ed. B.V. Lichman. Russia in the late 1920s-1930s.

4. History of Russia: Textbook for technical universities / A. A. Chernobaev, E. I. Gorelov, M. N. Zuev and others; Ed. M. N. Zuev, Ed. A. A. Chernobaev. - 2nd ed. reworked and additional.. - M.: Higher School, 2006. - 613 p.

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