The last year of the war: a comparison of the losses of the Third Reich in the east and in the west. aviation

On the eve of the start of the war in the Soviet Union, there were several different (in structure and order of subordination) “aviation”, namely: front-line (or military), subordinate to the command of combined arms armies and districts (fronts), aviation of the Navy, long-range aviation (long-range aviation actions, long-range bomber aviation), subordinate directly to the High Command of the Red Army, air defense fighter aviation.

In this book, all these structures are presented under the general name “Soviet aviation”, “Soviet Air Force”, “Red Army Air Force”.

In Hitler's Germany, all military aviation (Luftwaffe) was a strictly centralized structure; all aviation units and formations (including those solving air defense tasks of the country or interacting with Navy), as well as anti-aircraft artillery, searchlight and radar units.

The minimum “cell” of military aviation (both in the Soviet Air Force and in the Luftwaffe) was a “link”. The flight usually consisted of 3 or 4 aircraft.

Several units (from 3 to 5) were united into a squadron, which consisted of 12 (in the Luftwaffe) or from 12 to 15 (as in the Soviet Air Force) aircraft.

The basic tactical unit of combat aviation was the military unit, called a "regiment" (in the Soviet Air Force) or a "group" (in the Luftwaffe). As part of the Luftwaffe group staffing table there should have been three squadrons and a headquarters unit, a total of 40 aircraft; such a structure existed in all branches of German aviation. In the Soviet Air Force, fighter, attack and various bomber regiments had different structures, but according to the staffing schedule, all of them were supposed to have 62 - 64 aircraft (four or five squadrons and a regiment control link).

Several regiments (groups) were united into a formation called an “aviation division” (in the Soviet Air Force) or a “squadron” (in the Luftwaffe). On the eve of the war, the Soviet Air Force included “fighter” (IAD), “bomber” (BAD) and “mixed” (SAD) air divisions. Each division had its own number (for example, 9th SAD, 13th BAD, 43rd IAD). The regiments that were part of the division (usually from 3 to 5) had their own numbering, not related to the division number (for example, 127th IAP, 16th BAP, 61st ShAP). In documents from 1941, bomber regiments were often designated with an indication of their purpose, for example, SBP (high-speed bomber), BBP (short-range bomber), but in this book, a single designation system is used for front-line aviation regiments (only the abbreviation BAP); shelves Long-Range Aviation designated as DBAP or TBAP (respectively “long-range” or “heavy” bomber regiment).

In the Luftwaffe, squadrons were also divided into fighter squadrons (JG), bomber squadrons (KG), dive bomber squadrons (StG), and heavy long-range fighter squadrons (ZG). The squadron (with rare exceptions) consisted of three groups, with the groups designated by squadron number, for example II/JG-53 (second group of the 53rd Fighter Squadron).

Several Luftwaffe squadrons (usually 4 to 6) were combined into a large structure called an "air corps". Aviation corps were united into Air Fleets. Total for Eastern Front three Luftwaffe air fleets operated (1st V.f., 2nd V.f., 4th V.f.) consisting of five (1, 8, 2, 4, 5th) aviation corps (and also some units and divisions of the 5th V. F. in the Arctic).

In the Soviet Air Force, the corps unit existed only in long-range bomber aviation. By the beginning of the war, four such corps were deployed in the Western theater of operations: the 1st DBAC in the Novgorod area, the 3rd DBAC in the Smolensk area, the 2nd DBAC in the Kursk area and the 4th DBAC in the Zaporozhye area. Each corps had two bomber divisions (another one, the separate 18th DBAD, was based in the Kyiv area). The planned inclusion of a fighter division equipped with long-range escort fighters into the DBAC was practically not implemented.

A few days before the start of the war, a decision was made to deploy three air defense fighter aviation corps (6th in Moscow, 7th in Leningrad, 8th in Baku), and these corps did not have a divisional link (i.e. fighter the regiments were directly subordinate to the command of the corps and air defense zone). The formation of the IAK air defense was carried out already during the war that began on June 22, 1941.

Air Force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet

Air Force of the Baltic OVO (North-Western Front)


Air Force of the Western OVO (Western Front)




Air Force of the Kyiv OVO (South-Western Front)

Air Force of Odessa Military District (Southern Front)

Air Force Black Sea Fleet


Long-range bomber aviation formations in the Western theater of operations

TOTAL:

– 4720 fighters, incl. 1030 MiG-3 and Yak-1;

– 3583 bombers, incl. 205 Pe-2 and 9 TB-7;

- a total of 8303 combat aircraft.

Note:

– the total number of aircraft is indicated, including temporarily disabled ones;

– combat-ready aircraft averaged 80-85% of the total;

– the number of “new types” of aircraft included in the total number (MiG-3 and Yak-1 fighters, Pe-2 and TB-7 bombers) is indicated through a fraction;

– about 25 emerging air regiments and the aircraft in their arsenal were not taken into account;

– the naval aviation does not include reconnaissance units and the seaplanes they were armed with;

– the composition of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front is indicated according to the report of the commander of the Front Air Force; it is given in other sources larger number airplanes.

TOTAL: 2275 / 1779

Fighters - 848 / 683 (633 Bf-109 F + 215 Bf-109 E).

Bombers - 935/732 (528Ju-88 + 281He-111 + 126Do-17).

Dive bombers (Ju-87) – 309 / 220.

Multipurpose (Me-110) – 183 / 144.

Notes:

– in the first figure – total aircraft, the second – including combat-ready ones; all aircraft of the 5th Air Fleet are counted as combat-ready;

– headquarters aircraft are included in the total number of the corresponding squadrons;

– in cases where the fighter group was equipped with Bf-109 aircraft of two modifications (E and F), all fighters were recorded as Bf-109 F; this led to a slight overestimation of the total number of Bf-109 F compared to data from other sources;

– the headquarters units of the bomber squadrons also included several Me-110s (they are not taken into account in this table).

Notes:

– Group III/JG-53 operated at the junction of the NWF and the ZF, it can be assumed that approximately half of all declared victories relate to air battles with units of the NWF Air Force;

– Among the declared downed fighters there are only 14 MiGs, including at least 6 shot down in the Northwestern Front.

Notes:

– the initial number is indicated taking into account faulty aircraft;

– the tables take into account irrecoverable (60% damage) losses of combat aircraft “from enemy influence and for unknown reasons”;

– total losses for July are indicated taking into account the losses of the 5th V.F. in the Arctic;

– according to other sources, in June 1941, 13 German aircraft were irretrievably lost at airfields.

Luftwaffe classification of losses:

up to 24% – small and medium damage that can be repaired by ground services;

25 – 39% – larger ones required renovation work in parts;

40 – 44% – replacement of individual units or systems is required;

45 – 59% – numerous damages requiring replacement of many aircraft components;

60 – 80% – cannot be restored, some units can be used as spare parts;

81 – 99% – completely destroyed, debris fell on German-controlled territory;

100% missing, fell on enemy territory or in the sea.

From the Report on the combat work of units of the 6th SAD from 22.6 to 20.9.41.

“Quite often, even a superior group of enemy fighters avoids combat with our fighters, and if they engage in battle, they do not fight it for a long time and persistently. Especially at one time, the Me-109, as well as the Me-110, avoided combat with the I-153 of the 38th IAP...

The materiel in service with the enemy Air Force (Me-109, Me-110, Xe-113) is good in its performance characteristics, but due to insufficient training of the enemy flight personnel and their apparently weak moral fortitude, all capabilities of the materiel are not used, as a result of which the enemy suffers heavy losses even in battles when it significantly outnumbers our fighters.

Enemy bombers act intrusively only when they are covered by fighters and do not see organized resistance from the ground or in the air; when they resist, they leave very quickly. Cowardice and reluctance to engage in battle with our fighters is the main characteristic of the training of enemy air force flight personnel..."

(TsAMO, f. 221, on. 1374, building 16, m. 57-67)

From the Report on the combat work of the 57th SAD from 22.6 to 23.9.41.

Not a single case has been recorded of a pair of German fighters engaging in battle with a group of our fighters; in most cases, using speed, they avoid the battle...

Of the 125 air battles, 18 were very short-lived, because... the enemy, having in some cases superior speed, after the first attack by our fighters, left the battle using clouds or the sun.

During the three months of the war, the enemy never built up forces in an air battle. The battle began in the air with one group, and it ended with it. The main method used by the enemy in an air battle with our fighters is to not accept the battle if the forces are equal or have a slight superiority, to hide behind the clouds and wait for our individual aircraft to separate from the group in order to deal with them in an unequal battle...

If after the first blow to[our] at the airfield or before it, the enemy did not receive opposition from the ground or from the air, all his planes stood in a circle and continued bombing and machine-gun fire with individual aiming until the ammunition was completely used up, sometimes making up to 3-4 attacks. As a rule, the enemy did not make repeated attacks if at least 1 or 2 of our fighters were over the airfield...

The enemy, fearing the partisans, and at the same time due to fast promotion forward, deployed his aviation in entire regiments or more at one airfield. I always placed planes in the center of the airfield in one or two lines. A better target for our aviation could not be found..."

(TsAMO, f. 221, on. 1374, d. 16, pp. 84-89)

“At your order, I am reporting the main techniques of enemy aviation tactics, identified by the flight personnel of the regiment during combat operations.

1. In clear sunny weather, both enemy fighters and bombers always try to approach the target from the direction of the sun. Enemy bombers are active during cloudy weather, using cloud cover to fly covertly.

2. In air combat, enemy fighters Me-109 and Xe-113(as the Messerschmitt-109 F series was called in the Soviet Air Force at that time) They always try to have an altitude advantage over our planes. They mainly attack from above and, after attacking with a combat turn, go up again. During an air battle, our planes are almost never below.

3. In air combat, enemy fighters actively fight only when they have a large advantage in strength. With an equal balance of forces and even with their double advantage, they often avoid battle or quickly withdraw from it. After the first attack, they gain altitude and during a second attack they try to attack our individual aircraft located on the flanks or at the end of the battle formation.

4. Avoid frontal attacks.

5. Often single fighters are “tied” to the tail of aircraft coming from a mission and attack them during landing.”

(TsLMO, f. 20076, on. 1, d. 8A, l. 16)

From the Report on the combat operations of the 11th SAD for the period from 22.6 to 19.12.41.

During the period of hostilities, the LaGG-3 aircraft established itself as one of the best fighters of the Red Army Air Force. In terms of its flight-tactical data and weapons, it far surpasses everything modern types enemy fighters. The enemy, even with significant numerical superiority, does not engage in battle with fighters. When attacking LaGG-3, enemy fighters, as a rule, evade combat. The LaGG-3 aircraft is equally maneuverable at all altitudes and has a wide speed range.

The MiG-3 aircraft has not proven itself in use as an attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft due to insufficient training of the flight crew. In air battles conducted mainly at altitudes of 500 - 1500 m, the MiG-3 turned out to be less effective than the old I-16 type. In addition to low maneuverability at low altitudes, the MiG-3 has insufficiently strong weapons, mainly cannons.(so the text may have meant that the absence of a cannon reduces the effectiveness of this aircraft’s weapons).

The I-16 aircraft, thanks to extensive experience in piloting techniques and combat use in the past, proved to be quite effective in the fight against the latest types of enemy fighters. The big disadvantage of the I-16 fighter is its relatively weak armament, and most importantly, the wear and tear of the weapon, which very often failed in air combat and during assault operations. With a more powerful engine and increased armament, the I-16 may well compete with new types of fighters, both friendly and enemy..."

(TsAMO, f. 20054-A, on. 1, d. 12, pp. 27-28)

Brief information: the 123rd IAP met the war at border airfields in the Brest-Kobrin area, on June 27 it was withdrawn for reorganization in Monino near Moscow; The regiment's pilots mastered the new Yak-1 fighter in 12 days; since July 15, the regiment as part of the 6th IAK Air Defense has been fighting in the skies of Moscow (480 sorties have been carried out); since September 21, as part of the 7th IAK Air Defense (Leningrad), it has been providing air cover The road of life. In total, in the first 12 months of the war, 3010 combat sorties were carried out with a total flight time of 2431 hours, 199 air battles were carried out, 102 enemy aircraft were reported shot down, and 27 aircraft were lost in the air. The regiment was later reorganized into the 27th Guards.

Captain Zhidov G.N., squadron commander, conducted 33 air battles, shot down 4 aircraft personally and 12 in the group, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner:

“What gives us the opportunity to emerge victorious? The first is that we are flying a Yak-1 aircraft, which is superior in its flight performance to the enemy Me-109 aircraft, with which we mainly have to engage in air combat. The second thing is that our pilots, skillfully using the machine, boldly enter into battle and win...

It is easy to conduct an air battle on a Yak-1 aircraft with Me-109 aircraft, because the Yak-1 aircraft is not inferior in speed, has a smaller turning radius, catches up with the Me-109 both in a dive and when climbing - in these cases it is only necessary to use the R-7 correctly(screw pitch regulator): When diving, it is necessary to make the propeller pitch heavier, and when climbing, lighten the propeller.

Pidtykan I. D., conducted 60 air battles, shot down 8 planes personally and 6 in a group, awarded the Order of the Red Banner (hereinafter - Hero of the Soviet Union):

Air combat on an I-16 aircraft can be successfully conducted with any type of enemy aircraft due to the good maneuverability of the I-16. True, air combat sometimes takes the form of defense (especially with enemy fighters at an altitude of over 2000 m), but defense can also be very active and successful. Air combat is almost safe if you have developed good powers of observation.

The most important moment in air combat is the beginning of the battle, i.e. we must be the first to detect the enemy or timely see the moment when the enemy wants to attack our planes, and the second especially important point is the way out of the battle...

The best combat altitude for the I-16 is an altitude of up to 3000 m, and a combat altitude is considered to be 1000 - 2000 m. At this altitude, the I-16 aircraft will have maximum maneuverability and speed... As soon as the enemy aircraft begins to attack, you must calmly go at that in the same direction, only with a slight slip(maneuver in the horizontal plane, carried out with minimal roll), in order to prevent him from conducting aimed fire. As we get closer, it is necessary to move from defense to offense, i.e. make a quick 180-degree turn and fire head-on...

Conducting air combat with enemy fighters in turns on an I-16 aircraft is successful because The I-16 turns better than any enemy aircraft... After the first successful attack, the German pilot gets lost and will “dangle” in the sight until you shoot him down.

"Junkers-87" has good maneuverability - the turning radius is almost equal to the turning radius of the I-16. The plane in the air does not go in a straight line, but seems to “dance”, thereby making it impossible to conduct aimed fire at it, but after the first attacks of our I-16s, all resistance almost ceases, and[enemy pilot] walks in a straight line and does not try to position his plane so that the pilot himself can fire from the cannon or allow the gunner-radio operator to fire. The Ju-87 is an easily shot down aircraft during skillful attacks...

Fight between I-16 and Me-110. As in any air battle, here you need to try to get to the tail, have an advantage in height and hit mainly from behind and at the tail, initially at the gunner, and then at the engines and cockpit. It is not advisable to turn into a turn, because The Me-110 turns very well on one engine, and its turn is equal to the turn of the Yak-1, and also because the gunner-radio operator will fire throughout the turn... With a well-functioning engine on an I-16 aircraft, you can successfully follow the Me-11 110, provided that it does not dive, but goes along the horizon...”

(TsAMO, f. 123 IAP, on. 459716, d. 1, pp. 1-3)

This report was written in the late 1940s. within the program American army on the study and systematization of war experience. The author of the report is Wehrmacht Colonel General Erhard Rauss.

“In terms of numbers, the Russian Air Force was greatly underestimated by the Germans before the start of the Eastern Campaign. But, despite their numbers, which increased significantly during the war, they were unable to have a decisive influence on the outcome of the battles in the East.

Russian Air Force tactics were inflexible and strictly limited to fixed patterns. They lacked tactical flexibility. Only at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 could the first germs of a strategic air war be observed. Russian long-range aviation, which German radio intelligence had been tracking since 1941, carried out primarily transport operations. Although the Air Force was an independent part of the Russians armed forces, they were used almost exclusively on the battlefield, in joint operations with the army.

The Germans identified impending Russian attacks, among other signs, by the early assembly and concentration of combat aircraft at airfields near the front line. In this regard, the Russians turned out to be great experts in the construction of auxiliary airfields. Ruthlessly exploiting labor resources from the local population and using the most primitive equipment, they could completely prepare airfields in astonishingly a short time. Neither winter, nor periods of rain or mud could interfere with their work. The Russian Air Force widely used decoy airfields and mock-up aircraft, as well as numerous camouflage methods.

In battle, the direction of air strikes and the degree of its participation were controlled by command posts located near the front line; one of the most well-executed operations in this regard was the control of fighters from the ground. On the other hand, the interaction between fighters and attack aircraft or bombers left much to be desired. Fighters rarely accompanied them during combat missions, and if there was an escort, it usually scattered at the first contact with the enemy.

The Russians have proven themselves to be excellent pilots in bad weather. Although their aircraft were not equipped for instrument flight, fighters and attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield in the worst weather. In order to take the enemy by surprise, they liked to take advantage of low clouds and snowstorms. Russian night fighters generally limited themselves to attacking only those targets they were ordered to destroy, and were equipped with instruments for only the most basic navigation. The Germans were surprised to discover that Russian night lights almost always flew with their side lights lit.

Air formations concentrated for operations always found a rapid decline in combat capability as soon as they entered combat. The number of combat-ready aircraft was rapidly declining, and it took quite a long time to bring them back into combat-ready condition.

The Russians made extensive use of artificial smoke for camouflage and to protect industrial plants, railway junctions and bridges against strategic air attacks. The rapid repair of bombing damage was particularly remarkable, especially in the case of railway structures. Once again, labor from the local civilian population was ruthlessly recruited for these purposes.

During the war, air supply operations reached significant proportions. The planes either delivered supplies to airfields or dropped them by parachute. A special role was played by the dropping of agents and saboteurs behind the front line.

At the beginning of the war, Russian ground forces were extremely vulnerable to air attacks. However, changes came very soon. Russian troops became less vulnerable to attacks by German dive bombers and attack aircraft. The Russians paid a lot of attention to preparing troops for defense against attacks from low altitude. All the weapons available to the troops were turned against the attacking aircraft, thereby forming a dense defense. When weather permitted, Russian troops avoided populated areas and skillfully took cover in the area. If, in exceptional cases, they found refuge in populated areas, then they received strict orders not to go out during the daytime.

As part of Soviet ideology, the Russians used increasing numbers of female pilots and other crew members as the war continued. Women not only flew transport aircraft, but also flew combat vehicles.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Russian Air Force, although large in number and built on a grand scale, was prepared in a very primitive manner. Their will to fight, aggressive spirit and mastery of technical aspects left much to be desired. Constantly outnumbered by the Luftwaffe, they always performed the worst when it came to combat. Usually a small number of German fighters was enough to clear the skies of Russian aircraft."

Translation by Evgeny Kovalev

Victory, of course, has absolutely important in war, but the face of the victorious state depends on the price that was paid for it. IN in this case the price of victory in the air can be determined primarily by the number of lost crews and aircraft during the period of hostilities. The price of victory in the air is the most important criterion the level of combat skill and military art of the command staff and flight crews, which determines the winner as having achieved victory with much less losses than the enemy.

Unfortunately, we have to reckon with the fact that the price for the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was paid very, very high. Victory in the air did not become a completely separate indicator in this regard. Judge for yourself.

If on the part of the Red Army Air Force on the Soviet-German front 129,400 aircraft took part in combat operations, which carried out 3.8 million sorties (29 on average per aircraft), then on the part of the German Air Force - 48,450, which carried out 1. 8 million sorties (37 average per aircraft).

During the war years on the Soviet-German front, the ratio of aircraft losses was 1 to 1.15. If the combat losses of the Space Forces Air Force amounted to 46,100, and non-combat losses - 60,300, then the German Air Force on the Soviet-German front lost 52,850 aircraft, and in total since 1941 - 85,650 aircraft on the Eastern and Western fronts.

According to Germany itself, losses in German Air Force aircraft, taking into account damage from 10% to the complete destruction of the aircraft, for the entire Second World War world war, from 01.09.39, amount to 71965.

Moreover, if the USSR aircraft industry produced only 122,100 aircraft from 1941 to 1945, then the German aircraft industry produced 100,749. According to other data, 113,514. Therefore, we can talk about a larger number of aircraft produced and fewer combat losses by the Soviet Union .

However, we must not forget that Germany fought on two fronts: from 1939 - 64 months, and its non-combat losses were several times less than the losses of the Air Force, which can indicate a generally high level of aircraft equipment and an equally high level of training Luftwaffe flight personnel.

If the irretrievable losses of the air force crew of the spacecraft from 1941 to 1945 amounted to 48,158, including 28,193 pilots, then Germany lost more than 66 thousand flight personnel in the same period killed and missing on two fronts. According to other sources, the Luftwaffe from 1939 to 1945 lost only about 24 thousand killed and 27 thousand missing.

Even based on these figures, one can imagine the cost of victory in the air for the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.

The results of the combat operations of the Soviet Air Force in the initial period of the war were negatively affected, first of all, by the predominance of obsolete types of aircraft in their composition, the crowded deployment of aviation units and formations, and the cumbersome and sluggish organizational structure of front-line aviation. In addition, the level of training of the flight personnel did not meet the requirements imposed by the war.

The acceleration of the growth in the number of aviation personnel occurred to the detriment of the quality of their training, which, in turn, resulted in a decrease in the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of air units and air formations. On the eve of the war, the Air Force command staff found itself unsure of itself. The flight personnel were slowly retrained for new combat equipment, and were poorly prepared for flights in adverse weather conditions, at night, and for combat use complex species maneuver. The acquired combat experience in military conflicts of the interwar period was poorly suited to the conditions of modern warfare, and in addition, when generalized, it led to incorrect conclusions, primarily in the tactics of the aviation branches.

All this led to high losses of Soviet aviation in the first two years of the war, increasing the “price of victory” for the Red Army Air Force.

Despite the fact that the size of the Air Force spacecraft fleet was constantly increasing due to the growth in the volume of aircraft received from the aircraft industry and under Lend-Lease, the composition of the German Air Force group on the Soviet-German front was actually consistently decreasing. As a result, this led to a twofold or more numerical superiority of the Soviet Air Force air group starting in 1943 in all strategic operations. By the end of the war, the number of new types of aircraft had increased to almost 97%.

During the war years, the spacecraft entered service with the Air Force whole line modern cars, not inferior to similar aircraft in Germany. The Soviet aviation industry managed to seriously improve the combat qualities of aircraft without increasing their weight.

In addition, Soviet aircraft, born just before the war, had reserves for modification, while German aircraft, created much earlier, had actually exhausted such capabilities already at the beginning of the war. At the same time, shortcomings in combat use, organization of interaction and control of aviation in individual operations contributed to an increase in unjustified losses of spacecraft aviation and certainly affected the price of victory.

One of the reasons for high losses can also be called the lack of centralized leadership Soviet Air Force. The division of aviation, before the creation of air armies, into army and front-line aviation prevented the massing of front-line aviation in the main directions.

A huge role in the Air Force personnel training system was played by the formation of reserve and training air regiments, the continuous pilot training system and the reduction of training time in aviation schools and colleges. In essence, on the one hand, these measures were justified under those conditions. On the other hand, they can also be considered a factor in increasing losses.

Researchers of Air Force spacecraft losses point out that many of them resulted from significant shortcomings in the theory and practice of the combat use of the Air Force. The lack of initiative in the spacecraft air force in the initial period of the war led to its huge losses. In addition to errors in the theory of the construction and use of the Air Force, one can also pay attention to the neglect of the experience of the war taking place in the West. This is especially true for air supremacy and the practice of distributing the main Luftwaffe efforts among tasks.

The most important is the fact that the fight against enemy aviation was carried out, as a rule, by fighter aviation, covering the most important groupings of front troops and providing support for other types of aviation.

At the same time, for a number of reasons, such active actions as hunting, blocking airfields, imposing air battles, unlike the enemy, were carried out extremely rarely. It can be said that radar sights and electronic warfare equipment were almost completely absent in Soviet aviation, which, in turn, imposed significant restrictions on the use of the air force both at night and in difficult weather conditions. And this also led to unjustified losses...

Thus, it can be argued that the spacecraft air force suffered significant combat losses and even more significant non-combat losses.

N. Bodrikhin considers the amazing results of the Luftwaffe aces to be untenable. He's writing: “After all, the results of the combat work of more than 40 thousand fighter pilots alone who fought on the side of Germany during the Second World War are described by the law of normal distribution, and if we assume that the best of them actually won the declared number of victories (352 - E. Hartman, 301 - G. Barnhorn, 13 more pilots - over 200.88 - over 100, etc.), then the total number of aircraft shot down in air battles will exceed the actual number several times.” He claims, “that the losses of Allied aircraft in World War II, according to American data, consisted of non-combat losses (40-50%), losses from anti-aircraft artillery fire (15-20%), the number of those shot down in air battles (20-30%) and lost at airfields. (7-12%).

In this case, the losses of aircraft from the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in air battles in the European theater should not exceed 30-35 thousand aircraft, and the estimated number of those shot down by Luftwaffe pilots exceeds 60-80 thousand.”

Of course, patriotism is a good and necessary thing. Today it is just not enough. But as far as the historical past is concerned, in this regard the truth is still more valuable. Studies show that Germany, by the nature of Air Force losses, lost 57%, or 30,125 aircraft in air battles on the Soviet-German front, 17% were aircraft losses at airfields (8984) and 26% from anti-aircraft artillery fire.

Consequently, in this case, American data are not suitable for assessing the criterion for losses of both the German Air Force and the Space Force.

It should be noted that the method of destroying enemy aircraft in the air became most widespread during the war. This method accounts for 96% of all sorties flown Soviet aviation in the struggle for air supremacy. In this case, Luftwaffe pilots during the Second World War could well have won about 70 thousand victories, including 25 thousand in Western Front and 45 thousand in Vostochny. However, some researchers argue that real numbers victories of Luftwaffe pilots amount to 19 thousand on the Western Front, and about 32 thousand on the Eastern Front. In total, about 5,000 German pilots had five or more victories to their credit.

The list of Soviet aces includes more than 2000 names, of which about 800 pilots achieved 15 and more wins, another 400 - from 10 to 15 and about 200 pilots shot down 20 or more enemy aircraft.

In no case should we forget that after the First World War in the young Republic of Soviets, and then in the Soviet Union, there was no continuity of generations in the field of fighter aviation. There was no school... We started from scratch. In Germany, on the contrary, great attention devoted to the training of fighter pilots. There they perfectly understood their value in future war, which means they valued them. And the question of continuity as such did not arise at all. It is not surprising that in this case the German ace was first and foremost an individualist and, if you like, a “hunter”. He was not afraid to improvise tactics in the name of aerial victory.

The spacecraft air force carried out the smallest number of combat missions for “hunting.” For example, in the 28th IAP, in which I had the opportunity to serve as a lieutenant after college, only 86 sorties were carried out for this task (in 1944 - 48, in 1945 - 38). Of 14,045 combat missions, this is only 6%.

According to the authoritative opinion of Hero of the Soviet Union, General G.A. Baevsky, “the Luftwaffe was not only a group of outstanding pilots, they, and leading German aces A. Galland and E. Hartmann agreed with this, also had “thousands of young, unknown German pilots who died without winning a single victory.” battle!

This once again shows how difficult the profession of a fighter pilot is.” French fighter pilot Pierre Yuesterman shares this opinion in principle: “There seemed to be no “middle” in the Luftwaffe, and German pilots could be divided into two very clear categories.

Aces, who made up 15-20% of the total number of pilots, were indeed superior to the average Allied pilots. And the rest didn't deserve much attention. Brave, but unable to get the most out of their aircraft. The reason for this was primarily a hasty selection due to heavy losses in the Battle of Britain and in the Russian campaign. Their training was very short and not very well balanced; paramount importance was given to the cultivation of morale, devotion to the great German idea and adherence to military theories, while underestimating technical instruction. From the end; In 1943, these mistakes were compounded by an acute shortage of fuel. So there existed, gradually suffering huge losses in difficult trials in the skies of Europe, a heroic detachment of “experienced people” of the Luftwaffe, real veterans with three or four thousand hours of flight behind them. These pilots, who went through the Spanish school civil war, who survived successful Luftwaffe campaigns since 1940, knew their job thoroughly, in all its intricacies - careful and self-confident flying masters, they were very dangerous.

On the other hand, there were young fanatics with a high fighting spirit and bound by iron discipline, who could be sent into battle with relative ease in many difficult circumstances.

Overall, in late 1944 and early 1945 the average standard of German fighter pilots was much higher than at any other time since 1940. This can be explained - apart from the importance of battle morale and a sense of patriotism - by the fact that the elite fighter pilot units had unsurpassed authority and primacy in everything - until the distribution of fuel and lubricants.”

During the war, the 28th IAP destroyed only 511 aircraft and lost 56 pilots.

During the war, the 5th Guards IAP scored 539 confirmed victories and lost 89 pilots (36 in air battles, 23 did not return from a combat mission, 7 died from anti-aircraft artillery fire, 7 during bombing, attack and shelling, 16 - in disasters).

The 32nd IAP destroyed 518 enemy aircraft during the war and lost 61 pilots.

The 9th IAP shot down 558 enemy aircraft in total.

The most effective regiment in the Red Army Air Force was the 402nd Red Banner Sevastopol IAP, which destroyed 810 enemy aircraft in battle.

So why couldn’t the most successful Luftwaffe fighter squadron (52nd) destroy 10,000 aircraft during the war? After all, it is necessary to divide into three groups, in our opinion - into three regiments. And it will turn out to be more than three thousand per group, per regiment. Moreover, only one squadron in the Luftwaffe was so effective, and not all. Why not agree... For example, in another elite fighter squadron (“Green Heart” - 54th) from June 22, 1941 to 1945, 416 pilots did not return from combat missions. In 1942, 93 pilots were lost there, in 1943 - 112, and in 1944 - 109. And during the very first month of the war in Russia, from June 22 to July 22, 1941, 37 pilots of this squadron (out of 112 those on the list) were killed or went missing. That is, in each regiment or group there is an average of more than ten per unit.

For example, in 1943, Major Hans Hann (108 victories) was captured from this squadron on February 21, Oberleutnant Hans Beisswenger (152 victories) was shot down and died on March 17, Major Reinhard Seiler (109 victories) was also shot down on July 5 , and Lieutenant Max Stots (189 victories) bailed out and was captured on August 19. We still believe that if a German pilot with so many victories was shot down, then he could not have had so many.

In the Soviet Union, only 2,332 pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Of these, 810 (35%) are in fighter aviation. Total twice - 61. Of these, 22 (36%) in fighter aviation. A total of three times - 2, and all in IA.

In Germany, 1,730 pilots became holders of the Knight's Cross. Of these, 568 (33%) are in fighter aviation.

192 pilots were awarded the Oak Branch. Of these, 120 (63%) are in fighter aviation; “swords” - 41, including 25 (61%) in fighter aviation; “diamonds” - 12, including 9 (75%) in fighter aviation.

And here, in the awarding of ace pilots of both sides, we see similar restraint. And here and there they didn’t hang high awards on just anyone. This means that Goebbels’s propaganda was not completed, since in the Third Reich Knight’s Crosses should have been poured out several times more. At two or three! But no. In the two countries, awards were awarded, as a rule, for a certain number of victories, and each victory, as is known, had a high price.

yFPZY RETCHPZP DOS CHPKOSCH

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nsch HTSE PFNEYUBMY, YuFP ABOUT NOPZYI UPCHEFULYI BTPPDTPNBI (RTETSDE CHUEZP CH ъBRBDOPN pchp) ABOUT TBUUFPSOYY 12–50 LN PF ZPUKHDBTUFCHEOOPK ZTBOYGSCH OBIPYMPUSH RTYNETOP RP 100 UBNPMEFPCH , YuFP VSCHMP CHSHCHJCHBOP RETEKHYUYCHBOYEN MEFOPZP UPUFBCHB ABOUT OPCHHA NBFETYBMSHOKHA YUBUFSH. dBCE CH FEY UMKHYUBSI, LPZDB BCHYBRPML YNEM YFBFOSHCHK UPUFBCH 62 UBNPMEFB, TBNEEEOOYE CHUEK LFPC FEIOIL ABOUT PDOPC RMPEBDLE DEMBMP VBYTPCHBOYE CHUSHNB OBRTSCEOOSHCHN. dPVBCHYN L ULBBOOPNKH, YuFP ЪBRPЪDBMSCHE OE CHUEZDB DPUFBFPYUOSHE NETSCH RP NBULYTPCHLE BTPPDTPNPCH OE RPЪCHPMYMY PVEЪPRBUYFSH OBUY TBUUFBCHMEOOSH MYOEKLBNY NBYOSCH PF O BRBDEOYS U CHPDHIB. PFUHFUFCHYE TSHISSHICH DEDUFCH HRTBChmeis Yubufsnyi on TBUUFPSOI (TBDIP) I am doskhchlpch yi yi yurpmshpchibys rypmlkh tburpmbzbzbzbzbfshus about Ouulpmshlei BTPDTPNBI.

UOPCHB RTPGYFYTHEN TPNBO yRBOPCHB, P LPFPTPN ZPCHPTYMPUSH CH OBYUBME ZMBCHSHCH. “rTEDRPMBZBMPUSH, YuFP VPY VHDHF CHEUFYUSH ABOUT VPMSHYPK CHCHUPFE: LYUMPTPDODOSHE VTYLEFSH UBLMBDSHCHBMYUSH CH LTSHMSHECHESCH LBUUEFSCH... rPMYFTBVPFOILY PVIPDYMY NBYOSCH Y ЪBZMS DSHCHBMY CH RPMECHSHCHE BRFEYULY: ЪБЗПФПЧМЭОШЧ MY RTERBTBFSCH RTPFYCH PVNPTBTSYCHBOYS? rTPCHETSMY, OBDEFP MY FERMPE VEMSHE? ъBMYCHBMY CH FETNPUSCH YPLPMBD Y LBLBP. OE RPFETSM MY CH UREYLE LFP-MYVP RETYUBFLY, YURTBCHOSCH MY LYUMPTPDOSHE NBULY?” .

nBMP LFP YЪ BCHYBGYPOOSHI UREGYBMYUFPCH UPNOECHBMUS, YuFP PUOPCHOSCHE UICHBFLY TBCHETOHFUS CHVMYY RTBLFYUEULYI RPFPMLPCH CHSCUPFSCH UBNPMEFPCH. MEFYULLPCH HYUMY: LFP UNPZ PLBBBFSHUS CHCHYE OERTYSFEMS FPF ZPURPDUFCHHEF CH VPA. h TEBMSHOPK TSYЪ OENEGLBS BCHYBGYS DEKUFCHPCHBMB ABOUT NBMSCHI, B YOPZDB RTEDEMSHOP NBMSCHI CHCHUPFBI. h LFYI HUMPCHYSI UPCHEFULYE MEFUYILY-YUFTEVYFEMY, RTETSDE CHUEZP RYMPFYTPCHBCHYE OPCHSHHE NYZ-3 Y SL-1, ЪББУБУФХА OE NPZMY UPCHMBDBFSH U NBYOBNY. h OENEGLYI PFYUEFBI KHLBSCCHBMPUSH, UFP OETEDLP MEFUYILY y-18 (FBL RTPFPYCHOIL RPOBUYUBMKH OBSCHCHBM nyz-3), CHDS VPK ABOUT NBMPK CHCHUPFE, OE URTBCHMSMYUSH U RYMPFYTPCHBOYEN, UTSHCHCH BMYUSH CH YFPRPT Y TBVYCHBMYUSH. VEKHUMPCHOP, PUOPCHOBS FSTSEUFSH CHPDKHYOSCHI VPECH MEZMB ABOUT RMEYU CHEFETBOPCH: y-16, y-153, y-15VYU. PE NOPZYI UMHYUBSI OEPUCHPEOOOSCH "NYZY" Y "REYLY" PLBBBMYUSH VEURPMEYOSCHN VBMMMBUFPN.

MYYSH PFDEMSHOSH LPNBODYTSCH UKHNEMY PTZBOYPCHBFSH YURPMSHJPCHBOYE CH VPA OPCHSHHI NBYO. lTPNE HCE KHRPNSOKHFSHI LPNRPMLPC r. y. rHFYCHLP, h.o. pTMPCHB, ch.r. yCHBOPCHB, OBDP PFNEFYFSH RPNPEOILB LPNBODYTB 28-ZP YBR LBRYFBOB y. h. y. UYDPTEOLP, CHPZMBCHMSCHYEZP 23-K YBR. u VPMSHYPK CHETPSFOPUFSHA PDO YЪ RPDYUYOOOSCHI RPUMEDOEZP MEKFEOBOF z. O. nPOBUFSHTULYK UVYM OEDBMELP PF mSHCHPCHB ZHEMSHJEVEMS z. zhTBKFBZB (freitag island) JЪ II/JG3, LPFPTSCHK DP 2 YAMS ULTSHCHBMUS CH PDOPC JIBF, DPTsYDBSUSH RTYIPDB UCHPYI CHPKUL .

hCE RETCHSHCHE UFSHCHYULY RPLBYBMY, YuFP CH ZTHRRPCHSHCHI VPSI VEKHUMPCHOPE RTECHPUIPDUFCHP VSHMP X OENEGLYI MEFUYLPCH. noPZYE UPCHEFULYE RYMPFSH VSHMY PFMYUOSCHNY RYMPFBTSOILBNY, NEFLP UFTEMSMY RP LPOKHUBN Y VEUUFTBYOP VTPUBMYUSH CH UICHBFLH. OP POY KHUFKHRBMY OENGBN CH KHNEOY CHBYNPDEKUFCHPCHBFSH CH VPA, UMEFBOOPUFY RBT, YUEFCHETPL, ZTKHRR. OE FPMSHLP LPNBODOSHCHK, OP Y TSDPChPK UPUFBC MAJFCHBZHZHE KHUREM OBLPRYFSH VPMSHYPK VPECHPK PRSHCHF CH OEVE rPMSHYY, ZhTBOGYY, BOZMYY; CHSHCHYULB, RPMHYUEOOBS CH VPSI, OBNOPZP PFMYUBMBUSH PF FPK, YuFP RTYPVTEFBEFUS ABOUT RPMYZPOBI. OBRTYNET, CH ULBDTE JG51 L YAOA 1941 Z. BUBNY VSHMY OE FPMSHLP LPNNPPDPT Y LPNBODYTSCH ZTHRR, OP Y NMBDIYE PZHYGETSCH, FBLYE, LBL MEKFEOBOF z. bt (H. Bar), PDETSBCHYYK 17 RPVED, B FBLCE PVET-MEKFEOBOF X. zTBUUET (H. Crasser) Y MEKFEOBOPSH v. zBMMPCHYU (part Gallowitsch), h. iHRRETFG (H. Huppertz), h. uEZBFG ( H. Segatz), b. wMSKZ (e. Fleig) .

oEPTSYDBOOP DMS UPCHEFULPZP LPNBODPCHBOYS 22 YAOS 1941 Z. RTPFPYCHOIL CHRETCHSCHE RTYNEOM CH YYTPLYI NBUYFBVBI NEMLYE PULPMPYUOSCH VPNVSHCH. rP NOEOYA THLPCHPDUFCHB MAZHFCHBZHZHE, LZHZHELF Refinery VShchFSH DPUFYZOKHF MYYSH RTY NBUUYTPCHBOOPN YURPMSHЪPCHBOY OPCHSHHI PZOERTYRBUPCH. rПФПНХ L OBYUBMH MEFB OENEGLYE FSHMPCHSHCHE UMHTSVSH RPDZPFPCHYMY ЪBRBUSH YЪ 2298500 2-LYMPZTBNNNPCHSHCHI SD-2 Y 1152950 SD-10, CHUSEYI PLPMP 10 LZ, CH FP CHTENS LBL TB OEE SING YURPMSHЪPCHBMYUSH MYYSH CH EDYOYUOSCHI UMKHYUBSI.

h VPNVPPFUELBI NOPZYI DCHHINPFPTOSHHI VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLPCH HUFBOPCHYMY LBUUEFSCH, LKHDB ЪBZTHTSBMY 360 SD-2 YMY 60–70 SD-10. dTHZYN CHBTYBOFPN YURPMSHЪPCHBOYS NEMLYI VPNV VSHMY LPOFEKOETSH bch-250, LPFPTSHCHE RPDCHEYCHBMYUSH RPD LTSHMSHSNY Ju87, Bf109, Bf110 Y DTKHZYI UBNPMEFPCH, OE YNEAEYI CHOHF TEOOYI VPNVPFUELPCH. lPOFEKOET bch-250 CHNEEBM 96 SD-2 YMY 17 SD-10 Y TBULTSHCHBMUS, OE DPMEFBS DP YENMY. vPNVSH CHATSHCHBMYUSH LBL RTY UTBVBFSHCHBOY KHDBTOPZP NEIBOINB, FBL Y VEJ OEZP, TBTSCHCHBSUSH ABOUT CHCHUPFE DP RPMKHNEFTB PF YENMY. VE YURPMSHЪPCHBOYS LBUUEF PRFYNBMSHOBS CHSHUPFB VPNVPNEFBOYS UPUFBCHMSMB PLPMP 500 N, B U LPOFEKOETBNY OEULPMSHLP VPMSHYE. lTPIPFOSHCH PULPMLY PF LBTSDPK VPNVSH TBUUEYCHBMYUSH CH TBDHYHUE DP 12 N. h PVPYI UMHYUBSI (RTY YURPMSHЪPCHBOYY SD-2, Y SD-10) ABOUT THE COLLECTION OF PVTBЪPCHCHCHBMPUSH RPDPVYE LPCHTP CHCHCHI DPTPTsEL, LPFPTSCHE OCHETOSLB RPTBTSBMY UFPSEYE UBNPMEFSCH, BCHFPFTBOURPTF, OE URTSFBCHYYEUS CH HLTSHCHFYSI CHPKULB. rP PVTBOPNH CHSTBTSEOYA z. oPCHBTTSCH, "GEMSCHK MYCHEOSH FYI UBFBOYOULYI SYG RTPYYEM OBD TKHUULYNY BTPPDTPNBNY" . OP CE PFNEFYM, YuFP VPNVSH SD-2 Y PUPVEOOP SD10 CHTSCHCHBMYUSH RTY NBMEKYI CHYVTBGYSI, B YJ-UB OEDPTBVPFPL LPOUFTHLGYY YI ЪBEENMSMP CH TEYEFFLBI LBUUEF. rPUME FPZP LBL VEЪ CHPDEKUFCHYS RTPPFYCHOILB CHPPTCHBMYUSH CH CHPDHIE PDYO Ju88A Y PDYO Do17Z, B CH DTHZYI UMKHYUBSI CHSHCHRBCHYE RTY RPUBDLE VPNVSH "NYOTPCHBMY" UPVUFCHEOOP E MEFOPE RPME, LPNBODHAYK ChPЪDKHIOSCHN ZHMPFPN ZEOETBM-ZHEMSHDNBTYBM b. LEUUEMSHTYOZ PZTBOYUM CH DBMSHOEKYEN YURPMSHЪPCHBOYE NEMLYI PULPMPYUOSHI VPNV LPOFEKOETBNY ABOUT OBTHTSOPK RPDCHEULE.

JOCEOET-ZEOETBM b. nBTLCHBTD (e. Marquard), THLPCHPDYCHYK TBTBVPFLPK BCHYBVPNV CH FEIOYUUEULPN HRTBCHMEOY ZETNBOULPZP nYOYUFETUFCHB BCHYBGYY, CHRPUMEDUFCHY CHSHCHULBBMUS CH BDTEU "UBFBOYOULYI SYG" UMEDHAEIN PVT BUPN: “oEUNPFTS ABOUT KHUREY RTYNEOOYS CH RETCHSHE DOY TKHULPK LBNRBOYY, SD-2 FBL Y PUFBMYUSH “VBVPYULBNY-PDOPDOECHLBNY”. UPCHEFULYE UTEDUFCHB rchp CHULPTE RPLBUBMY UEVS CHEUSHNB DEKUFCHEOOSCHNY CH VPTSHVE U OYLPMEFSEYNY VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLBNY, ЪBUFBCHYCH OVIY UBNPMEFSCH ЪBVYTBFSHUS CHCHYY THINGS. bFP Y TEYYMP UKhDShVKh SD-2 OILBLYI OPCHCHI UREGYBMSHOSCHI RTYURPUPVMEOYK DMS YI YURPMSHЪPCHBOYS OE VSHMP TBTBVPFBOP .

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OEMSHЪS UVTBUSCHBFSH UP UUEEFPC RUYIPMPZYUEULYK ZBLFPT. pVTBFYNUS L CHPURPNYOBOYSN LPNBODHAEEZP UECHETOSCHN ZHMPFPN BDNYTBMB b. h. zPMPCHLP. rPUME VEЪOBLBЪBOOPZP RTPMEFB 17 YAOS 1941 Z. OENEGLPZP UBNPMEFB-TBCHEDYUILB BDNYTBM ЪBRYUBM CH DOECHOYLE: “rPVSCCHBCH ABOUT VBFBTESI, WITH ЪBDBCHBM LPNBODYTBN PDYO Y FPF CE CHPRTPU: RPYUENH OE UFTEMSMY, OEUNPFTS ABOUT YOUFTHLGYY PFLTSCHBFSH PZPOSH? rPMKHYUM PDYO Y FPF TSE PFCHEF: OE PFLTSCHBMY YЪ-ЪB VPSJUFP-MYVP OBRKhFBFSH. FP EUFSH YOUFTHHLGYY YOUFTHLGYSNY, B UPOBOE VPMSHYOUFCHB YЪ OBU RTDDPMTsBMP NEIBOYUEULY RPDYUYOSFSHUS PVEEK OBGEOOOPUFY RPUMEDOYI MEF: OE RPDDBCHBFSHUS ABOUT RTPCHPLB GYA, OE DBChBFSH RPCHPDB L YOGYDEOFBN, NPZKHEIN CHSHCHBFSH NBMP-NBMSHULYK LPOZHMYLF Y RPUMKHTSYFSH ZHTNBMSHOSHCHN RTEDMPZPN DMS TBCHSCHCHBOYS CHPKOSHCH.”

FERETSH IPTPYP YJCHEUFOP, YuFP U PLFSVTS 1939 Z. DP 22 YAOS 1941 Z. VPMEE 500 TB OENEGLYE UBNPMEFSH CHFPTZBMYUSH CH OBUYE CHP'DKHOPE RTPUFTBOUFCHP, CH FPN YUYUME 152 TB ЪБ Х 1941 Z. UPCHEFULYE RPUFSH chopu UPPVEBMY P RTPMEFBI TBCHEDYUYLPCH OBD FETTYFPTYEK RTYZTBOYUSHI PLTHZPCH, LPNBODITSCH OPOPUYMY NBTYTHFSH DCHYTSEOYS OJCHBOSCHI ZPUFEK ABOUT UREGYBMSHOSCH LBTFSHCH, DPLMBDSCHBMY CH ZEOETBMSHOSCHK YFBV. OP YOUFTHLGYS ЪBRTEEBMB ЪООФОПК BTFYMMETYY PFLTSCHCHBFSH PZPOSH ABOUT RPTBTSEOYE, B YUFTEVYFEMSN UVYCHBFSH OBTHYYFEMEK ChPЪDKHYOPZP RTPUFTBOUFCHB. fTEVPCHBMPUSH "RTEDMPTSYFSH YN RTYENMYFSHUS ABOUT PDYO YY UPCHEFULYI BTPDTPNPCH", OP OENEGLYE UBNPMEFSCH, EUFEUFCHEOOP, KHLMPOSMYUSH PF RETEICHBFPCH Y UCHPVPDOP KHIPDYMY ABOUT UCHPA FET YFPTYA.

CHUE LFP UYMSHOP DEPTZBOYPCHSHCHBMP UYMSCH rchp. OEKhDYCHYFEMSHOP, YuFP UPUBOBOYE NOPZYI MEFYUYLPCH, ЪООYFUYUYLPCH (LBL LPNBOYTPCH, FBL Y TSDPCHSHCHI) FEN FTBZYUEULYN CHPULTEUOSCHN KhFTPN OE RETEUFTPIMPUSH ABOUT CHPEOOOSCHK MBD. OBRTYNET, 374-K PFDEMSHOSHCHK ЪОІОФОСХК ДИЧИЪПО, RTYLTSHCHBCHYYK ZPTPD LPCHEMSH Y UYYFBCHYKUS UTEDY OBYVPME VPEURPUPVOSHCH VEMPTHUYY, DPMZPE CHTENS PZOS OE PFLTSCHBM, DB TSE LPZDB OENEGLIE UBNPMEFSCH YFKHTNPCHBMY RPIYGY VBFBTEC. ъBFEN PTHDYS DYCHYYPOB OEPTSYDBOOP DMS OENGECH "PTSYMY" Y OBYUBMY UFTEMSFSH ABOUT RPTBTSEOYE. rP PDOYN DBOOSCHN, CHUA PFCHEFUFCHOOPUFSH CHJSM ABOUT UEVS LPNBODYT RPDTBDEMEOYS LBRYFBO zh. u. DENYO, RP DTHZYN RTEDUFBCHYFEMY YOURELFYTHAEEK LPNYUUYY.

UPEDYOOYS DBMSHOEVPNVBTDYTPCHPYuOPK BCHYBGYY OE RPUFTBDBMY PF OBMEFPCH ABOUT BHTPDTPNSCH. tBURPTSTSEOYE LPNBODPCHBOYS chchu P RTYCHEDEOY YUBUFEK BCHYBLPTRHUPCH CH VPECHA ZPFPCHOPUFSH VSHMP RETEDBOP CH 6 Yu 44 NYO. th UFP CE? “about CHUEI BTPPDTPNBI OBYUBMYUSH NYFYOZY, ЪBRYUBOP CH PZHYGYBMSHOPK ITPOYLE bdd. MEFYUYYY, YFKHTNBOSHCH, FEIOYYYYE BCHYBUREGYBMYUFSH LMSMYUSH UTBTSBFSHUS U CHTBZPN DP RPMOPZP EZP TBZTPNB, ЪBCHETSMY tPDYOH, RBTFYA, OBTPD..." . fPMSHLP PLPMP 10 YU ZEOETBMPN r. and. tsYZBTECHSHN VSHMB RPUFBCHMEOB ЪBDББУБ 3-НХ БЧИБЛПТРХУХ dd RP HOYUFPTSEOYA ULPRMEOYK CHTBTSEULYI CHPKUL CH TBKPOE UKHCHBMPL, Y MYYSH CH 13 Yu 40 NYO RETCHSHE VPNVBTDYTPCHAILY ABOUT YUBMY CHUMEF. fBLYN PVTBBPN, VPMEE UENY YUBUPCH RETCHPK RPMPCHYOSCH DOS PLBBBMYUSH HRHEEOSHCH.

PUFBMPUSH RPDCHEUFY YFPZY DOS. OB PUOPCHBOY UPCHEFULYI UCHPDPL, RPMHYUEOSHI YI RTYZTBOYUOSCHI TBKOPCH, YFBV chchu lTBUOPK bTNYY UDEMBM CHCHCHPD, YuFP, RP LTBKOEK NETE, 1136 UBNPMEFPCH (CH FPN YUYUME 10 Ъ UPU FBChB chchu yuETOPNPTULPZP ZHMPFB) RPZYVMY CH RETCHSHCHK DEOSH CHPKOSHCH. pFUADB CHP'OILMP IPTPYP FERTSH Y'CHEUFOPE YUYUMP 1200 RPFETSOOSHI UBNPMEFPCH. h OENEGLYI PFUEFBI KHFCHETTSDBEFUS, YuFP 322 UPCHEFULYI UBNPMEFB UVYFP CH CHPDHIYE Y 1489 HOYUFPSEOSCH ABOUT ENME. chYDYNP, RPUMEDOSS GYZhTB RPMHYUEOB RKHFEN RPDUDUEEFB PVOBTHTSEOOSHI FTPZHEKOSCHI UBNPMEFPCH ABOUT BHTPDTPNBI Y RPUBDPUOSHI RMPEBDLBI. rPDTPVPOPE YHYUEOYE BICHBUEOOSHI OENGBNY NBOYO, PRHVMYLPCHBOOSCH ZhPFPUOINLY RPLBYBMY, YuFP DBMELP OE CHUE UPCHEFULYE YUFTEVYFEMY, VPNVBTDYTPCHAILY, YFKHTNPCH YLY RPMKHYUMY UETSHESHEOSCH RPCHTETSDEOOYS CH TEKHMSHFBFE CHPDHYOSCHI OBMEFPCH. yuBUFP UBNPMEFSH VSHMY CHPTCHBOSH Y UPTTSEOSH OEENGLYNY VPNVBNY, B UCHPYNY TSE LYRBTSBNY RTY PFIPDE YЪ-ЪB OECHPNPTSOPUFY uchBLHYTPCHBFSH NBFETYBMSHOHA YUBU FSH CH IBPUE PFUFHRMEOYS. eEE PVIDOEE FP, YuFP PLBBMYUSH VTPPEOSCH DEUSFLY BVUPMAFOP YURTBCHOSHI UBNPMEFPCH, LBL LFP RTPYЪPYMP ABOUT BUTPDTPNE RPD mHGLPN . ьФПФ UMKHYUBK TBUUMEDPCHBM OBYUBMSHOIL pUPVPZP PFDEMB lTBUOPK bTNYY V. C. bVBLKHNPCH.

dMS PGEOLY KHVSHCHMY NBFETYBMSHOPK YUBUFY UPCHEFULYI chchu UTBCHOYN OBMYUYE UBNPMEFPCH ABOUT 22 YAOS 1941 W. Y DCHB DOS URKHUFS. PLBYSCHCHBEFUS, UFP ABOUT UECHETP-ъBRBDOPN OBRTBCHMEOYY LPMYUUEUFCHP VPECHSHHI NBYO UPLTBFYMPUSH ABOUT 973, ABOUT ъBRBDOPN OBRTBCHMEOYY ABOUT 1497 Y ABOUT AZP-ъBRBDOPN ABOUT 1452 EDYOYGSHCH . yFPZP 3922 UBNPMEFB. yЪ ьФПЗП RПДУЭФБ OBRББИЧБЭФУСЧШЧЧПД, УФП ЪБ RETCHSHCHK CHPEOOSHCHK DEOSH RPFETY UPUFBCHYMY OE NEOEE 2000 UBNPMEFPCH. chPF LFP OEPTSYDBOOPUFSH: CH UPPFCHEFUFCHYY U RTYCHEDEOOSCHNY TBUYUEFBNY ​​chchu lTBUOPK bTNYY OEDPUYFBMYUSH DBTSE VPMSHYE NBYO, YUEN HLBJBMY OENGSCH?! chYDYNP, RPUMEDOYE PVOBTHTSYMY CH MEUOSCHY VPMPFYUFSHI TBKPOBI DBMELPOE CHUE UBNPMEFSHCH. p UMKHYUBSI RETEDYUMPLBGYY PECHSHCHI NBYO U ZHTPOFB CH FSHM OYUEZP OE YJCHEUFOP. (NETSDH RTPYUYN, BOBMPZYUOSCH DBOOSCH DPMPTSYMY OENEGLYE YFBVOSH PZHYGETSCH TEKIUNBTYBMH Z. ZETYOZH, LPZDB ON RTYLBYBM RETERTPCHETYFSH YUYUMP HOYUFPSEOOSHCH 22 YAOS UPCHEFULY And UBNPMEFPCH.)

fBLYN PVTBBPN, PVEBS KHVShchMSH UBNPMEFPCH RTECHSHCHYBEF UKHNNH UVYFSHCHI OERTYSFEMSHULINY YUFTEVYFEMSNYY YEOYFLBNY, HOYUFPTSEOOSCHI ABOUT BTPPDTPNBI, OE CHETOKHCHYIUS U VPECH SOI ЪBDBOYK, B FBLTSE CHCHYEDYI YЪ UFTPS YЪ-ЪB RPMPNPPL, BCHBTYK Y LBFBUFTPZH! OBRTYNET, CH 64-K YUFTEVYFEMSHOPK BCHYBDYCHYYY YYNECHYYIUS CH 12-N, 149-N Y 166-N YBR (VEY KHUEFB ZHTNYTHAEYIUS 246-ZP Y 247-ZP YBR) 64 nYz-3, 175 y-16 y-153 H VPSI RPZYVMY 5 UBNPMEFPCH Y 75 RPMKHYUMY ABOUT BTPDTPNBI RPCHTETSDEOOYS TBOPK UFEREOY. eEE 3–4 YUFTEVYFEMS YNEMY TBMYUOSCH RPMPNLY, OP CH UFTPA L 23 YAOS PUFBMPUSH NEOEE UPFOY NBYO. lHDB TSE DEMYUSH PUFBMSH?!

dMS PVASUOEOYS LFPP RBTBDPLUBMSHOPZP SCHMEOYS CH FP CHTENS CHP'OIL FETNYO "OEKHYUFEOOBS KHVSCHMSH". uPZMBUOP PFUEFH, RPDZPFPCHMEOOOPNH TBVPFOILPN YFBVB chchu lTBUOPK bTNYY RPMLPCHOILPN th. and. yCHBOPCHSHCHN, L 31 YAMS 1941 Z. OEKHYUFEOOBS HVShchMSH UPUFBCHYMB 5240 UBNPMEFPCH, YMY VPMEE RPMPCHYOSCH PVEYI RPFETSH . pUPVEOOOP NOPZP VPECHSHCHI NBYO PLBBBMPUSH URYUBOP RP LFPC ZTBZHE H RETCHSHE DOY CHPKOSHCH; RP NETE OBCHEDEOYS RPTSDLB OEHYUFEOOBS KHVSHHMSH OBYUYFEMSHOP UPLTBFYMBUSH.

rP UPCHEFULYN BTIYCHOSCHN DBOOSCHN, CH FEYUEOYE RETCHPZP DOS OBOY MEFYUILY UPCHETYYMY DP 6000 UBNPMEFP-CHSHCHMEFPCH (LFP, LUFBFY, RTYNETOP CH DCHB TBUB VPMSHYE, YUEN CHSHRPMOYMY MAZHFCHBZH SAME) Y KHOYUFPTSYMY VPMEE 200 OENEGLYI UBNPMEFPCH . OENGSH PVIASCHYMY CH UTEDUFCHBI NBUUPCHPK YOZHPTNBGYY, YuFP ЪB KHUREY YN RTYYMPUSH ЪBRMBFYFSH ZYVEMSHA 35 UBNPMEFPCH . UBNP RP UEVE FBLPE YUYUMP UKhFPYuOSHI RPFETSH SCHMSEFUS DMS MAJFCHBZHZHE CHEUSHNB OBYUYFEMSHOSCHN, OP PFOPUIFSHUS L GYZHTBN UMEDHEF LTYFYUEULY, RPULPMSHLH PLBBBMPUSH, YuFP L UPU FBCHMEOYA YFPZPCHPK UCHPDLY UB 22 YAOS "RTYMPTSYMP THLH" CHEDPNUFChP DPLFPTB ZEVVEMSHUB. MEFPN 1944 Z. CH UPCHEFULYK RMEO RPRBM MEKFEOBOF X. yFBKO YЪ TPFSCH RTPRBZBODSCH MAZHFCHBZHZHE, RPLBЪBCHYYK, YuFP RPMKHYUEOOOSCH YЪ BCHYBLPTRHUPCH DBOSCH PVTBVPFBMY OEPV SHYUOSCHN PVTBBPN. eUMY PDYO YЪ LPTRHUPCH RPFETSM 35 UBNPMEFPCH, DTHZPK 12, B FTEFYK, ULBTSEN, 10, FP CH UCHPDLE UPPVEBMPUSH P UKHNNBTOSHI RPFETSI 35 UBNPMEFPCH. rP NOEOYA YDEPMPZPCH OENEGLPK RTPRBZBODYUFULPK NBYOSCH, LFP OE RPЪCHPMYMP VSC "YUFPYUOILBN YOZHPTNBGYY" KHUFBOPCHYFSH YUFYOKH Y DPMTSOP VSCHMP RPDUFEZOHFSH LPNBODYTPCH CH DBMSHOEKYEN CHPECHBFSH U TKHUULINY U NEOSHYYNYY RPFETSNY. yFBKO UPPVEIM FBLCE, YuFP RPMKHYUM KHLBBOYE OE UYFBFSH RPFETSOOSCHNY RTPRBCHYE VE CHEUFY LYRBTSY: SING NPZMY EEE CHETOHFSHUS.

hPURPMSHKHENUS NBFETYBMBNY Bundesarchiv PE zhTBKVHTZE, YJ LPFPTSCHI UMEDHEF, YuFP OENEGLYE VEJCHPCHTBFOSH RPFETY (VPECHSHCHE Y OEVPECHSHCHE) UPUFBCHYMY 78 UBNPMEFPCH, LPFPTSCHE U TBVYCHLPK RP FYRBN RTYCHEDEOSH CH FBVM. 2.5:

fBVMYGB 2.5. rPFETY MAJFCHBZHZHE ABOUT chPUFPYuOPN ZHTPOFE 22 YAOS 1941 Z.

RTYNEYUBOYE. yj FBVMYGSHCH OE SUOP, HYUIFSHCHBMYUSH MY RPFETY CHPKULPCHPK BCHYBGYY. OP, RP-CHIDYNPNH, RTYCHEDEOOSCH CHCHYE GYZhTSCH CHEUSHNB VMYOLY L YUFYOE.

lPNNEOFYTHS DBOOSCH BTIYCHB, OENEGLYK YUFPTYL y. rTYEO RYYYEF, YuFP FBLYE RPFETY OE SCHMSMYUSH OBYCHSCHUYYNY DMS MAJFCHBZHZHE. fBL, 18 BCHZKHUFB 1940 Z. SING MYYYMYUSH FPMSHLP VEJCHPCHTBFOP RPFETSOOSCHNY YЪ-ЪB RTPFPYCHPDEKUFCHYS VTYFBOGECH 77 UBNPMEFPCH Y 163 YUEMPCHEL MEFOPZP UPUFBCHB, B 1 5 UEOFSVTS FPZP CE ZPDB 61 Y 188 UPPFCHEFUFCHEOOP; RETCHSCHK DEOSH BZTEUUYY RTPFYCH UPCHEFULLPZP UPAЪB UFPYM TSYOY 133 YUMEOBN MEFOSHHI LYRBTSEK .

iPFEMPUSH VSC PFNEFYFSH, YUFP PE CHTENS PECH OBD CHEMILPVTYFBOYEK X OENEGLYI RPCHTETSDEOOSCHI UBNPMEFPCH VSHMP NBMP YBOUPCH DPMEFEFSH DP UCHPYI BTPPDTPNPCH, B CHUE UVYFSCH RYMPFSCH YMY RPZYV BMY, YMY RPRBDBMY CH RMEO. ъB 22 YAOS 1941 Z. FPMSHLP CH ULBDTE JG3 YEUFSH "NEUUETYNYYFFPCH", OEUNPFTS ABOUT RPCHTETSDEOYS, UKHNEMY UPCHETYYFSH RPUBDHLH ABOUT UCHPEK FETTYFPTYY. BOBMPZYYUOSHE UMKHYUBY RTPYIPYMY Y CH DTHZYI UPEDYOEOSI.

h IPDE CHPKOSCH ABOUT chPUFPLE, CHPNPTSOP, VSHMY PFDEMSHOSHE DOY, ULBTSEN, CH DELBVTE 1942 Z. YMY YAME 1944 Z., LPZDB MAJFCHBZHZHE FETSMY CH UHFLY RP 50–60 UBNPMEFPCH. OP FY RPFETY RTYIPDIYMYUSH PUOPCHOPN ABOUT BTPPDTPNSCHY RPUBDPUOSCH RMPEBDLY; CHTSD MY LPZDB-MYVP EEE 57 OENEGLYI UBNPMEFPCH HDBCHBMPUSH KHOYUFPTSYFSH CH CHPDKHIE UB PJO DEOSH. (dBOOSCH P UVYFSHCHI 120 OENEGLYI UBNPMEFBI 23 BCHZKHUFB 1942 Z. OBD uFBMYOZTBDPN, 145 NBYOBI 2 YAOS OBD lHTULPN, FEN VPMEE 400 H OBYUBME VPECH OBD lHTULPK DKHZPK CHPPVEE OE R PDFCHETTSDBAFUS LBLYNY-MYVP DPLHNEOFBNY.) fBL UFP PFDEMSHOSHE UPCHEFULYE MEFUYULY HCE U RETCHSCHI YUBUPCH UTBTSEOYS RPLBBBMY CHTBZKH, YuFP U OINY OBDP UYUYFBFSHUS. UPPFOPYEOYE RPFETSH CH CHP'DKHYOSCHI VPSI (VEЪ HUEFB RPFETSH PF ЪООФОПК BTFYMMETYY) RTYVMYYYFEMSHOP TBCHOSMPUSH 50 ABOUT 250, YuFP UPPFCHEFUFCHBMP VPECHPNH PRSHCHFH, KhTPCHOA ME FOPK RPDZPFPCHLY Y DTHZYN ZBLFPTBN, UMPTSYCHYYNUS L OBYUBMKH CHPKOSHCH.

CHETOENUS UOPCHB L OENEGLINE BTICHOSCHN DBOOSCHN. PLBBSHCHBEFUS, SING LPTTEMYTHAFUS UP NOPZYNY OBYNYY PGEOLBNY. fBL, TBUYUEFSHCH, RTPY'CHEDEOOSCH RPMLPCHOILPN b. O. NEDCHEDEN YЪ chPEOOP-CHPЪDKHYOPK BLBDENYY YN. O. e. tsKHLPCHULPZP RP YOFETRPMSGYPOOSCHN ZHTNKHMBN, RPLBYUSHCHBAF, YuFP "FEPTEFYUUEULY" MAJFCHBJZHE DPMTSOSCH VSHMY RPFETSFSH 67 UBNPMEFPCH HOYUFPTSEOOSCHNY Y UETSHOP RP READER. h RETCHPN UPPVEEOOY UCHPDLY UPCHEFULPZP yOZhPTNVATP (POB FPZDB EEE OBSCHCHBMBUSH UCHPDLPK zMBCHOPZP lPNBODPCHBOYS lTBUOPK bTNYY) KHLBSCCHBMPUSH, UFP "OBNY UVYFP 65 UBNPME FPCH RTPPHYCHOILB", B ABOUT UMEDHAEIK DEOSH CHOPUYMYUSH HFPYUOOYOS KHOYUFPSEOP 76 OERTYSFEMSHULYI NBOYO. eUMY UYUYFBFSH, YuFP RTYNETOP 11 THNSCHOULYI UBNPMEFPCH TBDEMYMY HYUBUFSH 63 UVYFSHI OENEGLYI (UFEREOSH TBTHYEOYS OE NOOEE 60%), FP RPMKHYUBFUS CHEUSHNB VMYOLYE YUYU MB.

rPRTPVHEN UPRPUFBCHYFSH OENEGLYE RPFETY RP DBOOSCHN RTPFYCHOILCH. about ABYVPMSHYYE TBUIPTSDEOOYS, LBL HCE PFNEYUBMPUSH, YNEMY NEUFP ABOUT ъBRBDOPN ZHTPOFE. dBOOSCHE P 143 UVYFSHCHI ЪDEUSH UBNPMEFBI UP UCCHBUFYLPK OE RPDFCHETTSDBAFUS OH TSKHTOBMBNY VECHSHHI DEKUFCHYK UTBTSBCHYIUS OENEGLYI ULBDT, OH DPRTPUBNY RMEOOSCHI, OH LBLYNY-MYV P DTHZYNY OENGLYNY DPLHNEOFBNY. rPFPNH EUFSH PUOPCHBOYS UYYFBFSH DPLMBDSCH UPCHEFULYI UPEDYOEOYK PV HOYUFPTSEOYY DEUSFLPCH CHTBTSEULYI UBNPMEFPCH OEDPUFPCHETOSCHNY (SLPVSH PDOB FPMSHLP 9-S UNEYBOOBS BCHYBDYCH YЪYS UVYMB 85 OENEGLYI UBNPMEFPCH.rTY LFPN DBEFUS UUSCHMLB ABOUT ZhPOD PRETBFYCHOPZP KHRTBCHMEOYS chchu.dayyys RTELTBFYMB UCHPE UKHEEUFCHPCHBOYE Yuetej FTY DOS RPUME OYUBMB CH PKOSHCH, Y LBLYI -MYVP BTIYCHPCH UPEDYOEOYS OE UPITBOOMPUSH, RPPFPNH ZPCHPTYFSH P DPUFPCHETOPN HUEFE RPVED OE RTYIPDIFUS.) uMEDHEF RTYOBFSH, YuFP CH FYI HUMPCHYSI DPOUEOOYE “PV PZTPNOPN HT POE, OBOUEOOOPN CHFPTZYENKHUS CH OBUYE OEVP OERTYSFEMA» OETEDLP YNEMP ЪBDBUKH UZMBDYFSH ZPTEYUSH RPTBTTSEOYS.

chPPVEE, RETCHPYUFPYUOYLPCH, LPFPTSHCHE VSHCHMY OBRYUBOSCH "RP ZPTSUYN UMEDBN", HGEMEMP OENOPZP, Y FEN GEOOEE POY DMS RPOINBOYS YUFPTYY. rTYCHEDEN MYYSH PDYO RYЪPD. h RTBCHDYCHPK h GEMPN LOYSE "rP GEMSN VMYTSOIN Y DBMSHOIN" NBTYBM o. u. ULTYRLP RYYEEF:

“...about ChPKOE CHUSLPE UMHYUBMPUSH. lПЗДБ Л БТПДТПНХ, ZDE VБЪТПЧБМУС 16-К ULPTPUFOPK VPNVBTDYTPCHPYuOSCHK BCYBRPML, RTYVMYYMYUSH ZHBIYUFULYE UBNPMEFSHCH, LPNBODYT ULBDTYMSHY LBRYFBO b. u. rTPFBUCH OENEDMEOOOP CHUMEFEM ABOUT UCHPEN VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLE (BY RYMPFYTPCHBM lv. rTYN. BChF.) Y OEPTSYDBOOP DMS ZYFMETPCHGECH CHTEBMUS CH ZPMPCHOPE ЪCHEOP YUFTEVYFEMEK Bf110. chPURPMSHЪPCHBCHYYUSH ЪBNEYBFEMSHUFCHPN, TBVYCH YI UFTPK, LBRYFBO rTPFBUPC RKHMENEFOSCHN PZOEN UVYM PDYO “NEUUET”. b TBUUFTEMSCH CHUE RBFTPOSH, ZETPYUUEULYK LYRBTS FBTBOYM UCHPEK NBYOPK CHFPTPK UBNPMEF ZYFMETPCHGB Y RPZYV.”

dPLHNEOF DBEF VPMEE UHTPCHHA Y OERTYHLTBYEOOHA FTBLFPCHLH OENEGLPZP OBMEFB:

“...h RPML YЪ zTPDOP RTYVSHHM RTEDUFBCHYFEMSH YFBVB chchu 3-K BTNYY. according to UPPVEIM, YuFP OBD zTPDOP YDHF CHP'DKHYOSCHE VPY, Y RPDFCHETDYM RTETSOEEE KHLBBOIE: OBDP TsDBFSH VPECHPZP RTYLBYB. ch 6 Yu 50 NYO LPNBODYT RPMLB TEYM RPDOSFSH CH CHPDHI ЪCHEP UBNPMEFPCH uv DMS TBCHEDLY. OP EDCHB UDEMBCH LTHZ OBD BYTPDTPNPN, ЪЧЭП ВХЛЧБМШОП ЦТЭБМПУШ Ш ЛПМПУХ Bf 110 SING ABOUT VTEAEN RPMEFE ULTSHFOP RPDPYMY L BTPDTPNH. yFKHTNPCHYLY CHCHYMY L RPMA yuETMEOSCH, ZDE VBYTPCHBMUS RPML, YEUFSHA DECHSFLBNY.

lBRYFBO rTPFBUPC, MEFECHYYK ABOUT CHEDKHEEN uv, CHTEBMUS CH RTPPFYCHOILB Y RPZYV CHNEUFE U OYN. UTBH TSE VSHCHMY UVYFSCH CHEDPNSHCHE rTPFBUPCHB. yFKHTNPCHLB RTDPDPMTSBMBUSH RTPFYCHOILPN 32 NYO. Bf110 ЪBUSHRRBMY BTPDTPN NEMLYNY VPNVBNY Y TCHEM OERTETSCHOSCHK PVUFTEM ЪBTSYZBFEMSHOSHSHNY RKHMSNY. UFPSEYE ABOUT BTPPDTPNE UBNPMEFSCH UZPTEMY, CHTSCHCHBMYUSH RPDCHEEOOOSCH RPD OINY VPNVSH. chTBTSEULYE YFKHTNPCHYLY DEKUFCHPCHBMY VE'OBBLBBOOP, FBL LBL OYLBLPK RTPFYCHPCHP'DKHYOPK PVPTPPOSH OE VSHMP PTZBOYPCHBOP.

chПЪДХИЕ РПЗИВПЧ 9 УЭМПЧЛ ЪЧЭП ЛБРИФБОБ rТПФБУПЧБ (Ч EЗП ЛЛИРБЦ CHIPDIMY YFKHTNBO UV. MEKFEOBOF sTHMYO Y UFTEMPL-TBDYUF UETSBOF VEUBTBVPCH. rTYN. BChF.), B ABOUT JOIN RPZYVMP 6th TBOEOP 15 YUEMPCHEL. MYUOSCHK UPUFBCH ULTSHMUS ЪB FPMUFSHNY UPUOBNYY CH OBYUYFEMSHOPK UFEREOY UKHNEM URBUFYUSH PF MYCHOS RKHMENEFOPZP PZOS.

lPNBODYT RPMLB NBKPT ULCHPTGPCH RTYLBYBM OENEDMEOOOP CHPPTHTSYFSH MYYUOSCHK UPUFBCH RPMLB CHIOFPCHLBNY Y ZTBOBFBNY Y ЪBOSFSH PVPTPOH BTPPDTPNB. VSHM PTZBOYPCHBO NEDRHOLF..." .

CHETPSFOP, CH TE'KHMSHFBFE FBTBOB PLPMP 7 Yu KhFTB RPZYV U LYRBTSEN Bf110E (No. 3767) JЪ II/SKG210. URKHUFS FTY YUBUB VSHM UVYF DTHZPK DCHHINPFPTOSHK "NEUUUETYNYFF" (No. 4291) FPK TSE YUBUFYY CH FPN TSE TBKPOE, P YUEN RYUBMB ZBJEFB "ltBUOBS ъCHEDB" 9 YAMS 1941 Z.:

“at DECHSFSHA UBNPMEFBNY ​​RTPFYCHOILB CHUFKHRIM CH VPK ЪBN. LPNBODITB ULBDTYMSHY RP RPMYFYUBUFY UV. RPMYFTHL BODTEK dBOYMPCH (PO RYMPFYTPCHBM "YUBKLH". rTYN. BChF.). URKHUFS OUEULPMSHLP NZOPCHEOIK DHB YI OYI VSHMY UVYFSCH. tBUUFTEMSCH CHUE RBFTPOSHCH, VEUUFTBUOSCHK MEFUYIL OBRTBCHYM UCHPA NBYOKH RTSNP ABOUT CHTBTSEULYK UBNPMEF, BODTEK dBOYMPCH RPZYV UNETFSHHA ITBVTSCHI.”

h LFPN CE OPNETE ZBEBEFSH VSHM PRHVMYLPCHBO hLBЪ rteYYDYKHNB chETIPCHOPZP UPCHEFB uuut P OBZTBTSDEOOY b. u. dBOYMPCHB YЪ 127-ZP YBR RPUNETFOP PTDEOPN MEOYOB, B ABOUT EZP TPDYOH CH DETECHOA hSTSMS UBTBFPCHULPK PVMBUFY VSHMP PFRTBCHMEOP YYCHEEEOYE P ZYVEMY ZETPS. OP MEFUIL OE RPZYV. u FSCEMSCHNY TBOEOYSNY EZP RPDPVTBMY LPMIPYOILY DETECHY yuETMEOB Y RETEDBMY UBOYFBTBN PFIPDYCHYEK UBRETOPC YUBUFY. ЪБФЭН по ПЛБББМУС Х ФШЧПЧПН ЗПУРИФБМЭ І РПУМЭ ДПМЗПЗП МЭУЕОYС OBKHYUMUS IPDDYFSH VEЪ LPUFSHMEK, B ЪБФЭН CHETOKHMUS Ch UFTPK. b. u. dBOIMPCH UTBTSBMUS DP UEOFSVTS 1945 Z., ЪBLPOYUYCH CHPKOKH CH ъBVBKLBMSHE LPNBODITPN BCHYBGYPOOPZP RPMLB; ABOUT EZP UUEFKH OBYUMPUSH 8 UVYFSCHI MYUOP CHTBTSEULYI UBNPMEFPCH Y PDYO CH RBTE.

eUMY L ULBUBOOPNKH DPVBCHYFSH, YuFP EEE PDYO Bf110e No. 2333 TBCHEDYUYL Y PFTSDB 2(F)/33 VShchM UVYF FBTBOOSCHN HDBTTPN NM. MEKFEOBOFB d.ch. lPLPTECHB TBOOYN HFTPN (P YUEN HCE ZPCHPTYMPUSH), FP RPMKHYUBEFUS, YuFP YUEFSHTEI DCHHINPFPTOSH "NEUUETYNYFFPPCH", RPFETA LPFPTSCHI RTYOBMY OENGSCH CH VEMPTHUU YY, FTY RPZYVMY RPUME FBTBOPC. bFP ZPCHPTYMP P NHTSEUFCHY UBNPRPTSETFCHBOYY UPCHEFULYI MEFUYYLPCH Y CH FP TSE CHTENS UCHYDEFEMSHUFCHPCHBMP PV YI OEKHNEOY HOYUFPTSBFSH OERTYSFEMS PZOEN VPTFPCHPZP PTHTSYS. ZETNBOULPNH LPNBODPCHBOYA EEE RTEDUFPSMP UDEMBFSH CHCHCHPDSH P TKHULPK FBLFYLE CHEDEOYS CHPDHYOSCHI PECH, RPUFBTBFSHUS OBKFY RTPPHYCHPDEKUFCHYE.

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The problem of estimating losses of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) comes up almost always when someone tries to resort to the “balance method” - subtracting losses and the availability of equipment in Luftwaffe units from the number of aircraft produced. The ends just don't meet. Perhaps, this problem was taken seriously for the first time in the post-war report of the US Air Force, when, in hot pursuit, specially created commissions prepared “analysis” on the past war (fortunately, there were freshly captured documents, and witnesses could be brought “in bracelets” upon request) . So first, a big quote:

"Defeat of the German Air Force." Overview of US Strategic Bomber Command
...
The mystery of “where did all the fighters that were supposedly produced go” requires special research. Obviously, if 3,000 fighters were produced monthly, and the losses were only 1,000, then the combat strength of Luftwaffe fighter aircraft, as well as the technical equipment of flight schools, second-line units, etc., would have to increase by 2,000 units of difference. However, if you look at table. 21, it can be seen that the combat strength of Luftwaffe fighters increased in 1944 from only 1,500 to 2,200 aircraft, while the production of single-engine fighters during the same period exceeded the losses by 16,000 aircraft. At the same time, the leadership of the German Air Force flight schools announced a serious shortage of combat aircraft for training cadets. Colonel Littmann, head of the flight school at Straubing airport, claimed that the data on the strength of the Luftwaffe was a complete lie. Already in the summer of 1943, his flight school experienced a shortage of aircraft and fuel. Since Littmann participated in periodically held conferences of the heads of flight schools, he could be convinced that this situation was typical for the Luftwaffe.

Even if all the aircraft that received more than 10% damage were lost, the industry would still allegedly produce 8,000 more fighters than were lost and listed in units.

Even if all fighters that received more than 10% damage were included in the number of lost ones, 8,000 fighters would still fall out of the overall balance. That is, even if all the damaged planes went under the knife, 8,000 fighters would still have disappeared somewhere.

One can draw a conclusion, or rather a “suspicion,” that in reality so many aircraft were not produced. The solution to this riddle may lie in the interrogation protocol of Dr. Wagenfoer, where he notes, speaking about 1944: “This significant increase in fighter production became possible, among other things, thanks to the use, by decision of Saur [responsible in Germany for the production of fighters], of everything available at industry backlog of units and spare parts. Such a breakthrough in production was actually a one-time “record work.”

And further: “Another source of error could be the accounting of aircraft that have undergone repairs.
There were three possible categories of repair work:
a) repairs in parts (not included in statistics);
b) repairs requiring more than 1000 man-hours, which were carried out in repair shops. At first, the planes that hit them were in reserve. After the critical period in 1943, these aircraft were no longer taken into account in statistics;
c) The main option - “factory repair”, meant that the aircraft was sent back to the manufacturer. At the same time, it was taken into account in the list of losses, and later (returning to the unit) as a newly manufactured aircraft.

There is certainly a discrepancy between aircraft production figures and the size of the German Air Force and losses. Production of all types of aircraft in 1944 was stated at 39 thousand. The composition of combat units remained virtually unchanged throughout the year. The total number of aircraft retired in 1944 was 21,946, leaving a difference of 17,000 aircraft between production and losses. It is unlikely that all 17 thousand aircraft were lost somewhere before entering combat units. Perhaps part of the answer lies in the fact that 5,689 aircraft were sent to repairs rather than to combat units. Some of them were repaired and counted as “newly manufactured” and counted accordingly. In addition, statistics may include 25-30% of so-called “new” aircraft that were used for “other purposes or for modernization” and were not delivered to Luftwaffe units. There is a serious suspicion that the modernized aircraft were counted as newly manufactured."

All this would be tolerable if one did not know more or less detailed statistics on the work of the German aviation industry.

And this is where the beautiful reveals itself. We watch our hands: “Is it possible to deceive a person at such a distance that the person does not notice” (c) Hakobyan.

So, the Americans made the assumption that the number of German aircraft produced included factory repairs and major modernization. If.

In general, the Germans settled down well: they had no losses in aircraft at all. Yeah, there were only “damaged” ones. Like, “100% damage” - just, although the Luftwaffe will never see its plane again. It turns out a lovely picture - a floating scale of losses, setting with the left foot depending on the % of damage. Like, all aircraft with more than 80% damage are considered losses. We go to report to the “Demoniac” - “These are such small losses” - and we receive the next bruliks for the knight’s cross. Then we set the “loss” bar at 40%, recalculate, go to the Generalflugzeugmeister (Field Marshal Milch), wave the numbers before our eyes and demand that we speed up the supply of new equipment to the troops. May everyone live like this!

No, % damage is probably good for accounting for the book value of property, but why is this needed in war? Estimate the cost of upcoming repairs? You don’t know the realities of war very well - a damaged aircraft in part (especially with a plan to send it for factory repair) is a source of eternally scarce spare parts. Therefore, at best, an undocked airframe will go into repair, in which the “losses of components and equipment” will be much greater than the stated percentage.

Fuck him, about the main thing. The fact is that factory repair, like all sorts of similar events in Germany, was carried out on a solid basis - specialized (for each type of aircraft) aircraft repair plants operated, which de facto produced practically new aircraft from the wreckage that was brought to them by rail.
And accounting for such repairs was carried out separately from production - contrary to the assumption of the American report (see above). So, if during the entire war until March 1945, the German aircraft industry produced 113.6 thousand aircraft, then aircraft repair plants produced ANOTHER 47 THOUSAND AIRCRAFT (plus another 3.8 thousand “remade” - Umbau). Having 100.5 thousand losses by March 1945 (taking into account 10 thousand pre-war aircraft), we get that by the end of the war the Luftwaffe should have had 63,600 aircraft! OVER SIXTY THOUSAND! If we subtract from this how many aircraft the Luftwaffe actually had during this period, then we get at least 40 thousand aircraft that went into “hyperspace”! Into that “dark hole” into which Goering managed to push them.

The invisible “hero” of our story.

In 1944 alone, 7,000 single-engine fighters were released from repair - this is in addition to the 8,000 “orphans” noted in the American report. A total of 15 THOUSAND fighters, no one knows where, lost “by naval means.” Let's look at the updated chart:

They even broke through the “ceiling”!

Yes, and when now another “myth” is born, such as, “The Soviet Union made a significant contribution to the defeat of the Nazis on earth, and in the skies of the “backlashes” the Allies crushed the advantage,” then the authors of this statement must first answer what rug the Germans are under.” "swept away" 40 thousand of their planes? This is approximately the same amount as our entire aviation lost in combat! By the way, if you look at the growth on the graph of this very “black hole”, it completely coincides with the relative decrease in Luftwaffe losses on the Eastern Front. Yeah, maybe that’s why it wasn’t profitable for the Americans to “clarify” this issue to the end in their report?

It is extremely interesting to listen to the answer, especially considering the quote from William, ours, Green: “Milch repeatedly raised the question why, despite the sharp increase in the production of combat aircraft in 1944, the combat strength of the Luftwaffe did not increase, but he did not find an answer.” The field marshal did not find it. General, I’m not afraid of this word, weather vane master. The question is “on shoulder straps”. Only, it seems, the “extremely effective” reporting established by his partagenosse Goering will never answer this question.

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One of the little-known fighter formations of the Luftwaffe was the 4th Fighter Squadron (German: Jagdgeschwader JG.4). And although, unlike many other elite squadrons, its combat record was not so impressive (only about 600 air victories), nevertheless, the pilots of the squadron deserve the attention of military history buffs, since they fought in the final battles of 1945 on the outskirts of Berlin with the famous Soviet aces from the 2nd and 16th Air Armies.

The squadron was not created immediately; its groups were formed gradually. First, in August 1942, I./JG.4 was formed in Misile (Romania), whose task was to protect the oil-bearing region of Ploiesti. June 15, 1944 in Ansbach at the base of Jagdgeschwader z.b.V. The squadron headquarters (Stab/JG.4) was formed. On July 12, 1944, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 was formed in Salzwedel from the remnants of I./ZG.1. This assault group (Sturmgruppe) was specifically intended for assault attacks on formations of heavy four-engine bombers of Anglo-American aviation. The armored and well-armed heavy Focke-Wulf groups were engaged in direct combat with enemy bombers, while the lighter Messerschmitts of other groups engaged the escort fighters in battle. Also on July 12, III./JG.4 was formed from the personnel of III./ZG.1 in Rothenburg. The last, on October 20, 1944, IV./JG.4 was formed from the former II./JG.5 in Finsterwald. The emblem of the squadron was a blue shield with the image of a “Silver knight’s helmet with red plumage.”

All groups of the squadron took part in bloody battles in Italy, in the defense of the Reich from attacks by Anglo-American aviation armadas and in the Ardennes counter-offensive. At the same time, the squadron pilots achieved tangible successes in the fight against enemy four-engine bombers, but they themselves lost many of their comrades. JG.4 suffered especially huge losses during the notorious Operation Bodenplatte on January 1, 1945 - 23 pilots were killed or missing, which amounted to almost 42% of the total number of squadron flight personnel!

But it would be better for Western historians to study the actions of the 4th squadron on the Western Front against the Anglo-Americans. We are traditionally much more interested in the actions of the Luftwaffe against our aviation and troops. And since later, from the end of January to the end of April 1945, JG.4 participated in battles on the Eastern Front over the Oder and in the Berlin region, we will pay attention to this period and section of the front. True, due to the lack of complete documentary data on the losses of the squadron’s aircraft fleet, we will have to limit ourselves to listing only the irretrievable losses of flight personnel and the successes of the squadron pilots, which, by the way, also need clarification. To begin with, however, let's get acquainted with the command staff of the 4th squadron at the time of its appearance on the Eastern Front.

So, the squadron commander from August 1944 was the famous ace holder of the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, 27-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Michalski, who had 72 aerial victories, which he had previously won as part of the JG.53 “Ace of Spades” squadron.

The first group of the squadron was also commanded from August 1944 by 33-year-old Major Wilhelm Steinmann, who had recently been awarded the German Golden Cross for 35 aircraft shot down, most of which he shot down as part of JG.4. Later, in March 1945, he was awarded the Knight's Cross.

The commander of the second group from September 1944 was 33-year-old Major Gerhard Schröder, a former navigator of transport and bomber aircraft. Having become a fighter pilot, he managed to win only 3 aerial victories.

The third group was commanded since January 1945 by an experienced pilot, 28-year-old Captain Gerhard "Gerd" Strasen, who had 6 downed enemy aircraft, which he shot down while fighting as part of JG.26 "Schlageter" and JG.77 "Ace of Hearts" .

The commander of the last fourth group of the squadron from December 1944 was a veteran of the Condor Legion in Spain, 28-year-old Captain Ernst-Albert Laube, who scored 22 aerial victories, mainly with JG.26 Schlageter, JG.77 Ace of Hearts and JG.3 "Udet".

Unlike experienced commanders, most of the squadron's ordinary pilots were very young graduates of flight schools who had recently arrived at the front. Some of the pilots even consisted of retrained members of the crews of bomber, reconnaissance, naval and other aviation, who, however, had difficulty getting used to their new role as a fighter pilot. Of course, it was not because of a good life that these ersatz pilots were attracted to serve in fighter aircraft, but the Luftwaffe leadership at that time had no choice: in the hardest battles, in conditions of overwhelming superiority, German fighters suffered and continued to suffer devastating losses. And if the aviation industry still produced a sufficient number of aircraft, there were no longer enough qualified fighter pilots...

And this squadron, barely replenished hastily with youngsters, in mid-January 1945, after the start of a major offensive by Soviet troops, it was decided to send to the Eastern Front to the area southeast of Berlin. I./JG.4 was the first to arrive there - on January 22, Bf 109G/K aircraft of this group landed at Guben airfield. It was followed on January 23 by Stab/JG.4 and 11.(Sturm)./JG.4, which landed on Neuhausen airfield southeast of Cottbus on Fw 190A aircraft, as well as III./JG.4, but its Bf 109G/ K settled north of Cottbus - at the Drewitz airfield. At the same airfield three days later - January 26 - Bf 109G from IV./JG.4 landed. It is characteristic that the main task of the squadron pilots was assault raids on Soviet columns on the roads, although the squadron fighters were poorly suited for the role of attack aircraft, and the pilots were not trained for this. There were no massive air battles here, as on the Western Front, but the pilots had to make several sorties a day, which still ultimately led to heavy losses. Especially when very heavy and bloody air battles began over the Oder bridgehead...

Soon after the flight to the Soviet-German front, the squadron suffered its first loss: on January 24, during a flight to a new airfield, the Bf 109 G-14 785714 “Gelbe 7” of fanenjunker non-commissioned officer Klaus Ekard from 15./JG.4 caught fire in the air for unknown reasons reasons, the pilot jumped out with a parachute, but crashed and died 10 km from Halle northwest of Leipzig.

Two days later, on January 26, the squadron began combat operations on a new front for it and carried out 82 attack and reconnaissance missions in the Scharnikau-Wolstein area. In this case, four pilots were lost at once:
The first - non-commissioned officer Wilhelm (Willy) Gausten from 1./JG.4 (who had 2 aerial victories), on a Bf 109 G-10 491177 "Weisse 1" was shot down in an air battle in the Neutomichel - Pinne - Posen area, ended up in captivity and later died in captivity.
The second is Lieutenant Ulrich Blase (06/09/1924) from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8 961138 “Weisse 8” during an attack on Soviet convoys on the roads, was shot down in an air battle and died south of Neutomichel.
The third was Oberfenrich Herbert Schön from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4, who, during an attack on Soviet troops on the roads, hit a tree with his Fw 190 A-8/R2 682665 (982665) “Weisse 16” and died in the Schlepzig area near Lübben.
And the fourth - Fahnejunker non-commissioned officer Günter Wahl from 7./JG.4 (or II.(Sturm)/JG.4) on Fw 190 A-8 961102 "Gelbe 5" crashed and died due to snowfall in the Görzig area near Grossenhain.
In addition, five more aircraft received minor damage.
Needless to say, the beginning was depressing...
On the same day, the pilots of the squadron recorded the first aerial victory on the Russian front - at 12:45 p.m., First Lieutenant Lothar Wolff from 15./JG.4 shot down a Soviet P-39 Airacobra fighter in the Scharfenort area. "Stalin's Falcon" made an emergency landing and disappeared into the forest...

The next day, January 27, the squadron made 72 sorties and was missing three of its pilots:
Sergeant Major Heinrich Kamel (12/14/1918) from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 during an attack on Soviet convoys northwest of Graz - Neutomichel near Kirchplatz, dropped too low in his Fw 190 A-8 696095 “Weisse 6”, hit the car on the road and crashed.
Killed in air combat on Fw 190 A-8/R2 682224 “Gelbe 4” in the Posen area, Fahnejunker non-commissioned officer Fritz Hopfenmüller from 7./JG.4.
Sergeant Major Arno Pochmann from 13./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-14 783989 “Weisse 2” during an attack on Soviet troops was shot down by fire from the ground (or died in air combat), fell and died 3 km east of Lake Bentschener.
Three aircraft were slightly damaged.
In turn, non-commissioned officer Völkel from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 reported the destruction of one Yak-9, although he was not credited with the victory...

On Sunday, January 28, JG.4 pilots carried out 36 attack missions, while four aircraft received minor damage, but there were no casualties.

Nevertheless, attack flights against Soviet troops, well covered by anti-aircraft weapons, were costly for German fighters. On January 29, the squadron made 104 reconnaissance and attack missions in the Scharnikau-Wolstein area, but two squadron pilots did not return from these murderous flights:
Ober-Fenrich Heinz Seeberger of 15./JG.4 was shot down by fire from the ground during the attack, and together with his Bf 109 G-14 413791 "Gelbe 14" fell and died in the Köpnitz-Unrustadt area.
Non-commissioned officer Maximilian "Max" Huber from 16./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-14 462756 "Blaue 9" also did not return from the attack on Soviet troops, this time in the Küstrin area.
Eight more aircraft were damaged, including five in air battles.

On January 30, the squadron pilots flew 121 times for reconnaissance and attack in the Scharnikau-Wolstein-Züllichau-Meseritz area, and three pilots were killed in air battles:
Lieutenant Hans Roscher from 1./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 130362 "Weisse 7" in the Züllichau - Bohmst - Wolstein area.
Non-commissioned officer Rudolf Seebacher from 3./JG.4 on Bf 109 K-4 332302 "Gelbe 4" in the Züllichau area west of Grünberg.
Fahnejunker Oberfeldwebel Joachim Holtzbecher of 7./JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8/R2 682767 "Gelbe 16" in the Vanden area.
In air battles in the areas of Niedritsa, Oderecka and Züllichau, three more aircraft were lost (the pilot escaped from one of them by parachute) and three aircraft were damaged in the areas of Guben, Drewitz and Frankfurt an der Oder.
But the persistent non-commissioned officer Voelkel from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 was finally lucky and was credited with the first aerial victory over the Yak-9, shot down that day.

The last day of January - the 31st - passed for the squadron without losses: having completed 22 reconnaissance and assault missions in the Küstrin area, all the pilots returned safely from their missions, only one Fw 190 was slightly damaged.

In total, during almost a week of combat operations on the Eastern Front, JG.4 pilots destroyed 395 vehicles, one tank, three Katyusha rocket launchers, one multi-barrel anti-aircraft gun, three aircraft at airfields and other military equipment during assault raids.

The losses of the squadron were very high: in just January, JG.4 lost (including in three weeks of fighting on the Western Front, before flying to the Eastern Front) 26 pilots killed or missing, as well as 14 wounded. 57 aircraft were irretrievably lost (20 Fw 190 and 37 Bf 109), 39 aircraft were damaged (14 Fw 190 and 25 Bf 109).

The squadron suffered even greater losses in February. Already on the first day of the month, Corporal Hubert Gesterkamp from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8/R2 682207 “Weisse 2” did not return from a flight north of Küstrin.

Two days later - February 3 - two pilots were lost:
Non-commissioned officer Walter Wagner (07/19/1911) from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8 960328, landing at Neuhausen airfield near Cottbus, fell into a crater, overturned and died.
And a fairly experienced pilot, Ober-Fenrich Heinz Kühne (had 3 aerial victories to his credit) from 10./JG.4 on a Bf 109 K-4 332651 “Schwarze 1” was shot down in an air battle in the Zullichau-Blumberg area and was captured . He later died in captivity.

Two more pilots were captured the next day, February 4:
Non-commissioned officer Walter Nigl from 7./JG.4 on Fw 190 A-9 205056 “Gelbe 13”, flying out to attack Soviet troops on the roads in the Zielenzig-Meseritz area, was shot down and captured. A few years later he returned from captivity and died on October 6, 1950 in Germany.
Another pilot - Fenrich Wilhelm Dim from 15./JG.4 - on Bf 109 G-10 490419 "Gelbe 1" as part of a pair flew out for reconnaissance, but due to engine failure he was forced to land on territory occupied by Soviet troops 3 km away northeast of Frankfurt an der Oder and was captured. Still, he was lucky, and on May 9, 1949 he returned from captivity.

On February 7, two pilots also did not return from missions:
The first - Ober-Fenrich Hans Till from 13./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 490169 "Weisse 1" stormed Soviet troops in the Aurit - Balko - Zibingen area, was shot down and captured. As it turned out later, he died in captivity.
Another - non-commissioned officer Helmut Neumann from 15./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 490428 "Gelbe 10" also stormed Soviet troops in the Kurtschow - Zibingen - Gross - Gandern area, was shot down and died.
One Yak-9 in the Fürstenberg area at 11:45 a.m. was shot down on the same day by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4, but against the backdrop of the squadron’s growing losses, this was little consolation...

The next day, February 8, the squadron stubbornly continued to storm the advancing Russian troops, but this cost the squadron three more pilots:
Ober-Fenrich Martin Otto Stegmann from 2./JG.4 was mortally wounded during an attack on Soviet convoys in the Eichberg area, 12 km northwest of Grossen; his Bf 109 K-4 332376 “Schwarze 6” made an emergency landing near the convoy and died.
Non-commissioned officer Walter Gebauer from 12./JG.4 in Bf 109 K-4 332912 "Blaue 4" was probably shot down by anti-aircraft fire in the Drebiszow area and was captured. He later died in captivity.
Non-commissioned officer Johannes Bintrim from 16./JG.4 in Bf 109 G-14 462777 "Blaue 11" stormed Soviet convoys in the Wollnitz area, was shot down and captured. The fate of this pilot was also sad, and he also died in captivity.

On February 9, the 2nd group of the squadron was relocated to the Guben airfield, where the 1st group of the squadron had already been located since January 22.
On the same day, Lieutenant Dietrich Bartsch (12/29/1923) from 11./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-14 465330 “Schwarze 6” stormed Soviet convoys in the Drewitz area north of Cottbus, was shot down in an air battle and died.

On Saturday, February 10, three pilots were lost:
Feldwebel Wilhelm "Willy" Becker (had 1 aerial victory) from 3./JG.4 on Bf 109 K-4 332897 "Gelbe 9" returning from armed reconnaissance, in the Szydlo area southeast of Frankfurt an der Oder was shot down and disappeared without a trace.
Unlucky was non-commissioned officer Ernst Steingilb (had 1 aerial victory) from 12./JG.4, who, while taking off from the airfield in a Bf109 K-4 332485 “Blaue 6” with a bomb under the fuselage, fell and exploded 5 km east of Drewitz near Potsdam.
Corporal Harald Bankk from 13./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-14 785917 "Weisse 4" was hit and seriously wounded by anti-aircraft fire, made an emergency landing in the Kotzenau area and died of his wounds in hospital on February 14, 1945.
On the same day, at 14:15, in an air battle west of Luben, Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Messer from IV./JG.4 managed to shoot down one La-5.

The squadron lost its next three pilots on February 11:
The Bf 109 K-4 332858 "Schwarze 5" crashed and died during takeoff from Guben airfield, Corporal Robert Myrhofer from 2./JG.4.
Non-commissioned officer Franz Kaicher from 3/JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 491375 “Gelbe 3” was shot down, made an emergency landing on the fuselage in the Lübben-Steinau area near the Oder River, and then went missing.
The experienced commander of detachment 10./JG.4, Captain Bernhard Gasenberg (01/27/1913), who had 3 aerial victories to his credit, also died. The Bf 109 G-14 462968 “Schwarze 4” suffered an accident during takeoff, probably due to sabotage, and crashed 3 km northwest of Drewice.
And the commander of the 1st group, Major Wilhelm Steinmann, shot down one Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft on the same day.

On February 12, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 relocated to Berlin-Schönfeld airfield, having previously suffered heavy losses:
Non-commissioned officer Gerhard Grahl from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Bf 109 K-4 331336 "Blaue 2" exploded and died in an air battle south of Naumburg - Beaver.
Non-commissioned officer Herbert Brucksch from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A-9 980208 "Weisse 12" was shot down in the Naumburg - Sagan - Sprottau area and was captured, in which he died after the war on August 3, 1946 .
In an air battle east of Primkenau, Oberleutnant Heinz Schmeling (07.10.1911) from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 was killed. He was a very experienced pilot, having previously flown as a navigator in reconnaissance aircraft, and was awarded the German Golden Cross, the Silver Cup of Honor for excellence in air combat, the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class, as well as the Gold Badge for combat missions.
Sergeant Major Friedrich Bäre-Steingraf from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A-9 980570 "Schwarze 11" went missing in the Naumburg - Sagan - Sprottau area.
In the same area Naumburg - Sagan - Sprottau on Fw 190 A-8/R2 681356 "Schwarze 4" a very young Fenrich Karl Urban (06/19/1925) from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 went missing.

On Wednesday, February 14, almost the entire squadron relocated to other airfields. The squadron headquarters and the 3rd group were located at the Jüterborg-Damm airfield, the 1st group was located at the Berlin-Schönfeld airfield, and the 4th group was located at the Mark Zwuschen airfield. Despite the hassle associated with the relocation, the squadron continued to carry out combat missions and suffered heavy losses:
Ober-Corporal Wilhelm Falenti from 7./JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8 739202 "Gelbe 18" went missing in the area of ​​the Sommerfeld - Pförten highway.
In Bf 109 K-4 332658 "Weisse 7", non-commissioned officer Kurt Mendel of 11./JG.4 was seriously wounded and shot down in aerial combat. Despite lengthy treatment, he died of his wounds on April 20, 1945.
One of the best aces of the squadron, Feldwebel Erhard Mecca (02/26/1921) from 14./JG.4, who had 12 aerial victories and was awarded the Honorable Silver Cup for excellence in air battles and the Iron Crosses of the 1st and 2nd degrees, was fatally unlucky. On Bf 109 G-10 491440 “Schwarze 11” he was accidentally shot down by German anti-aircraft artillery 30 km west of Küstrin (according to other sources, he was shot down in an air battle in the Fürstenwalde area), jumped out with a parachute, but it did not open and the pilot died .
Ober-Fenrich Hans-Günther Lachmann (had 1 aerial victory) from 16./JG.4, on Bf 109 G-14 784988 “Weisse 7” stormed columns of Soviet troops in the Forst-Sommerfeld-Sorau area, was shot down and captured . Fortunately for him, he returned from captivity a few years later.
On the same day, the commander of the 1st group, Major Wilhelm Steinmann, distinguished himself again by shooting down one Yak-3.

Against the backdrop of depressing losses in the previous days, the results of the fighting on February 16 were more favorable for the squadron.
On this day, only one pilot, Corporal Günter Pöland from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4, was lost. In the Landsberg-Fitz area north-west of Leipzig, a shell from its own anti-aircraft artillery hit his Fw 190 A-8 738202 “Schwarze 2”, as a result of which the right wing came off, the pilot fell with the plane and died.
But in air battles, JG.4 pilots achieved significant success, shooting down four Soviet aircraft. One Yak-9 in the Küstrin area at 16:50 was shot down by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4, two Yak-9s were shot down by non-commissioned officer Kurt Scherer from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 and one by Po -2 was shot down by non-commissioned officer Gerhard Walter, also from II.(Sturm)/JG.4.

The results of the fighting on February 17 were equally favorable.
Only one pilot, non-commissioned officer Egon Kolias from 10./JG.4, was shot down during an attack by ground fire (or in air combat), fell together with his Bf 109 G-14 456317 “Schwarze 13” north of Seelow southwest of Küstrin and died.
But the JG.4 pilots scored three aerial victories over Soviet pilots. Having already shot down four Anglo-American aircraft, Fenrich Günther Wittbold from 1./JG.4 shot down one Russian Yak-9 at 10:21 a.m., and the next minute, the commander of the 1st group, Major Wilhelm Steinmann, immediately hit two Yak-9.

The day of February 18 was marked by heavy losses and decent successes. Three pilots were lost, including two experienced squad leaders:
The commander of 2./JG.4, Oberleutnant Werner Gerhartz (01/07/1921), who had 1 aerial victory, was hit in the radiator while attacking Soviet convoys in the Posen-Schwiebus-Steinberg area, on his Bf109 K-4 333886 “Schwarze 4” made an emergency landing on territory captured by Soviet troops and was captured. Later, in 1949, he returned from captivity.
Fenrich Hans-Joachim Schmidt from Stab III./JG.4 was also captured, who in Bf 109 K-4 332483 “Rote 1” was shot down in an air battle by Russian pilots in the Frankfurt-on-Oder area.
A heavy blow for the squadron was the death of the commander of 7./JG.4, Oberleutnant Ergard “Max” Niese (03/16/1910), who had 570 sorties and 23 air victories, for which he was awarded the German Golden Cross, the Honorary Silver a cup for excellence in air combat, Iron Crosses of the 1st and 2nd degree, a Golden Badge for combat sorties, a Badge for wounds (10/30/1942, 04/24/1944). During a stability test flight, his Fw 190 A-9 980576 “Gelbe 1” lost control at 16:12, the ace was unable to bail out, fell with the plane and died in the Schönfeld area southeast of Berlin.
In turn, the squadron pilots shot down seven Stalinist Falcons. Two Il-2 attack aircraft were destroyed in the Schwiebus-Steinberg area at 15:00 by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4, the remaining five aircraft were shot down by pilots whose names have not yet been found out. Including two Il-2s shot down by pilots from I./JG.4, one La-5 and one P-5 by pilots from II.(Sturm)/JG 4, and one Yak-9 was destroyed by a pilot from III./JG .4.

The results of the day on February 20 can be called a “combat draw.” The squadron lost one pilot:
Non-commissioned officer Eduard Jungwirth (12/27/1922) from 16./JG.4 was seriously wounded and hit by anti-aircraft fire, was forced to land his Bf 109 G-14/ASM 781174 “Gelbe 13” in the Mukbarup area north of Flensburg and was sent to hospital , where, despite the efforts of doctors, he died from his wounds on May 2, 1945. It is not clear how the pilot received his fatal wound in the indicated area, very far from the front line and the location of his group?
And the squadron’s combat account was replenished with one aerial victory: sergeant major Joseph Weichmann from 6./JG.4 shot down one Il-2...

In March, the number of losses decreased sharply; in addition to routine attack flights, completely unusual missions appeared. Thus, on March 6, the pilots of the squadron took part in a combat operation to destroy pontoon bridges on the Oder River. Two flights of four Bf 109s from I./JG.4 were accompanied by two groups of four He 111s from I./KG.200, with Hs 293 guided jet gliding bombs suspended under the fuselage. On approaching the target, the German planes were attacked by a group of Soviet fighters Yak-9. In the ensuing air battle, the Russians shot down one He 111, and Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4 at 17 hours 25 minutes and non-commissioned officer Walter Schola from I./JG.4 at 17 hours 37 minutes shot down one Yak-9. In addition, according to reports from Heinkel pilots, they managed to hit a bridge in the Göritz area, where the bridgehead of the Soviet 8th Guards Army was located. By the way, one of the missiles that fell into the water and did not explode aroused keen interest from the leadership of the Soviet Air Force. Army sappers were given the order to lift the missile and organize its delivery to Moscow...

The next day, March 7, nothing special happened, except that Sergeant Major Kurt Hoppe (1920) from III./JG.4 on a Bf 109 did not return from the air battle...

On March 8, JG.4 pilots again had to take part in a raid on crossings of the Oder in the area of ​​Göritz, Reitwein and Neu Manschnow. This time the group of German aircraft was even more impressive and unusual than the previous time. Along with conventional bombers - five Ju 188 and two Ju 88 from 5./KG.200 - the strike group also included four Mistel type aircraft from 6./KG.200. True, one plane filled with explosives, due to technical problems, immediately fell off the control plane and crashed into a field. The remaining aircraft were escorted by sixteen Bf 109s from III./JG.4 and two Fw 190s from Stab/JG.4, led by squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Michalski. At about 10:20 a.m. at an altitude of 3,000 meters, German planes approached the crossings. The anti-aircraft artillery guarding the crossings opened furious fire, and the Junkers, in turn, bombarded the positions of the Russian anti-aircraft gunners. However, another Mistel was hit by an anti-aircraft shell and, engulfed in flames, crashed to the ground far from the crossings. The remaining two Mistels disengaged as normal, but despite the impressive explosions, no significant damage was caused to the crossings. According to other German data, two direct hits were achieved on the bridge and one hit on the position of anti-aircraft batteries. The Germans also lost one Ju 188 to anti-aircraft fire, its crew was captured. And in an air battle, the Soviet Air Force lost one Yak-9, shot down at 10:27 a.m. by the commander of JG.4, Lieutenant Colonel Michalski himself. This was his 73rd aerial victory...

On Monday, March 19, I./JG.4 located at the Berlin-Schönfeld airfield was disbanded, and its pilots were sent to other squadron groups.

On March 25, a young pilot in the private rank of pilot Manfred Werle (06/14/1925) from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 (by the way, he was characterized extremely negatively as a liar and a thief, which was a rare exception among Luftwaffe pilots) in an Fw190 issued out of repair, took off on a test flight, but fell along with the plane and died in the Wassmansdorf area south of Berlin. Well, as they say, I atoned for my sins with blood...
And the commander of IV./JG.4, Captain Ernst-Albert Laube, was awarded the German Golden Cross on that day.

A little later, on March 28, the former commander of I./JG.4, which had already been disbanded, Major Wilhelm Steinmann received the Knight's Cross, thus becoming the only ace of the 4th squadron to earn this highest award.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of accurate data, the dates of some of the losses of the squadron pilots in March are unknown. At least six irretrievable losses are known:
Private pilot Bernhard Fichte from III./JG.4 on a Bf 109 was shot down in an air battle by Soviet fighters in the Küstrin area and captured. He later died in captivity.
Corporal Veit from 11/JG.4 on a Bf109 G-14 “Gelbe 9” was also shot down in an air battle, but not by the Russians, but by American P-51 Mustang fighters in the Kyffhäuser area west of Leipzig and was captured by the Americans.
Oberleutnant (or Oberfeldwebel) Berg from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 on an Fw 190A crashed while landing at the Schönefeld airfield southeast of Berlin and burned out.
Non-commissioned officer Helmut Pirmann from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 in an Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle in the Werneuchen-Strausberg area near Berlin and went missing.
Sergeant Major Manfred Jolschlägel from III./JG.4 on a Bf 109 did not return from the flight and, as it became known later, was captured. According to some reports, he was in the Kharkov prisoner of war camp.
Hermann Klotz of IV./JG.4 in a Bf 109 G did not return from his flight to the Berlin area. There is information that he was later seen in a Moscow prisoner of war camp.

On April 4, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 positioned itself at Mörtitz airfield, northeast of Leipzig. And already in the evening of that day at 16:30, the group pilot, Lieutenant Wolfgang Gankner, shot down an American P-47 Thunderbolt fighter in the Halberstadt area.

The next day, Fenrich Karl Joseph Hyde of 15./JG.4 on a Bf 109 was shot down in an air battle by Anglo-American aircraft in the Sahn area southwest of Berlin and captured by American troops.

The fate of Chief Sergeant Fritz Störker from 7./JG.4 remained unclear, who on April 7, either on an Fw 190 or a Bf 109 K-4, participated in an air battle with Anglo-American aircraft in the Eisenach-Bad area Langensatza north of Erfurt. According to some sources, he did not return from the battle, according to others, he was only wounded in the Eisenach area.

At about 15-16 hours the next day, non-commissioned officer Kurt Blumenberg (04/00/1923) from 14./JG.4, who had 1 air victory to his name, was shot down in an air battle by American P-47 fighters in a Bf 109 G-14/AS "Thunderbolt" north of Günserode west of Leipzig and died.

On April 9, Stab/JG.4 began to be based at the Mark Zvushen airfield.
As of this day, Stab./JG.4 had 6 Fw 190s, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 had 50 Fw 190s, and III./JG.4 had 61 Bf 109s.

On the evening of April 11, the pilots of III./JG.4, Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach and non-commissioned officer Rudolf Kozlowski, distinguished themselves: at 19 o’clock they shot down one American P-51 Mustang fighter in the area of ​​Bücheln and Tilleda...

The next relocation took place on April 12: II.(Sturm)/JG.4 was sent far to the north-west of Germany and began to be based at the Glücksburg airfield in the Flensburg area, and III./JG.4 flew to the Mark Zwuschen airfield.
As of this day, Stab./JG.4 had 7 Fw 190s, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 had 50 Fw 190s, and III./JG.4 had 62 Bf 109s.
Captain Günther Schwaneke from Stab./JG.4 added to his combat account by shooting down a Yak-3 at 12:40...

On Black Friday, April 13, the squadron lost two pilots:
Non-commissioned officer Günther “Splinter” Gallas from 7./JG.4 in an Fw 190 A-9 was shot down in an air battle by Anglo-American aircraft in the Elbe-Elster area southwest of Jüterborg and went missing. True, there is evidence that he was only wounded in the Eisenach area.
In the evening, during an emergency landing in the Juterborg area, his Fw 190 “Schwarze 13” overturned several times and Sergeant Major Günter Eberhard from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 was killed.

Two days later, on April 15, non-commissioned officer Max Miller (03/12/1924) from III./JG.4 on a Bf 109 flew out to attack Anglo-American troops, was shot down in an air battle in the Glücksburger Heide area near Juterborg, and fell along with plane and burned down.

On April 16, the number of aircraft in the squadron was: Stab/JG.4 - 5 Fw 190, II./JG.4 - 55 Fw 190, III./JG.4 - 52 Bf 109.
On this day, a powerful offensive of Soviet troops against Berlin began (the Berlin offensive operation of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts with the aim of completing the complete defeat of the German armies). Hundreds of Soviet aircraft were constantly in the air, and almost 200 air battles took place, in which the Germans and Russians suffered very heavy losses. In addition to the usual battles and attack missions, the pilots of JG.4 again had the opportunity to participate in a completely unusual Luftwaffe operation. This time, the German air force, following the example of the Japanese kamikazes, used the tactics of suicide pilots. About sixteen Bf 109 K-4s from JG.4 from 17:15 to 18:00 were escorted by eight Bf 109s and one Fw 190 with 500 kg bombs under the fuselage and suicide pilots in the cockpits, who were ordered to direct their aircraft to the crossings across the Oder and blow them up. At least one of these volunteers - Fenrich Ernst Beichl from SG.104 - managed to crash into one of the pontoon crossings in the Cellin area, in the zone of the 47th Soviet Army, and destroy it at the cost of his life. True, in the documents of the 47th Army it was not possible to find any mention of the destruction of the crossing, but in the zone of the 69th Army that day a crossing with a carrying capacity of 30 tons was indeed destroyed.
A little later, from 19:15 to 20:30, several Bf 109s from III./JG.4 escorted several Mistel twins to the crossing area. There are no details of this raid, but it is known that there were no meetings with Soviet fighters.
And, of course, in several heavy battles that day with Russian pilots, as well as with Anglo-American aviation, JG.4 suffered significant losses:
Non-commissioned officer Hans Richter from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 on an Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle by American P-51 Mustang fighters in the Halbe area near Brandenburg, jumped out with a parachute, but died.
An Estonian volunteer (former pilot of the Estonian NSGr.11), Oberleutnant Karl Lumi from 7./JG.4 on an Fw 190 A-8, was shot down in an air battle by Anglo-American aircraft in the Mühlhausen-Leipzig area and went missing.
Also, in an air battle with Anglo-American aircraft in the Mühlhausen-Leipzig area, Fenrich Hans-Martin Delkmann from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 was shot down on an Fw 190 and went missing.
Lieutenant Gorst (Herbert) Peschel (02/15/1923) from 7./JG.4 (had 2 aerial victories) on an Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle by American fighters and went missing. True, according to other sources, he was only wounded.
At about 15:00, in a Bf 109 G in an air battle with a group of Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft and Yak-9 fighters in the Bukov-Seelow area, non-commissioned officer Max Kolb from IV./JG.4 was shot down and captured, who later died in captivity.
The fate of non-commissioned officer Günther Schneider from 11./JG.4 (had at least 1 aerial victory) was also sad. On a Bf 109, he was shot down by Russian pilots in an air battle in the Frankfurt-on-Oder area, captured and also died in captivity.
In battles on both sides with Soviet and allied aviation, the squadron pilots achieved some successes:
Captain Johannes Kaufmann from 9./JG.4 shot down one Soviet P-39 Airacobra fighter in the Küstrin area at 11:15, and non-commissioned officer Hans Sepunkte from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 at 12:15 - one American P-51 Mustang, although it was not credited with victory. One Yak-9 at 15:15 in the Bukow-Seelow area was destroyed by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4. One P-51 Mustang was shot down by non-commissioned officer Weber from JG.4...

April 17 was also marked by a large number of battles and associated losses and successes.
The first to achieve an aerial victory was at 11:15 a.m. Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Messer from IV./JG.4, shooting down a Soviet Boston bomber east of Podelzig.
At about 2 p.m., one Il-2 attack aircraft in the Oder area was shot down by Captain Günther Schwaneke from Stab./JG.4 and non-commissioned officer Heinz Zimmer from III./JG.4. Probably in the same battle, the former naval and bomber aviation navigator Captain Rudolf Schröder (1912) (1914) from 7./JG.4 (8./JG.4), who had 3 aerial victories, was shot down in his Fw 190 A air battle in the Gorghast-Lebus area near Kustrin and died. Although according to other sources, he remained alive.
It is quite possible that in the same battle in the Küstrin area, Fenrich Wünsche from 7./JG.4 was shot down and killed in an Fw 190 A. However, according to other sources, he died in the Elbe-Elster area southwest of Jüterborg.
Already returning from a mission, at 14:20, while landing at the Mark Zwuschen airfield southwest of Juterborg, a Bf 109 group from III./JG.4 was suddenly attacked by American P-47 Thunderbolt fighters, killing three pilots:
Sergeant Major Fritz Lehmann jumped out by parachute, but died.
Non-commissioned officer Karl Riepe fell with the plane and died (according to other sources, he remained alive).
Chief Sergeant Major Fritz Zarske (10/19/1922) from 9./JG.4, who had 1 aerial victory, also died heroically: while covering the landing of his commander, Captain Gunther Schwaneke, he shot down one American P-47 Thunderbolt fighter, but he himself was shot down by another Thunderbolt. I jumped out with a parachute, but the parachute did not open.
At about 7 p.m., several Bf 109s of the squadron again escorted about 30 aircraft with volunteer suicide bombers on board to crossings on the Oder. At the same time, in an air battle with Russian aviation, pilots of 9./JG.4 Captain Johannes Kaufmann and Fenrich Oskar Butenop shot down a Yak-3 and a Yak-9 in the Frankfurt-on-Oder area at 19:30.

Several air battles carried out by the squadron during April 18 cost it two pilots:
Fenrich Rudolf von Baumgarten from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 in an Fw 190 A-8 was shot down in the Obiesfeld - Magdeburg area, escaped by parachute and was captured by Anglo-American troops.
At about 2 p.m., Fenrich Rainer Klötzl from IV./JG.4 on a Bf 109 was shot down by Soviet pilots in an air battle in the Frankfurt-on-Oder area and went missing.
However, the pilots of the squadron also won several aerial victories:
At dawn at 06:50, while escorting a group of Ju 87 dive bombers, Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Messer from IV./JG.4 shot down one Yak-3 in the Seelow area.
At 13 o'clock in the Fürstenwalde area, Captain Johannes Kaufmann from 9./JG.4 shot down an Il-2 attack aircraft, and the pilot of the same detachment, Sergeant Major Ottokar Bente, shot down a MiG fighter, and noted that the Russian pilot did not jump out of the falling plane.
A little later, at 13:30, the same sergeant major Ottokar Bente shot down an American P-47 Thunderbolt fighter in the Juterborg area.
Other pilots from III./JG.4 also distinguished themselves: at 17 hours 45 minutes, Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach shot down a Yak-3 in the Bukow-Seelow area, and non-commissioned officer Rudolf Kozlowski shot down a Yak-3 in the Muncheberg area. One La-5 was shot down by Captain Gerhard Strasen.
On this day, 31-year-old Major Wilhelm Moritz, holder of the Knight's Cross, was appointed commander of II./JG.4, having shot down 44 aircraft, mainly when he fought with JG.51 "Mölders" and JG.3 "Udet" ...

Thursday 19 April was again a relocation day: Stab/JG.4, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 and III./JG.4 flew to the new Rechlin-Roggentin airfield northwest of Berlin. At the same time, the Estonian volunteer Ober-Fenrich Axel Meingart Kessler (05/28/1916) from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 deserted: at 10 hours 50 minutes he took off from the Mark Zwuschen airfield on Fw 190 A-8 961076 “Schwarze 10” he flew to Sweden, landed at Bulltoft airfield and was interned.
Two more pilots of the same squad died, having fulfilled their military duty to the end:
Non-commissioned officer Philipp Köhler in an Fw 190 did not return from an air battle with British Spitfire fighters in the Neuruppin area.
The former pilot of the Fw 189 in (H)/Aufkl.Gr.10, Lieutenant Franz Rohleder, who was awarded the German Golden Cross, Iron Crosses 1st and 2nd class, as well as the Golden Badge for combat missions, also died. When he, as part of a flight, stormed Soviet tanks north of Berlin on an Fw 190, the left wing of the plane was torn off by a direct hit from an anti-aircraft shell, and the plane and the pilot crashed to the ground.
Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from III./JG.4 won his fifteenth aerial victory, shooting down a Yak-3 near Berlin at 15:30.

On 20 April 1945, several Fw 190 D-9s from III./JG.4 escorted a group of He 111 conventional bombers and eight Ar 234 jet bombers from KG.76, which attacked Soviet troops in the vicinity of Berlin. All Ar 234s returned safely from the mission, but five He 111s and three Fw 190s were shot down.
In just one day, JG.4 lost two pilots:
Former bomber radio operator and participant in the intervention in Spain, Oberfeldwebel Herbert Rinkleb from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4, awarded the Cross for Spain, Iron Crosses 1st and 2nd class, as well as the Gold Badge for combat missions , flying an Fw 190, was shot down in an air battle near Berlin and went missing.
Fenrich Helmut Klapprott from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4, who was shot down in an Fw 190 in an air battle east of Bernau northeast of Berlin, was killed. He may have been a victim of the Soviet Yak-9 pilot Captain P.F. Lavrikov from the 812th Fighter Aviation Regiment.
In the battles, Lieutenant Gottfried Moriot from 7.(Sturm)/JG.4, non-commissioned officer Valentin Scheurmann from III./JG.4, and made emergency landings on downed planes, Fenrich Oskar Butenop from 9./ JG.4, sergeant major Franz Sischka from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4, non-commissioned officer Horst Heifrich from III./JG.4…
For their part, the pilots of III./JG.4 were able to shoot down four enemy aircraft in the Berlin area:
At 13:00, Captain Günther Schwaneke of Stab/JG.4 destroyed an English Spitfire.
Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from III./JG.4 scored his 16th and 17th aerial victories when he shot down a Yak-9 fighter and a Boston bomber at 13:45.
One La-5 was shot down by Captain Gerhard Strasen from III./JG.4...

On Saturday, April 21, the main task of the squadron was bombing raids on Soviet troops, as well as “free hunting” flights, while two more pilots were lost:
Non-commissioned officer Walter Gausdörfer from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 in an Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle near Berlin and went missing.
And Fenrich Erich Giefer from 7./JG.4, piloting an Fw 190 A-9, crashed and burned at the Rechlin airfield.
According to some reports, the pilots of the squadron won several air victories in the Berlin area, but only two of them were credited to Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from III./JG.4, who at 13 hours shot down first a P-39 Airacobra, and later at 17 hours 30 minutes and La-5.

The next day, the squadron pilots again scored several aerial victories in the Berlin area, but again only Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from III./JG.4 was credited with one Yak-9 shot down at 1 p.m.

On April 23, the main task of JG.4 was again bombing raids on Russian troops in the vicinity of Berlin. Together with attack pilots from SG.1, JG.4 pilots with bombs suspended under the fuselage attacked Russian equipment and infantry from low level flight, and also fought grueling air battles, which again cost them two comrades:
Fenrich Winfried Braehler from 7/JG.4 in an Fw 190 A-9 was shot down in an air battle in the Küstrin area and went missing. True, according to other sources, he died in the Eisenach area.
At 13:30 in the Oranienburg area northwest of Berlin, sergeant major Hans Hochleitner from IV./JG.4 on a Bf109 fighter was shot down in an air battle by Soviet Yak-3 fighters, escaped by parachute, but was captured. However, we can say that he was lucky, since a few years after the end of the war he returned from captivity.
Even more fortunate was Captain Johannes Kaufmann from 9./JG.4, who in the same battle in the Oranienburg area at 13:40 shot down one Yak-9. This was his 7th aerial victory...

On Wednesday April 25, Soviet troops completely surrounded Berlin, the capital of the Third Reich was doomed. However, the Luftwaffe pilots, including JG.4, continued to fight. In one of the flights, Sergeant Major Ahlers from 7./JG.4 in an Fw 190 A-9 was shot down in an air battle in the Berlin area. According to some sources, he went missing, according to others, he was only wounded in the Eisenach area.

On April 26, the squadron lost Lieutenant Friedrich Pullmann from 9./JG.4. A fairly experienced pilot, he already had 3 aerial victories to his name, and was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd degree, the Combat Flights Badge and the Wound Badge (09/12/1944, 12/05/1944). But the data on the reasons for his death vary: according to one information, he was shot down in a Bf 109 in an air battle in the Rossov area near Pasewalk, and according to another, he died in the Wittstock area while flying as a passenger on a Ju 52 transport plane.

The next day the weather in the Berlin area was unfavorable: rain and clouds. There were few sorties, and even fewer fights. In one of them, at 16 o'clock, Captain Johannes Kaufmann from 9./JG.4 shot down one Yak-3. Captain Gerhard Strassen of III./JG.4 scored his 9th aerial victory by shooting down a La-5...

On Sunday, April 29, aircraft of the Luftwaffe 6th Air Fleet were able to carry out a total of 74 sorties to support German troops in Berlin. Several JG.4 pilots stormed Russian troops in the central zone of the city and near the Reich Chancellery.
At 8 hours 45 minutes, non-commissioned officer Manfred Kudell (02.09.1924) from 8./JG.4 on an Fw 190 D with a suspended 250-kg bomb took off as part of a pair on his last 29th combat mission to attack tanks. After dropping a bomb on a target, in an air battle with Soviet fighters, he was set on fire and shot down, landed by parachute on one of the streets in the Weissensee district of Berlin and was captured by Soviet soldiers. After returning from captivity, he lived in Germany; he died quite recently - on April 17, 2012.
After some time, the pilots of III./JG.4, in a battle with a large group of Russian fighters, shot down three of them: at 11:30 am, non-commissioned officer Erwin Teske from 8./JG.4 shot down two Yak-9s in the Schönewald area, winning thus his first two aerial victories. And Captain Johannes Kaufmann from 9./JG.4 won his ninth aerial victory, shooting down one Yak-3 in the Berlin area at 11:45...

On April 30, Stab/JG.4, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 and III./JG.4 were relocated from the Rechlin-Roggentin airfield to the Parchim airfield northwest of Berlin. And again, during the flight, another case of desertion occurred: an Estonian volunteer, a former navigator in Aufkl.Gr.127, Chief Lieutenant Anatol Rebane (03/04/1915), by the way, a native of the glorious Ukrainian city of Poltava, from 6.(Sturm)/ JG.4 flew his Fw 190 A-8 739136 "Weisse 15" to Sweden, landed at Bulltoft airfield and was interned. After the end of the war, he lived first in the United States, then in Estonia, where he died on October 16, 2007.

On Tuesday, May 1, the pilots of JG.4, together with the pilots of JG.26 and SG.1, continued to attack Soviet troops on the streets of Berlin and even destroyed several tanks. In addition, the pilots of JG.4 reported several aerial victories, but were credited with only one Yak-9, which was shot down by non-commissioned officer Erwin Teske from 8./JG.4 at 16:40. Apparently, this was the last success of the squadron...

The next day, May 2, the last relocation was made by Stab/JG.4, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 and III./JG.4 - they moved even further to the West, to the Lek airfield northwest of Flensburg. This ended the squadron's stay on the Eastern Front. There were only a few days left until the end of the war and the surrender of the German armed forces. Finally, we will report on the latest battles and losses of the 4th squadron.
During the day of May 2, JG.4 lost four pilots:
At about 8 o'clock, Sergeant Major Karl Eilitz from 9./JG.4 on a Bf 109 was shot down in an air battle by British Spitfire fighters in the Parchim area and died.
Chief Corporal Ernst from 7./JG.4 on an Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle with Anglo-American aircraft in the Dass area northeast of Lübeck and died.
In an air battle with Anglo-American aircraft in the Bad Godesberg area southeast of Bonn, non-commissioned officer Matthias van der Velden from Stab III./JG.4 was shot down and captured by parachute from his Bf 109 K-4 Americans. After the end of the war, he returned from captivity to Germany.
Lieutenant Franz Malsch of III./JG.4, who had 11 (14) aerial victories to his name, was awarded the Silver Cup of Honor for excellence in air combat, the Iron Cross of the 1st and 2nd class, as well as the Gold Badge for combat missions, he was shot down on a Bf 109, made an emergency landing in the Prague area and was captured.
True, the places where the last two pilots were captured are surprising, since they are too far from the airfields from which the squadron operated at that time. It is possible that these data are erroneous.

The last loss of the squadron was non-commissioned officer Helmut Lauer from JG.4, who was killed in a Bf 109 on May 5 in an air battle in the Landsberg an der Warth area. And in this case, as in the previous two, the place of his death is in doubt.

That’s practically all that is known about the actions of JG.4 on the Eastern Front...

In total, according to available data (far from complete!), during the hostilities against Soviet aviation, pilots shot down at least 50 aircraft, including 38 fighters, 8 Il-2 attack aircraft, 2 Boston bombers, 1 Po-2 and 1 R -5. In addition, they won at least 8 aerial victories in battles with Anglo-American aviation. The squadron's losses amounted to almost 90 pilots, however, these data, as mentioned above, need clarification. 12 pilots died in plane crashes. 12 pilots were also shot down by anti-aircraft fire. For unknown reasons, 26 pilots were lost. 2 pilots deserted. 39 pilots were lost in air battles, of which 23 were shot down by Soviet pilots and 16 by allied aircraft. There are no definitive data on aircraft losses, but given that on average there are two lost aircraft per lost pilot, it can be assumed that the squadron's losses amounted to at least 270 aircraft. The balance of victories and losses was clearly not in favor of the 4th squadron, but nothing else could have been expected in 1945: the multiple superiority of Soviet and Anglo-American aviation over the Luftwaffe was overwhelming. In the very first battles, many German poorly trained young “yellow mouths” became victims of experienced “Stalin’s falcons” and Allied pilots who had hundreds of hours of flight time and combat sorties. One could even say that the example of JG.4 is typical, because the rest of the Luftwaffe squadrons were in the same agony...
By the way, the appearance of ersatz newcomers from JG.4 on the Soviet-German front went unnoticed. In any case, in the memoirs of former Soviet pilots there is absolutely no mention of meetings in the air with Messers and Fokkers with the emblem of a “Knight’s helmet with red plumage”...

Igor, it is about kamikaze pilots that Oleg writes. Read his article carefully. As for the calls of Nazi propaganda, this is very doubtful. At least, this does not follow from the two-part film that you probably watched about the last days of the fascist regime. This is all a matter of conjecture as to what the defenders of Berlin were thinking.
I don’t sense any hatred from Western democratic citizens, either on TV, or on the radio, or in communication. But there is, indeed, plenty of hatred in Russian TV, the press, and even on Prose ru towards the West, towards those compatriots who live in other countries, towards those who do not share the ardent love for the president.

Vladimir, one can, of course, doubt how and what the defenders of Berlin were thinking. In such cases, if there is interest, you need to delve into the literature on this issue. We learn, for example, about direct appeals from the Fuhrer, recorded in documents. We learn that such a crazy idea was adopted, that this is a historical fact, confirmed many times.

The “yellow mouth pilots” of the Luftwaffe were “kamikazes” to a much lesser extent than the “Volkssturm” or the Wehrmacht soldiers on a Berlin street, than the thousands and thousands of military personnel and civilians faithful to the call - “Wir kapitulieren nie - Sieg oder Tod!” and hoping for a miracle.

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