1904 1905 who ruled. Russo-Japanese War: results and consequences

1904-1905, the reasons for which are known to every schoolchild, had a great influence on the development of Russia in the future. Despite the fact that now it is very easy to “sort out” the prerequisites, causes and consequences, in 1904 it was difficult to imagine such an outcome.

Start

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the causes of which will be discussed below, began in January. The enemy fleet, without warning or obvious reasons, attacked the ships of Russian sailors. This happened for no apparent reason, but the consequences were great: the powerful ships of the Russian squadron became unnecessary broken garbage. Of course, Russia could not ignore such an event and on February 10 war was declared.

Causes of the war

Despite the unpleasant episode with the ships, which dealt a significant blow, the official and main reason for the war was different. It was all about Russia's expansion to the east. This is the underlying reason for the outbreak of war, but it began under a different pretext. The reason for the fury was the annexation of the Liaodong Peninsula, which previously belonged to Japan.

Reaction

How did the Russian people react to such an unexpected start to the war? This clearly outraged them, because how could Japan dare to take on such a challenge? But the reaction of other countries was different. The USA and England determined their position and sided with Japan. Press reports, which were numerous in all countries, clearly indicated a negative reaction to the actions of the Russians. France declared a neutral position, as it needed Russian support, but soon it entered into an agreement with England, which worsened relations with Russia. In turn, Germany also declared neutrality, but Russia’s actions were approved in the press.

Events

At the beginning of the war, the Japanese took a very active position. The course of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 could change dramatically from one extreme to the other. The Japanese were unable to conquer Port Arthur, but made many attempts. An army of 45 thousand soldiers was used for the assault. The army met strong resistance from Russian soldiers and lost almost half of its employees. It was not possible to hold the fortress. The cause of the defeat was the death of General Kondratenko in December 1904. If the general had not died, the fortress could have been held for another 2 months. Despite this, Reis and Stoessel signed the act, and the Russian fleet was destroyed. More than 30 thousand Russian soldiers were captured.

Only two battles of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 were truly significant. The Mukden land battle took place in February 1905. It was rightfully considered the largest in history. It ended disastrously for both sides.

The second most important battle is Tsushima. It happened at the end of May 1905. Unfortunately, for the Russian army it was a defeat. The Japanese fleet was 6 times larger than the Russian fleet. This could not but affect the course of the battle, so the Russian Baltic squadron was completely destroyed.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the causes of which we analyzed above, benefited Japan. Despite this, the country had to pay dearly for its leadership, because its economy was depleted to the point of impossibility. This is what prompted Japan to be the first to propose the terms of a peace treaty. In August, peace negotiations began in the city of Portsmouth. The Russian delegation was headed by Witte. The conference became a big diplomatic breakthrough for the domestic side. Despite the fact that everything was moving towards peace, violent protests took place in Tokyo. The people did not want to make peace with the enemy. However, peace was still concluded. At the same time, Russia suffered significant losses during the war.

Just look at the fact that the Pacific Fleet was completely destroyed, and thousands of people sacrificed their lives for the sake of their Motherland. And yet, Russian expansion in the East was stopped. Of course, the people could not help but discuss this topic, because it was clearly clear that the tsarist policy no longer had such power and might. Perhaps this is what caused revolutionary sentiments to spread in the country, which ultimately led to the well-known events of 1905-1907.

Defeat

The results of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are already known to us. And yet, why did Russia fail and could not defend its policy? Researchers and historians believe that there are four reasons for this outcome. Firstly, the Russian Empire was very isolated from the world stage diplomatically. That is why only a few supported her policy. If Russia had support in the world, it would be easier to fight. Secondly, Russian soldiers were not ready for war, especially in difficult conditions. The effect of surprise, which played into the hands of the Japanese, cannot be underestimated. The third reason is very banal and sad. It consists of multiple betrayals of the Motherland, betrayal, as well as the complete mediocrity and helplessness of many generals.

The results of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 were also losing because Japan was much more developed in the economic and military spheres. This is what helped Japan gain a clear advantage. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the causes of which we examined, was a negative event for Russia, which exposed all its weaknesses.

The Russo-Japanese War began on January 26 (or, according to the new style, February 8) 1904. The Japanese fleet unexpectedly, before the official declaration of war, attacked ships located in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. As a result of this attack, the most powerful ships of the Russian squadron were disabled. The declaration of war took place only on February 10.

The most important reason for the Russo-Japanese War was Russia's expansion to the east. However, the immediate cause was the annexation of the Liaodong Peninsula, previously captured by Japan. This prompted military reform and the militarization of Japan.

The reaction of Russian society to the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War can be briefly said as follows: Japan’s actions outraged Russian society. The world community reacted differently. England and the USA took a pro-Japanese position. And the tone of press reports was clearly anti-Russian. France, an ally of Russia at that time, declared neutrality - it needed an alliance with Russia in order to prevent the strengthening of Germany. But already on April 12, France concluded an agreement with England, which caused a cooling of Russian-French relations. Germany declared friendly neutrality towards Russia.

Despite active actions at the beginning of the war, the Japanese failed to capture Port Arthur. But already on August 6 they made another attempt. A 45-strong army under the command of Oyama was sent to storm the fortress. Having encountered strong resistance and having lost more than half of the soldiers, the Japanese were forced to retreat on August 11. The fortress was surrendered only after the death of General Kondratenko on December 2, 1904. Despite the fact that Port Arthur could have held out for at least 2 more months, Stessel and Reis signed the act of surrendering the fortress, as a result of which the Russian fleet was destroyed, and 32 thousand. people were captured.

The most significant events of 1905 were:

The Battle of Mukden (February 5 – 24), which remained the largest land battle in human history until the outbreak of the First World War. It ended with the withdrawal of the Russian army, which lost 59 thousand killed. Japanese losses amounted to 80 thousand.

The Battle of Tsushima (May 27 - 28), in which the Japanese fleet, 6 times larger than the Russian fleet, almost completely destroyed the Russian Baltic squadron.

The course of the war was clearly in Japan's favor. However, its economy was depleted by the war. This forced Japan to enter into peace negotiations. In Portsmouth, on August 9, participants in the Russo-Japanese War began a peace conference. It should be noted that these negotiations were a serious success for the Russian diplomatic delegation, headed by Witte. The concluded peace treaty sparked protests in Tokyo. But, nevertheless, the consequences of the Russian-Japanese War were very noticeable for the country. During the conflict, the Russian Pacific Fleet was practically destroyed. The war claimed more than 100 thousand lives of soldiers who heroically defended their country. Russia's expansion to the East was stopped. Also, the defeat showed the weakness of the tsarist policy, which to a certain extent contributed to the growth of revolutionary sentiments and ultimately led to the revolution of 1904–1905. Among the reasons for Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 - 1905. the most important are the following:

diplomatic isolation of the Russian Empire;

the unpreparedness of the Russian army for combat operations in difficult conditions;

outright betrayal of the interests of the fatherland or the mediocrity of many tsarist generals;

Japan's serious superiority in the military and economic spheres.

At the dawn of the twentieth century, a fierce clash occurred between the Russian and Japanese empires. In what year did war with Japan await our country? It began in the winter of 1904 and lasted more than 12 months until 1905, becoming a real a blow to the whole world. It stood out not only as a subject of dispute between the two powers, but also as the latest weapon used in battles.

In contact with

Prerequisites

Basic events unfolded in the Far East, in one of the most contested regions in the world. At the same time, it was claimed by the Russian and Japanese empires, each with its own political strategies regarding this area, ambitions and plans. Specifically, there was talk of establishing control over the Chinese region of Manchuria, as well as over Korea and the Yellow Sea.

Note! At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia and Japan were not just the strongest countries in the world, but also actively developing. Oddly enough, this became the first prerequisite for the Russo-Japanese War.

The Russian Empire actively expanded its borders, touching Persia and Afghanistan in the southeast.

British interests were affected, so the Russian map continued to expand in the Far East.

The first to stand in the way was China, which had become impoverished from numerous wars and was forced give Russia part of its territories in order to gain support and funds. Thus, new lands came into the possession of our empire: Primorye, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

The reasons also lay in Japanese politics. The new Emperor Meiji considered self-isolation a relic of the past and actively began to develop his country, promoting it on the international stage. After numerous successful reforms, the Japanese Empire reached a new, modernized level. The next step was the expansion of other states.

Even before the start of the 1904 war Meiji conquered China, which gave him the right to dispose of Korean lands. Later, the island of Taiwan and other nearby territories were conquered. Here were hidden the prerequisites for future confrontation, since the interests of two empires that contradicted each other met. So, on January 27 (February 9), 1904, the war between Russia and Japan officially began.

Causes

The Russo-Japanese War became one of the most striking examples of “cockfighting”. There were no racist, religious or ideological disputes between the two warring countries. Nor did the essence of the conflict lie in increasing one’s own territory for significant reasons. It’s just that each state had a goal: to prove to itself and others that it was powerful, strong and invincible.

Let's first consider reasons for the emergence of the Russo-Japanese War within the Russian Empire:

1. The king wanted to assert himself through victory and show all his people that his army and military power were the strongest in the world.
2. It was possible to suppress once and for all the revolution that broke out, into which peasants, workers and even the urban intelligentsia were drawn.

Let us briefly consider how this war could be useful to Japan. The Japanese had only one goal: to demonstrate their new weapons, which had been improved. It was necessary to test the latest military equipment, and where could this be done if not in battle.

Note! If the participants in the armed confrontation had won, they would have settled their internal political differences. The economy of the victorious country would have improved significantly and new lands would have been acquired - Manchuria, Korea and the entire Yellow Sea.

Military operations on land

At the beginning of 1904, the 23rd artillery brigade was sent to the eastern front from Russia.

The troops were distributed among strategically important sites - Vladivostok, Manchuria and Port Arthur. There was also a special corral of engineering troops, and a very impressive number of people guarded the CER (railway).

The fact is that all food and ammunition were delivered to the soldiers from the European part of the country by train, which is why they required additional protection.

By the way, this became one of the reasons for Russia's defeat. The distance from the industrial centers of our country to the Far East is unrealistically large. It took a lot of time to deliver everything necessary, and it was not possible to transport much.

As for the Japanese troops, they were outnumbered by the Russian ones. Moreover, having left their native and very small islands, they found themselves literally scattered over a vast territory. But in the ill-fated 1904-1905 they were saved by military power. The latest weapons and armored vehicles, destroyers, and improved artillery have done their job. It is worth noting the very tactics of warfare and combat that the Japanese learned from the British. In a word, they took it not by quantity, but by quality and cunning.

Naval battles

The Russo-Japanese War became real fiasco for the Russian fleet.

Shipbuilding in the Far Eastern region at that time was not very developed, and delivering the “gifts” of the Black Sea to such a distance was extremely difficult.

In the land of the rising sun, the fleet was always powerful, Meiji was well prepared, knew the enemy’s weaknesses very well, and therefore managed not only to hold back the enemy’s onslaught, but also to completely defeat our fleet.

He won the battle thanks to the same military tactics that he learned from the British.

Main events

For a long time, the troops of the Russian Empire did not improve their potential and did not conduct tactical exercises. Their entry to the Far Eastern front in 1904 made it clear that they were simply not ready to fight and fight. This can be clearly seen in the chronology of the main events of the Russo-Japanese War. Let's look at them in order.

• February 9, 1904 – Battle of Chemulpo. The Russian cruiser "Varyag" and the steamer "Koreets", under the command of Vsevolod Rudnev, were surrounded by a Japanese squadron. In an unequal battle, both ships were lost, and the remaining crew members were evacuated to Sevastopol and Odessa. In the future, they were prohibited from enlisting in the Pacific Fleet;
• On February 27 of the same year, using the latest torpedoes, the Japanese disabled more than 90% of the Russian fleet by attacking it in Port Arthur;
• spring 1904 - defeat of the Russian Empire in numerous battles on land. In addition to difficulties with transporting ammunition and supplies, our soldiers simply did not have a normal map. The Russo-Japanese War had clear patterns and certain strategic objects. But without proper navigation it was impossible to cope with the task;
• 1904, August – The Russians were able to defend Port Arthur;
• 1905, January - Admiral Stessel surrendered Port Arthur to the Japanese;
• May of the same year - another unequal naval battle. After the battle of Tsushima, one Russian ship returned to the port, but the entire Japanese squadron remained safe and sound;
• July 1905 - Japanese troops invaded Sakhalin.

Probably the answer to the question of who won the war is obvious. But in fact, numerous battles on land and water caused the exhaustion of both countries. Japan, although considered the winner, was forced to enlist the support of countries such as Great Britain. The results were disappointing: the economy and domestic politics of both countries were completely undermined. The countries signed a peace treaty, and the whole world began to help them.

Outcome of hostilities

At the time of the end of hostilities in the Russian Empire, preparations for revolution were in full swing. The enemy knew this, so he set a condition: Japan agreed to sign a peace treaty only on condition of complete surrender. At the same time, it had to be observed the following items:

• half of the island of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were to pass into the possession of the land of the rising sun;
• renunciation of claims to Manchuria;
• Japan was to have the right to lease Port Arthur;
• the Japanese get all the rights to Korea;
• Russia had to pay its enemy an indemnity for the maintenance of prisoners.

And these were not the only negative consequences of the Russian-Japanese War for our people. The economy began to stagnate for a long time, as factories and factories became impoverished.

Unemployment began in the country, prices for food and other goods rose. Russia began to be denied loans many foreign banks, during which business activities were also suspended.

But there were also positive moments. By signing the Portsmouth Peace Agreement, Russia received support from the European powers - England and France.

This became the seed for the emergence of a new alliance called the Entente. It is worth noting that Europe was also frightened by the brewing revolution, so it tried to provide all possible support to our country so that these events would not go beyond its borders, but would only subside. But, as we know, it was not possible to restrain the people, and the revolution became a vivid protest of the population against the current government.

But in Japan, despite numerous losses, things got better. The Land of the Rising Sun proved to the whole world that it can defeat the Europeans. The victory brought this state to the international level.

Why did everything turn out this way?

Let us list the reasons for Russia's defeat in this armed confrontation.

1. Considerable distance from industrial centers. The railway could not cope with transporting everything necessary to the front.
2. The Russian army and navy lack proper training and skill. The Japanese had more advanced technology possession of weapons and combat.
3. Our enemy developed fundamentally new military equipment, which was difficult to cope with.
4. Betrayal by the tsarist generals. For example, the surrender of Port Arthur, which had previously been taken.
5. The war was not popular among ordinary people, and many of the soldiers who were sent to the front were not interested in victory. But the Japanese soldiers were ready to die for the sake of the emperor.

Analysis of the Russo-Japanese War by historians

Russo-Japanese War, reasons for defeat

Conclusion

After the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, the old regime completely collapsed in Russia. Just a few years later, our ancestors became citizens of a completely new country. And most importantly, many who died on the Far Eastern Front were not remembered for a long time.

(1904-1905) - a war between Russia and Japan, which was fought for control of Manchuria, Korea and the ports of Port Arthur and Dalny.

The most important object of the struggle for the final division of the world at the end of the 19th century was economically backward and militarily weak China. It was to the Far East that the center of gravity of the foreign policy activity of Russian diplomacy was shifted from the mid-1890s. The close interest of the tsarist government in the affairs of this region was largely due to the appearance here by the end of the 19th century of a strong and very aggressive neighbor in the person of Japan, which had embarked on the path of expansion.

After, as a result of victory in the war with China in 1894-1895, Japan acquired the Liaodong Peninsula under a peace treaty, Russia, acting as a united front with France and Germany, forced Japan to abandon this part of Chinese territory. In 1896, a Russian-Chinese treaty was concluded on a defensive alliance against Japan. China granted Russia a concession to build a railway from Chita to Vladivostok through Manchuria (northeast China). The railway, known as the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), began construction in 1897.

Japan, which had established its influence in Korea after the war with China, was forced in 1896 to agree to the establishment of a joint Russian-Japanese protectorate over Korea with the actual predominance of Russia.

In 1898, Russia received from China a long-term lease (for 25 years) of the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula, the so-called Kwantung Region, with the city of Lushun, which also had a European name - Port Arthur. This ice-free port became the base for the Pacific squadron of the Russian fleet in March 1898, which led to a new escalation of contradictions between Japan and Russia.

The tsarist government decided to aggravate relations with its Far Eastern neighbor because it did not see Japan as a serious enemy and hoped to overcome the impending internal crisis that threatened revolution with a small but victorious war.

Japan, for its part, was actively preparing for an armed conflict with Russia. True, in the summer of 1903, Russian-Japanese negotiations on Manchuria and Korea began, but the Japanese war machine, which had received direct support from the United States and England, was already launched. On February 6 (January 24, O.S.), 1904, the Japanese ambassador handed Russian Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamzdorf a note about the severance of diplomatic relations, and on the evening of February 8 (January 26, O.S.), 1904, the Japanese fleet attacked the port without declaring war. - Arthur squadron. The battleships Retvizan and Tsesarevich and the cruiser Pallada were seriously damaged.

Military operations began. At the beginning of March, the Russian squadron in Port Arthur was led by an experienced naval commander, Vice Admiral Stepan Makarov, but already on April 13 (March 31, O.S.), 1904, he died when the flagship battleship Petropavlovsk hit a mine and sank. Command of the squadron passed to Rear Admiral Wilhelm Vitgeft.

In March 1904, the Japanese army landed in Korea, and in April - in southern Manchuria. Russian troops under the command of General Mikhail Zasulich could not withstand the onslaught of superior enemy forces and were forced to abandon the Jinzhou position in May. Port Arthur was thus cut off from the Russian Manchurian army.

By decision of the Japanese commander-in-chief, Marshal Iwao Oyama, Maresuke Nogi's army began the siege of Port Arthur, while the 1st, 2nd and 4th armies that landed at Dagushan moved towards Liaoyang from the southeast, south and southwest. In mid-June, Kuroki's army occupied the passes southeast of the city, and in July repelled an attempted Russian counter-offensive. Yasukata Oku's army, after the battle of Dashichao in July, captured the port of Yingkou, cutting off the Manchurian army's connection with Port Arthur by sea. In the second half of July, three Japanese armies united near Liaoyang; their total number was more than 120 thousand against 152 thousand Russians. In the battle of Liaoyang on August 24 - September 3, 1904 (August 11-21, O.S.), both sides suffered huge losses: the Russians lost more than 16 thousand killed, and the Japanese - 24 thousand. The Japanese were unable to encircle the army of Alexei Kuropatkin, which retreated in good order to Mukden, but they captured Liaoyang and the Yantai coal mines.

The retreat to Mukden meant for the defenders of Port Arthur the collapse of hopes for any effective assistance from the ground forces. The Japanese 3rd Army captured the Wolf Mountains and began intensive bombardment of the city and the interior roadstead. Despite this, several assaults she launched in August were repulsed by the garrison under the command of Major General Roman Kondratenko; the besiegers lost 16 thousand killed. At the same time, the Japanese were successful at sea. An attempt to break through the Pacific Fleet to Vladivostok at the end of July failed, Rear Admiral Vitgeft was killed. In August, the squadron of Vice Admiral Hikonojo Kamimura managed to overtake and defeat the cruiser detachment of Rear Admiral Jessen.

By the beginning of October 1904, thanks to reinforcements, the number of the Manchurian army reached 210 thousand, and the Japanese troops near Liaoyang - 170 thousand.

Fearing that in the event of the fall of Port Arthur, the Japanese forces would increase significantly due to the liberated 3rd Army, Kuropatkin launched an offensive to the south at the end of September, but was defeated in the battle on the Shahe River, losing 46 thousand killed (the enemy - only 16 thousand) , and went on the defensive. The four-month “Shahei Sitting” began.

In September-November, the defenders of Port Arthur repelled three Japanese assaults, but the 3rd Japanese Army managed to capture Mount Vysokaya, which dominates Port Arthur. On January 2, 1905 (December 20, 1904, O.S.), the head of the Kwantung fortified area, Lieutenant General Anatoly Stessel, having not exhausted all possibilities for resistance, surrendered Port Arthur (in the spring of 1908, a military court sentenced him to death, commuted to ten years imprisonment).

The fall of Port Arthur sharply worsened the strategic position of the Russian troops and the command tried to turn the situation around. However, the successfully launched offensive of the 2nd Manchu Army towards the village of Sandepu was not supported by other armies. After joining the main forces of the Japanese 3rd Army

Their numbers were equal to the number of Russian troops. In February, Tamemoto Kuroki's army attacked the 1st Manchurian Army southeast of Mukden, and Nogi's army began to encircle the Russian right flank. Kuroki's army broke through the front of Nikolai Linevich's army. On March 10 (February 25, O.S.), 1905, the Japanese occupied Mukden. Having lost more than 90 thousand killed and captured, Russian troops retreated north to Telin in disarray. The major defeat at Mukden meant the Russian command lost the campaign in Manchuria, although it managed to retain a significant part of the army.

Trying to achieve a turning point in the war, the Russian government sent the 2nd Pacific Squadron of Admiral Zinovy ​​Rozhestvensky, created from part of the Baltic Fleet, to the Far East, but on May 27-28 (May 14-15, O.S.) in the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese fleet destroyed the Russian squadron . Only one cruiser and two destroyers reached Vladivostok. At the beginning of summer, the Japanese completely ousted Russian troops from North Korea, and by July 8 (June 25, O.S.) they captured Sakhalin.

Despite the victories, Japan's forces were exhausted, and at the end of May, through the mediation of US President Theodore Roosevelt, it invited Russia to enter into peace negotiations. Russia, finding itself in a difficult internal political situation, agreed. On August 7 (July 25, O.S.), a diplomatic conference opened in Portsmouth (New Hampshire, USA), which ended on September 5 (August 23, O.S.), 1905, with the signing of the Portsmouth Peace. According to its terms, Russia ceded to Japan the southern part of Sakhalin, the rights to lease Port Arthur and the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula and the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Changchun station to Port Arthur, allowed its fishing fleet to fish off the coast of the Japanese, Okhotsk and Bering Seas, recognized Korea became a zone of Japanese influence and renounced its political, military and trade advantages in Manchuria. At the same time, Russia was exempt from paying any indemnities.

Japan, which as a result of the victory took a leading place among the powers of the Far East, until the end of World War II celebrated the day of the victory at Mukden as Ground Forces Day, and the date of the victory at Tsushima as Navy Day.

The Russo-Japanese War was the first major war of the 20th century. Russia lost about 270 thousand people (including over 50 thousand killed), Japan - 270 thousand people (including over 86 thousand killed).

In the Russo-Japanese War, for the first time, machine guns, rapid-fire artillery, mortars, hand grenades, radio telegraphs, searchlights, barbed wire, including high-voltage wire, sea mines and torpedoes, etc. were used on a large scale.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

The main reason for the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia in 1904 lies on the surface 1 . The geopolitical ambitions of these powers collided in Northeast Asia. But as with many armed conflicts, the immediate causes of the war are more complex.

These include Russia’s plans to build a railway in the Russian Far East, and Japan’s victory in the war with China in 1895, and the project of some St. Petersburg guards officers to open a logging enterprise on the Yalu River, and Tokyo’s concerns about St. Petersburg’s influence in Korea. Erratic, fickle diplomacy also played a big role.

But, as with the outbreak of the First World War, a clear understanding of how the Russo-Japanese conflict broke out can take us beyond the bounds of historical scholarship.

The answer concerns an important but often elusive concept in diplomacy, namely honor 2 . When attempts to encroach on the international authority of a state can be considered as dangerous as a military invasion of its territory. Alexander II once stated that in the life of states, as in the life of any person, there are moments when you need to forget everything except protecting your own honor 3 .

CONFUSION ON PEVCHESKY BRIDGE

Russia and Japan had been headed toward war since 1895, when the Japanese spectacularly defeated the Chinese in a brief conflict over Korea. Russia's attempt to prevent Japan from gaining a foothold on Chinese territory caused extreme indignation in the island empire. And Russian intervention began after the conclusion of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty on April 17, 1895, which marked the end of the Sino-Japanese War. Among the demands of the Japanese side was the possession of the Liaodong Peninsula, located not far from Beijing, with the strategically important naval base of Port Arthur. The Qing Dynasty agreed to cede rights to the peninsula, but St. Petersburg attracted Berlin and Paris to jointly demand the concession of Liaodong to Russia.

The Russian demarche came after heated debates among the dignitaries of Nicholas II, caused primarily by the proximity of Eastern Siberia to the theater of military operations of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The main goal of the Romanovs was ice-free access to the Pacific Ocean. Owning the Pacific port of Vladivostok, surrounded by freezing seas, Russia did not have a convenient harbor washed by warm waters for the terminal station of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was then under construction. Prominent Russian naval commanders believed that the time had come to capture the port in Korea. This idea was enthusiastically shared by Nicholas II. Lacking the necessary support to take such a step, Foreign Minister Prince Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky proposed an agreement with Tokyo on a new port in the region.

But there was another point of view. Its most influential supporter was Finance Minister Sergei Witte, who considered good relations with China essential for the development of the Russian Far East. He had no doubt that the Romanovs would eventually dominate China. But the empire must go towards this peacefully and using economic methods. Russian and Chinese railways, banks, trading houses, and not troops, must compete with each other. Among other things, Witte often reminded Nikolai: “...for the general state of affairs within Russia, it is essential to avoid everything that could cause external complications” 4 .

As a result, after the Peace of Shimonoseki, Russia played more of a role as a defender of Beijing. The Minister of Finance quickly reaped dividends from the Chinese goodwill. He secured the consent of the Zongli Yamen (Chinese Foreign Office - Translator's note) to build the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria, which significantly shortened the eastern section of the railway. And on June 3, 1896, the two empires entered into a secret agreement on joint confrontation in the event of possible aggression from Japan 5 .

However, just a year later, Emperor Nicholas abruptly changed course. Imitating his cousin William, who had captured Qingdao, he occupied the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula, which included Port Arthur. Three years later, the Cossacks unexpectedly entered the hereditary provinces of the Qing dynasty in Manchuria. Although Nicholas's diplomats officially promised to withdraw them, the military did not budge and even planned a campaign against neighboring Korea.

Such inconstancy reflected deep divisions in the Far Eastern policy of St. Petersburg. An unshakable supporter of friendly relations with China remained Sergei Witte, who was supported by Count Vladimir Lamsdorf, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1900 to 1906. A coalition of “hawks” opposed it, including at various times naval commanders, Lamsdorf’s predecessor Count Mikhail Muravyov, a retired guards captain and the dubious businessman Alexander Bezobrazov and the imperial governor in the Russian Far East, Admiral Yevgeny Alekseev. However, disagreements did not prevent the opponents from agreeing on one thing: Russia should play an active role in Northeast Asia.

"KOREA FOR MANCHURI"

Japanese dignitaries also agreed on one thing: the main goal of their country's geopolitics was Korea, a hermit state that had long been a tributary of the Qing dynasty. However, by the end of the 19th century, China's progressive weakness led to the weakening of its rule on the peninsula and opened the door for stronger powers to operate there. The latter included Japan, which, during the Meiji Restoration, ended medieval isolation and became a modern state with a Europeanized army and its own colonial aspirations.

The simple logic of geography pointed to Korea as one of the main targets of the genro, the group of nine statesmen who determined the policy of the empire. At its narrowest point, only 60 kilometers separated Japan from Korea.

Already in 1875, Japanese troops clashed with the Koreans on the island of Ganghwado, and 20 years later the empire began a war with China, weakening its influence on the hermit country. As the Western powers divided China into spheres of influence, the Genro decided that they could fulfill their colonial ambitions by giving Russia a dominant role in Manchuria in exchange for their control of Korea. For the next eight years, the slogan “Man-Kan kokan” (“Korea for Manchuria”) became one of the leading imperatives of Japanese foreign policy 6 .

On April 13, 1898, Baron Rosen, the Russian envoy, and Japanese Foreign Minister Tokujiro Nishi signed a joint protocol in Tokyo recognizing Japanese economic dominance in Korea. But at the same time, both sides pledged to defend the country's political sovereignty. Rosen himself called the treaty “incomplete and meaningless,” and the Japanese also did not have the best opinion of it 7 .

Over the next four years, as Russia increasingly distanced itself from Korean affairs, Japan made repeated attempts to achieve official recognition of its primacy on the peninsula. However, Russian diplomats were unable to obtain permission from the government for such a policy turn. As Alexander Izvolsky, then envoy to Tokyo, explained, both the tsar and his admirals “were too interested in Korea” 8 . At the same time, Lamsdorff feared Japanese hostility, warning in letters to Witte, General Kuropatkin and Naval Minister Tyrtov: if Russia cannot appease a new serious rival, then “the obvious danger of an armed clash with Japan” will remain 9.

When the Japanese government was headed by Marquis Hirobumi Ito, cool heads prevailed in Tokyo. Since the Peace of Shimonoseki in 1895, the Marquis was inclined to a cautious policy towards Russia. One of the most prominent statesmen of the Meiji era, Ito had great authority among both dignitaries and the emperor. But despite this, in May 1901 his cabinet lost the confidence of parliament, and a new prime minister, Prince Taro Katsura, took office. The younger members of his cabinet were much more aggressive towards Russia 10 .

True, Marquis Ito, who found himself outside the government, did not give up. During a private visit to St. Petersburg in November 1901, he looked for ways to pursue a policy of reconciliation. The experienced dignitary received a warm welcome in St. Petersburg and was awarded the Order of St. by Nicholas II. Alexander Nevsky, and during meetings with Witte and Lamsdorff he defended the Korean-Manchurian project. But if the Minister of Finance was sympathetic to this idea, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was still against 11.

Most importantly, while Ito was negotiating with the king and his officials, the Japanese ambassador in London, Count Tadasu Hayashi, secretly concluded a defensive alliance with Great Britain 12 . Russian diplomats were taken by surprise by this news. Two main adversaries in the Far East have joined forces, simultaneously changing the political landscape in the Pacific region.

ST. PETERSBURG CONTINUES CONTINUES

Nicholas II's ministers hastily assured the world that Russian troops would leave Manchuria in the near future. However, even here opinions in St. Petersburg were sharply divided. Count Lamsdorff and Witte believed that Manchuria should be returned as soon as possible. They predicted that the reluctance to calm the atmosphere in the region would cause new unrest there 13 . This point of view was also supported by many Russians - for the simple reasons that there are no less problems at home 14. In addition, the “Kingdom of Witte” - the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) - flourished, and the military presence in Manchuria posed a serious threat to the plans of the Minister of Finance.

However, the idea of ​​preserving Manchuria for Russia had no less influential defenders. The military believed that Manchuria would become part of the Russian Empire like Khiva, Kokand and Bukhara, annexed in the second half of the 19th century 15 . The most prominent "hawk" was Admiral Evgeny Alekseev, who was in Port Arthur. This naval commander had authority not only in the Pacific Fleet, but also among the garrison of the Liaodong Peninsula. His irrepressible temperament and ambition, coupled with rumors that Alekseev was the illegitimate son of Alexander II, ensured that he was the enmity of many of his contemporaries. And above all, Sergei Witte, who saw him as a dangerous rival in the Russian Far East.

The pathologically indecisive Nicholas II hesitated. The empire's confused and unstable policies sharply increased the hostility of other powers. Nevertheless, after a year of difficult negotiations with China, on April 8, 1902, Russia signed an agreement in Beijing, according to which the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria was to take place in three stages over 18 months 16 . On October 8, 1902, the first phase of evacuation of troops began in the southern part of Fengtian province, including in the ancient capital of the Qing dynasty, Mukden (modern Shenyang). But the second stage, planned for April 1903, did not take place; Russian dignitaries could not agree among themselves. Petersburg did not keep its word.

"FUTULE NEGOTIATIONS"

In the summer of 1903, Russia and Japan again entered into debate, wanting to resolve their differences in East Asia. Moreover, the initiative was taken by the intractable Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura. By this point, the Russian line had also hardened significantly as the influence of Witte, a principled advocate of peace in East Asia, had plummeted at court. The Tsar called the hard line adopted in the spring of 1903 the “new course” 17. His goal was “to prevent foreign influence in any form from entering Manchuria” 18. Russia will emphasize its determination, he wrote to Alekseev, by embarking on a military and economic presence in East Asia 19 .

Tired of endless bickering among the ministers, Nikolai made two important decisions in the summer. On August 12, he appointed Admiral Alekseev as governor in the Far East, which actually made him the tsar’s personal representative in the Pacific region with full power here 20. And two weeks later, Nikolai removed Alekseev’s main opponent, Sergei Witte, from the post of Minister of Finance 21.

Alekseev's rise caused a sharp reaction in Tokyo. Baron Roman Rosen, the Russian envoy, reported that in Japan the appearance of the governor of the Far East was perceived as an act of aggression 22. The Japanese were especially offended by the fact that the appointment happened two weeks after their government proposed starting a new round of negotiations 23 .

Throughout 1903, European foreign ministers were confused, alarmed, and often irritated by the constant reversals of tsarist policy that exposed Russia to increasing international isolation. But a compromise was still possible even at this late stage. However, the king and his viceroy still did not take Japan seriously.

Nicholas, of course, did not consider endless negotiations a worthy reason to interrupt his long autumn trips abroad or hunting. And he believed that “there will be no war because I don’t want it” 24. As a result of fruitless negotiations until the winter, the Japanese cabinet finally came to the conclusion that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was impossible. On February 6, 1904, Foreign Minister Komura summoned Baron Rosen to announce that the government had lost patience with all these “futile negotiations.” Therefore, it decided to end them and break off diplomatic relations with Russia 25 .

Upon returning to his residence, the Russian envoy learned from the naval attaché that earlier that day, at 6 a.m. local time, two Japanese squadrons had weighed anchor for unknown reasons. Shortly after midnight on February 8, 1904, torpedoes from Japanese destroyers hit three Russian ships stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead. Two empires went to war...

CONCLUSION

The Russo-Japanese War is often seen as a classic imperialist conflict. This is only partly true. Although expansionist goals have led St. Petersburg and Tokyo to disagree over Northeast Asia, such rivalry is not unique in the age of aggressive colonial wars. In the decades since the 1880s. and before the outbreak of the First World War, there were repeated clashes between the great states of Europe in Asia and Africa. However, none of them escalated into open war. Disagreements were invariably resolved by “imperial diplomacy,” 27 a tool for solving colonial disputes that were gaining momentum at the end of the 19th century.

An unwritten code governed the relations between the great powers of Europe. Although there were no strictly fixed rules here, they were quite clear. Based on rigid calculation and a sense of fair play, imperialism's diplomacy was effective. Crucial to its success was the understanding by the great powers that they all had legitimate interests outside of Europe. And this line successfully saved countries from open struggle on other continents.

But the diplomacy of imperialism itself was not without flaws. Chief among these was the failure of states to recognize newly developing non-European countries. Like an old-fashioned gentlemen's club, membership was limited to European governments. Thus, the tiny Belgian monarchy was considered a colonial power, while the ambitions of the United States or Japan were questioned. It was precisely this inability of a member of this club - Russia - to take seriously the colonial aspirations of an outsider - Japan - that led on February 8, 1904 to the outbreak of war in East Asia.

Tokyo saw how St. Petersburg trampled on its honor. And statesmen who do not properly respect the interests of other countries have put their own at serious risk. And more than a hundred years later, this conflict has not lost its relevance in international relations.

Translation by Evgenia Galimzyanova

Notes
1. This article is based on the chapter Russia's Relations with Japan before and after the War: An Episode in the Diplomacy of Imperialism from the book: The Treaty of Portsmouth and its Legacies. Steven Ericson and Alan Hockley, eds. Hanover, NH, 2008. pp. 11-23, as well as in my monograph: Schimmelpenninck van der Oye D. Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan. DeKalb, 2001.
2. Honor Among Nations: Intangible Interests and Foreign Policy. Elliot Abrams, ed. Washington, DC, 1998; Tsygankov A.P. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations. Cambridge, 2012. P. 13-27.
3. Wohlforth W. Honor as Interest in Russian Decisions for War 1600-1995 // Honor Among Nations...
4. Witte to Nicholas II, memorandum, August 11, 1900 // RGIA. F. 560. Op. 28. D. 218. L. 71.
5. Collection of treaties between Russia and other states in 1856-1917. M., 1952. S. 292-294.
6. Nish I. The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London, 1985. P. 45.
7. Rosen R.R. Forty Years of Diplomacy. Vol. 1. London, 1922. P. 159.
8. A.P. Izvolsky L.P. Urusov. Letter dated March 9, 1901 // Bakhmetyevsky archive. Box 1.
9. V.N. Lamsdorf S.Yu. Witte, A.N. Kuropatkin and P.P. Tyrtov. Letter dated May 22, 1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 175. L. 2-3.
10. Okamoto S. The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. N.Y., 1970. P. 24-31.
11. V.N. Lamsdorf, reports 11/20/1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 62. L. 43-45; V.N. Lamsdorf to Nicholas II, memorandum, 11/22/1901 // Red Archive (M.-L.). 1934. T. 63. P. 44-45; V.N. Lamsdorf A.P. Izvolsky, telegram, November 22, 1901 // Ibid. pp. 47-48.
12. Nish I. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907. L., 1966. P. 143-228.
13. V.N. Lamsdorf A.N. Kuropatkin. Letter dated March 31, 1900 // RGVIA. F. 165. Op. 1. D. 759. L. 1-2. See also: A.N. Kuropatkin V.V. Sakharov. Letter dated July 1, 1901 // Ibid. D. 702. L. 2.
14. Suvorin A. Small letters. New time. 1903. February 22. S. 3; Chinese Railway // New Times. 1902. May 3. S. 2; Kravchenko N. From the Far East. // New time. 1902. October 22. S. 2.
15. For a good example of such opinions, see: I.P. Balashev to Nicholas II, memorandum, March 25, 1902 // GARF. F. 543. Op. 1. D. 180. L. 1-26.
16. Glinsky B.B. Prologue of the Russian-Japanese War: materials from the archive of Count S.Yu. Witte. Pg., 1916. P. 180-183.
17. Although Nikolai coined this term, B.A. Romanov popularized it among historians to describe Bezobrazov's growing influence.
18. Romanov V.A. Russia in Manchuria. Ann Arbor, 1952. R. 284.
19. Ibidem.
20. Nicholas II E.I. Alekseev, telegram, September 10, 1903 // RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 1. D. 2865. L. 31.
21. Nicholas II S.Yu. Witte, letter, August 16, 1903 // RGVIA. F. 1622. Op. 1. D. 34. L. 1.
22. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 219.
23. Gurko V.I. Facts and Features of the Past. Stanford, 1939. P. 281.
24. MacKenzie D. Imperial Dreams/Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917. Fort Worth, 1994. P. 145.
25. Nish I. The Origins... P. 213.
26. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 231.
27. The phrase is taken from the title of William Langer’s classic work on European diplomacy at the turn of the 20th century: Langer W.L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism. N.Y., 1956.

* Mikado is the oldest title of the secular supreme overlord of Japan.