General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. How many general secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee were there in the USSR?

The history of the Soviet Union is the most complex topic in history. It covers only 70 years of history, but the material in it needs to be studied many times more than in all previous time! In this article we will analyze what the general secretaries of the USSR were in chronological order, characterize each one and provide links to the relevant site materials on them!

Position of Secretary General

The position of General Secretary is the highest position in the party apparatus of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and then in the CPSU. The person who occupied it was not only the leader of the party, but de facto the entire country. How is this possible, let’s figure it out now! The title of the position was constantly changing: from 1922 to 1925 - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b); from 1925 to 1953 she was called the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; from 1953 to 1966 - First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; from 1966 to 1989 - General Secretary of the CPSU.

The position itself arose in April 1922. Before this, the position was called party chairman and was headed by V.I. Lenin.

Why was the head of the party the de facto head of the country? In 1922, this position was headed by Stalin. The influence of the position was such that he could form the congress at will, which ensured full support for himself in the party. By the way, such support was extremely important. Therefore, the struggle for power in the 20s of the last century resulted precisely in the form of discussions in which victory meant life, and loss meant death, if not now, then in the future for sure.

I.V. Stalin understood this perfectly. That’s why he insisted on creating such a position, which, in fact, he headed. But the main thing was something else: in the 20s and 30s, a historical process of merging the party apparatus with the state apparatus took place. This meant, for example, that the district party committee (the head of the district party committee) is in fact the head of the district, the city party committee is the head of the city, and the regional party committee is the head of the region. And the councils played a subordinate role.

Here it is important to remember that the power in the country was Soviet - that is, the real state authorities should have been councils. And they were, but only de jure (legally), formally, on paper, if you like. It was the party that determined all aspects of the development of the state.

So let's look at the main secretaries general.

Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin (Dzhugashvili)

He was the first General Secretary of the party, permanent until 1953 - until his death. The fact of the merging of the party and state apparatus was reflected in the fact that from 1941 to 1953 he was also the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and then the Council of Ministers of the USSR. If you don’t know, the Council of People’s Commissars and then the Council of Ministers are the Government of the USSR. If you are not in the subject at all, then .

Stalin stood at the origins of both the great victories of the Soviet Union and the great troubles in the history of our country. He was the author of the articles “The Year of the Great Turnaround.” He stood at the origins of super-industrialization and collectivization. It is with him that such concepts as the “cult of personality” are associated (see more about it and), the Holodomor of the 30s, the repressions of the 30s. In principle, under Khrushchev, Stalin was blamed for the failures in the first months of the Great Patriotic War.

However, the unrivaled growth of industrial construction in the 1930s is also associated with the name of Stalin. The USSR received its own heavy industry, which we still use today.

Stalin himself said this about the future of his name: “I know that after my death a heap of rubbish will be placed on my grave, but the wind of history will mercilessly scatter it!” Well, we'll see how it goes!

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev

N.S. Khrushchev served as General (or First) Secretary of the Party from 1953 to 1964. His name is associated with many events both from world history and from the history of Russia: Events in Poland, the Suez Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the slogan “Catch up and surpass America in meat and milk production per capita!”, the execution in Novocherkassk, and much more other.

Khrushchev, in general, was not a very smart politician, but he was very intuitive. He understood perfectly well how he would rise, because after Stalin’s death the struggle for power became fierce again. Many people saw the future of the USSR not in Khrushchev, but in Malenkov, who then held the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. But Khrushchev took a strategically correct position.

Details about the USSR under him.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev

L.I. Brezhnev held the main position in the party from 1964 to 1982. His time is otherwise called the period of “stagnation”. The USSR began to turn into a “banana republic”, the shadow economy grew, the shortage of consumer goods grew, and the Soviet nomenclature expanded. All these processes then led to a systemic crisis during the years of Perestroika, and ultimately.

Leonid Ilyich himself was very fond of cars. The authorities blocked one of the rings around the Kremlin so that the secretary general could test the new model given to him. There is also an interesting historical anecdote associated with the name of his daughter. They say one day my daughter went to museums to look for some kind of necklace. Yes, yes, to museums, not shopping. As a result, in one of the museums she pointed to the necklace and asked for it. The director of the museum called Leonid Ilyich and explained the situation. To which I received a clear answer: “Don’t give!” Something like this.

And more about the USSR and Brezhnev.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

M.S. Gorbachev held the party position in question from March 11, 1984 to August 24, 1991. His name is associated with such things as: Perestroika, the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the attempt to create the SSG, the Putsch in August 1991. He was the first and last President of the USSR.

Read more about all this.

We have not named two more general secretaries. See them in this table with photos:

Post Scriptum: many rely on texts - textbooks, manuals, even monographs. But you can beat all your competitors on the Unified State Exam if you use video lessons. They are all there. Studying video lessons is at least five times more effective than simply reading a textbook!

Best regards, Andrey Puchkov

People speak of Stalin as the Leader and General Secretary, less often - as the Prime Minister, Chairman of the Government of the USSR. All this is true, but if you ask whether Stalin was the General Secretary until his death, then most of the respondents will be mistaken in saying that Joseph Vissarionovich died as General Secretary. Many historians are also mistaken when they say that Stalin wanted to resign from the post of Secretary General in the fifties.
The fact is that Stalin abolished the post of General Secretary of the CPSU (b) in the thirties and until the sixties, already under Brezhnev, there were no general secretaries (already the Central Committee of the CPSU!) in the USSR. Khrushchev was First Secretary and Head of the Government after Stalin's death. What position did Stalin himself hold from the thirties until his death, and what position did he want to leave? Let's figure this out.

Was Stalin the General Secretary? This question will puzzle almost everyone. The answer will follow - of course, there was! But if you ask an elderly person who remembers the late 30s - early 50s, whether Stalin was called that then, he will answer: “I don’t remember anything. You know, definitely not.”
On the other hand, we have heard many times that in April 1922, at the plenum of the Central Committee after the 21st Party Congress, “at Lenin’s proposal” Stalin was elected General Secretary. And after that there was a lot of talk about his secretaryship.

It should be sorted out. Let's start from afar.
Secretary, according to the original meaning of the word, is a clerical position. Not a single state or political institution can do without office work. The Bolsheviks, who from the very beginning aimed at seizing power, paid a lot of attention to their archives. It was inaccessible to most party members, but Lenin often looked into it for his polemics, in other words, criticism. He had no difficulties - Krupskaya kept the archive.

After the February Revolution, Elena Stasova became the secretary of the Central Committee (still with a small letter). If Krupskaya kept the party archive in her desk, then Stasova was given a room in the Kseshinskaya mansion, and she had a staff of 3 assistants. In August 1917, after the 6th Congress of the Central Committee, a secretariat was established, headed by Sverdlov.

Further more. Bureaucratization gradually took hold of the Bolshevik Party. In 1919, the Politburo and the Organizing Bureau emerged. Stalin entered into both. In 1920, Krestinsky, a supporter of Trotsky, became the head of the secretariat. A year after another discussion, or simply put another way - squabbles, Krestinsky and other “Trotskyists” were removed from all the highest bodies of the party. Stalin, as usual, skillfully maneuvered and remained senior in the Organizing Bureau, which included the secretariat.

While Lenin and other “best minds” of the party were engaged in big politics, Stalin, in Trotsky’s words, “an outstanding mediocrity,” was preparing his army - the party apparatus. Separately, it should be said about Molotov, a typical party official, completely devoted to Stalin. He was in 1921-22. led the secretariat, i.e. was his predecessor.

By April 1922, when Stalin became General Secretary, his position was quite strong. Almost no one noticed this appointment itself. In the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, in the article “VKP(b)” (1928), Stalin is never mentioned separately and there is not a word about any General Secretary. And it was drawn up in a “working order”, among others they “listened and decided”, at the suggestion, by the way, of Kamenev.

Most often, the General Secretary was remembered in connection with the so-called “Testament of Lenin” (in fact, the document was called “Letter to the Congress”). One should not think that Lenin only spoke badly about Stalin: “too rude,” and suggested replacing him with someone else. The most humane man did not say a kind word about any of his “Partaigenosse”.

There is an important feature of Lenin’s statement about Stalin. Lenin dictated the proposal to remove him on January 4, 1923 after he learned of Stalin’s rudeness towards Krupskaya. The main text of the “Testament” was dictated on December 23-25, 1922, and it speaks quite restrainedly about Stalin: “he concentrated immense power in his hands,” etc. In any case, not much worse than others (Trotsky is self-confident, Bukharin is a scholastic, does not understand dialectics, and in general, is almost a non-Marxist). So much for the “principled” Vladimir Ilyich. Until Stalin became rude to his wife, he did not even think about removing Stalin.

I will not dwell in detail on the further history of the Testament. It is important to emphasize that Stalin, through skillful demagoguery, flexible tactics, and blocking with various “tsekists”, ensured that the post of General Secretary remained with him. Let's go straight to 1934, when the 17th Party Congress took place.

It has already been written many times that some of the congress delegates decided to replace Stalin with Kirov. Naturally, there are no documents about this, and the “memoir evidence” is extremely contradictory. The party's charter, based on the notorious "democratic centralism", completely excludes any personnel movements by decision of the congresses. The congresses elected only central bodies, but no one personally. Such issues were resolved in a narrow circle of the party elite.

Nevertheless, the “Testament” was not forgotten, and Stalin could not yet consider himself guaranteed against any accidents. At the end of the 20s, the “Testament” was remembered openly or in disguise at various party gatherings. For example, Kamenev, Bukharin and even Kirov spoke about him. Stalin had to defend himself. He interpreted Lenin’s words about his rudeness as praise that he was supposedly rude to those who “rudely and treacherously destroy and split the party.”

By 1934, Stalin decided to put an end to all talk related to the Testament. During the era of the “Great Terror”, the storage of this Leninist document began to be equated with counter-revolutionary activity. With corresponding conclusions. Neither at the 17th Congress, nor at the subsequent plenum of the Central Committee, the question of the General Secretary was raised. Since then, Stalin signed all documents modestly - Secretary of the Central Committee, even after Molotov's Presovnarkom. This was the case until May 1940, when he combined both positions.

In October 1952, at the plenum after the 19th Congress, the position of the General Secretary was abolished - officially, however, there was no announcement about this. No one should have remembered this story at all.

The General Secretariat was revived many years later, during the Brezhnev era.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the topic of this note is rather secondary, and in no case can Stalin’s reluctance to be called General Secretary after 1934 be considered a sign of his “modesty”. This is just his petty maneuver, aimed at quickly forgetting about Lenin’s letter and all the vicissitudes associated with it.

Partner News

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

Dictionaries define the word “apogee” not only as the highest point in the orbit of a spacecraft, but also as the highest degree, the flowering of something.

Andropov's new position, of course, became the culmination of his fate. For the history of the country - the last 15 months of Yuri Vladimirovich’s life, the period of his tenure as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee - is a period of hopes, searches and unfulfilled expectations, not through Andropov’s fault.

At the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on November 12, 1982, Yu. V. Andropov was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

He turned out to be the most informed leader of the USSR both on issues of the internal situation in the country and in the field of interstate relations.

Another aspect of the Andropov phenomenon is the fact that he was actually the first head of a special service in world history to become the head of state - on June 16, 1983, he was also elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

As one of the participants of that Plenum, A. S. Chernyaev, recalled, when Yu. V. Andropov was the first to appear on the stage of the Sverdlovsk Hall of the Kremlin Palace, the whole hall stood up in one impulse.

When K.U Chernenko read out the Politburo's proposal to recommend electing Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, an explosion of applause followed.

In his first speech in his new capacity at the Plenum of the Central Committee on November 12, 1982, Andropov emphasized:

– The Soviet people have unlimited trust in their Communist Party. She trusts because for her there were and are no other interests than the vital interests of the Soviet people. To justify this trust means to move forward along the path of communist construction and to achieve the further flourishing of our socialist Motherland.

Alas! one cannot help but admit that just a few years later these words will be consigned to oblivion, and in society the mood of “doublethink” and “double-mindedness” will begin to rapidly grow and develop as a response to the hypocritical, coldly official, formal “declarations” of party bosses, not confirmed by any specific cases.

Three days later, at a funeral meeting on Red Square at the funeral of L. I. Brezhnev, the new Soviet leader outlined the main directions of the state's future policy:

– do everything necessary to further improve the living standards of the people, develop the democratic foundations of Soviet society, strengthen the economic and defense power of the country, strengthen the friendship of the fraternal peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

– the party and the state will unwaveringly defend the vital interests of our Motherland, maintain high vigilance, readiness to give a crushing rebuff to any attempt at aggression... We are always ready for honest, equal and mutually beneficial cooperation with any state that so desires.

Of course, the Vice President of the United States, the Federal President of Germany, the Prime Minister of Japan, and the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and China who were present at this event drew conclusions from this political declaration of the new Secretary General.

As we have already noted, Andropov was well known abroad long before this day, including to foreign intelligence services, which immediately familiarized their governments with the “Andropov dossier” they had.

Nevertheless, the election of a new Soviet leader confronted the US President with the task of conducting “reconnaissance in force” of the USSR’s positions on a number of issues.

Thus, on November 13, the day after Andropov was elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Ronald Reagan lifted sanctions against the USSR, introduced on December 30, 1981 as “punishment” for the introduction of martial law by the government of Wojciech Jaruzelski in the Polish People’s Republic and the internment of activists of the anti-government Solidarity "

But the period of weakening US pressure on the USSR was short-lived.

“On the one hand, the enemy of the Soviet Union,” L. M. Mlechin wrote about R. Reagan, “on the other hand, in correspondence he looks like a reasonable person who is not averse to improving relations... Andropov couldn’t even admit that Reagan was sincerely trying take some positive steps.”

Or, unlike the author of the above maxim, Yu. V. Andropov simply knew that on March 8, 1983, in his famous speech about the notorious “evil empire,” Reagan stated: “I believe that communism is another sad and strange division history of mankind, the last page of which is being written now.” And, since Andropov knew that Reagan’s words were supported by very specific deeds, which Peter Schweitzer later told the world about, he understood that special prudence, firmness and flexibility should be shown in relations with the United States.

Accusing Andropov of aggravating relations with the United States, L. M. Mlechin simply does not know or has forgotten about Reagan’s escalation of military actions against OKSVA not only under the semi-competent K. U. Chernenko, but also under the very digestible soft-bodied M. S. Gorbachev. There is a lot of evidence about this.

Let us recall just one of them: “Before 1986 we were almost not involved in the war“, former CIA officer Mark Sageman admitted to a Russian journalist.

And it would seem that in such a favorable environment, why did the United States need to use the “stick” method? instead of the “carrot” of sweet promises???

In 1983, R. Reagan only makes decisions on the deployment of American Pershing missiles in Europe and the beginning of work on the creation of a strategic missile defense system (the Strategic Defense Initiative program, SDI, called “Star Wars” by journalists). This broke the existing system of military-strategic parity and forced the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization to take retaliatory measures.

And the very first of them - Declaration of the Political Advisory Committee of the Department of Internal Affairs regarding plans to expand the American military presence in Europe dated January 5, 1983 remained unanswered by the United States.

However, we will talk about the international activities of Yu. V. Andropov later.

On November 15, 1982, the long-planned Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee took place, which approved the plan for the country's socio-economic development and the budget for the next year. The new Secretary General spoke after two main speakers on these issues.

Foreign analysts noted that Andropov emphasized:

– I would like to draw your attention with all my might to the fact that for a number of the most important indicators, the planned targets for the first two years of the five-year plan turned out to be unfulfilled... In general, comrades, there are many urgent tasks in the national economy. Of course, I don’t have ready-made recipes for solving them....

At that time, noted L. M. Mlechin, such a phrase made an impression: they were accustomed to the fact that they could only teach from a high rostrum. But everyone liked it when Andropov said that it was necessary to strengthen discipline, to stimulate good work with rubles...

Some authors who wrote about Andropov’s desire to “capture political Olympus” seem to have underestimated the meaning of the new Secretary General’s key phrase about his lack of “ready-made recipes,” which is confirmed by all his activities in this post. Besides in numerous speeches Andropov of that period clearly formulated the goals and objectives of the actions taken, which clearly reflected the interests and aspirations of the majority of citizens of our country, members of the CPSU.

So such assumptions and versions about the “seizure” of power are not confirmed by specific facts.

E.K. Ligachev, head of the department of organizational and party work of the CPSU Central Committee, recalled that the General Secretary received tens of thousands of telegrams from people demanding that he restore order in society and increase the responsibility of leaders. This was the cry of the soul of the people, tired of the callousness and irresponsibility of the “servants of the people”, and other vicious phenomena that would later be called “stagnation”.

In addition to the specialized automated information system “P” that we mentioned, Yuri Vladimirovich demanded that a weekly systematized summary of all complaints and appeals from citizens be prepared for him personally in his name, and then, through assistants, he gave appropriate instructions for each fact...

Real " feedback" of the Secretary General with the people was established.

Some wrote that Andropov “got rid of V.V. Fedorchuk, who was undesirable to him as chairman of the KGB of the USSR”, “transferring” him to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

It seems that with such very superficial judgments a whole series of very serious circumstances are overlooked.

Former member of the Politburo of the Central Committee A. N. Yakovlev was perplexed that a criminal case had been opened against former minister N. A. Shchelokov:

– All power was corrupt, why did he choose only one object worthy of fighting for himself? Why didn’t he dare touch others??

Without asking a completely appropriate question, what about Alexander Nikolaevich and his other Politburo colleagues personally? done to fight the scourge of corruption, leaving also on his conscience statement that “the entire government was corrupt,” we only emphasize that, unlike zealous journalists, law enforcement agencies are required to present evidence to the court criminal acts. And they are collected as a result of investigative actions or previous operational checks or developments. Which requires, firstly, time.

Secondly, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was also called upon to fight official crimes, including “corruption” crimes, which at that time had predominantly rather banal forms of giving or receiving a bribe.

Thirdly, as is well known, N.A. Shchelokov was not the only corrupt official in Russia and the union republics of the USSR, who was dealt with by law enforcement agencies on the direct orders of the new Secretary General.

“Resonant” criminal cases of corruption crimes, and not only in Moscow - at the instigation of the KGB chairman - were initiated already in 1979 - such as the case of corruption in the Ministry of Fisheries and the Ocean trading company, in the fall of 1982 the famous “case” of the director of the Eliseevsky grocery store, Yu. K. Sokolov.

Let us remember the beginning of the “Uzbek case” in the fall of 1983, which revealed monstrous facts of corruption in this republic, led by “Brezhnev’s favorite” Sh. R. Rashidov!

So Yuri Vladimirovich dared, very dared, to “touch” yesterday’s “untouchables”!

But the “stories” of N. A. Shchelokov and the former secretary of the Krasnodar regional committee of the CPSU S. F. Medunov were completed after Andropov’s death - apparently, the inertia of the movement was still in effect: the new Secretary General Chernenko did not consider it possible to “pardon” the thieves fellow party members...

And yet, let us emphasize once again why exactly the Ministry of Internal Affairs, headed by former Minister Shchelokov, became the first object of a comprehensive audit of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office?

Yes, because Andropov understood that the fight against crime can only be strengthened by a civil service that is not corrupt, does not have dubious and openly criminal connections!

In addition, the new Secretary General received about thirty thousand(half of the complaints received by the CPSU Central Committee in 1954 against the NKVD - MGB!), letters from citizens asking for protection from the arbitrariness of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Having learned about Andropov’s election as General Secretary, N.A. Shchelokov, not without reason, said in his hearts: “This is the end!”

On December 17, 1982, V. M. Chebrikov, former first deputy of Andropov, was appointed chairman of the KGB of the USSR.

On the same day, N.A. Shchelokov was dismissed, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was headed by the recent chairman of the KGB, Vitaly Vasilyevich Fedorchuk.

Very soon, during an audit of the activities of the Economic Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and then the initiation of a criminal case on the identified crimes, Shchelokov became suspected of complicity in them.

The searches carried out at the apartment and dacha of the former minister provided the investigation with such convincing evidence that on June 15, 1983, he was removed from the CPSU Central Committee, and on November 6, 1984, that is, after the death of Yu. V. Andropov, he was stripped of the rank of army general and Hero of Socialist Labor.

In the conclusion of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office regarding N.A. Shchelokov, in addition to abuse of official position, it was noted:

“In total, Shchelokov’s criminal actions caused damage to the state in the amount of over 560 thousand rubles. To compensate for the damage, he and his family members were returned and confiscated by the investigative bodies of property in the amount of 296 thousand rubles, and 126 thousand rubles were contributed in money...”

And this is with a ministerial salary of 1,500 rubles per month! Yes, here we are definitely talking about “especially large sizes”, which have a special rating scale in the articles of the Criminal Code!

The conclusion of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office noted that a criminal case against N.A. Shchelokov could not be initiated due to his suicide on December 13, 1984.

And as you know, such is the pop - such is the parish. What generally characterizes the situation in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the late 70s - early 80s of the last century.

In a suicide note addressed to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee K.U. Chernenko, Shchelokov wrote:

“I ask you not to allow philistine slander about me to run rampant. This will involuntarily discredit the authority of leaders of all ranks; everyone experienced this before the arrival of the unforgettable Leonid Ilyich. Thank you for all the kindness and please forgive me.

With respect and love

N. Shchelokov."

It was V.V. Fedorchuk, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, who was sent to clear out such “Augean stables,” which clearly indicates Andropov’s great trust in him.

USSR KGB veteran N. M. Golushko, who knew Vitaly Vasilyevich well, wrote: “Fedorchuk was characterized by a tough, semi-military style of work, which led to rigor, strict discipline, and a lot of formalities and reports. At the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with persistence and conviction, he increased professionalism, responsibility and discipline, did a lot to get rid of corrupt employees, those who violated the law, had unofficial connections with the criminal world, and fought against the cover-up of crimes. He was not afraid to conduct business involving high officials - the party nomenklatura. During his service in the ministry (1983–1986), about 80,000 employees were dismissed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Those who worked with him note his hard work, sky-high demands that reached the point of humiliating people, but also his honesty and selflessness.”

Vitaly Vasilyevich himself recalled:

– When I began to understand the situation in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I got the impression that Shchelokov had not really been involved in business lately. I found it falling apart. Crime grew, but this growth was hidden. There are many bribe takers in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, especially in the traffic police service. We started to sort all this out, and then a bunch of allegations of abuse began to pour in. I reported to the Central Committee in the prescribed manner about signals related to Shchelokov’s abuses. Then this issue was brought up for consideration by the Politburo.

The meeting was chaired by Andropov. When the question arose whether to initiate a criminal case against Shchelokov, Tikhonov and Ustinov objected, Gromyko hesitated, others were also in favor of releasing everything on the brakes. But Andropov insisted on opening a case and entrusting the investigation to the Main Military Prosecutor's Office.

Andropov, who was well aware of the unfavorable situation that had developed in the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in connection with the many years of their leadership by Shchelokov and the principle of “stability and irremovability of personnel” that was being implemented, sent a large group of experienced KGB officers to the police: on December 20, 1982, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee agreed with the KGB’s proposal to select and send to the state security agencies, before April 1, 1983, experienced party workers under the age of 40, mainly with engineering and economic education, to leadership positions.

And on December 27, 1982, the Politburo additionally decided to send from the KGB to strengthen the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - meaning the ministries of internal affairs of the union republics, the departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the territories and regions, more than 2000 employees, including 100 officers from “the number of experienced leading operational and investigators."

Although, naturally, not everyone, including those in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were happy with such changes.

But these decisions and the activities of V.V. Fedorchuk and the security officers seconded to the Ministry of Internal Affairs clearly contributed to both getting rid of compromised employees and strengthening law and order in the country, real protection of citizens' rights from crimes and arbitrariness of officials.

Let us only note that under Fedorchuk, more than 30 thousand police officers were brought to criminal liability, more than 60 thousand of them were dismissed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs...

These measures were an important step both towards cleansing the country’s law enforcement system as a whole, restoring the trust of citizens to it, and towards intensifying the fight against crime and corruption, strengthening law and order, and increasing the effectiveness of protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the Soviet people.

And it was the results of the work done that confirmed the feasibility of forming a special department of the KGB of the USSR for operational servicing of internal affairs bodies - Directorate “B” of the 3rd Main Directorate of the KGB and its corresponding divisions in the territorial departments of state security, which was carried out on August 13, 1983.

And this decision definitely contributed to both ridding the Ministry of Internal Affairs of compromised employees, and strengthening law and order in the country, the real protection of the rights of citizens from crimes and arbitrariness of officials.

Let me make a note about “Andropov’s tightening of the screws” and “raids on truants during working hours.” In Moscow, such a practice actually took place, but it was carried out, of course, not by “KGB officers” and by no means on the “initiative of the Secretary General.” It is likely that this “Italian strike” was carried out precisely as a form of passive protest against the new Minister of the Interior, as a form of “imitation of vigorous activity” by careless officials.

In a speech at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee November 22, 1982. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov emphasized that the main thing “is the course to improve the well-being of the working people... caring for the Soviet people, their working and living conditions, their spiritual development...”.

In it, Andropov outlined those key points of development, which later came to be called the “perestroika plan”:

– It is necessary to create conditions – economic and organizational – that would stimulate high-quality, productive work, initiative and entrepreneurship. And vice versa, poor work, inactivity and irresponsibility should most directly and inevitably affect the material rewards, official position, and moral authority of workers.

It is necessary to strengthen responsibility for observing national and national interests, to decisively eradicate departmentalism and localism...

It is necessary to wage a more decisive struggle against any violations of party, state and labor discipline. I am confident that in this we will meet with the full support of party and Soviet organizations, the support of all Soviet people.

And in the latter, the new Secretary General was not mistaken: his words were received with enthusiasm and faith in the coming changes, which created in society a special aura of confidence in favorable changes. That is why Andropov’s authority rapidly rose in society.

And foreign analysts, who closely followed the development of the situation in the Soviet Union, emphasized that Andropov paid attention specifically to “the fight against any violations of party, state and labor discipline“, because he was well aware of how things really stood in our society.

Feeling a serious threat emanating from the control of the workers and their public organizations, the partyocrats, reluctantly, were forced to verbally declare “perestroika,” trying to drown the essence of the party demands of the moment in the usual verbal debates and praises.

In this inertia and psychological unpreparedness and inability to really and decisively take on concrete participation in the processes of development and stimulation of innovation and creative activity of the masses of workers lies, in our opinion, the objective need to replace management personnel who have lost both the trust of the collectives and have forgotten how to proactively solve non-trivial problems. life tasks.

During the 15 months of Andropov’s tenure as General Secretary, 18 Union ministers, 37 first secretaries of regional committees, territorial committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics were removed, criminal cases were opened against a number of high party and government officials - another thing is that not all of them were brought to justice logical end due to his death.

Under Andropov, facts of stagnation in the economy, underfulfillment of plans, and slowdown in scientific and technological progress were first made public and criticized, which would later be called the “revolutionary breakthrough” of perestroika...

The partycrats who survived such a “shake-up” instantly felt a blessed opportunity to “relax” after the election of K. U. Chernenko as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. It was these personnel that were “inherited” by the last Secretary General M. S. Gorbachev.

“We have large reserves in the national economy,” Andropov continued, which will be discussed further later. – These reserves must be sought in the acceleration of scientific and technological progress, in the widespread and rapid introduction into production of the achievements of science, technology and advanced experience.

In his opinion, the combination of science and production should have been “facilitated by planning methods and a system of material incentives. It is necessary that those who boldly introduce new technology do not find themselves at a disadvantage.”

With an impartial analysis of the causes of the catastrophe of the Soviet Union, which occurred 9 years after the events described, one can see that it was preceded by the refusal - or inability, which, however, does not change the essence of the matter, of the Gorbachev leadership from using methods of macro-planning and stimulating innovation. That is precisely the “know-how” (management technologies) that were successfully used even then in the most developed countries of the world and are now borrowed by us from the West as supposedly its “civilizational achievements.”

The real reason for the collapse of the USSR was the notorious “human factor” - the incompetence of the then leadership of the country - which turned into a fatal “mistake of the crew” and “ship captain”.

As S. M. Rogov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, noted on this occasion, “the unprecedented decline of the 90s is the result not of the machinations of the CIA and the Pentagon, but of the incompetent and irresponsible policies of the then Russian leaders.”

And the American strategy of “crushing a geopolitical rival” acted only as a background, an external factor that created real challenges and threats for the USSR, which Gorbachev’s leadership was powerless to resist.

However, few people have yet spoken seriously about the real reasons for the collapse of the Soviet state. But even a little over twenty years after the “beginning of the new history of Russia” and other CIS states, which means the cessation of the existence of the USSR, there will undoubtedly be a serious conversation about this, as well as about the “social price”, the results and the “achieved results.” .

As well as the fact that many unexpected discoveries and confessions await us here. But, I repeat, this is a matter of the not so distant future.

But, returning to November 22, 1982, we note that regarding the tasks facing the country and society, Andropov admitted very frankly:

– Of course, I don’t have ready-made recipes for solving them. But it is up to all of us – the Central Committee of the Party – to find these answers. Find, summarizing domestic and world experience, accumulating the knowledge of the best practitioners and scientists. In general, slogans alone will not get things moving. Much organizational work is needed by party organizations, economic managers, engineering and technical workers...

Faithful to the principles of collegial leadership, faith in the “living creativity of the masses”, Yu. V. Andropov intended to rely specifically on the specific knowledge of specialists and managers, without declaring “party and state decisions,” as was often the case in previous years, but developing them based on a deep analysis and objective forecast of the country’s available resources….

Hence the specific tasks and instructions to the State Planning Committee, the creation in March 1983 of the Commission for the preparation of economic reform under the leadership of the secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee N.I. Ryzhkov and M.S. Gorbachev... (We should immediately note that after the death of Yu.V. Andropov, this work stopped.)

And at the conclusion of his speech, the new General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee again emphasized:

– The further development of socialist democracy in its broadest sense is necessary, that is, the increasingly active participation of the working masses in the management of state and public affairs. And, of course, there is no need to prove how important it is to take care of the needs of workers, their working and living conditions.

The last words of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee addressed to the party leaders indicate both that he knew well the state of affairs in the social sphere on the ground, and that what will become the main criterion for assessing the performance of managers.

Unfortunately, these plans of Andropov were not destined to come true...

It is not difficult to notice that four years later the new Secretary General M. S. Gorbachev will begin his political career by repeating these words of Yu. V. Andropov. But, unlike Yuri Vladimirovich, for him political rhetoric was needed only for the populist winning of sympathy, and not for the implementation of specific socio-economic programs. This is the difference in the approaches and positions of these two last general secretaries of the CPSU.

And now the time has come to talk about the last secret of Yu. V. Andropov.

Not his personal secret, but the carefully guarded and guarded secret of my beloved, long-suffering, slandered and slandered Motherland.

After the election of Yu. V. Andropov as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress requested a report from the CIA on the state of the Soviet economy, where “both its potential capabilities and vulnerabilities would be presented.”

In presenting this report to Congress, Senator William Proxmyer, Vice-Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance and Economic Protection, considered it necessary to emphasize The following are the main conclusions from the CIA analysis:(translation quoted from English):

“In the USSR there is a steady decline in the rate of economic growth, however, this growth will remain positive for the foreseeable future.

The economy is performing poorly, with frequent deviations from the requirements of economic efficiency. However, this does not mean that the Soviet economy is losing vitality or dynamism.

Despite the fact that there are discrepancies between economic plans and their implementation in the USSR, The economic collapse of this country is not even a remote possibility" (!!!).

And how much work and effort had to be made to make the “impossible possible”!!!

But these are questions for other historical figures and characters.

For, as we know, the vulgar, straightforward principle does not “work” in the knowledge of history: post hoc, ad hoc - after this, therefore - therefore!

Let us, however, continue quoting the extremely important American intelligence document we mentioned.

“Usually Western specialists involved in the Soviet economy pay main attention to its problems,” the senator continued, “however, the danger of such a one-sided approach is that, by ignoring positive factors, we get an incomplete picture and draw incorrect conclusions based on it.

The Soviet Union is our main potential enemy, and this gives even more reason to have an accurate and objective assessment of the state of its economy. The worst thing we can do is underestimate the economic power of our main enemy.

You need to be aware that Soviet Union Although it is weakened by the inefficient functioning of the agricultural sector and burdened with high defense expenditures, it ranks economically second in the world in terms of gross national product, has a large and well-trained productive force, and is highly industrialized.

The USSR also has vast mineral reserves, including oil, gas, and relatively scarce minerals and precious metals. One should take a serious look at things and think about what might happen if the development trends of the Soviet economy turn from negative to positive.”

Concluding the presentation of the CIA report, William Proxmyer noted that it “must make clear to members of the US Congress and the American public the real state of the Soviet economy, about which they still had a very vague idea. The report also shows that forecasting the economic development of the Soviet Union contains at least as much uncertainty as the prospects for our own economy.”

We note, however, that certain conclusions and provisions of this report formed the basis of the strategy economic war against the USSR, unleashed by the administration of R. Reagan and especially intensified in 1986–1990.

Let us immediately present some statistical data from the first quarter of 1983, characterizing the development of the Soviet economy.

The growth of industrial production in January–March amounted to 4.7%, compared to the same period in 1982, and labor productivity increased by 3.9%.

These indicators gave hope that the country’s economic situation could be “raised” and the pace of sustainable development could be set.

The next significant political speech by Yu. V. Andropov was a report at a ceremonial meeting dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics December 21, 1982.

In it, the Secretary General stated that against the backdrop of the closely intertwined interests of the republics, “mutual assistance and relationships are becoming more and more fruitful, directing the creative efforts of the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union into a single direction. The comprehensive development of each of the socialist nations in our country naturally leads to their ever-increasing rapprochement... And this, comrades, is not just an addition, it is a multiple multiplication of our creative forces.”

But “success in solving the national question does not mean that all problems have disappeared,” which is why the development of socialism “must include a thoughtful, scientifically based national policy.”

Life shows, stated the Secretary General, “that economic and cultural progress of all nations and nationalities accompanied inevitably by the growth of their national self-awareness. This is a natural, objective process. It is important, however, that natural pride in the successes achieved does not turn into national arrogance or arrogance, does not give rise to a tendency towards isolation, disrespectful attitude towards other nations and nationalities. But such negative phenomena still occur. And it would be wrong to explain this only by relics of the past. They are sometimes fueled by our own miscalculations in our work. There are no trifles here, comrades. Everything is important here - the attitude towards language, and towards monuments of the past, and the interpretation of historical events, and how we transform villages and cities, influence the working and living conditions of people.”

Absolutely justifiably, as subsequent events in our country showed, Andropov called the eternal task of educating people in the spirit of mutual respect and friendship of all nations and nationalities, love for the Motherland, internationalism, and solidarity with the workers of other countries. “We must persistently search,” he emphasized, “for new methods and forms of work that meet today’s requirements, making it possible to make the mutual enrichment of cultures even more fruitful, to open up to all people even wider access to all the best that the culture of each of our peoples gives... A convincing, concrete demonstration of our achievements, a serious analysis of new problems constantly generated by life, freshness of thought and words - this is the path to improving all our propaganda, which must always be truthful and realistic, as well as interesting, intelligible, and therefore more effective.” .

Despite the presence of many serious difficulties in social development, which were made public for the first time in full by the new General Secretary, Andropov optimistically stated:

– We boldly talk about existing problems and unsolved tasks because we firmly know: we can handle these problems, these tasks, we can and must solve them. A mood for action, and not for loud words, is what is needed today in order for the great and mighty Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be even stronger.

Today it is somehow not customary to remember that many initiatives of the Soviet Union, based on the principles of the peaceful existence of states with different socio-political systems, received wide international recognition and were included in dozens of international documents that guaranteed peace and consistent stable development on different continents .

And it was precisely the rejection of these principles and obligations by the subsequent Soviet leadership led by M. S. Gorbachev that caused the effect of the collapse of the load-bearing structures of the world order, the consequences of which are still felt on the planet, including far beyond the borders of the former union republics of the USSR.

There is no doubt that Andropov, like no other leader of the country at that time, enjoyed great authority, trust, popularity and even love of a significant part of the population of the Soviet Union.

The German researcher D. Kreichmar noted on this occasion that “a significant part of the intelligentsia pinned great hopes on the election of Andropov to the post of General Secretary.”

Even L. M. Mlechin, who does not have any special sympathy for the KGB chairman, is forced to admit: “Andropov’s appearance at the head of the party and state promised change. I liked his taciturnity and severity. They made an impression with promises to restore order and end corruption.”

In January 1983, industrial production in the USSR increased by 6.3%, and agricultural production by 4% compared to the previous year.

“The recent chief of the KGB,” wrote R. A. Medvedev, “managed not only to quickly consolidate power, but also to win the undoubted respect of a significant part of the population,” while “different and contradictory hopes were associated with his activities in the new field. Some expected a quick restoration of order in the form, first of all, of tough measures against rampant crime and the mafia, the eradication of corruption and the strengthening of loose labor discipline.”

Andropov’s phrase, which has become almost a textbook, is well known that “we still have not yet adequately studied the society in which we live and work, and have not fully revealed its inherent patterns, especially economic ones.”

No matter how paradoxical this may seem, I think that the former chairman of the USSR KGB was right in this statement as well.

And in mid-April 1983, a completely dumbfounded BBC radio commentator told the Soviet audience that these facts “testify to the colossal potential that socialism conceals within itself, which its leaders themselves seem to have been unaware of.”

In February 1983, at the request of the editor-in-chief of the main theoretical body of the CPSU Central Committee “Communist” R.I. Kosolapov, Andropov shared with readers his vision of a complex of problems of modern social development in the article “The Teachings of Karl Marx and Some Issues of Socialist Construction in the USSR.”

In it he noted:

“For thousands of years, people have been looking for a way to a just reconstruction of society, to get rid of exploitation, violence, material and spiritual poverty. Outstanding minds devoted themselves to this search. Generation after generation, fighters for the people's happiness sacrificed their lives in the name of this goal. But it was precisely in the titanic activity of Marx that the work of the great scientist first merged with the practice of the selfless struggle of the leader and organizer of the revolutionary movement of the masses.”

The philosophical system that Marx created marked a revolution in the history of social thought: “Marx’s teaching, presented in the organic integrity of dialectical and historical materialism, political economy, and the theory of scientific communism, represented a genuine revolution in worldview and at the same time illuminated the way for the deepest social revolutions. ...Behind the visible, apparent, behind the phenomenon, he discerned the essence. He tore the veil off the mystery of capitalist production, the exploitation of labor by capital - he showed how surplus value is created and by whom it is appropriated.”

Some readers today may be surprised by such “panegyrics” addressed to a scientific and theoretical doctrine that is supposedly “refuted” by historical experience. Let's upset him with instructions only two facts.

On March 8, 1983, in his famous speech about the notorious “evil empire,” Reagan declared: “I believe that communism is another sad and strange part of human history, the last page of which is now being written.”

But in the economic departments of the world's leading universities, even in the 21st century, economics is still being studied. economic theory K. Marx, which, as is known, is only part of his ideological and theoretical heritage.

Study, among other things, to show the methodology and creative laboratory of one of the greatest thinkers of the 19th century, recognized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

In the 90s Journalists, analysts and economists, to explain many socio-economic processes, collisions and collapses that took place in Russia and other CIS countries, turned to the theory of “accumulation of initial capital” by K. Marx, which indicates that it has passed a rigorous test of vitality, a real reflection of objective processes, social practice for more than a hundred years.

Yu. V. Andropov emphasized that Marx “looked carefully into the life of individual peoples, he constantly looked for its interrelations with the life of the whole world,” which indicates that the new General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee fully understood the significance of globalization that was beginning to gain momentum.

And after the socialist revolution in October 1917 in Russia, “scientific socialism, created by Marx, merged with the living practice of millions of working people building a new society.”

The following words of Andropov still sound quite “modern”: “the ideologists of the bourgeoisie and revisionism to this day are building entire systems of arguments, trying to prove that the new society created in the USSR, in other fraternal countries, turned out to not correspond to that image socialism as Marx saw it. They say that reality has diverged from the ideal. But, consciously or out of ignorance, they lose sight of the fact that Marx himself, when developing his teaching, was least of all guided by the demands of some abstract ideal of a clean, sleek “socialism.” He derived his ideas about the future system from an analysis of the objective contradictions of large-scale capitalist production. It was precisely this, the only scientific approach that allowed him to correctly determine the main features of a society that was yet to be born in the cleansing thunderstorms of the social revolutions of the twentieth century.”

Speaking about the real problems of forming new social relations, Andropov frankly admitted: “Historical experience shows that the transformation of “mine,” privately owned, into “ours,” common, is not an easy matter. The revolution in property relations is by no means reduced to a one-time act, as a result of which the main means of production become public property. Obtaining the right to be an owner and becoming an owner - real, wise, zealous - are far from the same thing. The people who have accomplished the socialist revolution have a long time to master their new position as the supreme and undivided owner of all social wealth - to master it economically, politically, and, if you like, psychologically, developing a collectivist consciousness and behavior. After all, only a person who is not indifferent to his own labor successes, well-being, authority, but also to the affairs of his fellow workers, the work collective, the interests of the whole country, and the working people of the whole world, is socialistically educated.

When talking about turning “mine” into “ours,” we must not forget that this is a long, multifaceted process that should not be simplified. Even when socialist production relations are finally established, some people still retain, or even reproduce, individualistic habits, the desire to profit at the expense of others, at the expense of society.”

Continuing a frank conversation about the problems and contradictions of his contemporary society, Andropov noted that “a significant proportion of the shortcomings that sometimes disrupt normal work in certain areas of our national economy are caused by deviations from the norms and requirements of economic life, the basis of which is socialist ownership of land.” means of production".

Asking why the country’s economy was facing serious difficulties, Andropov unusually frankly stated: “First of all, one cannot help but see that our work aimed at improving and restructuring the economic mechanism, forms and methods of management has lagged behind the requirements imposed by the achieved level of material and technical , social, spiritual development of Soviet society. And this is the main point. At the same time, of course, there is also the impact of factors such as the lack of receipt of a significant amount of agricultural products over the last four years, the need to direct ever-increasing financial and material resources to the extraction of fuel, energy and raw materials in the northern and eastern regions of the country.”

Therefore, “the priority today is to think through and consistently implement measures that can give greater scope to the action of the colossal creative forces inherent in our economy. These measures must be carefully prepared and realistic, which means that when developing them it is necessary to strictly proceed from the laws of development of the economic system of socialism. The objective nature of these laws requires getting rid of all kinds of attempts to manage the economy by methods alien to its nature. It is worth recalling here Lenin’s warning about the danger that lies in the naive belief of some workers that they can solve all their problems by “communist decree.”

The interests of society as a whole, the new Soviet leader emphasized, are the most important guideline for economic development... But from here, of course, it does not follow that in the name of the common good of socialism, the interests of personal, local, specific needs of various social groups are supposedly suppressed or ignored. Not at all. " Idea,” as Marx and Engels emphasized, “invariably disgraced itself as soon as it separated from the “ interest"(Marx K., Engels F. Soch., vol. 2, p. 89). One of the most important tasks in improving the national economic mechanism is to ensure accurate consideration of these interests, to achieve their optimal combination with public interests and thus use them as a driving force for the growth of the Soviet economy, increasing its efficiency, labor productivity, and comprehensively strengthening the economic and the defense power of the Soviet state... In other words, it is not at the expense of the working people, but precisely in the interests of the working people that we are solving the problems of increasing economic efficiency. This does not simplify our work, but it allows us to carry it out, relying on the inexhaustible strength, knowledge, and creative energy of the entire Soviet people.”

“Taken together, all this means—which was extremely quickly forgotten or simply not even understood by Andropov’s “successors”—a fundamentally new quality of life for workers, which is by no means reduced to material comfort, but absorbs the entire spectrum of a full-blooded human existence.”

Andropov warned: “The so-called elementary truths of Marxism in general should be handled very carefully, because misunderstanding or forgetting them is severely punished by life itself.”

We all had to be convinced of the truth of these words, realizing the social losses that befell the peoples of our country as a result of ill-conceived and destructive political and social reforms of 1989–1994.

It was unusual for the time of post-Brezhnev “developed socialism” to read the words of the leader of the party and state about shortage goods and services “with all its ugly consequences, causing the just indignation of workers.”

And Andropov frankly warned: “Our indispensable duty has been and will be to work in two directions: firstly, the steady growth of social production and the rise on this basis of the material and cultural standard of living of the people; secondly, all possible assistance in raising the material and spiritual needs of Soviet people.”