The name of the Soviet operation near Stalingrad. Battle of Stalingrad: causes, course and consequences

5. Losses of other participants in the war and the ratio of irretrievable losses

2. Oath of the Komsomol members and Komsomol members of the Stalingrad region who joined the ranks of the defenders of Stalingrad November 1942 German barbarians destroyed Stalingrad, the city of our youth, our happiness. They turned the schools and institutes where we studied, factories and

Civilian losses and general losses of the population of the USSR There are no reliable statistics regarding the losses of the Soviet civilian population in 1941–1945. They can only be determined by estimation, first establishing the total irrecoverable losses

Losses of the parties Here is what the historian Shvedov writes about losses: “The starting point for assessing the losses of Russian troops in the battle, of course, is the loss list compiled at the headquarters of M. I. Kutuzov by September 13–14. To check the data of this loss list, it is important to assess the forces

Chapter 6. Losses of the parties According to official data, the losses of the Volkhov, Leningrad fronts and the Ladoga military flotilla were: Killed: 40,085 people; Wounded: 73,589 people; Total: 113,674 people. The headquarters of the Volkhov Front presented the following figures in their reporting documents

While some may consider D-Day to be the point at which World War II turned the tide in favor of the Allies, in reality the Nazis ran out of steam and began to retreat during the Battle of Stalingrad, which took place more than a year and a half earlier. Without a doubt, the Battle of Stalingrad was the most brutal battle of World War II and the fiercest battle in military history. The result of this battle buried Hitler's dream of a world empire and marked the beginning of the end for the Nazis. Without this battle, the Allied landings in Europe might not have happened at all. Now let's take a closer look at some of the events of this battle.

1. Losses


To fully understand the true scale, cruelty and importance of the Battle of Stalingrad, we must start at the end - with the losses. This was the bloodiest battle of the entire war, which lasted almost seven months, from mid-July 1942 to February 2, 1943, and in which not only Red Army soldiers and Nazis took part, but also Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, as well as some Russian conscripts. In this battle, more than 840 thousand Axis soldiers died, disappeared or were captured, while the Soviet Union lost more than 1.1 million people. During the battle, over 40 thousand Soviet civilians were also killed. Stalin himself strictly prohibited evacuation from Stalingrad, believing that Soviet soldiers would fight better knowing that they also had to protect the city's inhabitants.

By comparison, during the Allied landings in Europe and the subsequent invasion of Normandy, about 425 thousand soldiers died or disappeared on both sides. At the same time, in Stalingrad, of the approximately 91 thousand Germans who survived until February 2 and surrendered that day, only about 6,000 returned home at all. Others were dying of starvation and exhaustion in Soviet labor camps even ten years after the end of World War II. The Axis forces—about 250 thousand people—trapped in Stalingrad found themselves in the most terrible conditions. With meager supplies and no suitable clothing for the harsh Russian winter, many died of starvation or extreme cold. On both sides, many soldiers were forced to engage in cannibalism to survive. The average life of a recruit in Stalingrad was one day, while a captain could live there for three days. Of course, the Battle of Stalingrad is the bloodiest battle in human history, claiming more lives than many other wars combined.

2. Reason for pride


Today the city is known as Volgograd, but until 1961 it was called Stalingrad in honor of the Soviet leader. So, as you can understand, the city was of great importance to both Hitler and Stalin. Of course, the Germans sought to capture the city not only because of its name, but it had its role here. The main goal of the Battle of Stalingrad was to protect the northern flank of the German army, which was sent south into the Caucasus Mountains towards Baku and other oil-rich areas. Oil was Germany's Achilles heel, so to speak, since more than 75% of the oil came from Romania, whose reserves were already running low by 1941. In this regard, in order to continue the war, the Nazis needed to capture some oil areas. The Nazis called this search for oil “Operation Blau.” It was part of the even larger Operation Barbarossa, the goal of which was the conquest of the Soviet Union.

Encouraged by the initial victories and the rapid movement of the Axis forces through the territory of modern Ukraine and southern Russia, Hitler decided to split his southern armies. While his northern armies were mainly focused on the siege of Leningrad (present-day St. Petersburg) and the capture of Moscow, the southern group of troops was tasked with capturing Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Modern Belarus and Ukraine were important industrial areas for the Soviet Union, and if it also lost oil fields, it would most likely capitulate. Since the Red Army had suffered heavy losses in previous battles, Hitler thought that Stalingrad would be an easy target. By and large, Stalingrad did not have much strategic importance, but Hitler wanted to take the city because of its name. In turn, Stalin, for the same reason, wanted to hold the city at any cost. As a result, Stalin emerged victorious from this battle, which became the first major victory and turning point in World War II. And because this victory took place in a city named after him, it was an important propaganda tool for Stalin for the rest of the war and the rest of his life.

3. Not a step back!


Signed by Joseph Stalin himself on July 28, 1942, Order No. 227 is better known as the “Not a Step Back!” Order. In the context of the catastrophic situation that arose during the Great Patriotic War, Stalin issued this decree to put an end to the mass desertion and unauthorized and chaotic retreats that had taken place up to that point. The West of the USSR, which included modern Ukraine and Belarus, was the most industrialized part of the country, as well as the so-called breadbasket of the Soviet state. Most of its civilian population lived in these areas, therefore, even despite the vast territory of the USSR, permanent retreat was not a solution. This order meant that no military commander should give any orders for retreat, regardless of the situation, in the absence of corresponding orders from higher command. Violators of this order were subject to trial by a military tribunal.

On each front, including Stalingrad, there should have been penal battalions. These battalions consisted of approximately 800 mid-level commanders with disciplinary problems, as well as ordinary soldiers who were under their command. The latter also included deserters, so-called cowards, or other troublemakers. These battalions were placed in the front ranks and were always sent into the most dangerous battles. In addition, there were also detachments. Each army had to have several such detachments, each with 200 soldiers. Their task was to stand in the rear guard and turn around or kill deserters or those who tried to retreat without appropriate orders. According to rough estimates, 13,500 “traitors to the Motherland” were killed in Stalingrad alone.

4. Tank T-34


Up until 1942, the Soviet Union lagged behind the Germans, as well as their Western allies, in terms of armored vehicles. However, development of the T-34 tank began back in 1939. By June 1941, there were only 1,200 T-34 tanks on the Eastern Front. However, by the end of the war their numbers had grown to more than 84,000 units. The previous model of the Soviet tank, the T-26, could not compete with the German Panzer III tanks. It moved slower, had weak armor and much less firepower. In 1941 alone, the Nazis destroyed more than 20,000 Russian T-26 tanks. But with the advent of the T-34 tank, the situation changed, and the Panzer III tanks were at a disadvantage.

The T-34 tank was not perfect by many standards, but it was nonetheless a weapon to be reckoned with. It was equipped with a V12 engine, which allowed it to reach speeds of up to 48 kilometers per hour, and could also operate in sub-zero temperatures. It also had a 76.2 mm main gun and two machine guns. The T-34 tank had wider tracks than its predecessors and competitors, making it more maneuverable in seas of mud in the fall and spring and during heavy snowfalls in winter. But the most notable thing about the T-34 was its sloped armor, which gave the tank the protection it needed without increasing its overall weight. As the Germans soon learned, most of their shells simply bounced off his armor. The T-34 tank was the main reason for the development of the German Panther tank. In fact, the T-34 tank could be destroyed by throwing a grenade at it at close range or damaging its engine. This could also be done with heavy anti-aircraft artillery.

However, the most important advantage of the T-34 tank was the simplicity and low cost of its mass production. As you might expect, it was awkward and had a lot of imperfections. Many T-34 tanks were sent into battle directly from the factory assembly line. There was one such plant in Stalingrad itself. However, it was designed to be operated by a relatively inexperienced crew. This was precisely the main difference between the T-34 tank and its German counterparts. The first army of T-34 tanks was deployed in the counteroffensive that preceded the Battle of Stalingrad, on the banks of the Don.

As a result of this counter-offensive, the German army suffered heavy losses, and the attack on Stalingrad was delayed by almost three weeks. It also reduced the Nazis' resources and seriously damaged their morale. The Germans did not expect a Soviet counter-offensive at this stage of the war, let alone the appearance of new tanks.

5. Rat War


The attack on Stalingrad began with heavy aerial bombardment, turning the city into piles of charred ruins. An estimated 40,000 soldiers and civilians were killed in the first week of the air attack. Soviet soldiers stubbornly refused to retreat to the eastern side of the Volga, knowing full well what this would mean for both their war effort and their lives. Civilians, including women and children, dug trenches sometimes ten meters from the Germans. With constant shelling and aerial bombardment, the Battle of Stalingrad soon turned into the “rat war,” as the Germans called it.

The battle for Stalingrad quickly turned into a fierce guerrilla war, in which countless soldiers on both sides died for every inch of urban territory. Before moving forward, it was necessary to clear every street, every basement, room, corridor or attic from enemy troops. There were cases when in multi-storey buildings the floors were occupied by Germans or Russians in turn. They shot at each other through holes in the floor. Nowhere was safe. Fierce fighting took place in the streets, in trenches, in sewers, in blown-up buildings and even on overhead industrial pipelines. The Germans' initial advantage in armor and air power diminished in this "rat war", which put the Russians in a more advantageous position.

6. Pavlov's House


Pavlov's house became a symbol representing the Russians' resistance to constant German attacks during the Battle of Stalingrad. It was a four-story apartment building overlooking the “9 January Square.” The house was of great strategic importance for the Russians, as it occupied a very advantageous position, giving its defenders a large 800-meter line of sight to the west, north and south. The house was named after junior sergeant Yakov Pavlov, who became a platoon commander of the 13th Guards Rifle Division after the death of all senior sergeants. Pavlov's platoon received reinforcements a few days after he began his duties, and its strength grew to 25 men. The platoon also received machine guns, anti-tank rifles and mortars.

Pavlov ordered his men to surround the building with four rows of barbed wire and mines and stationed a man with a machine gun in each window facing the square. Some mortars and anti-tank rifles were placed on the roof of the building. This turned out to be a great advantage, since German tanks trying to drive up to the building were shot down from above with guns. The tanks could not raise their guns to shoot at the roof. However, the Germans stormed the building day and night, trying to capture it once and for all. At the same time, the Russians breached the walls in the basement and connected it to a trench system that carried supplies from the other side of the river. However, water and food supplies were limited.

Under the command of Yakov Pavlov, the platoon resisted German attacks for almost two months, from September 27 to November 25, 1942. The commander of the Soviet forces in Stalingrad, General Vasily Chuikov, jokingly said that the Germans lost more soldiers and tanks in the attacks on Pavlov's house than in the capture of Paris.

7. Height 102


Closer to the center of Stalingrad is Mamayev Kurgan, which is a 102-meter-high hill, from which there is a good view of the surrounding city and suburbs, as well as the opposite, eastern, bank of the Volga. And, naturally, fierce battles were fought for him during the Battle of Stalingrad. The first attack on this hill (or Hill 102) took place on September 13, 1942. Before the German advance, the Russians surrounded the hill with trenches lined with barbed wire and mines. However, a day later both the hill and the railway station underneath were captured. More than 10,000 Soviet soldiers died in this battle. And just two days later, the Russians recaptured the hill. In fact, Mamayev Kurgan changed hands 14 times during the Battle of Stalingrad.

By the end of the fighting, the once steep hillsides had been leveled by almost continuous shelling. Throughout the winter there was almost never snow on the hill due to the many explosions. Even in spring, the hill remained black, since grass did not grow on the scorched earth. According to available data, from 500 to 1,250 metal fragments were found on every square meter of the hall. Even today people find shards of metal and human bones on the hillsides. Mamayev Kurgan is also the burial place of more than 35,000 civilians who died in the city, and more than 15,000 soldiers who defended this position. Vasily Chuikov is also buried there. He became the first marshal of the Soviet Union not buried in Moscow. In 1967, a colossal monument 87 meters high, known as “The Motherland Calls,” was also erected on the hill. (For comparison, the Statue of Liberty is only 46 meters tall.)

8. Grain elevator

The southern outskirts of the city mainly consisted of wooden houses. After German air raids dropped thousands of incendiary bombs, these houses were left in piles of rubble with charred beams and brick chimneys. But among the wooden houses there was a large, concrete grain elevator. The walls of this building were very thick and practically invulnerable to artillery fire. By September 17, the entire area was under German control - with the exception of the elevator and the 52 Soviet soldiers holed up in it. For three days, the Germans carried out at least 10 unsuccessful attacks per day.

During the day, the defenders of the elevator fired at the enemy from the roof with machine guns and anti-tank rifles. At night they fought at the base of the tower, repelling attacks from German soldiers who tried to get inside. On the second day, a German tank with a white flag drove up to the elevator. A German officer came out and, through an interpreter, demanded that the Russians surrender. Otherwise, he threatened to wipe them off the face of the earth along with the elevator. The Russians refused to surrender and knocked out a retreating tank with several anti-tank shells.

9. Extraordinary Soviet heroes


Vasily Zaitsev is one of the most notable heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad (if you have seen the film Enemy at the Gates, this name should be familiar to you, since he is its main character). Being a simple rural boy from the Urals, Zaitsev spent his childhood hunting deer and wolves with his grandfather in the mountains. After the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, Zaitsev volunteered for the front and eventually ended up in Stalingrad. He became the most famous among the snipers who participated in the battle for this city. He took a scope from an anti-tank rifle, mounted it on his Mosin rifle and killed enemy soldiers while hiding behind walls. During the Battle of Stalingrad he killed 225 Germans. He even organized a kind of sniper school, in which he trained 28 snipers.
The 1077th Air Defense Regiment did something similar. When the Germans launched an attack on Stalingrad from the north, the Russians were severely short of troops to repel it. And then the soldiers of this regiment lowered their guns as much as possible and began to shoot at the advancing Germans and held them off in this way for two days. Ultimately, all 37 guns were destroyed, their positions were overrun by the Germans, and the regiment suffered heavy losses. But it was only after the Germans finally overcame the resistance of the 1077th Air Defense Regiment that they learned that it was made up of girls who had barely finished school.

10. Operation Uranus


Operation Uranus was launched in mid-November 1942 and was aimed at encircling the German 6th Army in Stalingrad. The Soviet forces involved in this operation, numbering about a million soldiers, had to attack from two directions instead of fighting the Germans directly in the city. Soviet troops were supposed to attack the flanks of the German army, which were defended by the Romanians, Hungarians and Italians. They were short of ammunition and men, and the front line was too stretched. The Axis forces did not believe that the Russians were capable of such a powerful offensive and were taken by surprise. Ten days after the offensive began, two formations of Soviet troops met at Kalach, a city located about 100 kilometers west of Stalingrad, and the 6th Army was completely cut off. The German High Command urged Hitler to allow the army at Stalingrad to retreat and establish contact with supply lines, but Hitler would not hear of it.

With the onset of winter, supplies to the cut-off German army could only be carried out by air. This supply was far from sufficient. At the same time, the Volga froze, and the Russians could easily supply their troops. In December, Hitler ordered the start of Operation Winter Storm, which was an attempt to rescue the encircled army. Special military units were supposed to approach from the west and break through to Stalingrad. However, Hitler prohibited the forces in Stalingrad from attacking from the east, and the operation failed. By January, the Germans were surrounded by six Soviet armies, and a month later the remnants of the German army surrendered.

200 days and nights: Vladimir Putin bowed to the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad

Vesti.ru: “Thank you and low bow for Stalingrad and the great victory,” said Russian President Vladimir Putin.

More than two million dead on both sides, one and a half million Red Army soldiers. Everything is approximately, victims continue to be found to this day. In the Volgograd museum "Russia - My History" the president is shown photographs of Soviet soldiers found by search engines in the summer...

Large-scale celebrations took place in Volgograd in honor of the 75th anniversary of the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad. The heroic battle on the banks of the Volga continued for 200 days and nights, turning the tide of World War II. Thousands of people came to Mamayev Kurgan to venerate the fallen heroes. President Vladimir Putin laid flowers at the Eternal Flame.

Under the dazzling sun, soldiers of the honor guard climb the steps of Mamayev Kurgan. 75 years ago, the most terrible battle in human history ended here. In the hall of military glory, Vladimir Putin kneels and straightens the ribbons of the wreath, a long minute of silence...
On the days of the heaviest battles the enemy's superiority in men was fivefold, A in tanks - twelvefold. There was no time to sleep, eat or bandage wounds. And there is nowhere to retreat...

On this holy day for every Volgograd resident, veterans receive congratulations and gratitude from the president.

“Our country stood up to the enemy as an indestructible stronghold. Unyielding Stalingrad stood up. Soviet soldiers seemed to have grown into the wounded land and turned every street, trench, house, and firing point into an impregnable fortress. With the same valor, its inhabitants fought for the city. This is a single resistance, readiness for self-sacrifice, spiritual power were truly invincible, incomprehensible, incomprehensible and terrible for the enemy. The fate of the Motherland, the whole world was decided then in Stalingrad. And here it manifested itself to the fullest extent the unbending character of our people. He fought for his home, for the lives of his children and, having defended Stalingrad, saved the fatherland", said Russian President Vladimir Putin...

In the fall of 1942, walls burst in Stalingrad, iron warped, and the soldiers continued to fight.

“The entire generation of winners accomplished not only a feat of arms. They passed on to us a great legacy - love for the motherland, readiness to defend its interests and independence, to be persistent in the face of any trials, to care for the native country and work for its prosperity. These simple and understandable truths are the essence our life. And we have no right to leave things unfinished, to show cowardice and indecisiveness. We must to equal in our actions the achievements of our fathers and grandfathers. Just like them, it is worthy to go towards our goals, to achieve more than we have already achieved and achieved. We were certainly proud and will continue to be proud of what was done for us. And, relying on this foundation, we will move forward, only forward. Let's be strong and honest. We will lead new generations pass on to them the great traditions of our great people. Thank you and low bow for Stalingrad and the great victory,” said Russian President Vladimir Putin.

More than two million dead on both sides, one and a half million Red Army soldiers. Everything is approximately, victims continue to be found to this day. In the Volgograd museum "Russia - My History" the president is shown photographs of Soviet soldiers found by search engines in the summer. By pressing a button, together with activists of the Victory Volunteers movement, the president launches virtual reality, in which the events of the Battle of Stalingrad are recreated.

“We should not just admire what was done before us (many thanks to our ancestors for this, without this nothing would have happened). But if we want to be on their level, we must achieve our results, our victories and strive for them “We will overcome the difficulties that face us at all costs,” Vladimir Putin expressed confidence.

The losses of the Soviet troops were great - 480 thousand people died at Stalingrad, more than 500 thousand were injured.

* * * * *
"The words A.M. Borodin, Deputy Director of the Defense Museum, during the construction of the monument on Mamayev Kurgan Vuchetich wanted to immortalize the names of all the dead, but stopped when he was given lists of 2 million people, and that was not all! The official figures for army losses in the Battle of Stalingrad, which lasted 200 days, are 1,347 thousand, of which 675 thousand are irrevocable. According to data from the book of memoirs of participants in the battles “Turning Point”: about 625 thousand died in defense, and about 486 thousand in the offensive operation and the total losses of the Red Army with reference to Academician Samsonov 1.5 million. It is believed that out of more than 400 thousand civilians, 180-200 thousand died, and most likely much more. Only refugees and evacuees in Stalingrad were estimated at up to 500 thousand, but they were not rewritten, and all the archives were lost. According to official data, about 300 thousand were evacuated (obviously without taking into account deaths during the crossing), the evacuation began only after August 23, not counting the previously evacuated children from orphanages and families of the regional and city leadership. 50 thousand people liable for military service were sent to form units on the left bank somewhere in August, several thousand more townspeople joined the units of Rodimtsev (13th Infantry Division) and Sarajevo (10th NKVD Division). 18 trains with 23 thousand workers of the tractor plant and their families were sent to the Urals in October. The Germans evicted about 200 thousand (from another source - 40 thousand) - some were sent to Germany to work, some to camps in Belaya Kalitva - at the end of September the German commandant ordered the residents to leave the city.
They say that in the sixties Borodin asked Chuyanov, the party leader and former head of the defense committee: “Why didn’t you save the people?” He even waved his hands at him: “What are you talking about, you couldn’t even mention evacuation.” And he told how Stalin called and demanded that all measures be taken to prevent evacuation. “Evacuation is panic,” said Stalin. It was forbidden to even talk about evacuation until August 23..." http://www.proza.ru/2018/01/09/646

According to official data, Soviet troops in the Stalingrad direction in the period from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943 lost 1,347,214 people, of which 674,990 were irrevocable. This does not include the troops of the NKVD and the people's militia, whose irretrievable losses were especially great. During the 200 days and nights of the Battle of Stalingrad, 1,027 battalion commanders, 207 regiment commanders, 96 brigade commanders, 18 division commanders died. The irretrievable losses of weapons and equipment amounted to: 524,800 small arms, 15,052 guns and mortars, 4,341 tanks and 5,654 combat aircraft...

In our opinion, to estimate the number of unique notices outside the Russian Federation, it is more correct to use data on the share of the population of the RSFSR in the population of the USSR as of January 1, 1941. It was 56.2 percent, and minus the population of Crimea, transferred to Ukraine in 1954, and with the addition of the population of the Karelo-Finnish SSR, included in 1956 as part of the RSFSR, it was 55.8 percent. Then the total number of unique notifications can be estimated at 26.96 million, and taking into account notifications from the border and internal troops - at 27.24 million, and excluding those who remained in exile - 26.99 million people.

This figure practically coincides with our estimate losses of the Soviet armed forces in killed and killed at 26.9 million people.

As Russian historian Nikita P. Sokolov notes, “according to the testimony of Colonel Fedor Setin, who worked in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense in the mid-1960s, the first group estimated the irretrievable losses of the Red Army at 30 million people, but these figures “were not accepted at the top.” N.P. Sokolov also notes that G.F. Krivosheev and his comrades do not take into account “the mobilization carried out directly by units of the active army on the territory of the regions occupied by the Germans after their liberation, the so-called unorganized marching replenishment. Krivosheev indirectly admits this when he writes that “during the war years, the following were taken from the population: in Russia... 22.2 percent of able-bodied citizens..., in Belarus - 11.7 percent, in Ukraine - 12.2 percent.” Of course, in Belarus and Ukraine no less “able-bodied population” was conscripted than in Russia as a whole, only here a smaller part was conscripted through military registration and enlistment offices, and a larger part was conscripted directly to the unit.”

The fact that the volume of Soviet irretrievable losses was enormous is evidenced by those few surviving veterans who personally had the opportunity to go into attacks. Thus, Guard Captain A.I. Shumilin, the former commander of a rifle company, recalled: “More than one hundred thousand soldiers and thousands of junior officers passed through the division. Of these thousands, only a few survived.” And he recalls one of the battles of his 119th Infantry Division on the Kalinin Front during the counteroffensive near Moscow: “On the night of December 11, 1941, we went out near Maryino and lay down at the starting point in front of the village in the snow. We were told that after two shots from the forty-five, we should get up and go to the village. It's already dawn. No shots were fired. I asked on the phone what was going on and was told to wait. The German rolled out anti-aircraft batteries for direct fire and began shooting soldiers lying in the snow. Everyone who ran was torn to pieces at the same moment. The snowy field was covered with bloody corpses, pieces of meat, blood and splashes of intestines. Of the 800 people, only two managed to get out by evening. I wonder if there is a list of personnel for December 11, 41? After all, no one from the headquarters saw this massacre. With the first anti-aircraft shot, all these participants fled in all directions. They didn’t even know that they were firing at the soldiers from anti-aircraft guns.”

The Red Army's losses of 26.9 million dead are approximately 10.3 times higher than the Wehrmacht's losses on the Eastern Front (2.6 million dead). The Hungarian army, which fought on the side of Hitler, lost about 160 thousand killed and died, including about 55 thousand who died in captivity. The losses of another German ally, Finland, in the fight against the USSR amounted to about 56.6 thousand killed and died, and about 1 thousand more people died in battles against the Wehrmacht. The Romanian army lost about 165 thousand killed and died in battles against the Red Army, including 71,585 killed, 309,533 missing, 243,622 wounded and 54,612 died in captivity. 217,385 Romanians and Moldovans returned from captivity. Thus, of the missing people, 37,536 people must be classified as killed. If we assume that approximately 10 percent of the wounded died, then the total losses of the Romanian army in battles with the Red Army will be about 188.1 thousand dead..." https://military.wikireading.ru/33471

Anniversary statistical collection “The Great Patriotic War” Federal State Statistics Service, Moscow 2015, dedicated to the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_2015/vov_svod_1.pdf

A year ago, in February 2017, another foray about losses in the Great Patriotic War took place, either authorized or just to check how the population would react to the terrible gigantic losses. Already on the part of the co-chairs of the “Immortal Regiment”, after two months of discussion, the topic died down again. And on May 9, the old figure of 27 million losses was again announced.

"co-chairman of the movement "Immortal Regiment of Russia" presented the report "Documentary basis of the People's Project "Establishing the fate of missing defenders of the Fatherland", within the framework of which research was carried out on the decline in the population of the USSR in 1941-45. He changed the idea of ​​​​the scale of losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War war.

According to declassified data from the Russian Ministry of Defense, the losses of the Soviet Union in World War II amount to 41 million 979 thousand, and not 27 million, as previously thought. This is almost one third of the modern population of the Russian Federation. Our fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers are hidden behind this terrible figure. Those who gave their lives for our future. And, perhaps, the biggest betrayal is to forget their names, their feat, their heroism, which formed our common great Victory.

— General population decline in the USSR 1941-45. - more than 52 million 812 thousand people. Of these, irretrievable losses as a result of war factors are more than 19 million military personnel and about 23 million civilians. The total natural mortality of military personnel and civilians during this period could have amounted to more than 10 million 833 thousand people (including 5 million 760 thousand deaths of children under the age of four). The irretrievable losses of the population of the USSR as a result of war factors amounted to almost 42 million people... The information provided is confirmed by a huge number of original documents, authoritative publications and testimonies."

The Battle of Stalingrad surpassed all battles in world history at that time in terms of the duration and ferocity of the fighting, the number of people and military equipment involved.

At certain stages, over 2 million people, up to 2 thousand tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft, and up to 26 thousand guns took part in it on both sides. The Nazi troops lost more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers killed, wounded, and captured, as well as a large amount of military equipment, weapons and equipment.

Defense of Stalingrad (now Volgograd)

In accordance with the plan for the summer offensive campaign of 1942, the German command, concentrating large forces in the southwestern direction, expected to defeat Soviet troops, enter the Great Bend of the Don, immediately capture Stalingrad and capture the Caucasus, and then resume the offensive in the Moscow direction.

For the attack on Stalingrad, the 6th Army was allocated from Army Group B (commander - Colonel General F. von Paulus). By July 17, it included 13 divisions, which included about 270 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars and about 500 tanks. They were supported by aviation from the 4th Air Fleet - up to 1,200 combat aircraft.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command moved the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies from its reserve to the Stalingrad direction. On July 12, on the basis of the field command of the troops of the Southwestern Front, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko. On July 23, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov was appointed commander of the front. The front also included the 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th combined arms and 8th air armies of the former Southwestern Front, and from July 30 - the 51st Army of the North Caucasus Front. At the same time, the 57th, as well as the 38th and 28th armies, on the basis of which the 1st and 4th tank armies were formed, were in reserve. The Volga military flotilla was subordinate to the front commander.

The newly created front began to carry out the task with only 12 divisions, in which there were 160 thousand soldiers and commanders, 2.2 thousand guns and mortars and about 400 tanks; the 8th Air Army had 454 aircraft.

In addition, 150-200 long-range bombers and 60 air defense fighters were involved. In the initial period of defensive operations near Stalingrad, the enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops in personnel by 1.7 times, in artillery and tanks by 1.3 times, and in the number of aircraft by more than 2 times.

On July 14, 1942, Stalingrad was declared under martial law. On the approaches to the city, four defensive contours were built: external, middle, internal and urban. The entire population, including children, was mobilized to build defensive structures. The factories of Stalingrad completely switched to the production of military products. Militia units and workers' self-defense units were created in factories and enterprises. Civilians, equipment of individual enterprises and material assets were evacuated to the left bank of the Volga.

Defensive battles began on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. The main efforts of the troops of the Stalingrad Front were concentrated in the large bend of the Don, where the 62nd and 64th armies occupied the defense in order to prevent the enemy from crossing the river and breaking through by the shortest route to Stalingrad. From July 17, the forward detachments of these armies fought defensive battles for 6 days at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers. This allowed us to gain time to strengthen the defense on the main line. Despite the steadfastness, courage and tenacity shown by the troops, the armies of the Stalingrad Front were unable to defeat the invading enemy groups, and they had to retreat to the near approaches to the city.

On July 23-29, the 6th German Army attempted to encircle the flanks of the Soviet troops in the large bend of the Don, reach the Kalach area and break through to Stalingrad from the west. As a result of the stubborn defense of the 62nd and 64th armies and a counterattack by formations of the 1st and 4th tank armies, the enemy's plan was thwarted.

Defense of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

On July 31, the German command turned the 4th Panzer Army Colonel General G. Goth from the Caucasian to the Stalingrad direction. On August 2, its advanced units reached Kotelnikovsky, creating the threat of a breakthrough to the city. Fighting began on the southwestern approaches to Stalingrad.

To facilitate the control of troops stretched over a 500 km zone, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on August 7 formed a new one from several armies of the Stalingrad Front - the South-Eastern Front, the command of which was entrusted to Colonel General A. I. Eremenko. The main efforts of the Stalingrad Front were directed towards the fight against the 6th German Army, which was attacking Stalingrad from the west and north-west, and the South-Eastern Front - towards the defense of the south-western direction. On August 9-10, troops of the South-Eastern Front launched a counterattack on the 4th Tank Army and forced it to stop.

On August 21, the infantry of the German 6th Army crossed the Don and built bridges, after which the tank divisions moved to Stalingrad. At the same time, Hoth's tanks began attacking from the south and southwest. 23 August 4th Air Army von Richthofen subjected the city to a massive bombardment, dropping more than 1,000 tons of bombs on the city.

Tank formations of the 6th Army moved towards the city, meeting almost no resistance, but in the Gumrak area they had to overcome the positions of anti-aircraft gun crews that had been deployed to fight the tanks until the evening. Nevertheless, on August 23, the 14th Tank Corps of the 6th Army managed to break through to the Volga north of Stalingrad near the village of Latoshinka. The enemy wanted to immediately break into the city through its northern outskirts, but along with army units, militia units, Stalingrad police, the 10th division of the NKVD troops, sailors of the Volga military flotilla, and cadets of military schools stood up to defend the city.

The enemy's breakthrough to the Volga further complicated and worsened the position of the units defending the city. The Soviet command took measures to destroy the enemy group that had broken through to the Volga. Until September 10, the troops of the Stalingrad Front and the Headquarters reserves transferred to it launched continuous counterattacks from the north-west on the left flank of the 6th German Army. It was not possible to push the enemy back from the Volga, but the enemy offensive on the northwestern approaches to Stalingrad was suspended. The 62nd Army found itself cut off from the rest of the troops of the Stalingrad Front and was transferred to the South-Eastern Front.

From September 12, the defense of Stalingrad was entrusted to the 62nd Army, whose command was taken by General V.I. Chuikov, and troops of the 64th Army General M.S. Shumilov. On the same day, German troops, after another bombing, began an attack on the city from all directions. In the north, the main target was Mamayev Kurgan, from the height of which the crossing of the Volga was clearly visible; in the center, German infantry was making its way to the railway station; in the south, Hoth’s tanks, with the support of infantry, were gradually moving towards the elevator.

On September 13, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 13th Guards Rifle Division to the city. Having crossed the Volga for two nights, the guards pushed back German troops from the area of ​​the central crossing across the Volga and cleared many streets and neighborhoods of them. On September 16, troops of the 62nd Army, supported by aviation, stormed Mamaev Kurgan. Fierce battles for the southern and central parts of the city continued until the end of the month.

On September 21, at the front from Mamayev Kurgan to the Zatsaritsyn part of the city, the Germans launched a new offensive with five divisions. A day later, on September 22, the 62nd Army was cut into two parts: the Germans reached the central crossing north of the Tsaritsa River. From here they had the opportunity to view almost the entire rear of the army and conduct an offensive along the coast, cutting off Soviet units from the river.

By September 26, the Germans managed to come close to the Volga in almost all areas. Nevertheless, Soviet troops continued to hold a narrow strip of the coast, and in some places even individual buildings at some distance from the embankment. Many objects changed hands many times.

The fighting in the city became protracted. Paulus’s troops lacked the strength to finally throw the city’s defenders into the Volga, and the Soviet troops lacked the strength to drive the Germans out of their positions.

The fight was fought for each building, and sometimes for part of the building, floor or basement. Snipers were actively working. The use of aviation and artillery became almost impossible due to the proximity of enemy formations.

From September 27 to October 4, active hostilities were carried out on the northern outskirts for the villages of the Red October and Barricades factories, and from October 4 - for these factories themselves.

At the same time, the Germans launched an attack in the center on Mamayev Kurgan and on the extreme right flank of the 62nd Army in the Orlovka area. By the evening of September 27, Mamayev Kurgan fell. An extremely difficult situation developed in the area of ​​the mouth of the Tsaritsa River, from where Soviet units, experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition and food and having lost control, began to cross to the left bank of the Volga. The 62nd Army responded with counterattacks from newly arriving reserves.

They were rapidly melting, however, the losses of the 6th Army were taking on catastrophic proportions.

It included almost all the armies of the Stalingrad Front, except the 62nd. The commander was appointed General K.K. Rokossovsky. From the South-Eastern Front, whose troops fought in the city and to the south, the Stalingrad Front was formed under the command of General A.I. Eremenko. Each front reported directly to Headquarters.

Commander of the Don Front Konstantin Rokossovsky and General Pavel Batov (right) in a trench near Stalingrad. Reproduction of a photograph. Photo: RIA Novosti

By the end of the first ten days of October, enemy attacks began to weaken, but in the middle of the month Paulus launched a new assault. On October 14, German troops, after powerful air and artillery preparation, went on the attack again.

Several divisions were advancing on an area of ​​about 5 km. This enemy offensive, which lasted almost three weeks, led to the most fierce battle in the city.

On October 15, the Germans managed to capture the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and break through to the Volga, cutting the 62nd Army in half. After this, they began an offensive along the Volga bank to the south. On October 17, the 138th Division arrived in the army to support Chuikov’s weakened formations. Fresh forces repulsed enemy attacks, and from October 18, Paulus's ram began to noticeably lose its power.

To ease the situation of the 62nd Army, on October 19, troops of the Don Front went on the offensive from the area north of the city. The territorial success of the flank counterattacks was insignificant, but they delayed the regrouping undertaken by Paulus.

By the end of October, the offensive actions of the 6th Army had slowed down, although in the area between the Barrikady and Red October factories there was no more than 400 m to go to the Volga. Nevertheless, the tension of the fighting eased, and the Germans mostly consolidated the captured positions.

On November 11, the last attempt was made to capture the city. This time the offensive was carried out by five infantry and two tank divisions, reinforced by fresh sapper battalions. The Germans managed to capture another section of the coast 500-600 m long in the area of ​​the Barricades plant, but this was the last success of the 6th Army.

In other areas, Chuikov’s troops held their positions.

The advance of German troops in the Stalingrad direction was finally stopped.

By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the Barricades plant and the northeastern quarters of the city center. The 64th Army defended the approaches.

During the period of defensive battles for Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet data, lost up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded, more than 1,000 tanks, over 2,000 guns and mortars, and more than 1,400 aircraft in July - November. The total losses of the Red Army in the Stalingrad defensive operation amounted to 643,842 people, 1,426 tanks, 12,137 guns and mortars, and 2,063 aircraft.

Soviet troops exhausted and bled the enemy group operating near Stalingrad, which created favorable conditions for launching a counteroffensive.

Stalingrad offensive operation

By the fall of 1942, the technical re-equipment of the Red Army was basically completed. At factories located deep in the rear and evacuated, mass production of new military equipment was established, which was not only not inferior, but often superior to the equipment and weapons of the Wehrmacht. During the past battles, Soviet troops gained combat experience. The moment came when it was necessary to wrest the initiative from the enemy and begin their mass expulsion from the borders of the Soviet Union.

With the participation of the military councils of the fronts at Headquarters, a plan for the Stalingrad offensive operation was developed.

Soviet troops had to launch a decisive counter-offensive on a front of 400 km, encircle and destroy the enemy strike force concentrated in the Stalingrad area. This task was entrusted to the troops of three fronts - Southwestern ( Commander General N.F. Vatutin), Donskoy ( Commander General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad ( Commander General A. I. Eremenko).

The forces of the parties were approximately equal, although the Soviet troops already had a slight superiority over the enemy in tanks, artillery and aviation. In such conditions, for the successful completion of the operation, it was necessary to create a significant superiority in forces in the directions of the main attacks, which was achieved with great skill. Success was ensured primarily due to the fact that special attention was paid to operational camouflage. The troops moved to the given positions only at night, while the radio points of the units remained in the same places, continuing to work, so that the enemy would have the impression that the units remained in the same positions. All correspondence was prohibited, and orders were given only orally, and only to the immediate executors.

The Soviet command concentrated more than a million people on the main attack in a 60 km sector, supported by 900 T-34 tanks fresh from the production line. Such a concentration of military equipment at the front has never happened before.

One of the centers of battles in Stalingrad was the elevator. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

The German command did not show due attention to the position of its Army Group B, because... expected an offensive by Soviet troops against Army Group Center.

Commander of Group B, General Weichs did not agree with this opinion. He was concerned about the bridgehead prepared by the enemy on the right bank of the Don opposite his formations. At his urgent request, by the end of October, several newly formed Luftwaffe field units were transferred to the Don to strengthen the defensive positions of the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian formations.

Weichs' predictions were confirmed in early November when aerial photographs showed several new crossings in the area. Two days later, Hitler ordered the 6th Panzer and two infantry divisions to be transferred from the English Channel to Army Group B as reserve reinforcements for the 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies. It took about five weeks to prepare them and transport them to Russia. Hitler, however, did not expect any significant action from the enemy until early December, so, according to his calculations, reinforcements should have arrived on time.

By the second week of November, with the appearance of Soviet tank units on the bridgehead, Weichs no longer doubted that a major offensive was being prepared in the zone of the 3rd Romanian Army, which, possibly, would be directed against the German 4th Panzer Army. Since all his reserves were at Stalingrad, Weichs decided to form a new group within the 48th Panzer Corps, which he placed behind the Romanian 3rd Army. He also transferred the 3rd Romanian Armored Division to this corps and was going to transfer the 29th Motorized Division of the 4th Panzer Army to the same corps, but changed his mind because he expected an offensive also in the area where the Gotha formations were located. However, all the efforts made by Weichs turned out to be clearly insufficient, and the High Command was more interested in increasing the power of the 6th Army for the decisive battle for Stalingrad, rather than in strengthening the weak flanks of General Weichs' formations.

On November 19, at 8:50 a.m., after a powerful, almost one and a half hour artillery preparation, despite fog and heavy snowfall, the troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts, located northwest of Stalingrad, went on the offensive. The 5th Tank, 1st Guards and 21st Armies acted against the 3rd Romanian Army.

The 5th Tank Army alone consisted of six rifle divisions, two tank corps, one cavalry corps and several artillery, aviation and anti-aircraft missile regiments. Due to the sharp deterioration of weather conditions, aviation was inactive.

It also turned out that during the artillery barrage, the enemy’s fire weapons were not completely suppressed, which is why the advance of the Soviet troops at some point slowed down. Having assessed the situation, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin, decided to introduce tank corps into the battle, which made it possible to finally break into the Romanian defenses and develop the offensive.

On the Don Front, especially fierce battles took place in the offensive zone of the right-flank formations of the 65th Army. The first two lines of enemy trenches, running along the coastal hills, were captured on the move. However, the decisive battles took place over the third line, which ran along the chalk heights. They represented a powerful defense unit. The location of the heights made it possible to bombard all approaches to them with crossfire. All the hollows and steep slopes of the heights were mined and covered with wire fences, and the approaches to them were crossed by deep and winding ravines. The Soviet infantry that reached this line was forced to lie down under heavy fire from dismounted units of the Romanian cavalry division, reinforced by German units.

The enemy carried out fierce counterattacks, trying to push the attackers back to their original position. It was not possible to bypass the heights at that moment, and after a powerful artillery attack, the soldiers of the 304th Infantry Division launched an assault on enemy fortifications. Despite hurricane machine-gun and machine gun fire, by 16:00 the enemy's stubborn resistance was broken.

As a result of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the Southwestern Front achieved the greatest successes. They broke through the defenses in two areas: southwest of the city of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. A gap up to 16 km wide opened in the enemy defenses.

On November 20, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive south of Stalingrad. This came as a complete surprise to the Germans. The offensive of the Stalingrad Front also began in unfavorable weather conditions.

It was decided to begin artillery training in each army as soon as the necessary conditions for this were created. It was necessary to abandon its simultaneous implementation on a front-line scale, however, as well as aviation training. Due to limited visibility, it was necessary to fire at unobservable targets, with the exception of those guns that were deployed for direct fire. Despite this, the enemy's fire system was largely disrupted.

Soviet soldiers are fighting in the streets. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

After artillery preparation, which lasted 40-75 minutes, formations of the 51st and 57th armies went on the offensive.

Having broken through the defenses of the 4th Romanian Army and repelled numerous counterattacks, they began to develop their success in a western direction. By mid-day, conditions had been created for introducing army mobile groups into the breakthrough.

Rifle formations of the armies advanced after the mobile groups, consolidating the success achieved.

To close the gap, the command of the 4th Romanian Army had to bring its last reserve into the battle - two regiments of the 8th Cavalry Division. But this could not save the situation. The front collapsed, and the remnants of the Romanian troops fled.

The messages received painted a bleak picture: the front was cut, the Romanians were fleeing the battlefield, and the counterattack of the 48th Tank Corps was thwarted.

The Red Army went on the offensive south of Stalingrad, and the 4th Romanian Army defending there was defeated.

The Luftwaffe command reported that due to bad weather, aviation could not support ground troops. On the operational maps, the prospect of encircling the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht clearly emerged. The red arrows of the attacks of the Soviet troops hung dangerously over its flanks and were about to close in between the Volga and Don rivers. During almost continuous meetings at Hitler's headquarters, there was a feverish search for a way out of the current situation. It was urgent to make a decision about the fate of the 6th Army. Hitler himself, as well as Keitel and Jodl, considered it necessary to hold positions in the Stalingrad area and limit ourselves only to a regrouping of forces. The OKH leadership and the command of Army Group B found the only way to avoid disaster was to withdraw the troops of the 6th Army beyond the Don. However, Hitler's position was categorical. As a result, it was decided to transfer two tank divisions from the North Caucasus to Stalingrad.

The Wehrmacht command still hoped to stop the advance of the Soviet troops with counterattacks from tank formations. The 6th Army received orders to remain in its original location. Hitler assured her command that he would not allow the army to be encircled, and if this did happen, he would take all measures to relieve the blockade.

While the German command was looking for ways to prevent the impending catastrophe, Soviet troops were building on the success they had achieved. During a daring night operation, a unit of the 26th Tank Corps managed to capture the only surviving crossing across the Don near the city of Kalach. The capture of this bridge was of enormous operational significance. The rapid overcoming of this major water barrier by Soviet troops ensured the successful completion of the operation to encircle enemy troops at Stalingrad.

By the end of November 22, the troops of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts were separated by only 20-25 km. On the evening of November 22, Stalin ordered the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Eremenko, to link up tomorrow with the advanced troops of the Southwestern Front, which had reached Kalach, and close the encirclement.

Anticipating such a development of events and in order to prevent the complete encirclement of the 6th Field Army, the German command urgently transferred the 14th Tank Corps to the area east of Kalach. Throughout the night of November 23 and the first half of the next day, units of the Soviet 4th Mechanized Corps held back the onslaught of enemy tank units rushing south and did not let them through.

The commander of the 6th Army already at 18:00 on November 22 radioed to the headquarters of Army Group B that the army was surrounded, the ammunition situation was critical, fuel reserves were running out, and there would only be enough food for 12 days. Since the Wehrmacht command on the Don did not have any forces that could relieve the encircled army, Paulus turned to Headquarters with a request for an independent breakthrough from the encirclement. However, his request remained unanswered.

Red Army soldier with a banner. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Instead, he received orders to immediately head to the cauldron, where he would organize a perimeter defense and wait for outside help.

On November 23, troops from all three fronts continued their offensive. On this day the operation reached its culmination.

Two brigades of the 26th Tank Corps crossed the Don and launched an attack on Kalach in the morning. A stubborn battle ensued. The enemy resisted fiercely, realizing the importance of holding this city. Nevertheless, by 2 p.m. he was driven out of Kalach, where the main supply base for the entire Stalingrad group was located. All the numerous warehouses with fuel, ammunition, food and other military equipment located there were either destroyed by the Germans themselves or captured by Soviet troops.

At about 16:00 on November 23, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts met in the Sovetsky area, thus completing the encirclement of the enemy’s Stalingrad group. Despite the fact that instead of the planned two or three days, the operation took five days to complete, success was achieved.

A depressing atmosphere reigned at Hitler's headquarters after the news of the encirclement of the 6th Army arrived. Despite the obviously catastrophic situation of the 6th Army, Hitler did not even want to hear about the abandonment of Stalingrad, because... in this case, all the successes of the summer offensive in the south would have been nullified, and with them all hopes of conquering the Caucasus would have disappeared. In addition, it was believed that a battle with superior forces of Soviet troops in an open field, in harsh winter conditions, with limited means of transportation, fuel supplies and ammunition, had too little chance of a favorable outcome. Therefore, it is better to gain a foothold in your positions and strive to unblock the group. This point of view was supported by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Reichsmarschall G. Goering, who assured the Fuhrer that his aircraft would provide supplies to the encircled group by air. On the morning of November 24, the 6th Army was ordered to take up a perimeter defense and wait for a relief attack from the outside.

Violent passions also flared up at the headquarters of the 6th Army on November 23. The encirclement ring around the 6th Army had just closed, and a decision had to be made urgently. There was still no response to Paulus’s radiogram, in which he requested “freedom of action.” But Paulus did not dare to take responsibility for the breakthrough. By his order, corps commanders gathered for a meeting at army headquarters to develop a plan for further action.

Commander of the 51st Army Corps General W. Seydlitz-Kurzbach spoke in favor of an immediate breakthrough. He was supported by the commander of the 14th Tank Corps General G. Hube.

But the majority of corps commanders, led by the Chief of Army Staff General A. Schmidt spoke out against. Things got to the point that during the heated argument, the commander of the 8th Army Corps, who became enraged, General W. Geitz threatened to shoot Seydlitz himself if he insisted on disobeying the Fuhrer. In the end, everyone agreed that they should approach Hitler for permission to break through. At 23:45, such a radiogram was sent. The answer came the next morning. In it, the troops of the 6th Army, surrounded in Stalingrad, were called “troops of the Stalingrad fortress”, and a breakthrough was denied. Paulus again gathered the corps commanders and conveyed the Fuhrer's order to them.

Some of the generals tried to express their counterarguments, but the army commander rejected all objections.

An urgent transfer of troops from Stalingrad began to the western sector of the front. In a short time, the enemy managed to create a group of six divisions. To pin down his forces in Stalingrad itself, on November 23, the 62nd Army of General V.I. Chuikov went on the offensive. Its troops attacked the Germans at Mamayev Kurgan and in the area of ​​the Red October plant, but met fierce resistance. The depth of their advance during the day did not exceed 100-200 m.

By November 24, the encirclement ring was thin, an attempt to break through it could bring success, it was only necessary to remove troops from the Volga Front. But Paulus was too cautious and indecisive a man, a general who was used to obeying and carefully weighing his actions. He obeyed the order. He subsequently admitted to his staff officers: “It is possible that the daredevil Reichenau after November 19, he would have made his way to the west with the 6th Army and then told Hitler: “Now you can judge me.” But, you know, unfortunately, I am not Reichenau.”

On November 27, the Fuhrer ordered Field Marshal von Manstein prepare a relief blockade for the 6th Field Army. Hitler relied on new heavy tanks, the Tigers, hoping that they would be able to break through the encirclement from the outside. Despite the fact that these vehicles had not yet been tested in combat and no one knew how they would behave in the Russian winter, he believed that even one Tiger battalion could radically change the situation at Stalingrad.

While Manstein was receiving reinforcements arriving from the Caucasus and preparing the operation, Soviet troops expanded the outer ring and strengthened it. When Hoth's tank group made a breakthrough on December 12, it was able to break through the positions of the Soviet troops, and its advanced units were separated from Paulus by less than 50 km. But Hitler forbade Friedrich Paulus to expose the Volga Front and, leaving Stalingrad, to fight his way towards Hoth’s “tigers,” which finally decided the fate of the 6th Army.

By January 1943, the enemy was driven back from the Stalingrad “cauldron” to 170-250 km. The death of the encircled troops became inevitable. Almost the entire territory they occupied was covered by Soviet artillery fire. Despite Goering’s promise, in practice, the average daily power of aviation in supplying the 6th Army could not exceed 100 tons instead of the required 500. In addition, the delivery of goods to the encircled groups in Stalingrad and other “cauldrons” caused huge losses in German aviation.

The ruins of the Barmaley fountain, which became one of the symbols of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

On January 10, 1943, Colonel General Paulus, despite the hopeless situation of his army, refused to capitulate, trying to pin down the Soviet troops surrounding him as much as possible. On the same day, the Red Army began an operation to destroy the 6th Field Army of the Wehrmacht. In the last days of January, Soviet troops pushed the remnants of Paulus's army into a small area of ​​the completely destroyed city and dismembered the Wehrmacht units continuing to defend. On January 24, 1943, General Paulus sent Hitler one of the last radiograms, in which he reported that the group was on the verge of destruction and proposed to evacuate valuable specialists. Hitler again forbade the remnants of the 6th Army to break through to his own and refused to remove anyone from the “cauldron” except the wounded.

On the night of January 31, the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 329th Engineer Battalion blocked the area of ​​the department store where Paulus' headquarters was located. The last radiogram that the commander of the 6th Army received was an order to promote him to field marshal, which the headquarters regarded as an invitation to suicide. Early in the morning, two Soviet envoys made their way into the basement of a dilapidated building and gave the field marshal an ultimatum. In the afternoon, Paulus rose to the surface and went to the headquarters of the Don Front, where Rokossovsky was waiting for him with the text of surrender. However, despite the fact that the field marshal surrendered and signed the capitulation, in the northern part of Stalingrad the German garrison under the command of Colonel General Stecker refused to accept the terms of surrender and was destroyed by concentrated heavy artillery fire. At 16.00 on February 2, 1943, the terms of surrender of the 6th Wehrmacht Field Army came into force.

Hitler's government declared mourning in the country.

For three days the funeral ringing of church bells sounded over German cities and villages.

Since the Great Patriotic War, Soviet historical literature has stated that a 330,000-strong enemy group was surrounded in the Stalingrad area, although this figure is not confirmed by any documentary data.

The German side's point of view on this issue is ambiguous. However, with all the diversity of opinions, the figure most often cited is 250-280 thousand people. This value is consistent with the total number of evacuees (25 thousand people), captured (91 thousand people) and enemy soldiers killed and buried in the battle area (about 160 thousand). The vast majority of those who surrendered also died from hypothermia and typhus, and after almost 12 years in Soviet camps, only 6 thousand people returned to their homeland.

Kotelnikovsky operation Having completed the encirclement of a large group of German troops near Stalingrad, the troops of the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front (commander - Colonel General A.I. Eremenko) in November 1942 came from the north to the approaches to the village of Kotelnikovsky, where they gained a foothold and went on the defensive.

The German command made every effort to break through a corridor to the 6th Army surrounded by Soviet troops. For this purpose, in early December in the area of ​​the village. Kotelnikovsky, a strike force was created consisting of 13 divisions (including 3 tank and 1 motorized) and a number of reinforcement units under the command of Colonel General G. Goth - the army group "Goth". The group included a battalion of heavy Tiger tanks, which were first used on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. In the direction of the main attack, which was delivered along the Kotelnikovsky-Stalingrad railway, the enemy managed to create a temporary advantage over the defending troops of the 51st Army in men and artillery by 2 times, and in the number of tanks by more than 6 times.

They broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and on the second day reached the area of ​​​​the village of Verkhnekumsky. In order to divert part of the forces of the shock group, on December 14, in the area of ​​​​the village of Nizhnechirskaya, the 5th Shock Army of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. She broke through the German defenses and captured the village, but the position of the 51st Army remained difficult. The enemy continued the offensive, while the army and the front no longer had any reserves left. The Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, trying to prevent the enemy from breaking through and releasing the encircled German troops, allocated the 2nd Guards Army and the Mechanized Corps from its reserve to strengthen the Stalingrad Front, giving them the task of defeating the enemy’s strike force.

On December 19, having suffered significant losses, Goth's group reached the Myshkova River. There were 35-40 km left to the encircled group, but Paulus’s troops were ordered to remain in their positions and not launch a counterattack, and Hoth was no longer able to advance further.

On December 24, having jointly created approximately double superiority over the enemy, the 2nd Guards and 51st armies, with the assistance of part of the forces of the 5th Shock Army, went on the offensive. The main blow against the Kotelnikov group was delivered by the 2nd Guards Army with fresh forces. The 51st Army attacked Kotelnikovsky from the east, while simultaneously enveloping the Gotha group from the south with tank and mechanized corps. On the first day of the offensive, troops of the 2nd Guards Army broke through the enemy's battle formations and captured crossings across the Myshkova River. Mobile formations were introduced into the breakthrough and began to rapidly advance towards Kotelnikovsky.

On December 27, the 7th Tank Corps approached Kotelnikovsky from the west, and the 6th Mechanized Corps bypassed Kotelnikovsky from the southeast. At the same time, the tank and mechanized corps of the 51st Army cut off the enemy group’s escape route to the southwest. Continuous attacks on the retreating enemy troops were carried out by aircraft of the 8th Air Army. On December 29, Kotelnikovsky was released and the threat of an enemy breakthrough was finally eliminated.

As a result of the Soviet counteroffensive, the enemy's attempt to relieve the 6th Army encircled at Stalingrad was thwarted, and German troops were thrown back 200-250 km from the outer front of the encirclement.

THEY COMMANDED FRONTS AND ARMIES IN THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD

BATOV

Pavel Ivanovich

Army General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Stalingrad he participated as commander of the 65th Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

In 1927 he graduated from the higher officer courses “Vystrel”, the highest academic courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950.

Participant of the First World War since 1916. For distinctions in battles, he was awarded 2 St. George's crosses and 2 medals.

In 1918 he voluntarily joined the Red Army. From 1920 to 1936 he successively commanded a company, battalion, and rifle regiment. In 1936-1937 fought on the side of the Republican troops in Spain. Upon return, commander of the rifle corps (1937). In 1939-1940 he took part in the Soviet-Finnish war. Since 1940, deputy commander of the Transcaucasian Military District.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of a special rifle corps in Crimea, deputy commander of the 51st Army of the Southern Front (from August 1941), commander of the 3rd Army (January - February 1942), assistant commander of the Bryansk Front (February - October 1942). From October 1942 until the end of the war, commander of the 65th Army, which participated in hostilities as part of the Don, Stalingrad, Central, Belorussian, 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts. The troops under the command of P.I. Batov distinguished themselves in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the battle for the Dnieper, during the liberation of Belarus, in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations. The combat successes of the 65th Army were noted 30 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

For personal courage and courage, for organizing clear interaction between subordinate troops during the crossing of the Dnieper, P. I. Batov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and for crossing the Oder River and capturing the city of Stettin (the German name for the Polish city of Szczecin) he was awarded the second Gold Star.

After the war - commander of the mechanized and combined arms armies, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, commander of the Carpathian and Baltic military districts, commander of the Southern Group of Forces.

In 1962-1965. chief of staff Since 1965, the military inspector has been an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1970, Chairman of the Soviet War Veterans Committee.

Awarded 6 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Orders of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, “Badge of Honor”, ​​honorary weapons, foreign orders, as well as medals.

VATUTIN

Nikolai Fedorovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). He took part in the Battle of Stalingrad as commander of the Southwestern Front.

He graduated from the Poltava Infantry School in 1922, the Kyiv Higher United Military School in 1924, and the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1929, operational department of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934, Military Academy of the General Staff in 1937

Participant in the Civil War. After the war, he commanded a platoon, a company, and worked at the headquarters of the 7th Infantry Division. In 1931-1941 was the chief of staff of the division, head of the 1st department of the headquarters of the Siberian Military District, deputy chief of staff and chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military District, head of the Operations Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff.

From June 30, 1941, Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front. In May - July 1942, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In July 1942 he was appointed commander of the Voronezh Front. During the Battle of Stalingrad he commanded the troops of the Southwestern Front. In March 1943, he was again appointed commander of the Voronezh Front (from October 1943 - the 1st Ukrainian Front). On February 29, 1944, while leaving for the troops, he was seriously wounded and died on April 15. Buried in Kyiv.

Awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, Suvorov 1st degree, Kutuzov 1st degree, and the Czechoslovakian Order.

PROUD

Vasily Nikolaevich

Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Stalingrad he participated as commander of the Stalingrad Front.

Born on December 12, 1896 in the village. Matveevka (Mezensky district, Republic of Tatarstan). In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the courses for senior command personnel in 1925, the higher officer courses “Vystrel” in 1927, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1932. In 1915 he was drafted into the army as a private. Participant of the First World War, senior non-commissioned officer. In December 1917 he joined the Red Guard. During the Civil War, he commanded a company, battalion, and regiment on the Eastern and Western fronts, and participated in the liquidation of Makhno’s gangs. After the Civil War, he held command and staff positions and was an instructor in the Mongolian People's Army (1925-1926). Since 1927, assistant commander of a rifle regiment. From 1933 to 1935, chief of staff of the Moscow Military Infantry School, then chief of staff of a rifle division. Since 1937, commander of a rifle division, since 1939, chief of staff of the Kalinin, since 1940, Volga military districts.

During the Great Patriotic War, chief of staff (June - September 1941), then commander of the 21st Army (October 1941 - June 1942), commander of the Stalingrad Front (July - August 1942), commander of the 33rd ( October 1942 - March 1943) and the 3rd Guards (April 1943 - May 1945) armies.

Awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Red Star, medals.

EREMENKO

Andrey Ivanovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In the Battle of Stalingrad he participated as commander of the South-Eastern Front, and subsequently the Stalingrad Front.

Born on October 14, 1892 in the village. Markovka (Lugansk region, Republic of Ukraine). In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the Higher Cavalry School in 1923, advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, courses for single-commanders at the Military-Political Academy in 1931, and the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1935

In 1913 he was drafted into the army. In World War I he fought as a private on the Southwestern Front in Galicia. Then he served on the Romanian front in the reconnaissance team of an infantry regiment. After the February Revolution in 1917, he was elected to the regimental committee. Having been demobilized, he returned to the village. Markovka and in 1918 organized a partisan detachment there, which later joined the Red Army. Participant in the Civil War. Since January 1919, deputy chairman and military commissar of the Markov Revolutionary Committee. From June 1919, he participated in battles on the Southern, Caucasian, and Southwestern fronts as chief of reconnaissance, then chief of staff of a cavalry brigade, assistant commander of the cavalry regiment of the 14th Cavalry Division of the 1st Cavalry Army. After the Civil War, from December 1929 he commanded a cavalry regiment, from August 1937 a cavalry division, and from 1938 the 6th Cavalry Corps, with which he participated in the liberation campaign in Western Belarus. Since June 1940, commander of the mechanized corps, since December 1940, commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army in the Far East.

During the Great Patriotic War, from July 1941, he was deputy commander of the Western Front and led the military operations of the troops in the Battle of Smolensk. In August - October 1941, commander of the Bryansk Front, which covered the approaches to Moscow from the southwest. Since December 1941 (after being wounded) commander of the 4th Shock Army. In January 1942 he was seriously wounded and was recovering until August. In August 1942, he took command of the South-Eastern Front (from 08/30/1942 - Stalingrad Front). Since January 1943, commander of the Southern Front, since April 1943 of the Kalinin Front, and since October of the 1st Baltic Front. Since February 1944, commander of the troops of the Separate Maritime Army, since April 1944, commander of the 2nd Baltic Front. In March 1945, he was appointed commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, he commanded the troops of the Carpathian, West Siberian and North Caucasus military districts (1945-1958). Since 1958, Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders. In addition, he was awarded the Arms of Honor.

ZHADOV

Alexey Semenovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Stalingrad he participated as commander of the 66th Army.

He graduated from cavalry courses in 1920, military-political courses in 1928, and the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934, higher academic courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950. Participant in the Civil War. In November 1919, as part of a separate detachment of the 46th Infantry Division, he fought against the Denikinites. From October 1920, as a platoon commander of a cavalry regiment of the 11th Cavalry Division of the 1st Cavalry Army, he participated in battles with Wrangel’s troops, as well as with gangs operating in Ukraine and Belarus. In 1922-1924. fought with the Basmachi in Central Asia and was seriously wounded. Since 1925, commander of a training platoon, then commander and political instructor of the squadron, chief of staff of the regiment, chief of the operational unit of the division headquarters, chief of staff of the corps, assistant cavalry inspector in the Red Army. Since 1940, commander of the mountain cavalry division.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the 4th Airborne Corps (from June 1941). As chief of staff of the 3rd Army of the Central and then Bryansk Fronts, he took part in the Battle of Moscow, and in the summer of 1942 he commanded the 8th Cavalry Corps on the Bryansk Front. Since October 1942, commander of the 66th Army of the Don Front, operating north of Stalingrad. Since April 1943, the 66th Army was transformed into the 5th Guards Army. Under his leadership, the army as part of the Voronezh Front participated in the defeat of the enemy near Prokhorovka, and then in the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation. Subsequently, the 5th Guards Army participated in the liberation of Ukraine, in the Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, and Prague operations. Army troops were noted 21 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for successful military operations. For skillful command and control of troops in the fight against the Nazi invaders and the courage and courage shown during this, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the post-war period, he served as deputy commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces for combat training (1946-1949), head of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1950-1954), Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces (1954-1955), Deputy and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces (1956-1964). Since September 1964, First Deputy Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since October 1969, the military inspector has been an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 5 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Red Star, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals.

Died 1977

POPOV

Markian Mikhailovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Stalingrad he participated as commander of the 5th Shock Army.

Born on November 15, 1902 in the village of Ust-Medveditskaya, Saratov province (now the city of Serafimovich, Volgograd region). In the Red Army since 1920

He graduated from the infantry command courses in 1922, the higher officer courses "Vystrel" in 1925, the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze. He fought in the Civil War on the Western Front as a private. Since 1922, platoon commander, assistant company commander, assistant chief and head of the regimental school, battalion commander, inspector of military educational institutions of the Moscow Military District. From May 1936, chief of staff of the mechanized brigade, then the 5th mechanized corps. From June 1938, deputy commander, from September, chief of staff, from July 1939, commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army in the Far East, and from January 1941, commander of the Leningrad Military District.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the Northern and Leningrad fronts (June - September 1941), the 61st and 40th armies (November 1941 - October 1942). He was deputy commander of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts. Successfully commanded the 5th Shock Army (October 1942 - April 1943), the Reserve Front and the troops of the Steppe Military District (April - May 1943), Bryansk (June - October 1943), Baltic and 2nd Baltic (October 1943 - April 1944) fronts. From April 1944 until the end of the war, chief of staff of the Leningrad, 2nd Baltic, and then again the Leningrad fronts. He participated in the planning of operations and successfully led troops in the battles of Leningrad and Moscow, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, and during the liberation of Karelia and the Baltic states.

In the post-war period, commander of the troops of the Lvov (1945-1946), Tauride (1946-1954) military districts. From January 1955, Deputy Chief and then Head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training, and from August 1956, Chief of the General Staff - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Since 1962, the military inspector has been an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of the Red Star, medals, as well as foreign orders.

ROKOSSOVSKY

Konstantin Konstantinovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Poland, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Stalingrad he participated as commander of the Don Front.

He graduated from cavalry advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, and advanced training courses for senior command personnel at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1929. In the army since 1914. Participant in the First World War. He fought in the 5th Dragoon Kargopol Regiment as a private and junior non-commissioned officer. After the October Revolution of 1917, he fought in the ranks of the Red Army. During the Civil War, he commanded a squadron, a separate division and a cavalry regiment. For personal courage and courage he was awarded 2 Orders of the Red Banner. After the war, he successively commanded the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, a cavalry regiment, and the 5th Separate Cavalry Brigade. For military distinction in battles during the military conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway, he was awarded the third Order of the Red Banner. From 1930 he commanded the 7th, then the 15th cavalry divisions. Since 1936, he was appointed commander of the 5th Cavalry Corps, and from November 1940, the 9th Mechanized Corps.

From July 1941 he commanded the 16th Army of the Western Front. From July 1942 he commanded the Bryansk, from September the Don, from February 1943 the Central, from October the Belarusian, from February 1944 the 1st Belorussian and from November 1944 until the end of the war the 2nd Belorussian Front. Troops under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky participated in the Battle of Smolensk (1941), the battle of Moscow, the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, and the Belarusian, East Prussian, East Pomeranian, and Berlin operations. Commanded the Victory Parade in Moscow on June 24, 1945.

After the war, Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Group of Forces (1945-1949). In October 1949, at the request of the government of the Polish People's Republic, with the permission of the Soviet government, he went to the People's Republic of Poland, where he was appointed Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland. He was awarded the rank of Marshal of Poland. Upon returning to the USSR in 1956, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since July 1957, the chief inspector has been the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since October 1957, commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. In 1958-1962. Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since April 1962, chief inspector of the Group of Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 6 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals. Awarded the highest Soviet military order "Victory". Awarded the Arms of Honor.

ROMANENKO

Prokofy Logvinovich

Colonel General. In the Battle of Stalingrad he participated as commander of the 5th Tank Army.

Born on February 25, 1897 in the Romanenki farm (Sumy region, Republic of Ukraine). In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, advanced training courses for senior command personnel in 1930, and the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1933, Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948. In military service since 1914. Participant in the First World War, ensign. Awarded 4 St. George Crosses. After the October Revolution of 1917, he was a volost military commissar in the Stavropol province, then during the Civil War he commanded a partisan detachment, fought on the Southern and Western fronts as a squadron and regiment commander and assistant commander of a cavalry brigade. After the war he commanded a cavalry regiment, and from 1937 a mechanized brigade. Participated in the national liberation struggle of the Spanish people in 1936-1939. For heroism and courage he was awarded the Order of Lenin. Since 1938, commander of the 7th Mechanized Corps, participant in the Soviet-Finnish War (1939-1940). From May 1940, commander of the 34th Rifle Corps, then the 1st Mechanized Corps.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the 17th Army of the Trans-Baikal Front. From May 1942, commander of the 3rd Tank Army, then deputy commander of the Bryansk Front (September-November 1942), from November 1942 to December 1944, commander of the 5th, 2nd Tank Armies, 48th Army. The troops of these armies took part in the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, and in the Belarusian operation. In 1945-1947 Commander of the East Siberian Military District.

Awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, foreign order.

TYMOSHENKO

Semyon Konstantinovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Stalingrad he served as commander of the Stalingrad and then the North-Western fronts.

Born on February 18, 1895 in the village. Furmanka (Furmanovka) Kiliya district, Odessa region (Republic of Ukraine). In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from higher academic courses in 1922 and 1927, courses for commanders at the Military-Political Academy named after. V.I. Lenin in 1930. In military service since 1915. During the First World War he fought on the Western Front as a private. In 1917 he participated in the liquidation of the Kornilov revolt, then in the defeat of the Kaledin revolt. In 1918, he commanded a platoon and squadron and fought against the German occupiers and White Guards in the Crimea and Kuban. Since August 1918, commander of the 1st Crimean revolutionary regiment. From November 1918, commander of the 2nd separate cavalry brigade, from October 1919, commander of the 6th cavalry division. From August 1920 he commanded the 4th Cavalry Division. For successful command of subordinate troops, courage and heroism shown in battles during the Civil War, he was awarded 2 Orders of the Red Banner. From 1925 he commanded the 3rd Cavalry Corps, from August 1933 he was deputy commander of the Belorussian military districts, and from September 1935 the Kyiv military district. From July 1937 he commanded the troops of the North Caucasus, from September the Kharkov, and from February 1938 the Kyiv Special Military District. In September 1939 he commanded the Ukrainian Front.

During the Soviet-Finnish War from January 1940, commander of the North-Western Front. For outstanding services he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Since May 1940, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.

During the Great Patriotic War in June - July 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, a representative of the Commander-in-Chief Headquarters, then was part of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In July - September 1941, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Since July 1941, commander-in-chief of the western, since September 1941, southwestern directions, simultaneously commander of the Western (July - September 1941) and Southwestern (September - December 1941) fronts. Under his leadership, the counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Rostov-on-Don in 1941 was planned and carried out. In July 1942, he was commander of the Stalingrad Front, from October 1942 to March 1943, the North-Western Front. The troops of the Northwestern Front liquidated the enemy's Demyansk bridgehead. From March 1943, as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, he coordinated the actions of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts (March - June 1943), the North Caucasus Front and the Black Sea Fleet (June - November 1943), the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts (February - June 1944), and from August 1944 until the end of the war - the 2nd, 3rd, 4th Ukrainian Fronts. With his participation, a number of major operations of the Great Patriotic War were developed and carried out, including the Iasi-Kishinev operation.

After the war, he commanded the troops of the Baranovichi (1945-1946), South Ural (1946-1949), and Belarusian (1946, 1949-1960) military districts. Since April 1960, Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and since 1961, at the same time, Chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 5 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals.

He was awarded the highest military order "Victory", the Honorary Revolutionary Weapon and the Weapon of Honor.

CHUYKOV

Vasily Ivanovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Stalingrad he participated as commander of the 62nd Army.

Born on February 12, 1900 in the village. Serebryanye Prudy (Moscow region). In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from military instructor courses in Moscow in 1918, Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1925, eastern department of the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1927, academic courses at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army in 1936. In 1917, he served as a cabin boy in a detachment of miners in Kronstadt, and in 1918, he participated in the suppression of the counter-revolutionary rebellion of the left Socialist Revolutionaries in Moscow.

During the Civil War he was an assistant company commander on the Southern Front, from November 1918 he was an assistant commander, and from May 1919 he was a regiment commander on the Eastern and Western Fronts. For bravery and heroism he was awarded 2 Orders of the Red Banner. Since 1927, military adviser in China. In 1929-1932. head of the headquarters department of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. Since September 1932, head of advanced training courses for command personnel, since December 1936, commander of a mechanized brigade, since April 1938, commander of the 5th Rifle Corps. From July 1938, commander of the Bobruisk Army in the Belarusian Special Military District, then the 4th Army, which took part in the liberation campaign in Western Belarus. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commander of the 9th Army. From December 1940 to March 1942, military attaché in China.

During the Great Patriotic War from 1942 in the active army on the Stalingrad, Don, South-Western, 3rd Ukrainian, 1st Belorussian fronts. From May 1942, commander of the 1st Reserve Army (from July 64th Army), then the operational group of the 64th Army. From September 1942 until the end of the war (with a break in October - November 1943) commander of the 62nd Army (from April 1943, 8th Guards Army), which fought from Stalingrad to Berlin. In the fierce battles for Stalingrad, the military talent of V.I. Chuikov, who developed and creatively applied various methods and techniques of combat operations in the city, was demonstrated with particular force.

After the Battle of Stalingrad, army troops participated in the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya, Donbass, Nikopol-Krivoy Rog, Bereznegovato-Snigirevskaya operations, in the crossing of the Seversky Donets and Dnieper, the night assault on Zaporozhye, the liberation of Odessa, and in the Lublin-Brest, Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations. For distinction in battles during the Great Patriotic War, the troops commanded by V.I. Chuikov were noted 17 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. After the war, Deputy, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief (1945-1949), Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (1949-1953). Since November 1949, Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany. Since May 1953, Commander of the Kyiv Military District, since April 1960, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, and since July 1961, at the same time, Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR. Since 1972, Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 9 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of the Red Star, medals, Weapons of Honor, as well as foreign orders and medals.

SHLEMIN

Ivan Timofeevich

Lieutenant General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Stalingrad he participated successively as commander of the 5th Tank, 12th and 6th armies.

He graduated from the first Petrograd infantry courses in 1920, the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1925, operational department of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1932. Participant in the First World War. During the Civil War, he participated as a platoon commander in battles in Estonia and near Petrograd. From 1925 he was the chief of staff of a rifle regiment, then the chief of an operational unit and the chief of staff of a division, and from 1932 he worked at the headquarters of the Red Army (from 1935 the General Staff). Since 1936, commander of a rifle regiment, since 1937, head of the Military Academy of the General Staff, since 1940, chief of staff of the 11th Army, in this position he entered the Great Patriotic War.

From May 1942, chief of staff of the North-Western Front, then of the 1st Guards Army. Since January 1943, he successively commanded the 5th Tank, 12th, 6th, 46th Armies on the Southwestern, 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. Troops under the command of I. T. Shlemin took part in the Battle of Stalingrad, Donbass, Nikopol-Krivoy Rog, Bereznegovato-Snigirev, Odessa, Iasi-Kishinev, Debrecen and Budapest operations. For successful actions he was noted 15 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. For skillful command and control of troops and the heroism and courage demonstrated, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the Great Patriotic War, he was the chief of staff of the Southern Group of Forces, and from April 1948, the deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces - the head of the operational department, and from June 1949, the chief of staff of the Central Group of Forces. In 1954-1962. senior lecturer and deputy head of the department at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1962 in reserve.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, medals.

SHUMILOV

Mikhail Stepanovich

Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Stalingrad he participated as commander of the 64th Army.

He graduated from the command and political courses in 1924, the higher officer courses “Vystrel” in 1929, the highest academic courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948, and before the Great October Revolution, the Chuguev Military School in 1916. A participant in the First World War , ensign. During the Civil War he fought on the Eastern and Southern fronts, commanding a platoon, company, and regiment. After the war, the regiment commander, then the division and corps commander, took part in the campaign in Western Belarus in 1939, and in the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939-1940.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of a rifle corps, deputy commander of the 55th and 21st armies on the Leningrad and Southwestern fronts (1941-1942). From August 1942 until the end of the war, commander of the 64th Army (transformed in March 1943 into the 7th Guards), operating as part of the Stalingrad, Don, Voronezh, Steppe, and 2nd Ukrainian fronts. Troops under the command of M.S. Shumilov took part in the defense of Leningrad, in battles in the Kharkov region, heroically fought at Stalingrad and together with the 62nd Army in the city itself, defended it from the enemy, participated in the battles of Kursk and the Dnieper, in Kirovograd , Uman-Botoshan, Iasi-Chisinau, Budapest, Bratislava-Brnov operations. For excellent military operations, the army troops were noted 16 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

After the war, he commanded the troops of the White Sea (1948-1949) and Voronezh (1949-1955) military districts. In 1956-1958 retired. Since 1958, military consultant to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Red Star, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals .