The Policy of the Donburo of the RCP(b) towards the Cossacks during the Civil War. Kuban Cossacks during the years of Soviet power (civil war, years of repression)
The policy of the Donburo of the RCP (b) in relation to the Cossacks during the civil war
The situation in Soviet Russia during the civil war largely depended on the situation on the outskirts, including the Don, where the largest detachment of the “most organized and therefore most significant” force of the non-proletarian masses of Russia, the Cossacks, was concentrated.
The origins of the Cossack policy of the Bolsheviks date back to 1917, when V.I. Lenin warned of the possibility of the formation of a “Russian Vendée” on the Don. Although the Cossacks during the revolution in October 1917 generally adhered to positions of neutrality, some of its groups already then took part in the struggle against the Soviet regime. V.I. Lenin considered the Cossacks to be a privileged peasantry, capable of acting as a reactionary mass under the condition of infringement of its privileges. But this does not mean that the Cossacks were considered by Lenin as a single mass. Lenin noted that it was fragmented by differences in the size of land ownership, in payments, in the conditions of medieval use of land for service.
The appeal of the Rostov Soviet of Workers' Deputies said: Again I recall the year 1905, when the black reaction went out on the Cossacks. Again, the Cossacks are sent against the people, again they want to make the word “Cossack” the most hated for the worker and peasant ... Again, the Don Cossacks gain the shameful glory of the people’s executioners, again it becomes ashamed for the revolutionary Cossacks to wear the Cossack title ... So throw it off, fellow villagers Get rid of the power of the Kaledins and Bogaevskys and join your brother soldiers, peasants and workers.
A civil war, as a sharp aggravation of class contradictions in specific historical conditions, hardly anyone could have prevented at that time. General Kaledin, ataman of the Don Cossacks, rose up in armed struggle against the revolution at noon on October 25, i.e. even before the opening of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the adoption by it of historic decrees that shook all of Russia. Following him, the overthrown Prime Minister of the Provisional Government Kerensky, the Cossack General Krasnov, the chieftains of the Cossack troops of the Kuban, Orenburg, Terek, and the Central Rada of Ukraine rebelled against the Soviet power. General Alekseev in Novocherkassk launched the formation of a volunteer army. Thus, a powerful center of counter-revolution arose in the south of the country. The Soviet government threw the armed force, led by Antonov-Ovseenko, to defeat him.
All eyewitnesses and contemporaries considered these fights as a civil war. In particular, this is how they were then qualified by the head of the Soviet government created by the revolution, V.I. Lenin. As early as October 29, 1917, he explained that "the political situation has now been reduced to a military one," and at the beginning of November he pointed out: "An insignificant handful has begun a civil war." On November 28, he signed a document with the expressive title "Decree on the arrest of the leaders of the civil war against the revolution." The Soviets were entrusted with the duty of special supervision of the Cadets because of its connection with ardent counter-revolutionaries. The resolution of December 3 stated: under the leadership of the Cadets, a fierce civil war began "against the very foundations of the workers' and peasants' revolution."
- On February 2, 1918, Volny Don reported that in Novonikolevsky the peasants decided to destroy the Cossack estate and take away the land from the Cossacks. The peasants are waiting for the Bolsheviks as their deliverers, who will bring the peasants both freedom and, more importantly, land. On this basis, relations between them and the Cossacks are aggravated every day, and, apparently, heroic measures will be required to prevent a civil slaughter on the Pacific Don.
- The year 1918 became a turning point in the development of a number of social, economic and political processes that were intertwined in Russia into a rather tangled knot. The collapse of the empire continued and this process reached its lowest point. The economy as a whole was in disastrous condition, and although the harvest of 1918 was above average, famine raged in many cities.
From the end of February to the end of March 1918, a peculiar split took place on the Don between the politically active prosperous Cossacks and the Don service elite. Active supporters of the anti-Bolshevik struggle created the Detachment of Free Don Cossacks and the Foot Partisan Cossack Regiment in order to preserve the necessary officer and partisan personnel by the time the Don Cossacks awakened. The idea to unite and oppose the Soviets all the anti-Bolshevik forces in the detachment was absent. The detachments acted separately for purely opportunistic reasons.
In February 1918, the Military Revolutionary Committee, actually headed by S.I. Syrtsov, pursued a line towards an agreement with the labor Cossacks. As a result of this policy - the creation of the Don Soviet Republic. The Cossack Committee under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee sent more than 100 agitators from the “Protection of the Rights of the Labor Cossacks” detachment to the Don. Their task is to organize Soviets of Cossack deputies in the Don region. By April, about 120 of them had been created in cities, villages and farms. However, the acceptance of Soviet power was far from unconditional.
The first recorded armed clash with the Soviet authorities was on March 21, 1918 - the Cossacks of the village of Luganskaya recaptured 34 arrested officers. On March 31, a rebellion broke out in the Suvorovskaya village of the 2nd Don district, on April 2 - in the Yegorlykskaya village. With the onset of spring, the contradictions in the countryside escalated. The bulk of the Cossacks, as usual, hesitated at first. When the peasants tried to divide the land without waiting for the solution of the land issue in the legislative order, the Cossacks even appealed to the regional Soviet authorities. In the north of the region, the Cossacks reacted painfully even to the seizure of landowner lands by peasants. Further developments put most of the Cossacks in direct opposition to Soviet power.
“In some places, the forcible seizure of land begins ...”, “The out-of-town alien peasantry began to cultivate ... military spare land and surplus land in the yurts of rich southern villages”, Peasants who rented land from the Cossacks “stopped paying rent”. The authorities, instead of smoothing over the contradictions, headed for the fight against the "kulak elements of the Cossacks."
Due to the fact that non-resident peasants stopped paying rent and began to use the land free of charge, part of the Cossack poor, who leased land, recoiled to the side of the anti-Bolshevik forces. Refusal of out-of-town rental payments deprived her of a significant part of her income.
The growth of the struggle exacerbated the contradictions within the Cossacks, and in April 1918, the Bolshevik Cossack V.S. Kovalev, characterizing the relationship between the Cossack poor and the elite, stated: she showed up."
Thus, by May 1918, in one of the regions of the South of Russia - on the Don - a mass anti-Bolshevik movement was emerging. The reasons for the mass uprising and mass resistance were different. All those changes in the social, political and agrarian structure that took place in Central Russia were not acceptable to the Don Cossacks, who preferred armed struggle. The Cossacks rise to fight initially defensive, from the point of view of the military, this doomed them to defeat. The logic of the rebels was as follows: “The Bolsheviks are destroying the Cossacks, the intelligentsia, like the communists, strive to abolish us, and the Russian people do not even think about us. Let's go recklessly - or we will die, or we will live: everyone decided to destroy us, we will try to fight back.
In June 1918, the split and class struggle in the Russian countryside reached its peak. On the Don, an outbreak of class struggle led to the transfer of the Cossacks, incl. and the poor, in the southern districts on the side of the Whites, in the northern districts, more homogeneous in terms of class and class, the Cossacks were inclined to neutrality, but submitted to mobilization. This turn of events slowed down the political division within the estates.
"The peasantry on the Don was more unanimous than anywhere else in Russia, it was entirely on the side of the Soviets." The lower Cossack villages (Bessergenevskaya, Melekhovskaya, Semikarakorskaya, Nagaevskaya, etc.) passed sentences on the eviction of non-residents. There were also exceptions: in May-August 1918, 417 non-residents who participated in the struggle against the Bolsheviks were accepted into the Cossacks, 1,400 sentences excluded the Cossacks from the estate for acts directly opposite, and 300 sentences were issued for eviction from the region. And yet the war acquired a class coloring.
With all the fighting qualities, the rebel Cossacks, as in the days of the peasant wars, having liberated their village, did not want to go further, and “it was not possible to raise them to energetic pursuit of the enemy. The rebels wanted to fight the Bolsheviks, but had nothing against the Soviets. As contemporaries believed, “when rising, the Cossacks least of all thought about the structure of their state. When they rebelled, they did not forget for a moment that it was possible to reconcile as soon as the Soviet government agreed not to disturb their stanitsa life.
Absolutely in the spirit of the times were the words of the Chairman of the Moscow Council P. Smidovich, said in September 1918 from the rostrum of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee: “This war is not being waged in order to bring to an agreement or subdue, this is a war of annihilation. There can be no other civil war." The logically natural step in such a struggle was terror as a state policy.
In the autumn of 1918, the forces of the Cossacks were split: 18% of the combat-ready Cossacks ended up in the ranks of the Red Army, 82% - in the Don. Among those who went to the Bolsheviks, the presence of the poor was clearly visible. The forces of the Don army were undermined. In the October battles, 40% of the Cossacks and 80% of the officers dropped out of its ranks.
Convinced in the practice of the spring and summer of 1918 of incompatibility with them, the Soviets, led by the RCP (b), from the autumn of 1918 headed for their complete defeat: “The government on the Don was already played when tendencies to flirt with the Cossack federalist desires . The civil war succeeded in a year on the Don in quite sharply demarcating and separating revolutionary elements from counter-revolutionary ones. And a strong Soviet government must rely only on economically true revolutionary elements, while the obscure counter-revolutionary elements must be suppressed by the Soviet government by its force, by its power, enlightened by its agitation and proletarianized by its economic policy.
The Donburo set a course to ignore the specific features of the Cossacks. In particular, the liquidation of the "Cossack-police-sky" division of the region into districts was begun, part of the territory was transferred to neighboring provinces. Syrtsov wrote that these steps marked the beginning of the abolition of that old form, under the cover of which the "Russian Vendée" lived. Revolutionary committees, tribunals and military commissariats were created in the formed regions, which were supposed to ensure the effectiveness of the new policy.
At the beginning of January 1919, the Red Army went on a general offensive against the Cossack Don, which was then going through a stage of agony, and at the end of the same month, the notorious circular letter of the Organizing Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee flew into place. A merciless bloody ax fell on the heads of the Cossacks ... ".
The January (1919) anti-Cossack actions served as an expression of the general policy of Bolshevism towards the Cossacks. And its foundations themselves received an ideological and theoretical development long before 1919. The foundations were the works of Lenin, his associates and the resolutions of the Bolshevik congresses and conferences. The by no means impeccable ideas that existed about the Cossacks as opponents of bourgeois transformations were absolutized in them and eventually cast into indisputable dogmas about the Cossacks as the backbone of the Vendee forces of Russia. Guided by the latter, the Bolsheviks, having seized power and following the formal logic of things, led - and could not help but lead - a line to eradicate the Cossacks. And after they faced the furious Soviet design and the attacks of the Cossacks on them, this line gained bitterness and wild hatred.
Don fought and the government took unpopular measures. On October 5, 1918, an order was issued: “The entire amount of bread, food and fodder, the harvest of the current 1918, past years and the future harvest of 1919, minus the stock necessary for the food and household needs of the owner, comes (from the time the bread was taken for registration) at the disposal of the All-Great Don Army and can be alienated only through the food authorities.
The Cossacks were asked to hand over the harvest themselves at a price of 10 rubles per pood until May 15, 1919. The villages were unhappy with this decision. The last straw was the offensive of the Soviet troops against Krasnov on the Southern Front, which began on January 4, 1919, and the beginning of the collapse of the Don Army.
In August 1918, the People's Commissar for Military Affairs of the Don Soviet Republic, E.A. Trifonov, pointed to mass transitions from camp to camp. With the onset of counter-revolutionary forces, the Don government was losing authority and territory. The Cossack department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee tried to organize the Cossacks, who took the side of the Soviet government. On September 3, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR issued a decree on the creation of the "Marching Circle of the Don Army" of the revolutionary Cossack government. “To convene the Marching Circle of the Soviet Don Army - a military government, dressed in full power on the Don ... The Marching Circle ... includes representatives of the Don Soviet regiments, as well as farms and villages freed from officer and landlord power.
But in that period, Soviet power on the Don did not last long. After the liquidation of the Council of People's Commissars of the Don Republic in the fall of 1918, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) appointed several members of the Don Bureau of the RCP (b) to lead illegal party work in the territory occupied by the enemy. The death of the Don Republic as a result of the intervention of the German troops and the uprising of the Lower Don Cossacks in the spring of 1918, as well as the execution of the Podtelkovskaya expedition, significantly influenced the attitude of the leaders of the Don Bolsheviks towards the Cossacks. As a result - the Circular of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of January 24, 1919, containing paragraphs on mass terror in relation to the counter-revolutionary Cossacks.
And when the November Revolution broke out in Germany, the Cossacks became a real threat. "To tear out a splinter from the heart" - such was the unanimous decision. In early January 1919, units of the Southern Front of the Red Army launched a counteroffensive to put an end to the recalcitrant Cossack Don. Its organizers neglected the fact that by that time the Cossacks, especially the front-line soldiers, had already begun to lean towards Soviet power. Although the political agencies urged fighters and commanders to be tolerant and prevent violence, for many of them the principle of "blood for blood" and "an eye for an eye" became the defining principle. Cossack villages and farmsteads, which had been quiet, turned into a boiling cauldron.
In such an extremely aggravated and cruel situation, on January 24, 1919, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) adopted a Circular Letter, which spurred violence and served as a target setting for decossackization:
“To carry out mass terror against the rich Cossacks, exterminating them without exception; to carry out merciless mass terror against all Cossacks who took any direct or indirect part in the struggle against Soviet power. It is necessary to apply to the average Cossacks all those measures that give a guarantee against any attempts on their part to new actions against the Soviet power.
- 1. Confiscate grain and force it to pour all surpluses into the indicated points, this applies both to bread and to all agricultural products.
- 2. To take all measures to assist the resettled immigrant poor, organizing resettlement where possible.
- 3. To equalize newcomers, non-residents with the Cossacks in land and in all other respects.
- 4. Carry out complete disarmament, shoot everyone who has a weapon found after the deadline for surrender.
- 5. Issue weapons only to reliable elements from other cities.
- 6. Armed detachments should be left in the Cossack villages until full order is established.
- 7. All commissars appointed to certain Cossack settlements are invited to show maximum firmness and steadily implement these instructions.
From January 1919, the practice of decossackization began in the Bolshevik way: everything came down to military-political methods. And this policy was by no means exhausted by some one-time act. She is a course, a line. Their theoretical beginning goes back to the end of the 19th century, and their implementation refers to the entire period of undivided rule of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) - CPSU.
On March 16, 1919, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) suspended the circular letter, which met the requirements of the policy of alliance with the middle peasantry, which was to be adopted by the party congress. But at the same time, Lenin and other top leaders agreed with the provision on the organization of the eviction of the Cossacks and the resettlement of people from the starving regions.
The Donbureau met with bewilderment the decision to suspend the January decision and on April 8 adopted a resolution emphasizing that “the very existence of the Cossacks, with its way of life, privileges and survivals, and most importantly, the ability to conduct an armed struggle, poses a threat to Soviet power. The Donburo proposed to liquidate the Cossacks as a special economic and ethnographic group by dispersing them and resettling them outside the Don.
1919 -1920 - the peak of the relationship between the Soviet government and the Cossacks. The Cossacks suffered huge losses. Some died on the battlefield, others - from the bullets of a Czech, others - tens of thousands - thrown out of the country, lost their homeland. Decossackization in the Bolshevik way changed its forms and methods, but it never stopped. It demanded the wholesale destruction of the counter-revolutionary upper classes of the Cossacks; evictions outside the Don of its unstable part, which included all the middle peasants - the bulk of the villages and farms; resettlement of poor peasants from the North-Western industrial center to the Don. The indiscriminate approach to the implementation of these inhumane orders resulted in rampant crimes that meant genuine genocide.
A cruel and unjustified political line, which gave rise to grave consequences, including the echo that has reached our days, causing justified anger, however, a biased interpretation. The circular letter, often erroneously called a directive, is overgrown with true stories and fables. But accuracy is an essential feature of truthful coverage of history. The implementation of the cruel circular on the ground resulted in repressions that fell not only on the real culprits, but on defenseless old men and women. Many Cossacks became victims of lawlessness, although there is no exact information about their number. .
The Cossacks, whose amplitude of fluctuations in the direction of Soviet power had previously been quite large, now turned in their mass by 180 o. The wholesale repression served as an anti-Soviet catalyst. On the night of March 12, 1919, in the villages of the village of Kazanskaya, the Cossacks killed the small Red Guard garrisons and local communists. A few days later, the flames engulfed all the districts of the Upper Don, which went down in history as Veshensky. It blew up the rear of the Southern Front of the Red Army. The offensive of its units on Novocherkassk and Rostov bogged down. The attempt to suppress the uprising was unsuccessful, since in practice it was reduced to exclusively military efforts.
The policy of the Center towards the Cossacks in 1919 was not consistent. On March 16, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) specifically discussed the issue of them. G.Ya.Sokolnikov condemned the Circular Letter and criticized the activities of the Donburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) (9, p.14). However, the emerging course was not developed and implemented. The central place was occupied by the problems of resettlement of new settlers to the Don, which added fuel to the fire and created a field of heightened political tension. FKMironov sent his protests to Moscow. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, although reluctantly, somewhat softened its position in relation to the Cossacks. V.I. Lenin hurried to put an end to the uprising. (9, p.14). However, the military command was in no hurry with this. Trotsky created an expeditionary corps, which went on the offensive only on May 28. But by June 5, the White Guard troops broke through to Veshenskaya and joined the rebels. Soon Denikin announced a campaign against Moscow. He assigned the decisive role to the Cossacks. Civil war, expanding and hardening. It dragged on for a few more months. Such a high price turned out to be decossackization.
On August 13, 1919, a joint meeting of the Politburo and the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) discussed the appeal to the Cossacks presented by Lenin. The government stated that it "is not going to forcibly tell anyone ... it does not go against the Cossack way of life, leaving the working Cossacks their villages and farms, their lands, the right to wear whatever uniform they want (for example, stripes)" . But the patience of the Cossacks burst. And on August 24, Mironov's corps arbitrarily set out from Saransk to the front. On August 28, Grazhdanupr, the organ of decossackization, was abolished and a temporary Donispolkom headed by Medvedev was created. In Balashov, under the leadership of Trotsky, the meeting brought to the forefront and outlined "broad political work among the Cossacks." After that, Trotsky developed "Theses on work on the Don".
At the moment when Denikin broke through to Tula, Trotsky left a question in the Central Committee of the party about changing the policy towards the Don Cossacks and about Mironov: “We are giving the Don, the Kuban full “autonomy”, our troops are clearing the Don. The Cossacks are completely breaking with Denikin. Appropriate guarantees must be created. Mironov and his comrades could act as an intermediary, who would have to go deep into the Don. On October 23, the Politburo decided: “To release Mironov from any punishment,” to coordinate his appointment with Trotsky. On October 26, it was decided to publish Mironov's appeal to the Don Cossacks. Trotsky offered to appoint him to a command post, but the Politburo, not agreeing with him, sent Mironov to work so far only in the Donispolkom.
The truth about decossackization without its falsification and without the political game around it is one of the most difficult pages in the history of the Cossacks, although it had many of them. And not only in Soviet times, but also in ancient times.
The triumphal procession of Soviet power in many regions of the country took place in the context of a civil war. This is so obvious that there is no doubt. Another thing is that there was a fundamental difference between the civil war at the end of 1917 and the middle of 1918. It consisted both in its forms and in its scale. In turn, this directly depended on the intensity and strength of the imperialist intervention in Soviet Russia.
The foregoing gives full grounds for the following conclusion: the civil war in Russia in general and in its individual regions with a special composition of the population, where the forces of the all-Russian counter-revolution were redeployed, began from the first days of the revolution. Moreover, this revolution itself unfolded in the midst of a peasant war that had flared up as early as September 1917 against the landlords. The overthrown classes resorted to violence against the rebellious people. And the latter had no choice but to respond to force with force. As a result, the revolution was accompanied by the sharpest armed clashes.
At the same time, the severity of the civil war had a decisive influence on the choice of ways and forms of socio-economic transformations and the first steps of Soviet power. And for this reason, too, she often took unjustifiably cruel measures, which ultimately hit her like a boomerang, because this repelled the masses, especially the Cossacks, from her. Already in the spring of 1918, when the dispossessed peasantry began the equalizing redistribution of land, the Cossacks turned their backs on the revolution. In May, they destroyed the expedition of F. Pod-telkov on the Don.
"Cossack uprising on the Don in March-June 1919. was one of the most serious threats to the Soviet government and had a great influence on the course of the civil war. The study of materials from the archives of Rostov-on-Don and Moscow made it possible to reveal contradictions in the policy of the Bolshevik Party at all levels.
The plenum of the RCP(b) of March 16, 1919 canceled the January directive of Sverdlov, just on the day of his "untimely" death, but the Donburo did not take this into account and on April 8, 1919 promulgated another directive: "The urgent task is complete, quick and the decisive destruction of the Cossacks as a special economic group, the destruction of its economic foundations, the physical destruction of the Cossack officials and officers, in general, all the tops of the Cossacks, the dispersal and neutralization of the ordinary Cossacks and its formal liquidation.
The head of the Donburo, Syrtsov, telegraphs the pre-revolutionary committee of the village of Veshenskaya: “For each killed Red Army soldier and member of the Revolutionary Committee, shoot a hundred Cossacks.”
After the fall of the Don Soviet Republic in September 1918, the Don Bureau was set up to direct underground communist work in Rostov, Taganrog, and other places behind White lines. When the Red Army advanced to the South, the Donburo became the main factor in the administration of the Don region. Bureau members were appointed by Moscow and operated from Kursk, Millerovo - the rear areas that remained under Soviet control. Local officials carried out large-scale confiscation of private property. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front insisted on executions and executions and called for the creation of tribunals in each regiment. The repressions carried out by the army tribunals and the Donbureau forced the territory to rise up against the communists, and this led to the loss of the entire region of the upper Don.
The first signs of a departure from the brutal military confrontation and extreme methods of resolving contradictions between the Cossacks and the Soviet government appeared towards the end of 1919 and were consolidated in 1920, when the civil war in southern Russia brought victory to the Bolsheviks. The White movement, in which the Cossacks played a prominent role, was defeated. Bolshevism came into its own on the Don.
Assessing the activities of the Donburo of the RCP(b) from the autumn of 1918 to the autumn of 1919, it should be recognized that despite the well-known positive contribution of the Donburo to the defeat of the counter-revolution and the establishment of Soviet power on the Don, a number of major miscalculations and failures were made in its Cossack policy. “Subsequently, all members of the Donburo revised their views and actions. S.I. Syrtsov recognized the work experience of the Citizenship Department as unsatisfactory and tried to limit the administrative activities of the political departments on the Don in the spring of 1920. At the first regional party conference, he opposed S.F. Vasilchenko, who called for crushing the Cossacks with “fire and sword”. Five years later, according to the report of Syrtsov, at the April (1925) plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), a resolution “On work among the Cossacks” was adopted, which outlined the course for the widespread involvement of the Cossacks in Soviet construction and the removal of all restrictions in his life.
don bolshevik cossacks civil war
Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below
Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.
Hosted at http://www.allbest.ru/
Introduction
Simultaneously with the completion of the “gathering of lands” by Moscow, the formation of an imperial state on the territory of the Northern Black Sea region, a military-political community was formed, later called the Don Army. Thus began the historical path of the Don Cossacks. Who were the first Cossacks? The historian of law M. Vladimirsky-Budanov defined the new society as follows: “On the Don, from ancient times (even when the Grand Duchy of Ryazan existed), people from the state, mostly dissatisfied with the new state system, founded free Cossack communities, fighting the Tatars at their own peril and risk , and finally, in the lower reaches of the Don, they rallied into one big land ... ".
For a long time in Russian historiography, the position was cultivated that the basis of the Don Cossacks was made up of peasants and serfs who fled from serfdom, most of all dissatisfied with the state system of Muscovite Rus'.
Despite the severity of total military service, the Cossacks, especially the southern ones, had a certain well-being, which practically completely excluded the material incentive that the working class and peasantry of Russia raised against the central government.
The Cossacks are one of the few units of the St. Petersburg garrison that was loyal to the policy of the Provisional Government. Most of all, hopes were pinned on them in revolutionary days. But the Cossacks were wary of the actions of the Provisional Government.
After the October coup, the Cossacks, as a military service class, were represented by 12 Cossack troops: Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan, Ural, Orenburg, Semirechensk, Siberian, Transbaikal, Amur, Ussuri. In total, the Cossack population of Russia by that time was about 4.5 million people. There were about 300 thousand Cossacks in combat formation. It was these people who had to take part in the fratricidal Civil War, during which they for the most part took the side of the White movement. According to various sources, from 10 to 20% of Cossacks turned out to be in the ranks of the Red Army, and from 80 to 90% in the ranks of the White Army. All this led to the fact that, acting as a force, an alternative power to the Bolsheviks - the Cossacks caused a negative attitude towards themselves not only from the government, but also from the bulk of the population.
1. Don Cossacks in the fight against the Bolsheviks 1917-1921.
1.1 Temporary truce of the Don and the Bolsheviks (December 1917 - March 1918)
The building of socialism in Russia was described in the book "State and Revolution" - V.I. Lenin 1917. According to Lenin's plan - socialism - "state - machine" - private property, private trade and all aspects of individual freedom were denied, labor duty, all producers had to hand over their products to the state, which in turn carries out centralized distribution. At the top of this entire pyramid is the “party of the working class”.
It was impossible to start building such a system in November 1917. The only real force that supported the Bolsheviks were the morally decomposed crowds of soldiers deserting from the front and the Kronstadt sailors well trained to rob. The inability of the new government to create order in the country, to give food and clothing - was replaced by the need to give the people an enemy. And if there is an internal enemy, then it is necessary to fight with him. During the war, what is the demand for cold, hunger, disease, etc. The Cossack atamans were the first to be declared traitors: Kaledin, Dutov, Filimonov, although they did not swear allegiance to the new government, and did not serve a single day.
On July 2, 1917, the Great Military Circle elected Lieutenant General of the tsarist army Kaledin to the post of Don ataman - after his repeated refusals. The Cossacks continued to fight at the front, and the Bolshevik propaganda penetrated deeper and deeper into their ranks, and while the spare parts waiting on the Don continue to firmly maintain a position hostile to the Bolsheviks, the front-line Cossacks begin to waver.
1.2 The uprising on the Don, the overthrow of Soviet power and the cleansing of the Don territories from the communists (March - November 1918)
The first attempt of interaction between the Don Cossacks and the Bolsheviks began with the intention of the Great Don Army (VVD) to reconcile with the Soviet government.
On December 5, Ataman Kaledin declared martial law on the Don - a democrat in spirit, Kaledin emphasizes that this is aimed solely at establishing order and security on the territory of the Don region. Kaledin demands caution in dealing with non-residents and miners of the Donetsk region.
At the end of January 1918, a military revolutionary committee (military revolutionary committee) was formed in the village of Kamenskaya, headed by the Don Cossack Podtelkov.
The front-line Cossacks, returning from the Great War, preferred to sleep in their huts, plow the land and maintain neutrality with the Kamensky Military Revolutionary Committee. And the VVD was surrounded from all sides, from all strategic directions, the Red Guards went to Novocherkassk. And the invasion was prevented only by the Volunteer Army (in the process of formation) and the detachment of Yesaul Chernetsov (400 Don partisans).
In the end, with the combined blows of the Red Guards and the Cossack regiments who had gone over to the side of the Bolsheviks, Chernetsov was defeated and personally hacked to death by the chairman of the Donrevkom, Podtelkov. Realizing that the VVD region could not be defended, the Volunteer Army left Novocherkassk and went to the Kuban. On January 29, Ataman Kaledin convened a meeting, where he announced that he had one company left to defend Novocherkassk. Most members of the government said that it was impossible to keep the capital of the VVD, a company of fighters remained to protect Novocherkassk. That same evening, A.M. Kaledin shot himself.
But a miracle happened, Don - shocked by the death of his beloved Ataman, got up, chose a new chieftain - General Nazarov, appropriated to him all the fullness of civil and military power. After that, even the “babblers” from the front-line soldiers fell silent. Unfortunately, the noble impulse turned out to be fleeting, no one doubted that Don's days were numbered. On February 25, General Nazarov was shot, and the Marching Ataman of the VVD Popov managed to withdraw military valuables and a detachment of 1.5 thousand people from the city of Novocherkassk.
The red units, having taken power on the Don, were ready to impose their worldview by violence and any means of coercion. Their hatred caused the whole traditional way of Cossack life - from private property to Cossack will in the matter of self-government. In response to the violence, the Cossack mass rebelled. The Cossack front-line soldiers - counting that "we will drive out the ataman and live our lives" - miscalculated. Golubov - who overthrew the government of the Military Circle - fled and was later identified and killed by the Cossacks.
On Easter night 1918, M.G. approached the city of Novocherkassk with a detachment. Drozdovsky. Marching from the Romanian front, the detachment went to join the Volunteer Army of A.I. Denikin. Passing the Gulyai-Pole, we learned about a certain N.I. Makhno, who robbed the train in the vicinity and killed "bourgeois and cadets." N.I. Makhno, having learned that staff officers and their families were coming, decided to attack the trains, where he was met by machine guns and bayonets of special forces officers. N.I. Makhno barely carried his legs. The detachment of M.G. Drozdovsky helped the rebellious Cossack villages to recapture the capital of the VVD, the city of Novocherkassk.
As soon as the villages of the Lower Don were cleared of Bolshevik detachments, the Don Salvation Circle was convened in Novocherkassk. It was attended only by the Cossacks, who often did not understand politics, as well as current issues. A new Army Ataman was nominated - P.N. Krasnov, as well as the military foreman Denisov, who also proved himself during the uprising. For the newborn Don state, natural allies were needed - Germany became them. The Germans were afraid of the Cossacks, and the VVD covered the German units from the invasion of the Bolshevik troops.
Ataman P.N. Krasnov in the past, served in the Guard, participated in two wars, the Russo-Japanese and the Great War, was a good writer, had military awards. The positions were not far from the Cossack villages. The war was fought according to Cossack rules, with horseback detours, luring the enemy into an ambush with false retreats. In this Cossack war, the Gundorovsky regiment was especially distinguished, commanded by Colonel Guselshchikov, as well as General Mamontov, who was not a natural Cossack, but went through the entire Great War with the Cossacks of the VVD and was assigned to one of the Nizhne-Don villages.
In one of the battles, the chairman of the Donrevkom Podtelkov was caught by the White Cossacks. He and the secretary of the Donrevkom Krivoshlykov were hanged, and about 70 Cossacks accompanying them were shot. So merciless was the trial of the traitors to the Cossacks. Soon an uprising began in the Upper Don districts.
Ataman P.N. Krasnov - unfortunately, was not a brilliant commander, but he was a talented administrator. Numbered divisions (participating in the Great War) began to form from the variegated and differently armed stanitsa regiments. The Young Don Army began to form, it consisted of Cossacks who had not been at the front of the Great War and were not poisoned by the poison of Bolshevik propaganda. It was the Don Guard - the basis of the future cadre army. In addition, officer schools were opened in Novocherkassk, and a small fleet was also established in the Sea of Azov.
At the end of August 1918, the VVD army reached the peak of its strength. But, having gone beyond the borders of the VVD, the desire to fight among the Cossacks has significantly decreased - the front-line soldiers started talking - “we will not let the Bolsheviks in, but let the Russians liberate themselves if they want.” In addition, in October 1918, the offensive of General Mamontov on the city of Tsaritsyn (Volgograd) ended in failure. By the onset of winter, the VVD had exhausted all its resources and began to fizzle out. In addition, Germany surrendered in November, and the troops of the VVD lost a regular supply of weapons, ammunition and uniforms.
The disaster began on the Don. The Don Army had one ally left - the White Volunteer Army, under the command of A.I. Denikin, but she was busy fighting with the Red Guard in the Kuban and Stavropol. The most serious trouble happened on the northern border of the VVD, where, succumbing to Bolshevik propaganda, three Cossack regiments left the front and went to their native villages to celebrate Christmas. The rebels were led by junior officer Fomin. The departure of three regiments exposed about 50 km of the front. The breakthrough immediately included 9 divisions of the 9th Red Army. The catastrophe became global: the departing units dispersed to their native villages and farms, leaving military equipment. Part of the Upper Don Cossacks, with weapons in their hands, went to F.K. Mironov (who regained his strength, like a "Phoenix bird"). It was possible to stop the Red Army through several counterattacks by Mamontov's cavalry corps, only at the turn of the river. Northern Donets. As a result of the retreat of the Don army, the ataman of the VVD P.N. Krasnov convened the Military Circle and resigned, transferring his powers to A.P. Bogaevsky. In the operational rear, the headquarters of the VVD concentrated a group of the most combat-ready formations: the Gundorovsky regiment, part of the Young Army, part of the Mamantov corps. The fight wasn't over Don didn't give up..
1.3 A new invasion of the Bolsheviks, the betrayal of the Upper Don districts. Upper Don uprising
The Cossack regiments that abandoned the front were urgently transferred to fight against A.V. Kolchak. January 24, 1919, signed by V.I. Lenin and Ya.M. Sverdlov issued an instruction that said: “To carry out mass terror against wealthy Cossacks, exterminating them without exception, to carry out merciless mass terror against all Cossacks who took any direct or indirect part in the fight against Soviet power” ... At the same time, L .D. Trotsky - Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and Fleet - introduced the expression: "arrange Carthage", which meant scorched earth tactics on the territory of the VVD. Execution relied for all: for undelivered edged weapons - checkers, daggers (which of the Cossacks didn’t have them?), for wearing a Cossack uniform, for undelivered monetary contributions, for wearing royal orders, for using the word “Cossack”, for wearing stripes - it’s easier to list what for which they were not shot.
In the first half of March, the villages of Yelanskaya and Kazanskaya revolted. In the beginning, the Bolsheviks did not betray the significance of the uprising that had begun, you never know how they suppressed peasant uprisings of the same type, without much loss for themselves. But this uprising differed from others, primarily in Cossack discipline, and also in the fact that people fought on the side of the rebels, who absorbed a sense of military prowess with their mother's milk. The village of Veshenskaya became the capital of the rebels. At first, the rebels fought with cold weapons, using Cossack methods of war and knowledge of the territory, cutting down punitive Chekist units on the rounds.
More and more elite-international communist units rushed to suppress the rebels. IN AND. Lenin writes: “I am afraid that you are mistaken ... that there are no forces for ferocious and merciless massacre... ". In the late spring of 1919, the Bolshevik command formed a special expeditionary force to fight the Upper Don uprising
June 6, 1919 suddenly from the turn of the river. The reorganized White Don Army went on the offensive in the Northern Donets. Punishers and security officers, finding themselves between two fires, began to retreat in a panic. In the rear of the Reds remained, like a splinter, the Upper Don uprising. Anyone who wanted to leave the area of the uprising was killed on the spot. Hostages were taken in the surrounding villages.
On June 6, the Red Army was surrounded. Mironov tried to mobilize in the Upper Don districts, but after everything that happened, even the Cossacks did not go to him. The Upper Don uprising symbolizes the attitude of the true patriots of the Russian people towards the Boshevik-international regime. It was at this moment that the character of the Russian people, their self-sufficiency, manifested itself.
1.4 The second invasion of the Red Army troops on the Don, the performance of the Don Cossacks on the side of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia under the leadership of A.I. Denikin (April - October 1919)
The situation near Tsaritsyn and in the Don region was aggravated by the fact that Dagestan revolted. Imam Uzum Haji declared Jihad against the infidels. Uzum Hadji himself and all his forces did not pose a particular danger to the troops of General A.I. Denikin, but his rebel army distracted parts of the Terek Cossack army from the fight against the Bolsheviks.
In the rear of the White Army of Denikin, units of Makhno became more active, in August 1919 the Terek division of General Agoev was sent against them, one of the most stable units in the corps of General A.G. Shkuro. At one point, the "father" was pinned to the banks of the Dnieper, at the same time he began negotiations on going over to the side of Petliura. When required, Mr. Makhno, like Mr. Lenin, easily went over to the side of the enemy, and ideological disputes did not bother them in the least.
An interesting situation arose in September-October 1919 in the South of Russia. Volunteer Corps A.P. Kutepov, having crushed about 80 Bolshevik divisions, approached Kursk. At this time, in reinforcements to the corps of Mamontov, the corps of General A.G. Shkuro. The battle with the 1st Cavalry Army near Voronezh lasted for 3 days. Despite the fact that the Reds suffered heavy losses, parts of Mamontov and Shkuro were forced to retreat under overwhelming advantage, in addition, numerous infantry covered the 1st Cavalry Army.
Why did the White Guard lose???
There were fewer of them. At the time when A.I. Denikin has about 60 thousand people, A.V. Kolchak 150 thousand people, N.I. Yudenich 10 thousand people - the number of the Red Army reached 1.5 million people.
· The central position of the Soviet of Deputies in relation to the White Fronts, which makes it possible for unlimited maneuver by forces.
· There were no politicians among the White Guards. None of the military commanders (including A.I. Denikin) considered it possible to make territorial and economic concessions that would infringe on the interests of Russia, unlike V.I. Lenin, who considered himself a man with the right to divide the Russian Empire.
· The Whites have lost the most important war - propaganda. Unlike the Bolsheviks, they used the power of propaganda very sparingly, for example, promising to give land and property to the landowners, they did not do so. Thus acquiring enemies in the camp of the inert peasantry and the landowners, it would seem, who stood for them.
In mid-October, the situation of the Don and Volunteer Army, advancing in the South of Russia, deteriorated significantly. The Red Army has increased quantitatively and, most importantly, qualitatively.
On October 12, 1919, the 1st Cavalry Army of Budyonny, reinforced by infantry divisions, in the amount of 15-20 thousand bayonets and sabers, launched an offensive against the weakened corps of A.G. Shkuro and K.K. Mamontov. At that time, the number of Cossack formations was 3.5-4 thousand people, however, in the saber felling, the Cossacks put up fierce resistance to the Budenovites. But the forces were too unequal. Advancing on the Cossack corps and pushing through their front, the Budenovites entered the flank of the Volunteer Army. The Don command in the person of General Sidorin sought to more reliably cover the lands of the Don from the Bolshevik invasion.
1.5 Catastrophe of 1919 - 1920 and the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia to the Crimea (October 1919 - March 1920)
On December 5, 1919, the 1st Cavalry Army of Budyonny made a breakthrough, driving a deep wedge between the Don and the Volunteer Army.
On January 9, 1920, Rostov was taken. By mid-January 1920, the red units operating against A.I. Denikin, were united in a common front under the command of Shorin.
By mid-January 1920, the thaw gave way to severe frosts. By the joint efforts of the Don and Volunteer armies, the 1st cavalry and infantry units of the Reds were driven back beyond the Don. And in the Kuban, decomposition continued, not affected by the red occupation of the Kuban - it showed signs of Bolshevism and anarchy. On January 18, 1920, the Supreme Cossack Circle was assembled in Ekaterinodar - the deputies of the Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan were assembled, he set about creating an "independent Cossack state" in order to cleanse the Cossack land from the Bolsheviks.
On January 27, 1920, all the forces of the Bolsheviks went on the offensive against the Don and Volunteer armies of Gen. A.I. Denikin.
The real battle unfolded at Manych. Against Dumenko's cavalry stood the 2nd and 4th Don Corps of Denikin's army.
February 8, 1920 A.I. Denikin issued a directive on the transition to a general offensive. A powerful force appeared in the White Guard, capable of withstanding the red cavalry groups.
After the defeat of the Don Corps, Gen. Pavlov and the collapse of the Kuban army, the Don and Volunteer armies began to quickly retreat to the sea. In the Don army, which proved to be excellent in the battles on the river. Manych, complete decay reigned. Don commanders, having collected their own "advice", arbitrarily dismissed Gen. Pavlov, accusing him of not being a Cossack. The Kuban army, which had almost completely disappeared, began to grow before our eyes as it retreated, but it grew not at the expense of the fighters, but at the expense of deserters, who believed that this was how they could be saved from the Bolsheviks.
On March 16, Yekaterinodar was surrendered. On March 20, the White armies approached Novorossiysk. At the same time, the last combat order of A.I. Denikin. The Don Cossacks did not have any feeling of resistance, there was only a consciousness of dull and indifferent indifference, everything was mixed up, no connections between the headquarters and the troops were observed. Many surrendered, but there were also individual feats - thus the Ataman regiment heroically died, entering the cabin against 2 red divisions. The disaster was becoming inevitable. It was necessary to save the remnants of the armies. March 26 Gen. A.P. Kutepov reported that it was no longer possible to remain in the city of Novorossiysk. On the existing ships were loaded: almost the entire Volunteer Corps, the remnants of the Kuban under the command of Gen. N.G. Babiev and several Don divisions. The last port of Novorossiysk left the destroyer "Captain Saken" with the gene. A.I. Denikin and his staff on board.
In total, about 30 thousand soldiers and Cossacks were taken from the city of Novorossiysk to the Crimean peninsula. After evacuation to the Crimean Peninsula, Gen. A.I. Denikin resigned from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the South of Russia.
Conclusion
The main outcome of the Civil War for the Cossacks was the completion of the process of “decossackization”. It must be admitted that in the early 1920s the Cossack population has already merged with the other agricultural population - merged in terms of its status, range of interests and tasks. Just as the decree of Peter I on the taxable population, at one time, eliminated in principle the differences between groups of the agricultural population by unifying their status and duties, in the same way, the policy pursued by the communist authorities in relation to farmers brought together groups that had previously differed so much, equalizing all as citizens of the "Soviet Republic".
At the same time, the Cossacks suffered irreparable losses - the officers were almost completely driven out, a significant part of the Cossack intelligentsia perished. Many villages were destroyed. A significant number of Cossacks ended up in exile. Political suspicion of the Cossacks remained for a long time. Involvement, at least indirectly, in the White Cossacks or the insurgent movement left a stigma for the rest of his life. In a number of districts, a large number of Cossacks were deprived of voting rights. Everything that reminded of the Cossacks fell under the ban. Until the early 1930s. there was a methodical search for "guilty" before the Soviet government; the accusation of anyone of involvement in the "Cossack counter-revolution" remained the most serious and inevitably entailed repression. Don Cossacks Bolshevik Denikin
I believe that, despite all the hesitations and contradictions with the authorities, the Cossacks of the Department of Internal Affairs remained faithful to their Motherland and the oath: "Faith, Tsar and Fatherland!"
Bibliography
1. Saveliev E.P. The average history of the Cossacks. Novocherkassk, 1916.
2. A.I. Denikin, "Essays on Russian Troubles"
3. M.A. Sholokhov, Quiet Flows the Don, collected works in 8 volumes.
4. Materials for the series "Peoples and Cultures", issue 19: "Cossacks of Russia", book 2, part 1 (published in Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1989, No. 6, p. 177)
5. V.I. Lenin, complete works, in 55 volumes.
6. V.V. Komin, "Nestor Makhno"
7. E.F. Losev, "Life of remarkable people: F.K. Mironov"
8. “Forgotten and unknown Russia: White movement”, “Don army in the fight against the Bolsheviks”, a collection of memoirs of the Don Cossack officers.
9. Vladimirsky-Budanov M.F. Review of the history of Russian law. Kyiv, 1900. S. 123.
Hosted on Allbest.ru
...Similar Documents
The origin of the Don Cossacks. A blow to the political rights of the Don Cossacks by Peter I, the subordination of the Cossacks to the Military Collegium. Free and service Cossacks. The policy of "carrot and stick", socio-economic privileges granted to the Cossacks by Catherine.
abstract, added 11/23/2009
Features of the life of the Don Cossacks in the second half of the XVII century. Service to the Moscow Tsars. The economic rise of the Russian state, its relationship with the Don. Internal and external events that led to changes in the structure and way of life of the Don Cossacks.
thesis, added 06/22/2017
Study of the history of the origin of the Don Cossacks. Cossacks in historiography: comparison of approaches. Culture and lifestyle of the Cossacks. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War and the moral choice of the Cossacks. Betrayal of the Motherland by part of the Cossacks and service to the Wehrmacht.
abstract, added 12/17/2014
Cossack movement on the Don. Prospects and tasks of the revival of the Cossacks. Public opinion about the movement for the revival of the Don Cossacks. Creation of the Union of Cossacks on the Don. Social activity and self-affirmation in the field of historical self-consciousness.
abstract, added 01/12/2012
Socio-economic position of the Cossacks. Periodization of the Civil War in the Works of Soviet Historians. Issues of periodization of the civil war on the Don in the 90s. XX century in historical science. Historians emigrants about the periods of the civil war on the Don.
term paper, added 09/21/2013
Acquaintance with the problems of the origin of the Don Cossacks. Study of the process of folding the system of self-government among the Cossacks of the Don region. Characterization of the results of a comparative analysis of the system of self-government of the Don Army and the Zaporizhzhya Sich.
thesis, added 12/11/2017
Beginning of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The role of the entire Cossacks in the Russian-Japanese war. Fighting cavalry of the Russian army. Don Cossacks at the front. The end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and the characteristics of the main reasons for Russia's defeat in it.
abstract, added 06/04/2010
Democratic principles of management and traditions of the Don Cossacks. The creative contribution of writers and writers of the Don region to its cultural development. The activities of the Cossack deputies in the State Duma. Don democracy after the fall of the autocracy.
abstract, added 10/20/2012
The attitude of the bulk of the Cossacks to the revolutionary events in Russia. Don Cossacks and the Revolution of 1905-1907, its role in the February Revolution. Cossacks and political crises of spring-summer 1917, the events of the October Revolution. The struggle of Ataman Kaledin.
abstract, added 12/20/2010
The Cossacks as a special military estate with privileges for performing compulsory service. The origin of the Cossacks. The role of the Cossacks in the history of Russia. Cossack beliefs and legends. Earrings and horses, Cossack family. Revolts of Razin, Bulavin and Pugachev.
In December 1918, at a meeting of party activists in the city of Kursk, L.D. Trotsky, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and People's Commissar for Naval Affairs, analyzing the results of the year of the civil war, instructed: “It should be clear to each of you that the old ruling classes inherited their art, their skill to govern from their grandfathers and great-grandfathers. What can we do to counter this? How can we compensate for our inexperience? Remember, comrades, only terror. Terror consistent and merciless! Compliance, softness history will never forgive us. If up to now we have destroyed hundreds and thousands, now the time has come to create an organization whose apparatus, if necessary, will be able to destroy tens of thousands. We have no time, no opportunity to seek out our real, active enemies. We are forced to embark on the path of annihilation."
In confirmation and development of these words, on January 29, 1919, Ya. M. Sverdlov, on behalf of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), sent a circular letter, known as "the directive on decossackization to all responsible comrades working in the Cossack regions." The directive read:
“Recent events on various fronts and Cossack regions, our advances deep into the Cossack settlements and disintegration among the Cossack troops compels us to give instructions to party workers about the nature of their work in these regions. It is necessary, taking into account the experience of the Civil War with the Cossacks, to recognize the only right thing is the most merciless struggle against all the tops of the Cossacks, through their total extermination.
1. Carry out mass terror against the rich Cossacks, exterminating them without exception; to carry out merciless terror against all Cossacks who took any direct or indirect part in the struggle against Soviet power. To the average Cossacks it is necessary to take all those measures that give a guarantee against any attempts on their part to new actions against the Soviet power.
2. Confiscate grain and force it to dump all surpluses at the indicated points, this applies both to bread and to all agricultural products.
3. To take all measures to assist the resettled immigrant poor, organizing resettlement where possible.
4. To equalize the newcomers from other cities with the Cossacks in land and in all other respects.
5. to carry out complete disarmament, to shoot anyone who is found to have a weapon after the deadline for surrender.
6. Issue weapons only to reliable elements from other cities.
7. Leave the armed detachments in the Cossack villages until full order is established.
8. All commissars appointed to certain Cossack settlements are invited to show maximum firmness and steadily implement these instructions.
The Central Committee decides to pass through the relevant Soviet institutions the obligation of the People's Commissariat of Land to develop in a hurry the actual measures for the mass resettlement of the poor on the Cossack lands. Central Committee of the RCP(b).
There is an opinion that the authorship of the directive on storytelling belongs to only one person - Ya. M. Sverdlov, and neither the Central Committee of the RCP (b), nor the Council of People's Commissars took any part in the adoption of this document. However, analyzing the entire course of the seizure of power by the Bolshevik Party in the period 1917-1918, the fact of the regularity of raising violence and lawlessness to the rank of state policy becomes obvious. The desire for limitless dictatorship provoked a cynical justification for the inevitability of terror.
Under these conditions, the terror unleashed against the Cossacks in the occupied villages acquired such proportions that, on March 16, 1919, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was forced to recognize the January directive as erroneous. But the flywheel of the extermination machine was started, and it was already impossible to stop it.
The beginning of the state genocide on the part of the Bolsheviks and distrust of yesterday's still neighbors - the highlanders, fear of them, pushed part of the Cossacks again onto the path of fighting the Soviet regime, but now as part of the Volunteer Army of General Denikin.
The undisguised genocide of the Cossacks that had begun led the Don to a catastrophe, but in the North Caucasus it ended in complete defeat for the Bolsheviks. The 150,000-strong XI Army, which Fedko headed after Sorokin's death, was cumbersomely deploying for a decisive blow. From the flank it was covered by the XII Army occupying the area from Vladikavkaz to Grozny. From these two armies, the Caspian-Caucasian Front was created. In the rear, the Reds were restless. The Stavropol peasants leaned more and more towards the whites after the invasion of the food detachments. Highlanders turned away from the Bolsheviks, even those who supported them during the period of general anarchy. So, inside the Chechens, Kabardians and Ossetians there was their own civil war: some wanted to go with the Reds, others with the Whites, and still others wanted to build an Islamic state. The Kalmyks openly hated the Bolsheviks after the outrages committed against them. After the bloody suppression of the Bicherakhovsky uprising, the Terek Cossacks hid.
On January 4, 1919, the Volunteer Army dealt a crushing blow to the XI Red Army in the area of the village of Nevinnomysskaya and, breaking through the front, began to pursue the enemy in two directions - to the Holy Cross and to Mineralnye Vody. The gigantic XIth Army began to fall apart. Ordzhonikidze insisted on retreating to Vladikavkaz. Most of the commanders were against it, believing that the army pressed against the mountains would fall into a trap. Already on January 19, Pyatigorsk was taken by the Whites, on January 20, the St. George group of the Reds was defeated.
To repulse the White troops and to manage all military operations in the region, by the decision of the Caucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b), at the end of December 1918, the Council of Defense of the North Caucasus was created, headed by G. K. Ordzhonikidze. At the direction of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, weapons and ammunition were sent to the North Caucasus to help the XI Army.
But, despite all the measures taken, the units of the Red Army could not resist the onslaught of the Volunteer Army. The Extraordinary Commissar of the South of Russia, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, in a telegram addressed to V. I. Lenin dated January 24, 1919, reported on the state of affairs as follows: “There is no XI Army. She finally broke down. The enemy occupies the cities and villages almost without resistance. At night, the question was to leave the entire Terek region and go to Astrakhan.
On January 25, 1919, during the general offensive of the Volunteer Army in the North Caucasus, the Kabardian cavalry brigade, consisting of two regiments under the command of captain Zaurbek Dautokov-Serebryakov, occupies Nalchik and Baksan with battle. And on January 26, the detachments of A. G. Shkuro occupy the railway stations of Kotlyarevskaya and Prokhladnaya. At the same time, the White Guard Circassian division and two Cossack plastun battalions, turning to the right from the village of Novoossetinskaya, went to the Terek near the Kabardian village of Abaevo and, having joined at the Kotlyarevskaya station with detachments of Shkuro along the railway line, moved to Vladikavkaz. By the beginning of February, the white units of Generals Shkuro, Pokrovsky and Ulagay blocked the administrative center of the Terek region - the city of Vladikavkaz - from three sides. February 10, 1919 Vladikavkaz was taken. Denikin's command forced the XIth Red Army to retreat across the hungry steppes to Astrakhan. The remnants of the XII Red Army crumbled. The Extraordinary Commissar of the South of Russia G.K. Ordzhonikidze with a small detachment fled to Ingushetia, some units under the command of N. Gikalo went to Dagestan, and the bulk, representing already disorderly crowds of refugees, poured into Georgia through winter passes, freezing in the mountains, dying from avalanches and snowfalls, exterminated by yesterday's allies - the highlanders. The Georgian government, fearing typhus, refused to let them in. The Reds tried to storm their way out of the Darial Gorge but were met by machine-gun fire. Many died. The rest surrendered to the Georgians and were interned as prisoners of war.
By the time the Volunteer Army occupied the North Caucasus, of the independent Terek units that survived the defeat of the uprising, only a detachment of Terek Cossacks in Petrovsk, led by the commander of the Terek Territory, Major General I. N. Kosnikov, survived. It included the Grebensky and Gorsko-Mozdok cavalry regiments, the cavalry hundred of Kopay Cossacks, the 1st Mozdok and 2nd Grebensky Plastun battalions, the hundreds of foot Kopay Cossacks, the 1st and 2nd artillery divisions. By February 14, 1919, the detachment consisted of 2,088 people.
One of the first units of the Tertsians who joined the Volunteer Army was the Terek officer regiment, formed on November 1, 1918 from the officer detachment of Colonel B.N. Litvinov, who arrived in the army after the defeat of the Terek uprising (disbanded in March 1919), as well as detachments of colonels V. K. Agoeva, Z. Dautokova-Serebryakova and G. A. Kibirova.
On November 8, 1918, the 1st Terek Cossack Regiment was formed as part of the Volunteer Army (later merged into the 1st Terek Cossack Division). The broad formation of the Terek units began with the establishment of the Volunteer Army in the North Caucasus. The basis of the Terek formations in the Civil War was the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Terek Cossack divisions and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Terek plastun brigades, as well as the Terek Cossack horse artillery divisions and separate batteries, which were both part of the Troops Terek-Dagestan region, and the Volunteer and Caucasian Volunteer armies. Beginning in February 1919, the Terek formations were already conducting independent military operations against the Red Army. This was especially significant for the white forces in the south, in connection with the transfer of the Caucasian Volunteer Army to the Northern Front.
The Terek Plastunskaya separate brigade was formed as part of the Volunteer Army on December 9, 1918 from the newly formed 1st and 2nd Terek Plastunskaya battalions and the Terek Cossack artillery division, which included the 1st Terek Cossack and 2nd Terek Plastunskaya batteries.
With the end of the North Caucasian operation of the Volunteer Army, the Armed Forces in the South of Russia established control over most of the territory of the North Caucasus. On January 10, 1919, A. I. Denikin appointed the commander of the III Army Corps, General V. P. Lyakhov, commander-in-chief and commander of the troops of the created Terek-Dagestan Territory. The newly appointed commander, in order to recreate the Terek Cossack army, was ordered to assemble the Cossack Circle to select the Army Ataman. The Terek Great Military Circle began its work on February 22, 1919. More than twenty issues were put on the agenda, but in terms of its importance, the issue of the adoption of the new Constitution of the region, which was then adopted on February 27, was in the first row. The next day after the adoption of the Constitution, the elections of the military ataman took place. They became Major General G. A. Vdovenko - a Cossack of the State village. The Big Circle showed support for the Volunteer Army, elected a small Circle (Commission of Legislative Provisions). At the same time, the Military Circle decided on the temporary deployment of military authorities and the residence of the military ataman in the city of Pyatigorsk.
The territories liberated from Soviet power were returning to the mainstream of peaceful life. The former Terek region itself was transformed into the Terek-Dagestan region with the center in Pyatigorsk. The Cossacks of the Sunzha villages evicted in 1918 were returned back.
The British tried to limit the advance of the Whites, keeping the oil fields of Grozny and Dagestan in the hands of small "sovereign" formations, such as the government of the Central Caspian Sea and the Gorsko-Dagestan government. Detachments of the British, even having landed in Petrovsk, began to move towards Grozny. Having outstripped the British, the White Guard units entered Grozny on February 8 and moved on, occupying the Caspian coast to Derbent.
In the mountains, to which the White Guard troops approached, confusion reigned. Each nation had its own government, or even several. So, the Chechens formed two national governments, which waged bloody wars between themselves for several weeks. The dead were counted in the hundreds. Almost every valley had its own money, often homemade, and rifle cartridges were the universally recognized "convertible" currency. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and even Great Britain tried to act as guarantors of the "mountain autonomies". But the Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army A. I. Denikin (whom the Soviet propaganda liked to portray as a puppet of the Entente) resolutely demanded the abolition of all these “autonomies”. By placing governors in the national regions from white officers of these nationalities. So, for example, on January 19, 1919, the commander-in-chief of the Terek-Dagestan region, Lieutenant General V.P. Lyakhov, issued an order according to which a colonel, later a major general, Tembot Zhankhotovich Bekovich-Cherkassky, was appointed the ruler of Kabarda. His assistants: Captain Zaurbek Dautokov-Serebryakov was appointed for the military unit, Colonel Sultanbek Kasaevich Klishbiev for civil administration.
Relying on the support of the local nobility, General Denikin convened mountain congresses in March 1919 in Kabarda, Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan. These congresses elected Rulers and Councils under them, who had extensive judicial and administrative powers. Sharia law was preserved in criminal and family cases.
At the beginning of 1919, a system of self-government by the region of two centers was formed in the Terek-Dagestan region: Cossack and volunteer (both were in Pyatigorsk). As A. I. Denikin later noted, the unresolved nature of a number of issues dating back to pre-revolutionary times, lack of agreement in relations, and the influence of the Kuban independentists on the Tertsy could not but give rise to friction between these two authorities. Only due to the awareness of mortal danger in the event of a break, the absence of independent tendencies among the mass of the Terek Cossacks, personal relationships between representatives of both branches of power, the state mechanism in the North Caucasus worked throughout 1919 without significant interruptions. Until the end of the white power, the region continued to be in dual subordination: the representative of the volunteer government (General Lyakhov was replaced by cavalry general I.G. a meeting in May 1919; military ataman ruled on the basis of the Terek constitution.
Political disagreements and misunderstandings between representatives of the two authorities, as a rule, ended with the adoption of a compromise solution. Friction between the two centers of power throughout 1919 was created mainly by a small but influential part of the radical independent Terek intelligentsia in the government and the Circle. The most obvious illustration is the position of the Terek faction of the Supreme Cossack Circle, which met in Ekaterinodar on January 5 (18), 1920 as the supreme power of the Don, Kuban and Terek. The Terek faction maintained a loyal attitude towards the government of the South of Russia, proceeding from the position of unacceptability for the army of separatism and the fatefulness of the mountain issue. The resolution on breaking off relations with Denikin was adopted by the Supreme Circle of the Don, Kuban and Terek with an insignificant number of votes of the Terek faction, most of which went home.
On the territory liberated from the Bolsheviks, the work of transport was adjusted, paralyzed enterprises were opened, and trade revived. In May 1919, the South-Eastern Russian Church Council was held in Stavropol. The Council was attended by bishops, clerics and laity chosen from the Stavropol, Don, Kuban, Vladikavkaz and Sukhumi-Black Sea dioceses, as well as members of the All-Russian Local Council who ended up in the south of the country. Questions of the spiritual and social structure of this vast territory were discussed at the Council, and the Supreme Provisional Church Administration was formed. Archbishop Mitrofan (Simashkevich) of the Donskoy became its chairman, the members were Archbishop Dimitry (Abashidze) of Tauride, Bishop Arseniy (Smolenets) of Taganrog, Protopresbyter G. I. Shavelsky, Professor A. P. Rozhdestvensky, Count V. Musin-Pushkin and Professor P. Verkhovsky.
Thus, with the arrival of the White troops in the Terek region, the Cossack military government was restored, headed by the ataman, Major General G. A. Vdovenko. The “South-Eastern Union of Cossack Troops, Highlanders of the Caucasus and Free Peoples of the Steppes” continued its work, the basis of which was the idea of a federation of the Don, Kuban, Terek, the North Caucasus region, as well as the Astrakhan, Ural and Orenburg troops. The political goal of the Union was its accession as an independent state association to the future Russian Federation.
A. I. Denikin, in turn, advocated “preserving the unity of the Russian state, subject to granting autonomy to individual nationalities and original formations (Cossacks), as well as broad decentralization of the entire state administration ... The basis for decentralization of administration was the division of the occupied territory into regions.”
Recognizing the fundamental right of autonomy for the Cossack troops, Denikin made a reservation regarding the Terek army, which "in view of the extreme stripedness and the need to reconcile the interests of the Cossacks and mountaineers" had to enter the North Caucasian region on the rights of autonomy. It was planned to include representatives of the Cossacks and mountain peoples in the new structures of the regional authorities. The mountain peoples were granted broad self-government within ethnic boundaries, with elected administration, non-interference on the part of the state in matters of religion and public education, but without funding these programs from the state budget.
Unlike the Don and the Kuban, the “connection with the all-Russian statehood” has not weakened on the Terek. On June 21, 1919, Gerasim Andreevich Vdovenko, elected military ataman, opened the next Great Circle of the Terek Cossack Army at the Park Theater in the city of Essentuki. The Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army A. I. Denikin was also present at the circle. The program of the Terek government stated that "only a decisive victory over Bolshevism and the revival of Russia will create the possibility of restoring the power and native army, bled white and weakened by civil strife."
In view of the ongoing war, the Tertsians were interested in increasing their numbers by attracting their neighbors-allies to the anti-Bolshevik struggle. Thus, the people of the Karanogays were included in the Terek army, and on the Big Circle, the Cossacks expressed their consent in principle to joining the Army "on an equal footing" of Ossetians and Kabardians. The situation was more complicated with the out-of-town population. Encouraging the entry of individual representatives of the indigenous peasants into the Cossack estate, the Tertsy treated with great prejudice the demand of non-residents to resolve the land issue, to introduce them into the work of the Circle, as well as into the central and local government.
In the Terek region liberated from the Bolsheviks, a complete mobilization took place. In addition to the Cossack regiments, units formed from the highlanders were also sent to the front. Wishing to confirm their loyalty to Denikin, even yesterday's enemies of the Tertsy, the Chechens and Ingush, responded to the call of the Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army and replenished the White Guard ranks with their volunteers.
Already in May 1919, in addition to the Kuban combat units, the Circassian cavalry division and the Karachaev cavalry brigade operated on the Tsaritsy front. The 2nd Terek Cossack Division, the 1st Terek Plastun Brigade, the Kabardian Cavalry Division, the Ingush Cavalry Brigade, the Dagestan Cavalry Brigade and the Ossetian Cavalry Regiment, who arrived from the Terek and Dagestan, were also transferred here. In Ukraine, the 1st Terek Cossack Division and the Chechen Cavalry Division were involved against Makhno.
The situation in the North Caucasus remained extremely difficult. In June, Ingushetia raised an uprising, but a week later it was crushed. Kabarda and Ossetia were disturbed by their attacks by the Balkars and "Kermenists" (representatives of the Ossetian revolutionary democratic organization). In the mountainous part of Dagestan, Ali-Khadzhi raised an uprising, and in August this "baton" was taken over by the Chechen sheikh Uzun-Khadzhi, who settled in Vedeno. All nationalist and religious uprisings in the North Caucasus were not only supported but also provoked by anti-Russian circles in Turkey and Georgia. The constant military danger forced Denikin to keep up to 15 thousand soldiers in this region under the command of General I. G. Erdeli, including two Terek divisions - the 3rd and 4th, and another plastun brigade.
Meanwhile, the situation at the front was even more deplorable. So, by December 1919, the Volunteer Army of General Denikin, under pressure from three times superior enemy forces, lost 50% of its personnel. As of December 1, there were 42,733 wounded in military medical institutions in southern Russia alone. A large-scale retreat of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia began. On November 19, units of the Red Army broke into Kursk, on December 10 Kharkov was abandoned, on December 28 - Tsaritsyn, and already on January 9, 1920, Soviet troops entered Rostov-on-Don.
On January 8, 1920, the Terek Cossacks suffered irreparable losses - units of the First Cavalry Army of Budyonny almost completely destroyed the Terek Plastun Brigade. At the same time, the commander of the cavalry corps, General K.K. Mamontov, despite the order to attack the enemy, led his corps through Aksai to the left bank of the Don.
In January 1920, the Armed Forces of the South of Russia numbered 81,506 people, of which: Volunteer units - 30,802, Don troops - 37,762, Kuban troops - 8,317, Terek troops - 3,115, Astrakhan troops - 468, Mountain units - 1042. These forces were clearly not enough to contain the offensive of the Reds, but the separatist games of the Cossack leaders continued at this critical moment for all anti-Bolshevik forces.
In Ekaterinodar on January 18, 1920, the Cossack Supreme Circle gathered, which set about creating an independent union state and declared itself the supreme authority over the affairs of the Don, Kuban and Terek. Part of the Don delegates and almost all of the Tertsians called for the continuation of the struggle in unity with the high command. Most of the Kuban, part of the Don and a few Terts demanded a complete break with Denikin. Some of the Kuban and Don people were inclined to stop fighting.
According to A. I. Denikin, “only the Tertsy – the ataman, the government and the faction of the Circle – almost in full force represented a united front.” The Kubans were reproached for leaving the front by the Kuban units, proposals were made to separate the eastern departments (“lineists”) from this army and attach them to the Terek. Terek ataman G. A. Vdovenko spoke with the following words: “The course of the Tertsy is one. We have written in gold letters "United and indivisible Russia".
At the end of January 1920, a compromise provision was developed, accepted by all parties:
1. South Russian power is established on the basis of an agreement between the High Command of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia and the Supreme Circle of the Don, Kuban and Terek, until the convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.
2. Lieutenant-General A. I. Denikin is recognized as the first head of the South Russian authorities ....
3. The law on the succession of power of the head of state is developed by the Legislative Chamber on a general basis.
4. Legislative power in the South of Russia is exercised by the Legislative Chamber.
5. The functions of the executive power, except for the head of the South Russian government, are determined by the Council of Ministers ...
6. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers is appointed by the head of the South Russian government.
7. The person heading the South Russian government has the right to dissolve the Legislative Chamber and the right to a relative "veto" ...
In agreement with the three factions of the Supreme Circle, a cabinet of ministers was formed, but "the appearance of a new government did not bring any change in the course of events."
The military and political crisis of the White Guard South was growing. Government reform no longer saved the situation - the front collapsed. On February 29, 1920, Stavropol was taken by the Red Army, on March 17 Yekaterinodar and the village of Nevinnomysskaya fell, on March 22 - Vladikavkaz, on March 23 - Kizlyar, on March 24 - Grozny, on March 27 - Novorossiysk, on March 30 - Port-Petrovsk and on April 7 - Tuapse . Almost throughout the entire territory of the North Caucasus, Soviet power was restored, which was confirmed by a decree of March 25, 1920.
Part of the army of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (about 30 thousand people) was evacuated from Novorossiysk to the Crimea. The Terek Cossacks, who left Vladikavkaz (together with the refugees, about 12 thousand people), went along the Georgian Military Highway to Georgia, where they were interned in camps near Poti, in a swampy malaria area. The demoralized Cossack units, squeezed on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, for the most part surrendered to the red units.
On April 4, 1920, A. I. Denikin ordered the appointment of Lieutenant General Baron P. N. Wrangel as his successor to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia.
After the evacuation of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia to the Crimea, from the remnants of the Terek and Astrakhan Cossack units in April 1920, a Separate Terek-Astrakhan Cossack brigade was formed, which from April 28 as the Terek-Astrakhan brigade was part of the 3rd cavalry division of the Consolidated Corps. On July 7, after reorganization, the brigade again became separate. In the summer of 1920, she was part of the Special Forces Group, which participated in the Kuban landing. From September 4, the brigade operated separately as part of the Russian army and included the 1st Terek, 1st and 2nd Astrakhan regiments and the Terek-Astrakhan Cossack cavalry artillery division and the Separate Terek spare Cossack hundred.
The attitude of the Cossacks to Baron Wrangel was ambivalent. On the one hand, he contributed to the dispersal of the Kuban Regional Rada in 1919, on the other hand, his rigidity and commitment to order impressed the Cossacks. The attitude of the Cossacks towards him was not spoiled by the fact that Wrangel brought the Don general Sidorin to justice because he telegraphed the military ataman Bogaevsky about his decision to “withdraw the Don army from the limits of the Crimea and the subordination in which it is now located.”
The situation with the Kuban Cossacks was more complicated. The military ataman Bukretov was an opponent of the evacuation to the Crimea of the Cossack units squeezed on the Black Sea coast. Wrangel was not immediately able to send the ataman to the Caucasus to organize the evacuation, and the remnants of those who did not surrender to the Reds (about 17 thousand people) were only able to board the ships on May 4th. Bukretov handed over ataman power to the chairman of the Kuban government Ivanis and, together with the "independent" - deputies of the Rada, taking with him part of the military treasury, fled to Georgia. The Kuban Rada, which gathered in Feodosia, recognized Bukretov and Ivanis as traitors, and elected military general Ulagay as the military chieftain, but he refused power.
The small Terek group led by Ataman Vdovenko was traditionally hostile to the separatist movements and, therefore, had nothing in common with the ambitious Cossack leaders.
The lack of unity in the political Cossack camp and Wrangel's uncompromising attitude towards the "independents" allowed the commander-in-chief of the Russian army to conclude with the military atamans the agreement that he considered necessary for the state structure of Russia. Gathering together Bogaevsky, Ivanis, Vdovenko and Lyakhov, Wrangel gave them 24 hours to think, and thus, “On July 22, a solemn signing of an agreement took place ... with the atamans and governments of the Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan ... in development of the agreement dated 2 (15 ) April of this year ...
1. The state formations of the Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan are provided with complete independence in their internal structure and management.
2. In the Council of Heads of Departments under the Government and the Commander-in-Chief, with the right of a decisive vote on all issues, the chairmen of the governments of the state formations of the Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan, or members of their governments replacing them, participate.
3. The Commander-in-Chief is assigned full power over all the armed forces of state formations ... both in operational terms and on fundamental issues of organizing the army.
4. All necessary for the supply ... food and other means are provided ... on a special allocation.
5. Management of railways and main telegraph lines is vested in the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.
6. Agreement and negotiations with foreign governments, both in the field of political and in the field of commercial policy, are carried out by the Ruler and the Commander-in-Chief. If these negotiations concern the interests of one of the state formations ..., the Ruler and Commander-in-Chief first enters into an agreement with the subject ataman.
7. A common customs line and a single indirect taxation are being established ...
8. A single monetary system is established on the territory of the contracting parties ...
9. Upon the liberation of the territory of state formations ... this agreement has to be submitted for approval by large military circles and regional councils, but it takes effect immediately upon its signing.
10. This agreement is established until the complete end of the Civil War.
The unsuccessful landing of the Kuban troops led by General Ulagai in the Kuban in August 1920, and the choked September offensive on the Kakhovka bridgehead forced Baron Wrangel to close within the Crimean peninsula and begin preparations for defense and evacuation.
By the beginning of the offensive on November 7, 1920, the Red Army had 133,000 bayonets and sabers, while the Russian army had 37,000 bayonets and sabers. The superior forces of the Soviet troops broke the defense, and already on November 12, Baron Wrangel issued an order to leave the Crimea. The evacuation organized by the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army was completed on November 16, 1920 and made it possible to save about 150,000 military and civilians, including about 30,000 Cossacks.
The remnants of the last provisional nationwide government and the last legitimate governments of the Cossack troops of the Russian Empire, including Terek, left the territory of Russia.
After the evacuation of the Russian army from the Crimea in Chataldzha, the Terek-Astrakhan regiment was formed as part of the Don Corps. After the transformation of the army into the Russian General Military Union (ROVS), the regiment until the 1930s was a cropped unit. So by the autumn of 1925, there were 427 people in the regiment, including 211 officers.
The history of the Cossack officer corps is one of the little-studied pages of the military history of Russia. In the article brought to the attention of readers, we will talk about the officer corps of the Orenburg army - one of the largest Cossack troops in Russia.
From the end of 1917, the territory of the Orenburg Cossack army became the scene of a fierce fratricidal struggle for two years. Cossack officers played a special role in these events. During the years of the First World War, the officer corps of the Orenburg Cossack army suffered minor losses and managed to retain the vast majority of the officer cadre. This fact played a decisive role in the transition of the Orenburg Cossacks almost in its entirety to the side of the anti-Bolshevik forces. There were only a few Cossack officers who went over to the side of the Reds. These are, first of all, the brothers Yesaul N.D. Kashirin and podesaul I.D. Kashirin, captain A.G. Nagaev, who worked in the Cossack department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, was under the command of N.G. Enborisov, who was executed for Bolshevism by his own Cossacks, was led by F.G. Pichugin and Yesaul I.A. Yudin. Among the Cossack officers, these people were perceived as outcasts. At the same time, several hundred Orenburg Cossack officers fought on the side of the Whites.
The officers were for the Cossacks not only superiors, but also unconditional authorities. Orenburg Cossacks, led by the Ataman Colonel A.I. Dutov were among the first to oppose the Bolsheviks. In the Petrograd region, the Orenburgers under the command of the cornet A. Bolgartsev from the Life Guards of the Consolidated Cossack Regiment opposed the Reds, in Tashkent - the Cossacks of the 17th Orenburg Cossack Regiment, some of which then went to Dutov.
In addition to the actual Cossack officers, non-Cossack officers also flocked to Dutov. In particular, there is information that
About 250 officers who made up the officer squad made their way to Vyatka, and on November 7, 1917, with the assistance of the 21-year-old sister of mercy M.A. Nesterovich from Moscow to Orenburg managed to get 120 disguised officers and cadets. On November 14, she sent another 68 officers and cadets to Orenburg. Thus, in total, in Orenburg, with the assistance of the sister of mercy M.A. Nesterovich in November 1917, at least 188 officers and cadets were transferred. However, this was more the exception than the rule.
After the disbandment of the old army, many officers who came from these places returned to the Southern Urals, serving both in the Cossack and in other parts. Most of them took part in the anti-Bolshevik movement. If we talk about the qualitative composition and peculiarities of recruiting officers of the white armies of the East of Russia, then it is appropriate to quote the words of the famous historian of the anti-Bolshevik movement, veteran of the Civil War, Lieutenant B.B. Filimonov, who wrote that, in contrast to the South of Russia, where officers flocked from all over the country, “to Siberia ... made their way and settled there, mainly officers who had any connection with this vast region of the Russian State. The number of officers not associated with Siberia, who got there by chance, mainly due to the desire to join the detachments of Dutov and Semenov, was generally insignificant. All this predetermined the shortage of officer cadres and led to accelerated promotion of junior and middle command personnel. So, until 1918, only half of the top leaders of the White movement in the East of Russia had the rank of general, the vast majority of the chiefs of higher staffs and army commanders had the rank of colonel, not to mention the lower commanders. With regard to the ranks of the Orenburg Cossack officers, the following pattern can be established. Cossack headquarters officers during the years of the Civil War, as a rule, became generals, chief officers - headquarters officers, and in the chief officer ranks there were either wartime officers produced during the First World War and the Civil War, or non-commissioned officers who served the officer rank, which could not but have a negative impact on ordinary Cossacks.
It happened that non-Cossack officers or non-commissioned officers were in officer positions due to a lack of officers. Non-Cossack officers were actively accepted into the Cossack estate. Due to the acute shortage of junior officers, some of them, who were even in large administrative positions by the standards of the troops, were sent to the front. For example, it was for this reason that the ataman of the 2nd military district was temporarily admitted to the front. Zakharov.
Often, chief officers became commanders of regiments. Many experienced senior officers - veterans of several wars, on the contrary, ended up in rear positions. As a result, during the Civil War, the positions of junior officers who directly communicated with ordinary Cossacks were almost exclusively wartime officers, often from the lower ranks. This state of affairs led to familiarity between the rank and file and officers, the fall in the authority of the officer and, as a result, to the exit of the Cossacks from subordination to their commanders. The well-known shortcomings of the territorial Cossack formations were also added here, when the commanders, if necessary, made a harsh decision were forced to take into account the fact that they and their subordinates would have to live in the neighborhood after the war.
Actually, the production of ranks of the First World War, in our opinion, led to an overproduction of regular Cossack headquarters officers and to a shortage of junior officers during the Civil War. In almost all Cossack regiments, the shortage of chief officers was expressed in double digits. As of October 15, 1918, the shortage of officers in relation to the staff in the units of the army was at least 63 headquarters officers and at least 801 chief officers. The numbers are amazing. Let's illustrate them with a specific example. According to the state, the Cossack cavalry regiment was supposed to have 4 staff officers and 45 chief officers. So, in the 2nd Orenburg Cossack Regiment, 2 staff officers and 31 chief officers were not enough to the regular number, in the 5th - 1 staff officer and 40 chief officers. Ataman A.I. On September 7, 1918, Dutov even appealed to the Cossack officers with an appeal not to leave their units due to shortages.
What was the total number of Orenburg Cossack officers - participants in the anti-Bolshevik movement? There is no exact data on this subject due to the difficulty of separating Cossack and non-Cossack officers, accounting for officers accepted into the army during the Civil War and promoted to officers from non-commissioned officer ranks. However, some statistics are still available. As of July 11, 1918, in the 2nd and 3rd military districts in the anti-Bolshevik resistance outside the subordination of A.I. Dutov was attended by 137 officers. By July 15, Dutov had 141 officers at his disposal. On August 23, 1918, 327 officers were subordinate to the ataman, including the Bashkir units. As of September 21, 1918, there were already 609 officers on the fronts of the Orenburg Military District. On October 4-5, 1918, orders were issued on the mandatory registration and mobilization of all officers under 55 years old located on the territory of the Orenburg Military District, not excluding retired ones. By October 15, 1918, 549 officers and 99 officials and doctors were mobilized in the Orenburg army. As of October 1, 1919, there were 205 Orenburg Cossack officers and generals in the troops of the Moscow Army Group on October 1, 1919 (that is, after leaving the territory of the Orenburg Cossack army). Thus, the total number of officers deployed by the army during the years of the Civil War can be approximately estimated at 800 people - more than was exhibited during the First World War. If on September 21, 1918, one Orenburg officer accounted for an average of 16 Cossacks, then by October 15 already by 45, in the Moscow Army Group by October 1, 1919 - by 35 lower ranks, which was much worse than the situation on the Eastern Front of the Whites in in general. Thus, the Cossack units were extremely poor in officers, which could not but affect their combat capability in the most sad way.
According to our calculations, 46 Orenburg Cossack generals took part in the anti-Bolshevik movement, and the vast majority of them (33 people) received general ranks already during the Civil War. Only one rose to the rank of full general (artillery general M.V. Khanzhin), 6 officers (M.P. Borodin, A.I. Dutov, G.P. Zhukov, V.M. Panov, N.T. Sukin , L.P. Timashev) finished their service with the rank of lieutenant general, the rest - major generals.
11 generals belonged to the hereditary nobility. The rights of hereditary nobility were also given by the awarding of the Order of St. George and the St. George weapon. Thus, from the group of officers under consideration, the formal right to nobility by order before the First World War was acquired by M.V. Khanzhin, during the First World War - another 17 people (I.G. Akulinin, P.G. Burlin, G.P. Zhukov, I.M. Zaitsev, L.A. Krylov, P.A. Lebedev, I. N. Losev, P. M. Losev, Y. I. Mamaev, A. N. Onchokov, V. M. Panov, V. M. Pechenkin, V. N. Polovnikov, V. G. Popov, M. G. Smirnov, R.P. Stepanov, L.P. Timashev (these three officers belonged to the nobility before the award)) and, finally, 1 officer - during the Civil War (L.N. Domozhirov), that is, a little less than half of all Orenburg generals. There was an opportunity to curry favor with the hereditary nobility and, upon reaching the VI class, the Table of Ranks (the rank of colonel). In this case, all generals should be classified as hereditary nobles. Unfortunately, the issue of granting this kind of privileges in the process of promotion and awards during the years of the First World War and the Civil War has not yet been practically studied.
Almost all the generals participated in the First World War (except those who served in the army) and only about one third (15 people) - in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, one general participated in the Chinese campaign and two more - in the Central Asian expeditions. Several generals (I.G. Akulinin, A.N. Vagin, L.N. Domozhirov, I.M. Zaitsev, A.V. Zuev, D.G. Serov) undoubtedly belonged to the category of intellectuals. They left behind memoirs, scientific works, journalism.
On January 18 (31), 1918, Orenburg fell, it was decided to disband the white volunteer detachments (mainly officers, old Cossacks and young students). Those who did not want to lay down their arms retreated in two directions: to Uralsk (led by the General Staff, Major General K.M. Slesarev) and to Verkhneuralsk, or temporarily took refuge in the villages. Dutov himself had to hastily leave the military capital, accompanied by only six officers, with whom he took military regalia and part of the weapons out of the city. Despite the demands of the Bolsheviks to detain Dutov, the promise of a reward for his capture and the almost complete absence of his guards, not a single village betrayed a military chieftain. During this period, Cossack units from the fronts returned to the army, but all of them were disbanded upon their return and practically did not participate in the Civil War. It should be noted that, despite the demands of the Bolsheviks, the Cossacks did not extradite their officers.
Of course, for supporting Dutov's speech, the Cossack officers suffered more than other social groups in the Southern Urals from the Bolshevik terror and violence. After the occupation of Orenburg by the Reds in January 1918, extrajudicial reprisals began. Already on January 24, the sailors shot the cadet A. Babichev, who was hiding in a monastery near the Platovka station and, in their opinion, fired a signal rocket. On the same day, at junction No. 18, the former commander of the 2nd Orenburg Cossack regiment, Major General P.V. Khlebnikov, who had previously been detained at the Platovka station and taken to Orenburg for a brief interrogation. In his apartment, 67-year-old Lieutenant-General Sheikh-Il-Islam Abdul Vagapovich Kochurov was killed, and with him the former commander of the 12th Orenburg Cossack regiment, Colonel M.F. Domozhirov. From the former chieftain of the 2nd military department of the Orenburg Cossack army, Lieutenant General N.A. On the street, Nasledov's shoulder straps were torn off and beaten. Only by a miracle did the 63-year-old general manage to get home alive. Yesaul G.M. was killed in front of his own young children. Nagaev. Esauls S.S. were shot. Polozov and A. Kruchinin.
A new wave of violence against officers and Cossacks followed after the white raid on Orenburg on April 4, 1918. On April 7, six staff officers of the 2nd Orenburg military department gymnasium were shot, including its director, Major General A.K. Akhmatov. Retired Major General F.S. Vorobyov, old military foreman Nikitin, retired colonel A.N. Polozov (later it was reported that he was shot “through a misunderstanding”), the centurion N.V. Strelkovskiy.
Not far from Orenburg in the village of Sakmarskaya in May 1918, 14 people were arrested and shot, including several Cossack officers. In total, according to the Orenburg Social Revolutionaries, about 400 corpses were buried in the city cemetery of Orenburg during the few weeks of Bolshevik rule. About 100 officers in Orenburg were held hostage under the Bolsheviks, and it was announced to the population that 10 hostages would be shot for every killed Soviet worker or Red Guard. In Verkhneuralsk, after his supporters left Dutov, executions of officers, Cossacks, and ordinary people also began. According to available information, about a hundred people were executed (including a member of the Military Government I.S. Beloborodov, who did not have time to leave the city, the mayor of Verkhneuralsk P.S. Polosin, military foreman P.F. Vorotov, Archpriest Gromoglasov), which for a provincial there were many towns. On April 10, 1918, two sons of General Mikhailov were shot at the Dubinovka station of the Orsk railway - the lieutenants Mikhail and Vasily, who were handed over to the Bolsheviks by the Cossacks of the village of Verkhneozernaya.
On the territory of the 3rd military district, Colonel K.T. Kuznetsov, district ataman, military foreman A.N. Polovnikov (June 13, 1918; brother of the head of the military department of the Military Government and Dutov's assistant, Major General V.N. Polovnikov), military foreman D.M. Nagaev (March 25, 1918), captain P.V. Tokarev, centurions A.M. Deryagin and I. Kozhevnikov, cornets N.I. Plotnikov, M. Elagin, A. Nosov, warrant officers A. Matyunov, I.F. Plotnikov, P.I. Bespalov, officer A. Nagaev. From some Cossack officers, the Reds demanded a subscription refusing to obey the Military Government.
In general, the attitude towards captured Cossack officers, especially in the initial period of the Civil War, on the part of the Reds was, as a rule, extremely cruel. An officer who served in one of the Orenburg Cossack regiments recalled that “if an officer was captured, then shoulder straps were cut from a living officer, and if there were stars on shoulder straps, then how many stars there were, the same number of nails were driven into their shoulders. This is an irrefutable fact." The Cossacks, in addition, were carved with "stripes" on their legs.
Dutov decided not to leave the territory of the army and went to Verkhneuralsk, located far from major roads and making it possible to form new forces against the Bolsheviks without losing control of the army. The basis of the new formation was the partisan detachments of military foremen G.V. Enborisov and Yu.I. Mamaeva, podesaulov V.A. Borodin and K.N. Mikhailov. On January 29, 1918, the 2nd Emergency Military Circle of the Orenburg Cossack Army was opened in Verkhneuralsk. Dutov spoke in favor of creating officer detachments in the army. It was also decided that officers should not take off their epaulettes. The anti-Bolshevism of the deputies of the circle and the military administration did not yet have any complete character. For example, podesaul I.D. Kashirin, known for his revolutionary views, was only not accepted by the circle, but he did not suffer any punishment for his political convictions.
On the territory of the 2nd (Verkhneuralsky) military district, Dutov's detachments held out until mid-April, when the Cossacks were forced under the blows of superior Red forces under the command of V.K. Blucher to leave with their families on a six-hundred-mile march to the southeast, to the Turgai steppes.
The conflict between the old people and the front-line soldiers that took place in the Orenburg Cossack army, as well as in other troops, did not allow Dutov to unite significant masses of Cossacks around him at the initial stage of the struggle. However, the new government did not take into account the Cossack traditions and way of life, they talked with the Cossacks, mainly from a position of strength, which caused acute discontent among them, which quickly grew into an armed confrontation. Thus, for the majority of the Cossacks, the struggle against the Bolsheviks took on the character of a struggle for their rights and the very possibility of a free existence.
In the spring of 1918, out of touch with Dutov, a powerful insurrectionary movement against the Bolsheviks arose on the territory of the 1st military district, which was headed by a congress of delegates from 25 united villages and headquarters of the fronts, headed by military foreman D.M. Krasnoyartsev. On March 28, in the village of Vetlyanskaya, the Cossacks destroyed the detachment of the chairman of the council of the Iletsk Protection P.A. Persianov, on April 2, in the village of Izobilnaya, the punitive detachment of the chairman of the Orenburg Military Revolutionary Committee S.M. Zviling, and on the night of April 3-4, a detachment of military foreman N.V. Lukina raided Orenburg, occupying the city for some time and inflicting significant losses on the Reds. The Reds responded with cruel measures: they shot anti-Bolshevik Cossacks, burned the resisting villages (11 villages were burned in the spring of 1918), and imposed significant indemnities on the Cossacks. As a result, only on the territory of the 1st military district of the Orenburg Cossack army by June 1918, more than six thousand Cossacks were involved in the insurgent struggle, the ranks of the rebels were replenished by officers who had previously left Orenburg for the Ural Cossack army.
Basically, the insurgent movement was led by little-known Cossack chief officers, there were very few staff officers. To attract officers to the ranks of the rebels, the congress of delegates of the united villages reported: “Infantry officers temporarily live in the city of Ilek, but they are afraid to come to us, because. rumors are circulating that there is distrust of the Cossacks in the Orenburg army, taking into account that our decision of May 16, 1918 expressed full confidence in all officers, and therefore we ask infantry officers if they wish to arrive at our positions as ordinary fighters against the Bolsheviks ; We confirm that the rumors of distrust are false and are being spread by unintentional people – provocateurs.” At the same time, the rebel units were distinguished by low discipline, the command staff was elected, as a result of which the Cossacks sometimes did not follow the orders of higher authorities, up to the level of front commanders (for example, in hundreds of right-bank villages).
In addition, at the end of May, the Cossacks of the 3rd military district, supported by the Czechoslovaks, joined the resistance movement. On July 3, 1918, rebel detachments liberated Orenburg from the Reds. Under the onslaught of the rebels, V.K. Blucher, N.D. Kashirin and G.V. Zinoviev, who led the Red forces in the region, with his detachments retreated from Orenburg to the north, to the Beloretsk region and to the south, to Turkestan. And on July 7, Colonel A.I. returned to the city with his detachment from Turgay. Dutov, whom the leaders of the rebel detachments recognized as the Army Ataman.
The liberation of the territory of the army from the Bolsheviks came from two sides: in the south it was carried out by the rebel detachments of the Orenburg Cossacks, and in the north - by the combined forces of the Cossacks and units of the Separate Czechoslovak Rifle Corps that rebelled against the Bolsheviks. Moreover, the Orenburg Cossack units in the north acted as part of the Siberian army and subordinate to the Provisional Siberian government, and in the south - as part of Dutov units, which recognized the Samara Committee of members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly (Komuch). Despite the contradictions between these forces of the anti-Bolshevik camp, by the autumn of 1918, almost the entire territory of the Orenburg Cossack army was under the control of the Cossacks.
Many officers during this period took a wait-and-see position (for example, Lieutenant General M.V. Khanzhin, who did not take part in the armed struggle until July 1918 and lived with his family on the territory of the army), trying to wait out the turbulent time, and when the scales tilted to one side or the other to join the winners. However, regardless of the desire or unwillingness of such officers to fight, all officers under 48 years old (the age limit is 55 years old) were required to serve. Those who did not receive assignments to combat units constituted the military officer reserve.
The summer of 1918 was characterized by a reorientation of A.I. Dutov from Komuch to the Provisional Siberian Government and the correction of his political course. In addition, a decree of the Military Government of August 12 proclaimed the formation within the Russian Federal Republic (as a future form of government approved by all military circles) of a special Region of the Orenburg Army, i. Cossack autonomy was created, later recognized by Admiral A.V. Kolchak. During this period, the Orenburgers fought along with parts of the People's Army on the Volga, fought in Tashkent and other directions, and participated in the liberation of Yekaterinburg. On September 28, 1918, Orsk was taken by the Cossacks - the last of the cities on the territory of the troops occupied by the Bolsheviks. Thus, the territory of the army was completely cleared of the Reds for some time. This success, in many respects, belonged to Ataman Dutov himself, who, despite the strong opposition to his power from the Socialist-Revolutionaries from the military intelligentsia and part of the rebel leaders, managed to keep sole power in his hands and subjugate the previously independent rebel partisan detachments, leading them to the traditional the sight of the Cossack units. In September 1918, the State Conference was held in Ufa, at which the Provisional All-Russian Government (Directorate) was formed.
In the second half of 1918 - the first half of 1919, the fate of Russia was decided in a fierce struggle in the Urals. On October 17, 1918, the Southwestern Army was formed from the Orenburg and Ural Cossack units, commanded by Dutov himself, already in the rank of lieutenant general. In the autumn of 1918, upon the liberation of the territory of the army, most of the Cossacks considered their task completed and sought to disperse to the villages in order to take care of their household. This, of course, played into the hands of the Bolsheviks and contributed to their success at the front.
In the autumn of 1918, Ataman A.I. Dutov prepared an appeal to the officers of the Red Army, in which he assessed the officers who found themselves on opposite sides of the front: “I, Ataman Dutov, am at the head of one of the armies operating against the Bolsheviks and their allies, the Austro-Germans. I appeal to you, officers of the Russian army. Have you, valiant officers, forgotten the honor and dignity of our Great Russia? Can you, officers of the General Staff, really serve in an army that is corrupting the Russian people and destroying the homeland? Do you really not see all the horror that the red regiments leave behind everywhere? Hunger, cold and orphaned families of those who were shot and tortured by your subordinates must touch your hearts! We, the officers of the honest Russian army, together with the allies are fighting to restore the honor of Russia, and you cannot in good conscience fight against us. Our strength is growing. Time will pass and the truth will prevail. Where will you go? Everywhere you will be followed by the name of a traitor to the Motherland. Stop, it's not too late! You can become the former sons of Russia. There are many ways in your hands to help us in the fight against the Bolsheviks. On behalf of the Russian people, as a member of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, I call you to a feat, an honest feat, for the good of the Motherland. Ataman Dutov.
One of the first after the Omsk coup on November 18, Dutov recognized the power of Admiral A.V. Kolchak, whose political position he shared. However, it was the Orenburg army that suffered more than others from the consequences of this coup. In Orenburg, the opponents of Dutov and Kolchak are leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, leaders of the national outskirts (also adhered to a socialist orientation), as well as representatives of the “democratic” opposition of the Orenburg Cossacks of the General Staff, Colonel F.E. Makhin and Colonel K.L. Kargin plotted against Dutov, one of the far-reaching consequences of which could be the re-establishment of Komuch and the split of the anti-Bolshevik camp in Eastern Russia. By chance, the plot was uncovered and the armed coup failed. However, later, in February 1919, the Bashkir units, under the influence of a participant in the conspiracy, the leader of the Bashkirs A.-Z. Validov went over to the side of the Reds, weakening the front of the Orenburg Cossack army.
On December 28, 1918, the Southwestern Army was reorganized into the Separate Orenburg Army (total strength - 18,728 people with 53 guns and 319 machine guns - according to January 18, 1919), the position of which was soon affected by the autumn failures of the Whites on the Volga. In the spring of 1919, Dutov's troops again went on the offensive in order to occupy Orenburg, which had been abandoned by the Whites in January. However, the siege of Orenburg dragged on and did not lead to success. On May 23 of the same year, the Southern Army was formed from the Separate Orenburg Army, the Orenburg Military District in the theater of operations and the Southern Group of the Western Army. Major General P.A. was appointed commander of the army. Belov (G.A. Witekopf). The new army also did not have much success. By the autumn of 1919, the main forces of the army were trapped on the line of the Tashkent railway between Aktobe in the north and the Aral Sea station in the south. In order not to be destroyed, the troops begin to retreat to the west and east of the road. During the retreat from the territory of the Orenburg Cossack army at the end of August - the first half of September in the Orenburg-Aktyubinsk region, up to 57 thousand people surrendered to the Reds, mainly military personnel of the Southern Army. These were mainly the Orenburg Cossacks, who did not want to leave the territory of the army and go to Turkestan. Many of those who surrendered entered the service of the Red Army. In particular, the officers of the 2nd Separate Orenburg Cossack brigade under the command of Colonel F.A. Bogdanov.
On September 18, 1919, the Southern Army was renamed the Orenburg Army, and Lieutenant General A.I. Dutov. The troops had to retreat to Turgai across the hungry and deserted steppe. Typhus raged in parts. By mid-October, no more than 50 percent remained in service. personnel. From Turgay it was necessary to go over 400 versts across the steppe to the nearest populated areas of the Akmola region, where the troops arrived in October, located near the cities of Atbasar and Kokchetav, from which it was planned to launch a flank attack on the Reds near Petropavlovsk. But in mid-November, the retreat continued to Karkaralinsk and Semipalatinsk. 30-degree frosts came, and the troops did not have winter uniforms, people were exhausted. This campaign was called the Hungry. In our opinion, the retreats of the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks from the territory of their troops were the most tragic in their severity and losses in comparison with the retreats of the White forces on other fronts.
On December 1, the Reds occupied Semipalatinsk and units of the Separate Orenburg Army (the army received this name in early November 1919) had to retreat to Sergiopol, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich were located parts of the Separate Semirechensk Army, Major General B.V. Annenkov. The Annenkovites met with hostility the retreating Separate Orenburg Army, which, already hungry and ragged, was shamelessly robbed, there were even cases of skirmishes with the use of weapons. At the beginning of January 1920, all units of the Orenburg Army were consolidated into a separate detachment named after Ataman Dutov under the command of Major General A.S. Bakich, who became part of the Separate Semirechye Army. In March of the same year, shortly after the fall of Sergiopol, the detachment left the former Russian Empire, crossing the Chinese border near the city of Chuguchak. As part of the detachments of B.V. Annenkova, A.S. Bakich and A.I. Dutov, up to 15,000 soldiers and officers and about 5,000 civilian refugees crossed the border of Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang).
The Orenburg Cossacks also fought in other theaters of operations - they participated in the Siberian Ice Campaign and in the fighting in the Far East (until the end of 1922). The Orenburg Cossack regiment, formed from Cossacks who went over to the side of the Whites from the Red Army (and previously taken prisoner by the latter), also existed as part of the 3rd Russian Army in Poland (1920).
During the Civil War, the training of Cossack officers was carried out at the Orenburg Military School. Due to the lack of officers of special units and the lack of a base for creating specialized educational institutions, the school was transformed from a Cossack school into a universal one, in which, in addition to training Cossack officers, an infantry company, a cavalry squadron, an artillery platoon and an engineering department were formed. Thus, there was no need to preserve the Orenburg ensign school. In various periods of 1917-1919. about 150-320 cadets constantly studied at the school. At the beginning of 1919, the school was evacuated to the East of Russia and later settled in Irkutsk. By July 1919, it released 285 officers, according to July 18, 100 cadets were trained in it (320 were supposed to be in the state).
I.K. Volegov recalled his colleagues in the Orenburg Cossack regiment: “I really liked the officers of the regiment. There was nothing artificial in them, everything was natural, simple, comradely, without any ambition, as happens with some. I must note that in the ranks the attitude towards each other is not the same. During the Civil War, many Cossack officers distinguished themselves, many died heroically. Here are just a few examples.
On January 17, 1918, military foreman Protodyakonov and centurion B.A. Melyanin, under artillery and machine-gun fire of the Reds, blew up the railway bridge across the Kargalka River at junction No. 18. The cornet of the 3rd Ufa-Samara regiment of the Orenburg Cossack army S. Vdovin on June 15, 1918, commanding the Petrovsky hundred, with fifty went into the rear of the Red under the village. Nadyrov, attacked the Reds, but, not supported from the front by an officer detachment, was surrounded. With 12 Cossacks, he remained at the machine gun and, despite the fire, took him out of the ring. During the hand-to-hand fight, Vdovin received a blow with a butt and a wound in the chest right through. The result of the attack was the retreat of the Reds by 20 versts, which greatly facilitated the battles for the Nadyrov Bridge crossing.
On October 22, 1918, the commander of the battalion of the 1st Orenburg Cossack linear cavalry regiment, foreman Kartashev, was awarded the "Ribbon of Distinction" of the Orenburg Cossack Host (the highest award of the troops during the Civil War) "for attacking the enemy in cavalry formation and bringing it to a blow with cold weapons" .
Troop foreman R.P. Stepanov in 1919 was awarded the Order of St. George 4th degree for the fact that “in the battles from January 20 to January 23, 1919 in the Iletsk Defense area, commanding two reconnaissance hundreds and remaining with them alone in position against superior enemy forces, thanks to skillful leadership and selfless courage, appearing personally in the most dangerous places at critical moments and thus inspiring his hundreds, successfully held back the onslaught of enemy units, made it possible to save the artillery and carts of the 1st Cossack corps, whose units were retreating in panic, and safely withdraw them from -under the blows of the Reds. The commander of the 1st hundred of the 9th Orenburg Cossack regiment, cornet G. Odinokov, in a battle near the village of Elizavetinsky on March 17, 1919, captured two 42-line guns of the Reds, for which he was awarded the French gold medal of the "President of the Republic" with swords.
At the beginning of 1919, officers of the II Orenburg Cossack Corps, setting an example for the Cossacks, personally led units into the attack. As a result of this, the losses among the officers, including the seniors, were great: the commander of the division of the 23rd Orenburg Cossack Regiment, cornet Kholodilin, died heroically, military foremen Zuev and V.M. Almetiev, Colonel Ushakov. The commander of the corps of the General Staff, Major General I.G. Akulinin was repeatedly at the forward observation post, and the chief of staff of the corps, military foreman L.I. Tushkanov personally led the troops on the attack.
Already in 1922 in Primorye, when the Red partisans raided the Novonezhino station, part of the Orenburg Cossacks of the platoon guarding the station, Zavyalov, was captured by them. Zavyalov, who found himself in a hopeless situation, blew himself up with a hand grenade in order not to fall into the hands of the Reds.
But not all officers in the conditions of the Civil War were a model of devotion to their homeland. The year 1917 decomposed not only the soldiers, but also the officers. Already in the fall of the following year, observers noted that there were not enough officers at the front, but in the rear of Orenburg they were found in abundance. Surprisingly, the old corporate traditions were superimposed on the new conditions of service. The decree of the Military Government of July 20, 1918 noted: “Many of the officers in the service did not respond to the call of the commander-in-chief of the front of the Cossack detachments operating against the Bolsheviks and did not join the ranks of the fighters to protect the troops. There were cases of staff officers refusing to carry out orders from front commanders, apparently because the commanders were younger than their rank. Now is not the time to reckon with seniority and belittle the power of those who, driven by love for their native army and Russia, sparing neither strength nor life, not knowing rest, give all of themselves to the fight against the worst enemy of the Cossacks - the Bolsheviks and, thanks only to their selfless work, promoted to a prominent position as commander of a detachment or front. If success accompanies such commanders, then they are in their place and their change is harmful to the common cause.
The time we are going through is too hard, no less difficult now are the duties of managing the recovering, but terribly weakened from a serious illness, armed forces of the army, and therefore the command should be in the hands of those who are trusted and [for whom] the units will willingly go into battle, not sparing life. Such are the officers who have already advanced from the ranks of the fighters against Bolshevism.
Some phenomena testified to the moral decay of the officer corps, including not the worst of its representatives. Disrespect began to appear among the officers (for example, in relation to the old Cossacks). The card game and other entertainments, drunkenness (perhaps due to the hopelessness of the situation) and even looting were widespread. In particular, the commander of the squad of the village of Petrovskaya, and later an officer of the 17th Orenburg Cossack regiment, centurion N.P. Ponomarev, according to Major General V.V. Kruchinin, was one of the morally fallen people. “Produced, obviously, during the Great War, from police officers, and not having the appropriate education and proper upbringing, he, with his anti-moral (as in the text - A.G.) actions in relation to the inhabitants and their property, truly acquired the name of a marauder, and you just have to wonder how such a geek could serve in the White Army and bear the high rank of an officer?!”
In May 1919, a drunken brawl was staged by Ensign of the 18th Orenburg Cossack Regiment P.A. Nikolsky, who “on the night of May 13, 1919 in Ufa got drunk drunk until he lost a decent military rank look ... then and there, while in the Labor Artel cafe, he carried a bottle of alcohol with him, which is in the said cafe and drank, and behaved indecently there, making noise, swearing and walking around the restaurant, which caused indignation of the public in the cafe and a demand to remove him from the cafe, ”and then, not wanting to obey the officers who tried to calm him down, said that he“ serves in the troops of Dutov, of whom he recognizes only one, but he does not care about the rest. Ensign of the 8th Orenburg Cossack Regiment F. Barmotin in December 1918 committed a drunken rampage, for which he was demoted to the rank and file. It got to the point that Dutov in January 1919 issued an order: “By the authority given to me by the Supreme Ruler, I resolutely declare: every drunk, met on the street, will be flogged without distinction of rank and status ... Luxury, drunkenness and disgrace cannot be allowed in the city around which the holy blood of the defenders of the Motherland flows.
The disease also affected senior officers. For example, in the order on the Eastern Front dated September 8, 1919, it was said that the commander of the 6th Orenburg Cossack regiment, military foreman A.A. Izbyshev "for evading combat operations and incessant drunkenness" was demoted to the rank and file. I must say that drunkenness also spread among non-Cossack officers.
Some officers did not disdain to fish in troubled waters and during the period of fratricidal war they were engaged in personal enrichment at the expense of the army. For example, General S.A. Shchepikhin noted that the Orenburg Cossack officer Colonel Novokreshchenov, who in 1919 was the head of the stage unit of the Southern Army, was convicted of abuse.
The loss of moral restrictions also affected the personal life of the officer corps. In particular, during the Civil War, such Orenburg generals as A.I. Dutov and A.S. Bakich kept several mistresses despite the fact that they were married and had children.
The order for the Orenburg garrison dated October 17, 1918 noted that “despite repeated orders for the garrison, many years. officers walk around the city without shoulder straps, St. George ribbons on cockades and do not greet each other and elders. A similar situation gave rise to General S.A. Shchepikhin would later claim that Dutov had "crowds of armed Cossacks à la Zarutsky, but no military units".
As the commander of the 1st hundred of the 25th Orenburg Cossack regiment, who later defected to the Reds, recalled, centurion I.V. Rogozhkin, “I noticed the bad order from the first time, they didn’t give out salaries and daily allowances for 2 months. Uniforms too, most of the Cossacks are shabby, they got allowances for themselves and their horses by means of requisition and immoderately (the word was added in a different handwriting - A.G.), where anyone grabs as much, weapons [:] with the exception of my 1 [th] hundred, the entire regiment is armed with rifles Gras systems and mostly faulty." According to Rogozhkin (however, he was twice brought to court-martial), the successive commanders of the regiment were extremely unsuccessful: one was “a uniform alcoholic, and apparently of a close mind ... according to the sign, he was very representative” (Colonel Turgenev), the other was “a sober man and very humane, but in military affairs he was mediocre to infinity ”(military foreman P. Ivanov), the third -“ even more wonderful ... a person completely stupid and incapable of anything ”(colonel Kalachev). To combat deserters at the end of 1918, it was ordered to detain their able-bodied parents and send them to work in the trenches in the front line.
Relations within the officer corps were also far from simple. There was a division into Cossack and non-Cossack officers, and some representatives of each of the groups treated the others with distrust. This issue, despite the tradition of hiding internal departmental contradictions, in the autumn of 1918 even dedicated a special material in the Orenburg Cossack Bulletin. Staff Captain Nasonov addressed the Cossack officers with an open letter in which he wrote: “I am sad to see the mutual misunderstanding and distrust that is noticed between the infantry and Cossack officers ... I, who fought all the time in the ranks of the Cossacks, in moments of trials and hardships of combat life - I saw all the greatness of spirit and complete unity among the military officers. We did not have a division into infantry and Cossack officers. Brilliant military officers: Yesaul Yershov, Donetskov, Captain Bulgakov and Volodin never talked about their advantages. They gave all their strength to the fight against the Bolsheviks and they had no time for empty childish strife. We all need to learn from them.”
Conflicts also existed among the actual Cossack officers. In particular, in late October - early November 1918, literally because of the completely insignificant issue of clerks, a sharp conflict broke out between Major General G.P. Zhukov and his headquarters on the one hand and the head of the 1st Orenburg Cossack division, Major General D.M. Krasnoyartsev. The underlying reason for the conflict was the ambiguity of the question of the subordination of the Krasnoyartsev division. The issue had to be settled at the level of the Army Ataman and the government.
In 1918-1919, the actions of the Army Ataman A.I. led to serious conflicts with other senior officers. Dutov. Upon returning from the Turgai campaign, the ataman and his entourage, who participated in the campaign, became the head of the anti-Bolshevik movement in the army, while the participants in the insurgent struggle, who, unlike Dutov, did not leave the troops, found themselves on the sidelines, which led to a split in the officer environment . Dutov was lucky - the leaders of the Cossack rebels were, for the most part, obscure chief officers who could not compete with the honored staff officers with an academic education who went with him to Turgai. It was also not in favor of the insurgent leaders that they strongly gravitated towards guerrilla methods of struggle. All these factors predetermined the weakness and deliberate doom of the opposition in the struggle for power in the army.
Dutov wrote in August 1918 to General A.N. Grishin-Almazov: “You hear rumors that the officers are not happy with me; I'm talking about the Cossack. This, perhaps, is partly true, for I recognize the principle of seniority only in exceptional cases, while I assign command positions exclusively to officers who have proven themselves, both in battle and in politics. All the officers who saved their lives at the cost of betrayal of the troops, of course, will not receive jobs from me. This is the reason for the dissatisfaction of mainly senior officers.
One of the most striking manifestations of the opposition of the rebel leaders to Dutov was the activity of the hero of the rebel struggle Yesaul F.A. Bogdanov. On July 17, in the organ of the Orenburg organization of the RSDLP (Mensheviks) to the newspaper Rabocheye Utro, he and two of his colleagues, the centurion Kryltsov and the lieutenant Skrypnikov, wrote: “They don’t know us, they didn’t appreciate us, they forgot us, but in vain: descendants will appreciate our work, oh our suffering and wandering are known by many of our combat comrades-in-arms. We took the city, and a lot of hunters appeared to rule the city, who recently disguised themselves as "comrades", and now impudently declare "We suffered and we plowed." Where is the conscience and where is the honor. Those who received a standing ovation at the solemn meeting did not muster the courage to indicate the names of the true heroes, but there are names that absolutely did not participate in the capture of the city of Orenburg and did not take any part in the overthrow of Soviet power ... ". The contradictions between the "Turgais" and the participants in the insurgent movement could not but have an impact on the general course of the anti-Bolshevik struggle of the Orenburg Cossacks. It is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that the rebel leaders under Dutov were pushed into the background and did not take a leading role in the anti-Bolshevik movement of the Orenburg Cossacks.
Conflict situations arose between Dutov and his former colleague, Colonel V.G. Rudakov and General N.T. Sukin. Of course, being distracted by the fight against opponents and intrigues, Dutov, like his opponents, could not devote himself entirely to organizing the fight against the Reds.
During the years of the Civil War, innovations uncharacteristic of previous times also appeared. So, in September 1918, a society of officers of the Orenburg Cossack army was formed - a kind of officers' trade union to protect corporate interests. The creation of such a society was a visible manifestation of the politicization of the Cossack officers during the Civil War. By the way, soon after its establishment, the society, by decision of the 3rd Emergency Military Circle, was closed as having a political character.
However, there is a definite trend. If before 1917 politics as such did not exist for officers, then under the new conditions, political preferences often predetermined the actions of officers. Among the Orenburgers, not counting those who went over to the Reds, the most striking example of an officer for whom the party spirit prevailed over military duty was a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party of the General Staff, Colonel F.E. Makhin, who became one of the active participants in the military conspiracy against Ataman A.I. Dutov in December 1918 However, Makhin was not alone. "Socialist odor" Cossack officers noted in another senior officer - the commander of the 17th Orenburg Cossack regiment, Colonel N.G. Smirnova.
During periods of military setbacks, doubts arose among the officers about the advisability of continuing the fight against the Bolsheviks. For example, there is information that Major General L.N. Domozhirov, speaking in the spring of 1919 at a stanitsa gathering in the village of Kizilskaya, spoke to the Cossacks about the aimlessness of the fight against the Reds. Some officers in the autumn of that year deserted from units and went over to the side of the Reds. There were even cases of mass surrender. The already mentioned F.A. Bogdanov, with the rank of colonel, commanded the 2nd Separate Orenburg Cossack brigade. On September 8, 1919, together with a brigade in full strength (more than 1,500 sabers, including 80 officers) and with all weapons, he went over to the side of the Reds. On the night of September 22, Bogdanov and other Cossack officers who had gone over to the Reds were introduced to the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, M.I. Kalinin, who arrived at the front, moreover, "Bogdanov and other prisoners of war warmly thanked for the reception given by the Soviet government, repented of their mistakes, swore to honestly serve the people, to defend the Soviet government." In the future, the Bogdanov brigade successfully operated as part of the Red Army against the Poles, Wrangel and Basmachi.
If we talk about the Cossack military leaders, then it must be admitted that the Civil War brought forward few talented commanders. One can note the military art of the General Staff, Major General I.G. Akulinin, Major General R.P. Stepanov, General Staff Colonel F.E. Makhin (all three are career officers), some other officers, but most did not show the qualities of cavalry commanders.
When ataman Dutov was killed on February 7, 1921 in Suidin, the problem of maintaining the succession of ataman power arose. From March 1, 1921, Major General N.S. became the deputy chieftain. Anisimov, who was elected to this post by the organizational meeting of the Orenburg Cossacks in Harbin. However, after the fall of the White Primorye, it became known that Anisimov squandered military capital. Back in the fall of 1920, from ataman G.M. Semenov Anisimov received over 100 thousand gold rubles to support the Orenburgers in Xinjiang, but Bakich and Dutov practically did not receive this money for their units. Only later, as a result of the investigation of Anisimov's activities, conducted by the audit commission chaired by court adviser P.S. Arkhipov, facts of the theft of most of these funds (57 thousand rubles) were revealed. No confidence was expressed in him, and on February 16, 1923, Dutov's former assistant to the general staff, Major General I.G. Akulinin, was elected as the ataman of the foreign Orenburg Cossacks. Subsequently, Anisimov went over to the side of the Bolsheviks and on April 5, 1925, with a group of Cossacks, stole the Mongugai steamer from Shanghai to the USSR.
After the death of Dutov, the disintegration of the white detachments in Western China sharply intensified, primarily the detachment of the ataman himself in Suiding. Unsightly pictures were the behavior of the officers of the detachment in those years. Drunkenness, theft, fighting and debauchery have become features of everyday life. The new ataman, General Akulinin, considered it necessary "to make every effort to ensure that the Cossacks, scattered across different countries, do not turn into human dust, but rather maintain close adhesion among themselves and reveal their Cossack face at the right time." Apparently, Akulinin retained his post as the Military Ataman of the Foreign Orenburg Cossacks until his death in 1944.
With the emigration, the anti-Bolshevik movement of the Orenburg Cossacks did not stop, but only acquired other forms. The very existence of Russia Abroad became a challenge to the Bolshevik regime. Already in 1920, in Harbin, the Orenburg Cossacks created the Workers' Artel, renamed in 1922 into the Orenburg Cossack Far Eastern Village - the first Cossack association in Manchuria (ataman - Yesaul A.Ya. Arapov). In 1924, the Orenburg named after Ataman A.I. was formed in Harbin. Dutova village (ataman - Major General V.V. Kruchinin). In 1927, both villages merged into one. Orenburg Cossacks in 1923 became part of the Eastern Cossack Union with a center in Harbin (Chairman of the Board - Orenburg Cossack, Colonel G.V. Enborisov). In the 1930s-1940s. Orenburgers were part of the Union of Cossacks in the Far East, for some time headed by the Orenburg Cossack, Major General A.V. Zuev (since 1937 - ataman of the Orenburg village named after ataman Dutov). The most favorable period for the existence of the Orenburg Cossack emigration in the Far East was the 1930s, when the Cossacks had already managed to adapt to the new conditions of existence, intensified research and educational work. During this period, one-day newspapers and collections "Orenburg Cossack" were published in Harbin, publishing memoirs and studies on the history of the army, including the period of the Civil War. It was then that the memoirs of generals I.G. Akulinin and A.V. Zuev, Colonel G.V. Enborisov about the period of the Civil War, without acquaintance with which a serious study of the history of the anti-Bolshevik movement of the Orenburg Cossacks is impossible.
In total, there were about 1,500 officers in exile - participants in the anti-Bolshevik movement of the Orenburg Cossacks (not only Cossack officers). In the 1930s, the Union of Cossacks in the Far East included 109 Orenburg officers living in Manchuria. How many of them were natural Cossacks, it is difficult to say now. During World War II, part of the Orenburg Cossacks, including General Akulinin, supported Germany in the fight against the USSR. With the entry of Soviet troops into Manchuria in 1945, the main centers of the anti-Bolshevik movement of the Orenburg Cossacks were liquidated, some of the Cossacks fled to the Philippines, Australia, and the USA.
The fate of the Cossack officers who remained in Soviet Russia or returned to the USSR from emigration was sometimes no less tragic, in comparison with the fate of those who were forced to leave their homeland forever. Almost all of them were destroyed during the repressions of the 1930s.
Ibid. F. 39477. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 81.
Ibid D. 6. L. 1; People's business. 1918. No. 71. 06.10. C. 2.
Calculated according to: GAOO. F. R-1912. Op. 2. D. 106. L. 1-5.
Calculated according to: RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 193. L. 27ob.-33ob.
Volkov S.V. Decree. op. S. 257.
Shepelev L.E. Titles, uniforms, orders in the Russian Empire. L., 1991. S. 210, 211. Despite the abundance of legislative acts that regulated the order system of the Russian Empire, the author, when preparing this article, could not find a document that would unequivocally state that awarding the Order of St. George or the St. George Arms gave rights hereditary nobility. At the same time, orders are mentioned that give hereditary nobility (without listing them) - Establishment of orders and other insignia //Code of basic state laws. T. I. Part II. Book. VIII. SPb., 1892. Art. 145. S. 22. It is also known that those awarded with St. George's weapons were equated in rights with those awarded the Order of St. George - the Code of Military Decrees of 1869. Book. VIII. Ed. 3rd. (On January 1, 1914) Pg., 1915. Sec. 1. Art. 78. S. 21. See also: Statutes of the Order of 1769, 1833 and 1913. and other legislative and other sources on the history of the Order // Military Order of the Holy Great Martyr and Victorious George. Name lists 1769-1920. Biobibliographic reference book / Ed. comp. V.M. Shabanov. M., 2004. S. 16-112.
Korostelev A.A. My meetings with S. Zwilling //For the power of the Soviets. Memoirs of participants in the civil war in the Orenburg region. Chkalov, 1957, p. 64.
Polosin M.P. 1918 (from the memoirs of an inhabitant) // Civil War on the Volga in 1918. Sat. first. Prague, 1930, p. 265; Akulinin I.G. Orenburg Cossack army in the fight against the Bolsheviks. 1917-1920. Shanghai, 1937, pp. 54, 79.
Protocols of the 3rd Emergency Military Circle of the Orenburg Cossack Army. Orenburg, 1918. S. 60.
Krivoshchekov A. In memory of the martyrs for the Cossacks // Orenburg Cossack Bulletin. 1919. No. 110. 14.06. S. 2; Kobzov V.S. The officer corps of the Orenburg Cossack army in 1918-1919. // Civil war in the East of Russia: new approaches, discoveries, finds. M., 2003. S. 70.
Volegov I.K. Decree. op. pp. 50, 51.
SAOO. F. R-1912. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 97.
Calculated according to: Directory-list of leaders and rank and file - members of the White Guard "Union of Cossacks in the Far East", located on the territory of Manchuria. Khabarovsk, 1950. S. 3-321.
Ganin Andrei Vladislavovich- Editor of the department of military history of the magazine "Rodina", candidate of historical sciences.
In 2003 he graduated with honors from the Faculty of History of Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov (supervisor - candidate of historical sciences, associate professor O.R. Airapetov). Since 2000, he has been the host of Andrey Ganin's Web site dedicated to the military history of Russia in the early 20th century. Since 2002 - member of the editorial board and editor of the Cossack department of the historical almanac "White Guard" (Moscow). Member of the Russian Historical Society. Since 2003, he has been a postgraduate student at the Faculty of History of Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov. Research interests: military history of Russia, the corps of officers of the General Staff, the history of the anti-Bolshevik movement in the east of Russia and the Orenburg Cossacks of the late 19th - first quarter of the 20th century. Author of more than 60 scientific publications on the history of the anti-Bolshevik movement and the Cossacks. Member of the team of authors of the Great Russian Encyclopedia. Author and host of the network scientific project “Alexander Ilyich Dutov. Biography". He took part in 19 scientific conferences held in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Simferopol, Ufa, Chelyabinsk, Kemerovo.
Compositions: Montenegrin in Russian service: General Bakic. Moscow: Russian way, 2004; On the role of officers of the General Staff in the Civil War // Questions of History. 2004. No. 6; Alexander Ilyich Dutov // Ibid. 2005. No. 9; The bag of General A.M. Zaionchkovsky // Ibid. 2006. No. 2; Archival collections on the history of the Orenburg Cossacks and their fate // Otechestvennye archives. 2006. No. 1; Orenburg Cossacks in the fight against the revolutionary movement in the Volga region and the Urals in 1905-1908. // Russian collection. Studies in the history of Russia. T. 3. M., 2006; Reconstruction of the combat schedule of the Cossack troops of the Urals, Siberia and the Far East as of October 25, 1919 // Cossacks of Russia in the White Movement. White Guard. Almanac. 2005. No. 8; Boldyrev Vasily Georgievich // Great Russian Encyclopedia: In 30 volumes. Banquet campaign 1904. Big Irgiz. M. T. 3. 2005; The fate of the General Staff of Colonel F.E. Makhina // Military History. magazine. 2006. No. 6; Orenburg Cossack army in the Civil War and in exile. 1917-1945 // Military history. magazine. 2006. No. 8.
After the February Revolution of 1917, a political situation developed in the Kuban that was different from the all-Russian one. Following the commissioner of the Provisional Government K. L. Bardiz, appointed from Petrograd, and the Kuban Regional Council that arose on April 16, the Kuban Military Rada at its 1st Congress proclaimed itself and the military government the highest governing bodies of the army. The “triarchy” thus formed lasted until July 4, when the Rada declared the Council dissolved, after which K. L. Bardizh transferred all power in the region to the military government.
Ahead of developments in Petrograd, the II Regional Rada, which met in late September and early October, proclaimed itself the supreme body not only of the army, but of the entire Kuban Territory, adopting its constitution - "Temporary Regulations on the Supreme Authorities in the Kuban Territory." After the 1st session of the Legislative Rada, which began on November 1, and part of the 1st regional congress of non-residents united, they declared their non-recognition of the authority of the Council of People's Commissars and formed the Legislative Rada and the regional government on an equal footing. N.S. became the Chairman of the Rada. Ryabovol, the chairman of the government instead of the elected ataman of the Kuban army A.P. Filimonov - L.L. Bych. January 8, 1918 Kuban was proclaimed an independent republic, which is part of Russia on a federal basis.
Putting forward the slogan of "fighting the dictatorship from the left and the right" (that is, against Bolshevism and the threat of the restoration of the monarchy), the Kuban government tried to find its own, third way in the revolution and civil strife. For 3 years in the Kuban, four chieftains were replaced in power (A.P. Filimonov, N.M. Uspensky, N.A. Bukretov, V.N. Ivanis), 5 chairmen of the government (A.P. Filimonov, L.L. Bych, F. S. Sushkov, P. I. Kurgansky, V. N. Ivanis). The composition of the government changed even more often - a total of 9 times. Such a frequent change of government was largely the result of internal contradictions between the Black Sea and the linear Cossacks of the Kuban. The first, economically and politically stronger, stood on federalist (so-called "independent") positions, gravitating towards "nenko-Ukraine". Its most prominent representatives were K. L. Bardizh, N. S. Ryabovol, L. L. Bych. The second political direction, represented by Ataman A.P. Filimonov, was traditionally oriented towards a united and indivisible Russia for the Russian-speaking Linens.
In the meantime, the First Congress of Soviets of the Kuban Region, held on February 14-18, 1918 in Armavir, proclaimed Soviet power throughout the region and elected an executive committee headed by Ya. V. Poluyan. On March 14, Yekaterinodar was taken by the Red troops under the command of I. L. Sorokin. The Rada, which left the capital of the region, and its armed forces under the command of V. L. Pokrovsky, united with the Volunteer Army of General L. G. Kornilov, who set out on their first Kuban ("Ice") campaign. The main part of the Kuban Cossacks did not support Kornilov, who died on April 13 near Ekaterinodar. However, the six-month period of Soviet power in the Kuban (from March to August) changed the Cossacks' attitude towards it. As a result, on August 17, during the second Kuban campaign, the Volunteer Army under the command of General A.I. Denikin occupied Yekaterinodar. At the end of 1918, 2/3 of it consisted of Kuban Cossacks. However, some of them continued to fight in the ranks of the Taman and North Caucasian Red armies that retreated from the Kuban.
After returning to Ekaterinodar, the Rada began to resolve issues of the state structure of the region. On February 23, 1919, at a meeting of the Legislative Rada, a 3-stripe blue-crimson-green flag of the Kuban was approved, the regional anthem "You, Kuban, you are our Motherland" was performed. The day before, a Rada delegation headed by LL Bych was sent to Paris for the Versailles Peace Conference. The idea of Kuban statehood came into conflict with the slogan of General Denikin about the great, united, indivisible Russia. For Rada Chairman N.S. Ryabovol, this confrontation cost his life. In June 1919, he was shot dead in Rostov-on-Don by a Denikin officer.
In response to this murder, a general desertion of Kuban Cossacks began from the front, as a result of which no more than 15% of them remained in the Armed Forces of southern Russia. Denikin responded to the Parisian diplomatic demarche of the Rada by dispersing and hanging the regimental priest A. I. Kulabukhov. The events of November 1919, called by contemporaries the "Kuban action", reflected the tragedy of the fate of the Kuban Cossacks, expressed by the phrase "one of us among strangers, a stranger among our own." This expression can also be attributed to the Kuban Cossacks who fought on the side of the Reds - I. L. Sorokin and I. A. Kochubey, after the death of declared adventurers by the Soviet authorities. Later, in the late 1930s, their fate was shared by the well-known Kuban Bolshevik Cossacks - Ya. V. and D. V. Poluyan, V. F. Cherny and others.
The capture of Yekaterinodar by the Red Army on March 17, 1920, the evacuation of the remnants of Denikin's army from Novorossiysk to the Crimea and the capitulation of the 60,000-strong Kuban army near Adler on May 2-4 did not lead to the restoration of civil peace in the Kuban. In the summer of 1920, an insurrectionary movement of the Cossacks unfolded against the Soviet regime in the Trans-Kuban region and the Azov floodplains. On August 14, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Primorsko-Akhtarskaya, a landing of Wrangel troops under the command of General S. G. Ulagay landed, ending in failure. Nevertheless, the armed struggle of the Kuban Cossacks in the ranks of the white-green movement continued until the mid-1920s. Of the 20,000 Kuban Cossacks who emigrated, more than 10,000 remained abroad forever.
The Kuban paid a heavy price for the establishment of Soviet power. From the memorandum of the Regional Council it is known that only in the spring-autumn of 1918, 24 thousand people died here. Soviet sources give a no less frightening picture of the White Terror. However, in 1918 - early 1920. The region managed to avoid the negative impact of the policy of military communism and decossackization, since from the autumn of 1918 until the spring of 1920 the Kuban was in the rear of Denikin's army. Together with a strong agricultural potential, the presence of ports, this created, in comparison with other regions of Russia, more favorable conditions for economic development. The same can be said about the state of affairs in the sphere of culture and education. During the Civil War Ekaterinodar became one of the small literary capitals of Russia. If on the eve of the First World War there were 1915 educational institutions in the Kuban, then by 1920 there were 2200 of them. In 1919, the Kuban Polytechnic Institute was opened in Ekaterinodar, and in 1920 - the Kuban State University.
The drama of the confrontation between the forces of the old and the new, which clashed in the Kuban like "ice and fire", is vividly captured in the figurative titles of books about the civil war in the region. These are R. Gul's memoirs "The Ice Campaign" and A. Serafimovich's story "The Iron Stream", dedicated to the heroic campaigns of the Volunteer and Taman armies. The tragedy of the fratricidal war was reflected in the title of the novel by A. Vesely "Russia, washed with blood", which tells, among other things, about the events that took place in the Kuban. In a concise and frank form, the laconic language of ditties of that time conveys the mood of the Cossacks at various stages of the revolution and the civil war: “We are not Bolsheviks and not Cadets, we are neutral Cossacks”, “Young officer, white epaulette, don’t go to the Kuban until whole" and, finally, "Gentlemen Bolsheviks, do not work in vain, you cannot reconcile a Cossack with a Soviet commissar."
Candidate of Historical Sciences,Associate Professor A. A. Zaitsev
Official website of the administration of the Krasnodar Territory
