The last year of the war: a comparison of the losses of the Third Reich in the east and in the west. aviation

Air victories

As already noted in the 1st part, the number of aerial victories won by combat units of single-seat fighters on the Soviet-German front was calculated from the multi-volume book “Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945” by a team of authors headed by Johan Prien. Compiling the most complete and reliable list of aerial victories of German fighters in WWII is one of the main tasks that the authors of this study have set themselves. And they really managed to achieve great success in its decision, significantly clarifying and supplementing previously published data. However, in order to fill in all the blank spots in this issue, the array of documents available to the authors was not enough.

Experts of 6./JG 5 near the Bf 109F-4 "yellow 12" detachment commander Lieutenant Heinrich Erler, Petsamo airfield (Soviet name - Luostari), late August - early September 1942.
From left to right - sergeant major Albert Brunner (53 air victories, shot down and killed in an air battle near Murmansk on May 7, 1943); unknown; probably sergeant major Rudolf Müller (94 aerial victories, shot down in an air battle near Murmansk on 04/19/1943 and captured, died in captivity on 10/21/1943); Lieutenant Heinrich Erler (208 air victories, died in an air battle near Stendal on April 4, 1945 while repelling a daytime raid by American heavy bombers); non-commissioned officer Hans-Heinrich Döbrich (65 air victories, shot down and seriously wounded in an air battle west of the Rybachy Peninsula on 07/16/1943, did not participate in hostilities after recovery).
Of all the units of German fighter aviation operating on the Soviet-German front in the period 1941-1943, the least is known about the victories won by the pilots of JG 5. In the surviving lists of air victories compiled by the personnel department of the Luftwaffe High Command, only a small number can be found part of the victories of this squadron, and most of the documents operating on the Soviet-German front Stab/JG 5, II./JG 5 and III./JG 5 were destroyed at the end of the war. The most important source of information about the victories of these units are the daily reports of the Luftwaffe liaison officer at the headquarters of the 20th Mountain Army (until June 1942 - the Lapland Army). Unfortunately, these reports report only the total number of victories won per day; the names of the winning pilots are not included in them.

The process of officially confirming air victories in the Luftwaffe was multi-stage and took quite a long time. After a report on the destruction of an enemy aircraft (Abschussmeldung) was drawn up based on the pilot’s application, it had to be signed by the immediate commander of the victorious pilot (in the case of an ordinary pilot, the detachment commander) and sent for approval to higher headquarters. If the report was approved by all higher headquarters, it eventually ended up in the personnel department of the Luftwaffe High Command (OKL), where the final decision was made and, if it turned out to be positive, an official notification of victory was issued. It is quite natural that each level of command kept its own lists, which included all victories approved at this level and transferred for consideration to higher headquarters. If a higher authority decided to refuse to confirm a victory, information about this was transmitted down the chain to subordinate headquarters, and the corresponding victory was excluded from their lists. The entire process could take from several weeks to a year or more. There are cases when a refusal to confirm a victory came from Berlin a year after the date on which it was declared.

Unfortunately, not all lists of OKL air victories survived the war and are available for study. Therefore, to obtain missing data, the study authors used a large number of surviving documents of various units, formations and formations of the Luftwaffe - lists of victories of fighter squadrons, air divisions, corps and air fleets, their concrete records and daily reports, etc. The lists compiled as a result of this work include the following number of victories won by combat units of single-seat Luftwaffe fighters on the Soviet-German front:

These lists include only those applications that have been reported to OKL. Applications that have not been confirmed at the level of the headquarters of a group, squadron, formation or formation should not be included in the lists (but may be there due to the incompleteness of the information available to the authors of the study and the resulting errors). The minimum necessary information about an air victory that must be known to include it in the list is the date it was won and the unit that claimed it. Unfortunately, even this is unknown about some victories. The number of such victories, missing from the lists of victories, declared by combat units of single-seat fighters on the Soviet-German front during the period of time we are considering can be estimated at several hundred - or no more than 1-2% of the total number of declared victories (in particular, the study provides data about the 212 victories known to the authors, won in 1941-1942, which were not included in the lists). In the future, in this work, these victories that are not included in the lists will not be taken into account by me anywhere.

Total number of aerial victories (second column) includes all known to the authors studies and listed applications of German fighters, with the exception of applications indicated in the fourth column, which were denied approval. The third column - victories confirmed by OKL - includes only those victories whose confirmation information is contained in the documents available to the authors of the study. The difference between the numbers in the second and third column is:

Applications that have been confirmed by OKL, but the authors do not have information about confirmation;

Applications for which a decision had not been made at the time of compiling the documents available to the authors. As already noted, the process of confirming an air victory could take more than a year. Thus, in the OKL lists of air victories dating from the end of 1944 to the beginning of 1945, there are victories declared back in 1942 and still under consideration. This explains the large difference between the figures in the second and third columns for 1943. For the large number of victories declared during this year, a final decision was never made;

Applications for which a decision was made to refuse approval, but information about this is not available in the documents available to the authors or is not enough to identify the application for which this decision was made and exclude it from the total number of victories.

In the column with applications that were denied confirmation, only those rejected applications for which the authors had sufficient information to identify them are taken into account. It also takes into account applications for which, in the opinion of the authors, OKL should have made a negative decision, but direct instructions there is no documentation for this in the documents available to them. The table shows that the number of applications for which OKL made a decision to refuse was small - 1-2% of the number of confirmed ones.

As an example to explain the meaning of the figures indicated in the table, consider several applications submitted by Hans Philipp, who during the period described was the commander of I./JG 54:

In January-February 1943, OKL decided to refuse confirmation of three applications made by Philip in the first half of 1942. Since the authors of the study do not know which of Philip’s applications were rejected, these applications are included in the list of the total number of victories ( second column of the table) and, accordingly, are not taken into account in the number of rejected applications (fourth column of the table);

02/11/1943 Philip declared one air victory, but the squadron headquarters refused to confirm it. The same thing happened with another of his applications, made between February 15 and 18, 1943. Since both of these applications were rejected at the level of squadron headquarters and reports about them were not sent to OKL, they are not included in the lists of air victories, and, accordingly, not included in any column.

The dynamics of changes in the number of victories declared by German fighters is an excellent indicator of the intensity of air battles on the Soviet-German front, and therefore the level of activity of both German fighter aircraft and Soviet aviation, which she struggled with. The degree of reliability of the air victories of German fighters, in other words, the extent to which the declared victories correspond to the losses of Soviet aviation, is not considered within the framework of this work.

Losses

As is known, the main source of information on the losses of Luftwaffe combat units are the lists of combat unit losses (Flugzeugunfälle und Verluste bei den Fliegende Verbänden), compiled by the 6th Department of the Quartermaster General's Directorate General Staff Luftwaffe. The huge amount of information they contain allows us to obtain a fairly complete and detailed picture of the losses suffered by Luftwaffe combat units throughout the Second World War. But, as in most other summary documents compiled on top level command based on data provided by many lower headquarters, the information provided in these lists is not 100% complete, reliable, or uniform. In order to identify and fill the gaps in the lists of the Luftwaffe Quartermaster General, the authors of the multi-volume “Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945” processed a large number of other documents, which allowed them to somewhat expand the list of losses suffered by units of single-seat fighters. In the following tables, the loss figures were calculated from the lists from this study. I did not carry out a complete check of the information presented in the study against the lists of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe and other sources; only individual accidentally discovered errors were corrected, in addition, episodes of losses for which incomplete information was indicated in the study were double-checked.

As part of this work, I did not set myself the task of dividing losses into categories depending on the reasons that caused them and the circumstances in which they were incurred (combat/non-combat, lost in air battles/shot down by anti-aircraft fire/lost in accidents, etc. ), since it is impossible to correctly make such a distribution only on the basis of the information presented in the Quartermaster General’s lists. You can try to do this only based on the results of a full analysis of each episode with a search for all the information necessary for this. How much time and effort it takes to complete such work, I think, is clear even without my explanation. Therefore, the tables show only general loss figures, which include all the losses of combat aircraft suffered by combat units of single-seat fighters on the Soviet-German front - in the air, on the ground, abandoned and destroyed during retreat, etc. The only exception is the reliably known cases of flight (desertion) of the crews of the Croatian and Slovak detachments to the side of the Soviet troops. The aircraft lost as a result are not included in the total loss figures, but are instead listed in the notes.

The loss figures indicated in the tables are calculated using the same criteria that were used to calculate the number of combat units of single-seat fighters operating on the Soviet-German front, which were described in the section “Conditions and exceptions” of the 2nd part of this work. Moreover, in cases where the aircraft was lost while flying to the theater of operations from airfields located outside of it, or vice versa when relocating outside the theater of operations, the issue of their accounting was decided depending on where the incident occurred - in the number of losses on the Sovetsko -The German Front included only those incidents that occurred on the territory specified in paragraphs 2-4 of the above section.

The technique used in the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe to present the severity of damage received by an aircraft in the form of percentage damage is widely known and there is no need to dwell on it in detail. The only point that I would like to draw attention to is that there is a direct relationship between the percentage of damage assigned to the damaged machine and its future fate did not have. There are cases when aircraft that received 60-70 percent or more damage underwent factory repairs and continued to fly, but under other circumstances they could write off an aircraft that was assigned a much lower percentage of damage. The same applies to the possibility of repairs by the unit - in some cases, the unit/field workshops could repair an aircraft that had received 30% damage, while aircraft with 20% damage were often sent for factory repair. At the same time, the aircraft sent for repair could have received additional damage/destroyed during transportation or been disassembled into spare parts for the repair of other aircraft at the plant, which neither the headquarters of the combat unit nor the employees of the 6th department of the Quartermaster General’s Directorate, who compile their lists of losses based on In principle, they could not find out the reports of these units. However, the compilers of the Luftwaffe Quartermaster General's loss lists themselves, for accounting purposes, used a damage level of 60% as a conditional boundary between a destroyed and a damaged aircraft. We will adhere to the same rule. In all the following tables and diagrams, the term “destroyed” refers to an aircraft whose damage level is in the range of 100-60%, and the term “damaged” is an aircraft whose damage level is in the range of 59-10%. As a rule, information about aircraft that received less than 10% damage was not submitted to the Office of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe. However, the department's loss lists include a small number of entries with aircraft damage levels of less than 10%. Most of them are related to the submission of information about cases of death or injury of crew members in which the aircraft received only minor damage. Information about these recorded cases with a damage level of less than 10% is given in the table with monthly data on victories and losses of combat units of single-seat fighters, but they are not taken into account either in the calculations or in other tables and charts.

In the lists of losses compiled by the authors of "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945", there are a small number of entries in which instead of the percentage of damage the letter b (short for the German bruch - broken) is indicated, meaning that the level of damage to this aircraft is unknown to the authors of the study. In some cases, this is due to the lack of relevant information in the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, but more often this is due to the fact that the authors took information about this loss from some alternative source(for example, a flight book), from which the degree of damage cannot be determined even approximately. For the purposes of this work, all such records are conditionally classified as damaged, i.e. It is believed that their damage level lies in the range of 59-10%.

Since the lists of losses of the Luftwaffe Quartermaster General were compiled on the basis of reports of losses received from the headquarters of aviation units, it is quite obvious that their completeness and reliability, first of all, depended on the integrity and qualifications of the relevant employees of these headquarters. A careful study of these lists shows that approaches to compiling reports differed from part to part. So, for example, if some units reported every case of even minor damage, others preferred not to include in reports most of the damage that could be repaired by the unit. As a visual confirmation of this statement, below are diagrams of the distribution of damage levels received by aircraft of some units of single-seat fighters in 1943. To construct the diagrams, all their known losses were divided into ten groups depending on the degree of damage received: 100%; 99-90%; 89-80% and further up to 19-10%. Cases with damage less than 10% and those in which the level of damage was unknown were not included. Most a bright picture can be observed in a diagram illustrating the distribution of damage levels for the three groups of JG 52. If the distribution of damage levels for I./JG 52 and II./JG 52 is very close to the average for all single-seat fighter units operating on the Soviet-German front in 1943 g., then III./JG 52 has an abnormally low number of damage in the 19-10% group and a noticeably higher proportion of 100% damage. If we conditionally add to the losses of III./JG 52 20 aircraft damaged by 19-10%, then we will get a curve (III./JG 52 accor.), which corresponds much better to both the schedules of the other two groups of the squadron and the average for the theater of operations. It is worth adding to the above that in the lists compiled by the authors of “Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945” there are 9 losses of III./JG 52 aircraft for 1943, for which the level of damage is unknown (in the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, most of they are missing) - it is likely that most of them were 19-10% damaged. However, in the other two groups of the squadron the number of losses with an unknown level of damage is not much less (3 for I./JG 52 and 8 for II./JG 52). The distribution diagram of damage levels constructed for the two groups of JG 54 also clearly shows the lack of cases with damage levels in the range of 29-10% for II./JG 54.

From the above-described feature of the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, an important conclusion follows that a comparison of the number/level of losses suffered by different units and/or in different periods time, it is better to do it by the number of destroyed aircraft, since a comparison by the sum of destroyed and damaged aircraft will give a distorted result.

In some units there were much more serious problems with reporting losses. The most egregious example in this regard is 15.(span.)/JG 51. For the period from the last months of 1942 to the very end of 1943, in the lists of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe one can find losses of this detachment only with a damage level of 100% ! The authors of "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945" managed to increase the list of squad losses by several aircraft with an unknown level of damage, but, apparently, a significant number of squad losses still remain unknown. Another indisputable example is the obviously incomplete data on losses of III./JG 52 for November-December 1943.

However, in the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe one can find errors in the other direction. The most typical of them are related to the problem of 100% damage. Typically, this level of damage was assigned to aircraft that crashed or made an emergency landing in enemy territory, at sea or in inaccessible terrain, as well as to missing aircraft whose fate and whereabouts could not be determined. The problem with accounting for these seemingly irretrievably lost aircraft is that sometimes they were found and evacuated, and the loss lists were not always corrected. As typical example You can cite the plane of II./JG 53 commander Hauptmann Heinz Bretnütz, who was shot down in an air battle on the morning of June 22, 1941 and made an emergency landing on Soviet territory. The wounded Bertnütz died of gangrene on 06/27/1941, and his plane, included in the list of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe as 100% destroyed, was soon found, evacuated and repaired (later crashed in an accident on 10/23/1942 as part of Erg. JGr Süd). In the loss lists of the study "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945" the extent of damage to this aircraft is not indicated. In the following tables it is considered damaged (damage level 59-10%).

Despite all the shortcomings noted above, the lists of losses of combat units of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, corrected and supplemented by the authors of "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945", give enough full picture losses of combat units of single-seat Luftwaffe fighters on the Soviet-German front during the period of time we are considering. According to my assessment, the error in the total loss figures for all combat units of single-seat fighters is no more than a few percent and changes little over the period under review, which allows them to be used to analyze changes in the intensity and effectiveness of the combat work of German fighter aircraft. As for the loss figures for separate parts, then for them the magnitude of the error can be significantly greater, and the completeness of data on losses can vary noticeably from part to part.

Required Disclaimer

One of the most important indicators To assess the effectiveness of fighter aircraft in fulfilling its main task - gaining air supremacy - the ratio of the number of enemy aircraft shot down to its own losses incurred in air battles is used. Unfortunately, the data presented in this work allows us to calculate only the ratio of the number of air victories to total losses, which, both in numerical value and in meaning, differs significantly from the ratio of losses of the parties in air battles.

The number of air victories, as is known, rarely corresponds to the actual losses suffered by the opposing side. The ratio of declared victories to actual enemy losses in air battles is usually called the victory overstatement coefficient. And this coefficient is not constant. It can vary noticeably depending on the period of time, unit, nature of the tasks performed, the quantitative and qualitative composition of opposing aircraft, the scale of air battles, etc. So, for example, the average overestimation factor for victories claimed by Luftwaffe fighters on the Soviet-German front in 1943 was noticeably higher than in 1941.

On the other hand, the ratio of German fighter losses in air battles to their total losses was also not the same for different units and time periods. It is quite natural that during periods of low combat activity the proportion of combat losses in general and losses in air battles in particular will be noticeably lower than during periods of intense air battles. It is this circumstance that explains the noticeable decrease in the ratio of the number of air victories to total losses during periods of low activity of Luftwaffe fighter units on the Soviet-German front.

However, with a correct understanding of the meaning of the ratio of the number of air victories to total losses and proper consideration of the circumstances and limitations described above, it is quite acceptable to use it to analyze the effectiveness of combat operations of fighter aircraft.

Barbarossa and the Citadel

From the tables and diagrams presented above, it is clearly seen that the intensity of combat operations by aviation on both sides on the Soviet-German front varied greatly from month to month. At the same time, quite predictably, maximum aviation activity occurs during periods of the most intense combat operations on the land front. During the period of time under consideration, three pronounced peaks of activity can be distinguished - June-July 1941 (invasion), August 1942 ("Not a Step Back") and July 1943 ("Citadel"). At the same time, the greatest losses (both absolute and relative, reduced to the average monthly strength) of the German fighter units suffered during the first month of the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and during the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. The table below presents a comparison of the generalized results of combat performance of Luftwaffe single-seat fighter units achieved during the first 30 days of the invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 and for the corresponding period of time in the summer of 1943, starting from the first day of Operation Citadel. Below are charts illustrating the results of daily comparisons. The average monthly number of single-seat fighters in the Luftwaffe combat units in the Soviet-German for the period 22.06 - 21.07.1941 was calculated on the basis of weekly reports of the Einsatzbereitschaft der Fliegende Verbände in the manner described in the section "Counting Method" of the 2nd part of this work. For the period 5.07 - 3.07.1943, the arithmetic mean of the population values ​​on 07/1/1943 and 08/1/1943 was taken as the average monthly number.

Bf 109 vs Fw 190

The first fighter group on the Soviet-German front to receive the Fw 190A was I./JG 51. In August 1942, it was withdrawn to Yesau to receive new aircraft and retrain, and in early September it returned to the front and began combat work. . Several more fighter units operating in the East received Fw 190A in November-December and barely managed to begin their combat use by the end of the year. Behind recent months In 1942, Focke-Wulf pilots won only 97 air victories on the Soviet-German front, while their own losses for all reasons amounted to 8 destroyed and 17 damaged aircraft. These fighters became truly widespread on the Soviet-German front only in 1943. Below is a comparison of the main results of the combat work of units armed with Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Focke-Wulf Fw 190A fighters for 1943.

All aerial victories are divided into three groups - victories won on the Bf 109, victories won on the Fw 190 and victories for which it is impossible to determine exactly what type of aircraft they were won on. The third group includes victories won by pilots of I./JG 54 in January-February and II./JG 54 in the period from May to August 1943. During these periods of time, these groups rearmed from Bf 109G to Fw 190A and carried out combat work on fighters of both types. At the same time, both in the case of I./JG 54 and in the case of II./JG 54, the bulk of the combat work was carried out on the Fw 190, and most of the aerial victories were also won on them. An indirect confirmation of this can be the losses suffered by these groups in the indicated periods given in the table.
In January-February 1943, a significant part of the losses of fighter units operating on the southern sector of the Soviet-German Front were aircraft destroyed or abandoned at airfields abandoned during the retreat. Since all fighter units operating in the south were armed with Messerschmitts, taking these losses into account puts the types of aircraft being compared at an unequal disadvantage. In order to eliminate the influence of this factor, the total losses were divided into two parts - losses incurred in the air and losses on the ground. At the same time, air losses include all cases of loss and damage to aircraft that occurred to them in the period of time from the start of the takeoff run to the end of the run after landing. All other aircraft losses, including those crashed/damaged while taxiing around the airfield, destroyed as a result of enemy air strikes, lost as a result of emergency incidents on the ground, abandoned and destroyed during retreat, are classified as losses on the ground.
The charts below compare the monthly combat results of single-seat fighter units armed with Bf 109 and Fw 190 aircraft - the total number of aerial victories and the ratio of aerial victories to losses (total and in the air). Additionally, there are charts showing the results shown by some of the top performing groups.

Based on the data presented, we can conclude that the rearmament with the Fw 190 led to a qualitative strengthening of the single-seat fighter units operating on the Soviet-German front, which made it possible to maintain the ratio between air victories and the losses incurred were almost at the same level as was achieved in 1942.

Issues of unbiased analysis and comparison of the effectiveness of the use of fighter aircraft of the warring parties, primarily on the Soviet-German front, have been repeatedly raised in recent years on the pages of domestic printed publications, including Aviamaster.

However, often the problem is considered only through the prism of the personal accounts of ace pilots, while the reasoning goes at the level of finding out who is “worse” and who is “better” in calculating their victories, completely bypassing the issue of the availability of a documentary base and its quality. Conducting a discussion in this way, we doom ourselves to a kind of “flying in circles”, to using the same argumentation repeated many times.

There is a proposal to finally get off the “beaten path” and finally take a break from the endless comparisons between Kozhedub and Hartman, and first figure out the figures for the total losses of the opposing sides’ aviation and their ratios, then, if possible, determine the structure of losses. And finally, move on to the most difficult thing - identifying each declared victory or finding out the cause of the death of each specific aircraft.

A small digression. The authors do not consider themselves to be the ultimate truth, therefore they are always open to criticism, corrections and additions. We would be especially grateful for the correction of the tables below based on materials from Russian military archives.

However, let's return to the issue at hand. Let's start with the total losses. It is probably logical to assume that the total losses of Soviet aviation are known more or less accurately. The funds of the central military archives must be completely preserved, and the extent of the total loss in people and equipment must be known. Another question is how well these figures correspond to the data published in the domestic press.

However, you can doubt as much as you like, but there will be no benefit from it if there are no serious arguments. The authors have no arguments that could indicate the unreliability of these figures. Therefore, we will consider the information from the almost classic work “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed” to be approximately true. Why is it still “approximately”? Yes, because with the complex system of distribution and subordination of the aviation fleet that existed during the war years (Red Army Air Force and Navy, Civil Air Fleet, Air Defense, ADD, Airborne Forces), it was apparently impossible to avoid mistakes. But it is unlikely that this could seriously affect the overall outcome.

Now let's move on to the opposite side and see how fully Luftwaffe losses are taken into account. From modern foreign literature one can understand that historians now have access to materials from the 6th department of the service Quartermaster General Luftwaffe, which was in charge of recording losses.

Again, based on these publications, we can conclude that if the documents for 1941-1943 are well preserved, then for 1944 their preservation is somewhat worse, and for 1945 the information is simply fragmentary. Copies of the relevant materials for 1943, which one of the authors managed to familiarize themselves with, make it possible to judge their sufficient completeness, while at the same time not excluding individual errors. But the proportion of these errors is probably very small.

When studying data on German losses and comparing them with domestic ones, it is necessary to take into account the difference in approach to the very definition of this term in the Soviet and German Air Forces.According to our documents, we have lost cars that were lost or written off for one reason or another. In the Luftwaffe, any damage requiring repair was considered a loss. Even something that an aircraft technician was able to fix in a few hours. Therefore, when analyzing German losses, in some cases difficulties arise in separating irretrievably lost vehicles and those that were subsequently returned to service.

Having made these introductory remarks, let's move directly to the numbers. The first table, based on materials from the “Classified Classification...” contains data on the losses of the USSR Air Force (in thousands of aircraft).

Losses of the USSR Air Force from 06/22/1941 to 05/09/1945.

The second table gives an idea of ​​the losses of the Luftwaffe (also in thousands of aircraft) for individual periods for which this information was discovered.

German Air Force losses on the Eastern Front (for certain periods)

The number of losses includes both aircraft that did not return from a combat mission and those that were damaged (beyond repair).

Considering the lack of accurate data on the ratio of combat and non-combat losses on the Eastern Front, we established the size of combat losses based on the share of the total loss for the corresponding period on all fronts. This share, calculated according to published data, is for 1942 – 53%, for 1943 – 55%, for 1944 – 60%. For 1941, the percentage of combat losses was taken to be equal to the same figure for 1942.

Since the data we know about German losses for 1942 and 1944 are incomplete, we will conditionally determine the final figure of losses for these years as the sum of losses for January-October plus one fifth of this amount. Thus, the table of Luftwaffe losses in the East will take the following form (in thousands of aircraft).

German Air Force losses on the Eastern Front

Taking into account the losses of Germany's allies will give an increase of about 10%, but for us this is not very significant.

Of course, these figures can and should be clarified and supplemented, but as initial data for work, in our opinion, they are quite suitable. Therefore, an approximate ratio of losses can be presented (data in the table, in thousand aircraft).

Ratio of USSR and German Air Force losses

As can be seen from the table, if we exclude the tragic year of 1941, then the ratio of Soviet and German combat losses fluctuates between 4-5 to one. What is most interesting is that this ratio does not change much during the years 1942-1944.

Now let's see if, with this general data at hand, it is possible to identify the structure of losses. It is possible, but only approximately enough. We use the figures for losses of the Red Army Air Force in 1944 published in the magazine “Aviation and Cosmonautics” for March 2000. However, in the data presented, most of the losses are classified as those who did not return from a combat mission. Therefore, we will conditionally attribute this part to the account of certain enemy combat weapons in a proportion similar to known cases.

As a result, it turns out that of the combat losses, 40% were due to fighter aircraft, 58% were due to ground-based air defense systems, and the rest were destroyed at airfields. Taking into account the same conditions for conducting combat operations, we will extend this ratio to 1945.

To establish similar relationships for the remaining years of the war, we will make a number of assumptions. Firstly, it is logical to assume that the number of losses from ground-based air defense systems should increase. This was a consequence of the increase in the offensive activity of Soviet aviation, which increasingly carried out its flights behind the front line, in the zone of enemy air defense.

Secondly, this phenomenon should have accelerated from the second half of 1943, when the Germans had to transfer from Eastern Front a significant part of fighter aircraft to other theaters of operations. That's why We consider it possible to establish for 1943 there was an almost equal distribution of losses between fighter aircraft and ground-based air defense, and for 1942 it was a mirror image of the situation in 1944.

For the first year of the war, we will establish a ratio between the successes of German fighters and anti-aircraft gunners in the proportion of 50 to 30, but at the same time we will allocate 20% to aircraft destroyed at airfields. For the remaining years of the war, the number of Soviet vehicles lost on the ground is small and is assumed to be similar to 1944, that is, 2%. The calculation results are shown in the table below.

General structure of losses of the USSR Air Force

For all its approximateness, the table allows you to make one simple calculation: estimate how many Soviet aircraft an average German fighter (not a pilot, but a machine) could shoot down before its own death.

The authors have at their disposal data on irretrievable losses, including non-combat ones, of German fighters for January-November 1943. This figure is 1084 cars. It is legal to assume losses for the year equal to 1100 fighters.

A simple calculation shows that before its death, the German fighter could have destroyed 5-6 Soviet aircraft. After that, he was shot down or the pilot crashed his plane.

You can check this ratio for 1944, especially since the most reliable data on Soviet losses is available for it. During January-October 1944, 1,824 German single-engine fighters plus 25 Me-110s were shot down, crashed in accidents, and damaged on the Soviet-German front, not counting 112 night fighters. Irreversible losses of their number are probably about half, i.e. approximately 900 cars. At the same time, we do not take into account attack squadrons armed with aircraft FW -190, but for our reasoning this is not so important.

For 900 lost fighters, there are 4,200 downed Soviet aircraft, that is, again the same maximum - 5 victories. Consequently, simple arithmetic operated in the air war on the Eastern Front. In order to shoot down 50 Soviet aircraft within a year, the average German pilot had to parachute out of a downed plane ten times, or sit down on his belly due to combat damage, or after an air battle, “decompose” the fighter when landing at his airfield. So the Germans, of course, were strong opponents and fought very well, but they themselves suffered a fair amount...

yFPZY RETCHPZP DOS CHPKOSCH

PP NOPZYI UPCHEFULYI LOIZBI Y DPLKHNEOFBI PVSHYUOP PGEOYCHBAFUS RPFETY chchu lTBUOPK bTNYY UB 22 YAOS 1941 Z. H 1200 UBNPMEFPCH, RTYUEN KHLBSCCHBEFUS, YuFP VPMSHYOUF PE YЪ OYI VSHMP HOYUFPSEOP ABOUT YENMA. rTY LFPN PUEOSH YUBUFP RPDYUETLYCHBEFUS JBLFPT CHOEBROPUFY. fBL, VSHCHYYK TBVPFOIL YFBVB chchu n. O. LPTSECHOYLPCH UTEDY ZMBCHOSHI RTYYUYO OBCHBM FP PVUFPSFEMSHUFCHP, YuFP FEMEZTBNNB olp, CH LPFPTPK LPNBODHAEYE CHPEOOSHNY PLTHZBNY RTEDHRTETSDBMYUSH P CHTENEY ChPNPTSOPZP OBR BDEOYS ZHBUYUFULPK ZETNBOYY, PFDBCHBMYUSH TBURPTTSCEOYS P RTYCHEDEOYY CH VPECHA ZPFPCHOPUFSH CHPKUL Y P TBUUTEDPFPYUEOYY BCHYBGYY ABOUT RPMECHESCH BTPDTPNSCH, VSHMB RETEDBOB CH RTYZTBOYUOSCH PLTHZB MYYSH ЪB 4 Yu DP CHFPTSEOYS .

lPOYUOP, ZBLFPT CHOEBROPUFY USCHZTBM UCHPA TPMSH. yuBUFSH MEFUYLPCH Y LPNBODYTPCH FP CHULTEUOPE HFTP PFDSHIBMY, DTHZIE OBIPDIMYUSH CHOE UCHPYI YUBUFEK. h FP TSE CHTENS UTEDY UPCHEFULYI MEFUYULLPCH, PUPVEOOOP CHPECHBCHYYI CH YURBOYY, NOPZYE RPOINBMY, YuFP CHPKOSCH OE YJVETSBFSH, Y PTSYDBMY OBRBDEOYS ZETNBOY. dMS CHUEI OYI OEPTSYDBOOSHN PLBBBMUS IBTBLFET CHPDHYOPK CHPKOSHCH, LPFPTHA OBN OBCHSBMY MAZHFCHBZHZHE U RETCHSHCHI YUBUPCH. h YUEN ON RTPSCHMSMUS?

rTETSDE CHUEZP OENGSH PLBBMYUSH PYUEOSH OBUFPKYUYCHSHCH DPUFYTSEOYY GEMEK. fBL, CH 10-K UBD RETCHSCHK HDBT ЪBUFBM CHTBURMPI FPMSHLP 74-K YBR NBKPTB v. n. hBUYMSHECHB. PUFBMSHOSHE RPMLY KHUREMY TBUUTEDPPFPYUFSH NBFETYBMSHOHA YUBUFSH. 123-K YBR PUOPCHOSCH RPFETY RPOEU RTY RSFPN OBMEFE, B 33-K YBR RTY YUEFCHETFPN. h RPUMEDOEN UMHYUBE DECHSFLB Bf109 UKHNEMB PVNBOKHFSH VDYFEMSHOPUFSH RPUFPCH chopu, RPDLTBCHIYUSH ABOUT RTEDEMSHOP NBMPK CHCHUPFE, Y 40-NYOKHFOPK YFKHTNPCHLPK UPTsZMB 21st-16th 5 y-153. rPML RPFETSM VPEURPUPVOPUFSH .

fBLFYLB OENEGLPK BCHYBGYY UPUFPSMB CH YUETEDPCHBOY OBMEFPCH ABOUT BTPPDTPNSCH YUFTEVYFEMEK Y VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLPCH NEMLYYYY UTEDOYNY ZTHRRRBNY H ЪBCHYUYNPUFY PF UPCHEFULPZP RTPPHYCHPDECUFCHYS. b RPULPMSHLH ABOUT NOPZYI BTPPDTPNBI CHPPVEEE OE VSHMP LBLYI-MYVP UTEDUFCH rchp, B DTHZIE YNEMY RP PDOPNKH-DCHB ЪОІОФОСХИ RХМЭНЭФБ, ПФУХФУФЧПЧБМІ мЭНИОФБТОШЧХЛТШЧФYS DMS ME FOPZP Y FEIOYUUEULPZP UPUFBCHB, UBNPMEFSH RPCHUENEUFOP TBURPMBZBMYUSH ULHYUEOOOP Y OE NBULYTPCHBMYUSH, FP MAJFCHBZHZHE DEKUFCHPCHBMY PUEOSH LZHZHELFYCHOP Y RTBLFYUEULY VE OBBLBBOOOP. lBL HCE PFNEYUBMPUSH, BTPPDTPN 122-ZP YBR PLPMP mYDSCH RPDCHETZBMUS YUEFSHTEN OBMEFBN OENEGLYI VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLPCH (CH PDOPN UMHYUBE DEKUFCHPCHBMY YUFTEVYFEMY-VPNVBTDAY TPCHAILY) VEJ CHUSLPZP RTYLTSHCHFYS YUFTEVYFEMSNY . chP'DKHYOSHE RPVEDSCH, P LPFPTSCHI ЪBSCHYMY CH LFPF DEOSH MEFUYULY RPMLB, CHSHCHCHBAF VPMSHYYE UPNOEOYS.

CHEUSHNB UKHEEUFCHEOOSCHN ZBLFPTPN, RPCHMYSCHYYN ABOUT TELPE UOYTSEOYE VPEURPUPVOPUFY CHCHU, SCHYMBUSH RPFETS KHRTBCHMEOYS ABOUT VPMSHYOUFCHE ORTTBCHMEOYK CH ЪCHOE CHCHU PLTHZB (BTNYY) BC YBGYPOOSHE UPEDYOOYS, YUBUFY. PUPVEOOOP RMPIP PVUFPSMP DEMP ABOUT ъBRBDOPN ZHTPOF, ZDE YFBV chchu ZHTPOFB CH FEYOOYE RETCHSCHI FTEI (!) DOEK CHPKOSH ZHBLFYUEULY VEDKUFCHPCHBM. NOPZYE LPNBODYTSCH BCHYBRPMLPCH UFBCHYMY UCHPYN RPDYUYOOOSCHN ЪBDBUY ABOUT CHEDEOYE VPECHSHI DEKUFCHYK VEJ UPZMBUPCHBOYS U CHCHYEUFPSEIN YFBVPN.

pVEEZP RMBOB CHCHCHPDB YUBUFEK YЪ-RPD HDBTB OE UKHEEUFCHPCHBMP. h FYI HUMPCHYSI DBMELP OE CHUE LPNBODYTSCH RTYOINBMY TEYEOYS, UPPFCHEFUFCHHAEYE UMPTSYCHYEKUS PVUFBOPCHLE, RSCHFBMYUSH NBOECHTTYTPCHBFSH UYMBNY CH FPF TPLPCHPK DEOSH. OP Y YI PTSYDBMB OEKHDBYUB, RPULPMSHLH CHCHSUOYMPUSH: RTPFYCHOIL IPTPYP PUCHEDPNMEO P TBURPMPTSEOYY VBPCHSHYY ЪBRBUOSHI BTPDTPNPCH, B FBLCE RPMECHCHI RMPEBDPL CHVMYYY ZTBOYGSH. rПФПНХ FE YUBUFY, LPFPTSCHE UNPZMY RETEVBYTPCHBFSHUS 22 YAOS, RPUFTBDBMY OE NOSHOYE PUFBMSHOSCHI.

nsch HTSE PFNEYUBMY, YuFP ABOUT NOPZYI UPCHEFULYI BTPPDTPNBI (RTETSDE CHUEZP CH ъBRBDOPN pchp) ABOUT TBUUFPSOYY 12–50 LN PF ZPUKHDBTUFCHEOOPK ZTBOYGSCH OBIPYMPUSH RTYNETOP RP 100 UBNPMEFPCH , YuFP VSCHMP CHSHCHJCHBOP RETEKHYUYCHBOYEN MEFOPZP UPUFBCHB ABOUT OPCHHA NBFETYBMSHOKHA YUBUFSH. dBCE CH FEY UMKHYUBSI, LPZDB BCHYBRPML YNEM YFBFOSHCHK UPUFBC 62 UBNPMEFB, TBNEEOOYE CHUEK LFPC FEIOIL ABOUT PDOPC RMPEBDLE DEMBMP VBYTPCHBOYE CHUSHNB OBRTSCEOOSHCHN. dPVBCHYN L ULBBOOPNKH, YuFP ЪБРПЪДБМШЧ ЪКУЭЗДБ ДПУФБФПУОШЧ НЭЦЧ Р НБУЛИТПЧLe BTPPDTPNPCH OE RPЪCHPMYMY PVEЪPRBUYFSH OBY TBUUFBCHMEOOSH MYOEKLBNY NBYOSCH PF O BRBDEOYS U CHPDHIB. PFUHFUFCHYE TSHISSHICH DEDUFCH HRTBChmeis Yubufsnyi on TBUUFPSOI (TBDIP) I am doskhchlpch yi yi yurpmshpchibys rypmlkh tburpmbzbzbzbzbfshus about Ouulpmshlei BTPDTPNBI.

UOPCHB RTPGYFYTHEN TPNBO yRBOPCHB, P LPFPTPN ZPCHPTYMPUSH CH OBYUBME ZMBCHSHCH. “rTEDRPMBZBMPUSH, YuFP VPY VHDHF CHEUFYUSH ABOUT VPMSHYPK CHCHUPFE: LYUMPTPDODOSHE VTYLEFSH UBLMBDSHCHBMYUSH CH LTSHMSHECHSHCHE LBUUEFSCH... rPMYFTBVPFOILY PVIPDYMY NBYOSCH Y ЪBZMS DSHCHBMY CH RPMECHSHCHE BRFEYULY: ЪБЗПФПЧМЭОШЧ MY RTERBTBFSCH RTPFYCH PVNPTBTSYCHBOYS? rTPCHETSMY, OBDEFP MY FERMPE VEMSHE? ъBMYCHBMY CH FETNPUSCH YPLPMBD Y LBLBP. OE RPFETSM MY CH UREYLE LFP-MYVP RETYUBFLY, YURTBCHOSCH MY LYUMPTPDOSHE NBULY?” .

nBMP LFP YЪ BCHYBGYPOOSHI UREGYBMYUFPCH UPNOECHBMUS, YuFP PUOPCHOSCHE UICHBFLY TBCHETOHFUS CHVMYY RTBLFYUEULYI RPFPMLPCH CHSCUPFSCH UBNPMEFPCH. MEFYULLPCH HYUMY: LFP UNPZ PLBBBFSHUS CHCHYE OERTYSFEMS FPF ZPURPDUFCHHEF CH VPA. h TEBMSHOPK TSYЪ OENEGLBS BCHYBGYS DEKUFCHPCHBMB ABOUT NBMSCHI, B YOPZDB RTEDEMSHOP NBMSCHI CHCHUPFBI. h LFYI HUMPCHYSI UPCHEFULYE MEFUYILY-YUFTEVYFEMY, RTETSDE CHUEZP RYMPFYTPCHBCHYE OPCHSHHE NYZ-3 Y SL-1, ЪББУБУФХА OE NPZMY UPCHMBDBFSH U NBYOBNY. h OENEGLYI PFYUEFBI KHLBSHCHBMPUSH, UFP OETEDLP MEFUYILY y-18 (FBL RTPFPYCHOIL RPOBUYUBMKH OBSCHCHBM nyz-3), CHDS VPK ABOUT NBMPK CHCHUPFE, OE URTBCHMSMYUSH U RYMPFYTPCHBOYEN, UTSCHCH BMYUSH CH YFPRPT Y TBVYCHBMYUSH. VEKHUMPCHOP, PUOPCHOBS FSTSEUFSH CHPDKHYOSCHI VPECH MEZMB ABOUT RMEYU CHEFETBOPCH: y-16, y-153, y-15VYU. PE NOPZYI UMHYUBSI OEPUCHPEOOOSCH "NYZY" Y "REYLY" PLBBBMYUSH VEURPMEYOSCHN VBMMMBUFPN.

MYYSH PFDEMSHOSH LPNBODYTSCH UKHNEMY PTZBOYPCHBFSH YURPMSHJPCHBOYE CH VPA OPCHSHHI NBYO. lTPNE HCE KHRPNSOKHFSHI LPNRPMLPC r. y. rHFYCHLP, h.o. pTMPCHB, ch.r. yCHBOPCHB, OBDP PFNEFYFSH RPNPEOILB LPNBODYTB 28-ZP YBR LBRYFBOB y. h. y. UYDPTEOLP, CHPZMBCHMSCHYEZP 23-K YBR. u VPMSHYPK CHETPSFOPUFSHA PDO YЪ RPDYUYOOOSCHI RPUMEDOEZP MEKFEOBOF z. O. nPOBUFSHTULYK UVYM OEDBMELP PF mSHCHPCHB ZHEMSHJEVEMS z. zhTBKFBZB (freitag island) JЪ II/JG3, LPFPTSCHK DP 2 YAMS ULTSHCHBMUS CH PDOPC JIBF, DPTsYDBSUSH RTYIPDB UCHPYI CHPKUL .

hCE RETCHSHCHE UFSHCHYULY RPLBYBMY, YuFP CH ZTHRRPCHSHCHI VPSI VEKHUMPCHOPE RTECHPUIPDUFCHP VSHMP X OENEGLYI MEFUYLPCH. noPZYE UPCHEFULYE RYMPFSH VSHMY PFMYUOSCHNY RYMPFBTSOILBNY, NEFLP UFTEMSMY RP LPOKHUBN Y VEUUFTBYOP VTPUBMYUSH CH UICHBFLH. OP POY KHUFKHRBMY OENGBN CH KHNEOY CHBYNPDEKUFCHPCHBFSH CH VPA, UMEFBOOPUFY RBT, YUEFCHETPL, ZTKHRR. OE FPMSHLP LPNBODOSHCHK, OP Y TSDPChPK UPUFBC MAJFCHBZHZHE KHUREM OBLPRYFSH VPMSHYPK VPECHPK PRSHCHF CH OEVE rPMSHYY, ZhTBOGYY, BOZMYY; CHSHCHYULB, RPMHYUEOOBS CH VPSI, OBNOPZP PFMYUBMBUSH PF FPK, YuFP RTYPVTEFBEFUS ABOUT RPMYZPOBI. OBRTYNET, CH ULBDTE JG51 L YAOA 1941 Z. BUBNY VSHMY OE FPMSHLP LPNNPPDPT Y LPNBODYTSCH ZTHRR, OP Y NMBDIYE PZHYGETSCH, FBLYE, LBL MEKFEOBOF z. bt (H. Bar), PDETSBCHYYK 17 RPVED, B FBLCE PVET-MEKFEOBOF X. zTBUUET (H. Crasser) Y MEKFEOBOPSH v. zBMMPCHYU (part Gallowitsch), h. iHRRETFG (H. Huppertz), h. uEZBFG ( H. Segatz), b. wMSKZ (e. Fleig) .

oEPTSYDBOOP DMS UPCHEFULPZP LPNBODPCHBOYS 22 YAOS 1941 Z. RTPFPYCHOIL CHRETCHSCHE RTYNEOM CH YYTPLYI NBUYFBVBI NEMLYE PULPMPYUOSCH VPNVSHCH. rP NOEOYA THLPCHPDUFCHB MAZHFCHBZHZHE, LZHZHELF Refinery VShchFSH DPUFYZOKHF MYYSH RTY NBUUYTPCHBOOPN YURPMSHЪPCHBOY OPCHSHHI PZOERTYRBUPCH. rПФПНХ L OBYUBMH MEFB OENEGLYE FSHMPCHSHCHE UMHTSVSH RPDZPFPCHYMY ЪBRBUSH YЪ 2298500 2-LYMPZTBNNNPCHSHCHI SD-2 Y 1152950 SD-10, CHUSEYI PLPMP 10 LZ, CH FP CHTENS LBL TB OEE SING YURPMSHЪPCHBMYUSH MYYSH CH EDYOYUOSCHI UMKHYUBSI.

h VPNVPPFUELBI NOPZYI DCHHINPFPTOSHHI VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLPCH HUFBOPCHYMY LBUUEFSCH, LKHDB ЪBZTHTSBMY 360 SD-2 YMY 60–70 SD-10. dTHZYN CHBTYBOFPN YURPMSHЪPCHBOYS NEMLYI VPNV VSHMY LPOFEKOETSH bch-250, LPFPTSHCHE RPDCHEYCHBMYUSH RPD LTSHMSHSNY Ju87, Bf109, Bf110 Y DTKHZYI UBNPMEFPCH, OE YNEAEYI CHOHF TEOOYI VPNVPFUELPCH. lPOFEKOET bch-250 CHNEEBM 96 SD-2 YMY 17 SD-10 Y TBULTSHCHBMUS, OE DPMEFBS DP YENMY. vPNVSH CHATSHCHBMYUSH LBL RTY UTBVBFSHCHBOY KHDBTOPZP NEIBOINB, FBL Y VEJ OEZP, TBTSCHCHBSUSH ABOUT CHCHUPFE DP RPMKHNEFTB PF YENMY. VE YURPMSHЪPCHBOYS LBUUEF PRFYNBMSHOBS CHSHUPFB VPNVPNEFBOYS UPUFBCHMSMB PLPMP 500 N, B U LPOFEKOETBNY OEULPMSHLP VPMSHYE. lTPIPFOSHCH PULPMLY PF LBTSDPK VPNVSH TBUUEYCHBMYUSH CH TBDHYHUE DP 12 N. h PVPYI UMHYUBSI (RTY YURPMSHЪPCHBOYY SD-2, Y SD-10) ABOUT THE COLLECTION OF PVTBЪPCHCHCHBMPUSH RPDPVYE LPCHTP CHCHCHI DPTPTsEL, LPFPTSCHE OCHETOSLB RPTBTSBMY UFPSEYE UBNPMEFSCH, BCHFPFTBOURPTF, OE URTSFBCHYYEUS CH HLTSHCHFYSI CHPKULB. rP PVTBOPNH CHSTBTSEOYA z. oPCHBTTSCH, "GEMSCHK MYCHEOSH FYI UBFBOYOULYI SYG RTPYYEM OBD TKHUULYNY BTPPDTPNBNY" . OP CE PFNEFYM, YuFP VPNVSH SD-2 Y PUPVEOOP SD10 CHTSCHCHBMYUSH RTY NBMEKYI CHYVTBGYSI, B YJ-UB OEDPTBVPFPL LPOUFTHLGYY YI ЪBEENMSMP CH TEYEFFLBI LBUUEF. rPUME FPZP LBL VEЪ CHPDEKUFCHYS RTPPHYCHOILB CHPPTCHBMYUSH CH CHPDHIE PDYO Ju88A Y PDYO Do17Z, B CH DTHZYI UMKHYUBSI CHSHCHRBCHYE RTY RPUBDLE VPNVSH "NYOTPCHBMY" UPVUFCHEOOP E MEFOPE RPME, LPNBODHAYK ChPЪDKHIOSCHN ZHMPFPN ZEOETBM-ZHEMSHDNBTYBM b. LEUUEMSHTYOZ PZTBOYUM CH DBMSHOEKYEN YURPMSHЪPCHBOYE NEMLYI PULPMPYUOSHI VPNV LPOFEKOETBNY ABOUT OBTHTSOPK RPDCHEULE.

JOCEOET-ZEOETBM b. nBTLCHBTD (e. Marquard), THLPCHPDYCHYK TBTBVPFLPK BCHYBVPNV CH FEIOYUUEULPN HRTBCHMEOY ZETNBOULPZP nYOYUFETUFCHB BCHYBGYY, CHRPUMEDUFCHY CHSHCHULBBMUS CH BDTEU "UBFBOYOULYI SYG" UMEDHAEIN PVT BUPN: “oEUNPFTS ABOUT KHUREY RTYNEOOYS CH RETCHSHE DOY TKHULPK LBNRBOYY, SD-2 FBL Y PUFBMYUSH “VBVPYULBNY-PDOPDOECHLBNY”. UPCHEFULYE UTEDUFCHB rchp CHULPTE RPLBUBMY UEVS CHEUSHNB DEKUFCHEOOSCHNY CH VPTSHVE U OYLPMEFSEYNY VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLBNY, ЪBUFBCHYCH OVIY UBNPMEFSCH ЪBVYTBFSHUS CHCHYY THINGS. bFP Y TEYYMP UKhDShVKh SD-2 OILBLYI OPCHCHI UREGYBMSHOSCHI RTYURPUPVMEOYK DMS YI YURPMSHЪPCHBOYS OE VSHMP TBTBVPFBOP .

oBYUBCHYBSUS CHPKOB RPLBJBMB, YuFP UPCHEFULPE THLPCHPDUFCHP, CH FPN YUYUME LPNBODPCHBOYE chchu lTBUOPK bTNYY, OE URPUPVOP HRTBCHMSFSH ChPKULBNY CH LUFTEOOSCHI UIFKHBGYSI. yЪHYUBS RTYLBYUSH RETCHPZP DOS, RTYIPDIFUS RTYOBFSH, YuFP POY CH VPMSHYOUFCHE PFDBCHBMYUSH VEH HUEFB TEBMSHOPK PVUFBOPCHLY YMY SCHOP ЪBRBDSHCHBMY. fBL, YЪ YFBVB chchu ъBRBDOPZP PLTHZB CH RPMDEOSH CH YFBV 10-K UBD RPUFKHRYMB YYZHTTPFEMEZTBNNB: “RETEVBYTPCHBOYE CH rYOUL KHFCHETSDBA. VPMSHYE YOIGYBFYCHSHCH, NBOECHTYTHKFE BTPPDTPNBNY. b. fBATULYK" . l NNPNEOFKH TBUYYZHTPCHLY FEMEZTBNNNSCH VPMSHYE RPMPCHYOSCH UBNPMEFPCH DYCHYYYY HCE PLBBBMYUSH RPFETSOOSCHNY.

OEMSHЪS UVTBUSCHBFSH UP UUEEFPC RUYIPMPZYUEULYK ZBLFPT. pVTBFYNUS L CHPURPNYOBOYSN LPNBODHAEEZP UECHETOSCHN ZHMPFPN BDNYTBMB b. h. zPMPCHLP. rPUME VEЪOBLBЪBOOPZP RTPMEFB 17 YAOS 1941 Z. OENEGLPZP UBNPMEFB-TBCHEDYUILB BDNYTBM ЪBRYUBM CH DOECHOYLE: “rPVSCCHBCH ABOUT VBFBTESI, WITH ЪBDBCHBM LPNBODYTBN PDYO Y FPF CE CHPRTPU: RPYUENH OE UFTEMSMY, OEUNPFTS ABOUT YOUFTHLGYY PFLTSCHBFSH PZPOSH? rPMKHYUM PDYO Y FPF TSE PFCHEF: OE PFLTSCHBMY YЪ-ЪB VPSJUFP-MYVP OBRKhFBFSH. FP EUFSH YOUFTHHLGYY YOUFTHLGYSNY, B UPOBOE VPMSHYOUFCHB YЪ OBU RTDDPMTsBMP NEIBOYUEULY RPDYUYOSFSHUS PVEEK OBGEOOOPUFY RPUMEDOYI MEF: OE RPDDBCHBFSHUS ABOUT RTPCHPLB GYA, OE DBChBFSH RPCHPDB L YOGYDEOFBN, NPZKHEIN CHSHCHBFSH NBMP-NBMSHULYK LPOZHMYLF Y RPUMKHTSYFSH ZHTNBMSHOSHCHN RTEDMPZPN DMS TBCHSCHCHBOYS CHPKOSHCH.”

FERETSH IPTPYP YJCHEUFOP, YuFP U PLFSVTS 1939 Z. DP 22 YAOS 1941 Z. VPMEE 500 TB OENEGLYE UBNPMEFSH CHFPTZBMYUSH CH OBUYE CHP'DKHOPE RTPUFTBOUFCHP, CH FPN YUYUME 152 TB ЪБ Х 1941 Z. UPCHEFULYE RPUFSH chopu UPPVEBMY P RTPMEFBI TBCHEDYUYLPCH OBD FETTYFPTYEK RTYZTBOYUSHI PLTHZPCH, LPNBODITSCH OPOPUYMY NBTYTHFSH DCHYTSEOYS OJCHBOSCHI ZPUFEK ABOUT UREGYBMSHOSCH LBTFSHCH, DPLMBDSCHBMY CH ZEOETBMSHOSCHK YFBV. OP YOUFTHLGYS ЪBRTEEBMB ЪООФОПК BTFYMMETYY PFLTSCHCHBFSH PZPOSH ABOUT RPTBTSEOYE, B YUFTEVYFEMSN UVYCHBFSH OBTHYYFEMEK ChPЪDKHYOPZP RTPUFTBOUFCHB. fTEVPCHBMPUSH "RTEDMPTSYFSH YN RTYENMYFSHUS ABOUT PDYO YY UPCHEFULYI BTPDTPNPCH", OP OENEGLYE UBNPMEFSCH, EUFEUFCHEOOP, KHLMPOSMYUSH PF RETEICHBFPCH Y UCHPVPDOP KHIPDYMY ABOUT UCHPA FET YFPTYA.

CHUE LFP UYMSHOP DEPTZBOYPCHSHCHBMP UYMSCH rchp. OEKhDYCHYFEMSHOP, YuFP UPUBOBOYE NOPZYI MEFYUYLPCH, ЪООYFUYUYLPCH (LBL LPNBOYTPCH, FBL Y TSDPCHSHCHI) FEN FTBZYUEULYN CHPULTEUOSCHN KhFTPN OE RETEUFTPIMPUSH ABOUT CHPEOOOSCHK MBD. OBRTYNET, 374-K PFDEMSHOSHCHK ЪОІОФОСХК ДИЧИЪПО, RTYLTSHCHBCHYYK ZPTPD LPCHEMSH Y UYYFBCHYKUS UTEDY OBYVPME VPEURPUPVOSHCH VEMPTHUYY, DPMZPE CHTENS PZOS OE PFLTSCHBM, DB TSE LPZDB OENEGLIE UBNPMEFSCH YFKHTNPCHBMY RPIYGY VBFBTEC. ъBFEN PTHDYS DYCHYYPOB OEPTSYDBOOP DMS OENGECH "PTSYMY" Y OBYUBMY UFTEMSFSH ABOUT RPTBTSEOYE. rP PDOYN DBOOSCHN, CHUA PFCHEFUFCHOOPUFSH CHJSM ABOUT UEVS LPNBODYT RPDTBDEMEOYS LBRYFBO zh. u. DENYO, RP DTHZYN RTEDUFBCHYFEMY YOURELFYTHAEEK LPNYUUYY.

UPEDYOOYS DBMSHOEVPNVBTDYTPCHPYuOPK BCHYBGYY OE RPUFTBDBMY PF OBMEFPCH ABOUT BHTPDTPNSCH. tBURPTSTSEOYE LPNBODPCHBOYS chchu P RTYCHEDEOY YUBUFEK BCHYBLPTRHUPCH CH VPECHA ZPFPCHOPUFSH VSHMP RETEDBOP CH 6 Yu 44 NYO. th UFP CE? “about CHUEI BTPPDTPNBI OBYUBMYUSH NYFYOZY, ЪBRYUBOP CH PZHYGYBMSHOPK ITPOYLE bdd. MEFYUYYY, YFKHTNBOSHCH, FEIOYYYYE BCHYBUREGYBMYUFSH LMSMYUSH UTBTSBFSHUS U CHTBZPN DP RPMOPZP EZP TBZTPNB, ЪBCHETSMY tPDYOH, RBTFYA, OBTPD..." . fPMSHLP PLPMP 10 YU ZEOETBMPN r. and. tsYZBTECHSHN VSHMB RPUFBCHMEOB ЪBDББУБ 3-НХ БЧИБЛПТРХУХ dd RP HOYUFPTSEOYA ULPRMEOYK CHTBTSEULYI CHPKUL CH TBKPOE UKHCHBMPL, Y MYYSH CH 13 Yu 40 NYO RETCHSHE VPNVBTDYTPCHAILY ABOUT YUBMY CHUMEF. fBLYN PVTBBPN, VPMEE UENY YUBUPCH RETCHPK RPMPCHYOSCH DOS PLBBBMYUSH HRHEEOSHCH.

PUFBMPUSH RPDCHEUFY YFPZY DOS. OB PUOPCHBOY UPCHEFULYI UCHPDPL, RPMHYUEOSHI YI RTYZTBOYUOSCHI TBKOPCH, YFBV chchu lTBUOPK bTNYY UDEMBM CHCHCHPD, YuFP, RP LTBKOEK NETE, 1136 UBNPMEFPCH (CH FPN YUYUME 10 Ъ UPU FBChB chchu yuETOPNPTULPZP ZHMPFB) RPZYVMY CH RETCHSHCHK DEOSH CHPKOSHCH. pFUADB CHP'OILMP IPTPYP FERTSH Y'CHEUFOPE YUYUMP 1200 RPFETSOOSHI UBNPMEFPCH. h OENEGLYI PFUEFBI KHFCHETTSDBEFUS, YuFP 322 UPCHEFULYI UBNPMEFB UVYFP CH CHPDHIYE Y 1489 HOYUFPSEOSCH ABOUT ENME. chYDYNP, RPUMEDOSS GYZhTB RPMHYUEOB RKHFEN RPDUDUEEFB PVOBTHTSEOOSHI FTPZHEKOSCHI UBNPMEFPCH ABOUT BHTPDTPNBI Y RPUBDPUOSHI RMPEBDLBI. rPDTPVPOPE YHYUEOYE BICHBUEOOSHI OENGBNY NBOYO, PRHVMYLPCHBOOSCH ZhPFPUOINLY RPLBYBMY, YuFP DBMELP OE CHUE UPCHEFULYE YUFTEVYFEMY, VPNVBTDYTPCHAILY, YFKHTNPCH YLY RPMKHYUMY UETSHESHEOSCH RPCHTETSDEOOYS CH TEKHMSHFBFE CHPDHYOSCHI OBMEFPCH. yuBUFP UBNPMEFSH VSHMY CHPTCHBOSH Y UPTTSEOSH OEENGLYNY VPNVBNY, B UCHPYNY TSE LYRBTSBNY RTY PFIPDE YЪ-ЪB OECHPNPTSOPUFY uchBLHYTPCHBFSH NBFETYBMSHOHA YUBU FSH CH IBPUE PFUFHRMEOYS. eEE PVIDOEE FP, YuFP PLBBMYUSH VTPPEOSCH DEUSFLY BVUPMAFOP YURTBCHOSHI UBNPMEFPCH, LBL LFP RTPYЪPYMP ABOUT BUTPDTPNE RPD mHGLPN . ьФПФ UMKHYUBK TBUUMEDPCHBM OBYUBMSHOIL pUPVPZP PFDEMB lTBUOPK bTNYY V. C. bVBLKHNPCH.

dMS PGEOLY KHVSHCHMY NBFETYBMSHOPK YUBUFY UPCHEFULYI chchu UTBCHOYN OBMYUYE UBNPMEFPCH ABOUT 22 YAOS 1941 W. Y DCHB DOS URKHUFS. PLBYSCHCHBEFUS, UFP ABOUT UECHETP-ъBRBDOPN OBRTBCHMEOYY LPMYUUEUFCHP VPECHSHHI NBYO UPLTBFYMPUSH ABOUT 973, ABOUT ъBRBDOPN OBRTBCHMEOYY ABOUT 1497 Y ABOUT AZP-ъBRBDOPN ABOUT 1452 EDYOYGSHCH . yFPZP 3922 UBNPMEFB. yЪ ьФПЗП RПДУЭФБ OBRББИЧБЭФУСЧШЧЧПД, УФП ЪБ RETCHSHCHK CHPEOOSHCHK DEOSH RPFETY UPUFBCHYMY OE NEOEE 2000 UBNPMEFPCH. chPF LFP OEPTSYDBOOPUFSH: CH UPPFCHEFUFCHYY U RTYCHEDEOOSCHNY TBUYUEFBNY ​​chchu lTBUOPK bTNYY OEDPUYFBMYUSH DBTSE VPMSHYE NBYO, YUEN HLBJBMY OENGSCH?! chYDYNP, RPUMEDOYE PVOBTHTSYMY CH MEUOSCHY VPMPFYUFSHI TBKPOBI DBMELPOE CHUE UBNPMEFSHCH. p UMKHYUBSI RETEDYUMPLBGYY PECHSHCHI NBYO U ZHTPOFB CH FSHM OYUEZP OE YJCHEUFOP. (NETSDH RTPYUYN, BOBMPZYUOSCH DBOOSCH DPMPTSYMY OENEGLYE YFBVOSH PZHYGETSCH TEKIUNBTYBMH Z. ZETYOZH, LPZDB ON RTYLBYBM RETERTPCHETYFSH YUYUMP HOYUFPSEOOSHCH 22 YAOS UPCHEFULY And UBNPMEFPCH.)

fBLYN PVTBBPN, PVEBS KHVShchMSH UBNPMEFPCH RTECHSHCHYBEF UKHNNH UVYFSHCHI OERTYSFEMSHULINY YUFTEVYFEMSNYY YEOYFLBNY, HOYUFPTSEOOSCHI ABOUT BTPPDTPNBI, OE CHETOKHCHYIUS U VPECH SOI ЪBDBOYK, B FBLTSE CHCHYEDYI YЪ UFTPS YЪ-ЪB RPMPNPPL, BCHBTYK Y LBFBUFTPZH! OBRTYNET, CH 64-K YUFTEVYFEMSHOPK BCHYBDYCHYYY YYNECHYYIUS CH 12-N, 149-N Y 166-N YBR (VEY KHUEFB ZHTNYTHAEYIUS 246-ZP Y 247-ZP YBR) 64 nYz-3, 175 y-16 y-153 H VPSI RPZYVMY 5 UBNPMEFPCH Y 75 RPMKHYUMY ABOUT BTPDTPNBI RPCHTETSDEOOYS TBOPK UFEREOY. eEE 3–4 YUFTEVYFEMS YNEMY TBMYUOSCH RPMPNLY, OP CH UFTPA L 23 YAOS PUFBMPUSH NEOEE UPFOY NBYO. lHDB TSE DEMYUSH PUFBMSH?!

dMS PYASUOOEOYS LFPPZP RBTBDPLUBMSHOPZP SCHMEOYS CH FP CHTENS CHP'OIL FETNYO "OEKHYUFEOOBS KHVSCHMSH". uPZMBUOP PFUEFH, RPDZPFPCHMEOOOPNH TBVPFOILPN YFBVB chchu lTBUOPK bTNYY RPMLPCHOILPN th. and. yCHBOPCHSHCHN, L 31 YAMS 1941 Z. OEKHYUFEOOBS HVShchMSH UPUFBCHYMB 5240 UBNPMEFPCH, YMY VPMEE RPMPCHYOSCH PVEYI RPFETSH . pUPVEOOOP NOPZP VPECHSHCHI NBYO PLBBBMPUSH URYUBOP RP LFPC ZTBZHE H RETCHSHE DOY CHPKOSHCH; RP NETE OBCHEDEOYS RPTSDLB OEHYUFEOOBS KHVSHHMSH OBYUYFEMSHOP UPLTBFYMBUSH.

rP UPCHEFULYN BTIYCHOSCHN DBOOSCHN, CH FEYUEOYE RETCHPZP DOS OBOY MEFYUILY UPCHETYYMY DP 6000 UBNPMEFP-CHSHCHMEFPCH (LFP, LUFBFY, RTYNETOP CH DCHB TBUB VPMSHYE, YUEN CHSHRPMOYMY MAZHFCHBZH SAME) Y KHOYUFPTSYMY VPMEE 200 OENEGLYI UBNPMEFPCH . OENGSH PVIASCHYMY CH UTEDUFCHBI NBUUPCHPK YOZHPTNBGYY, YuFP ЪB KHUREY YN RTYYMPUSH ЪBRMBFYFSH ZYVEMSHA 35 UBNPMEFPCH . UBNP RP UEVE FBLPE YUYUMP UHFPUOSHI RPFETSH SCHMSEFUS DMS MAJFCHBZZHE CHEUSHNB OBYUYFEMSHOSCHN, OP PFOPUIFSHUS L GYZHTBN UMEDHEF LTYFYUEULY, RPULPMSHLH PLBBBMPUSH, YuFP L UPU FBCHMEOYA YFPZPCHPK UCHPDLY UB 22 YAOS "RTYMPTSYMP THLH" CHEDPNUFChP DPLFPTB ZEVVEMSHUB. MEFPN 1944 Z. CH UPCHEFULYK RMEO RPRBM MEKFEOBOF X. yFBKO YЪ TPFSCH RTPRBZBODSCH MAZHFCHBZHZHE, RPLBЪBCHYYK, YuFP RPMKHYUEOOOSCH YЪ BCHYBLPTRHUPCH DBOSCH PVTBVPFBMY OEPV SHYUOSCHN PVTBBPN. eUMY PDYO YЪ LPTRHUPCH RPFETSM 35 UBNPMEFPCH, DTHZPK 12, B FTEFYK, ULBTSEN, 10, FP CH UCHPDLE UPPVEBMPUSH P UKHNNBTOSHI RPFETSI 35 UBNPMEFPCH. rP NOEOYA YDEPMPZPCH OENEGLPK RTPRBZBODYUFULPK NBYOSCH, LFP OE RPЪCHPMYMP VSC "YUFPYUOILBN YOZHPTNBGYY" KHUFBOPCHYFSH YUFYOKH Y DPMTSOP VSCHMP RPDUFEZOHFSH LPNBODYTPCH CH DBMSHOEKYEN CHPECHBFSH U TKHUULINY U NEOSHYYNYY RPFETSNY. yFBKO UPPVEIM FBLCE, YuFP RPMKHYUM KHLBBOYE OE UYFBFSH RPFETSOOSCHNY RTPRBCHYE VE CHEUFY LYRBTSY: SING NPZMY EEE CHETOHFSHUS.

hPURPMSHKHENUS NBFETYBMBNY Bundesarchiv PE zhTBKVHTZE, YJ LPFPTSCHI UMEDHEF, YuFP OENEGLYE VEJCHPCHTBFOSH RPFETY (VPECHSHCHE Y OEVPECHSHCHE) UPUFBCHYMY 78 UBNPMEFPCH, LPFPTSCHE U TBVYCHLPK RP FYRBN RTYCHEDEOSH CH FBVM. 2.5:

fBVMYGB 2.5. rPFETY MAJFCHBZHZHE ABOUT chPUFPYuOPN ZHTPOFE 22 YAOS 1941 Z.

RTYNEYUBOYE. yj FBVMYGSHCH OE SUOP, HYUIFSHCHBMYUSH MY RPFETY CHPKULPCHPK BCHYBGYY. OP, RP-CHIDYNPNH, RTYCHEDEOOSCH CHCHYE GYZhTSCH CHEUSHNB VMYOLY L YUFYOE.

lPNNEOFYTHS DBOOSCH BTIYCHB, OENEGLYK YUFPTYL y. rTYEO RYYYEF, YuFP FBLYE RPFETY OE SCHMSMYUSH OBYCHSCHUYYNY DMS MAJFCHBZHZHE. fBL, 18 BCHZKHUFB 1940 Z. SING MYYYMYUSH FPMSHLP VEJCHPCHTBFOP RPFETSOOSCHNY YЪ-ЪB RTPFPYCHPDEKUFCHYS VTYFBOGECH 77 UBNPMEFPCH Y 163 YUEMPCHEL MEFOPZP UPUFBCHB, B 1 5 UEOFSVTS FPZP CE ZPDB 61 Y 188 UPPFCHEFUFCHEOOP; RETCHSCHK DEOSH BZTEUUYY RTPFYCH UPCHEFULLPZP UPAЪB UFPYM TSYOY 133 YUMEOBN MEFOSHHI LYRBTSEK .

iPFEMPUSH VSC PFNEFYFSH, YuFP PE CHTENS PECH OBD CHEMILPVTYFBOYEK X OENEGLYI RPCHTETSDEOOSCHI UBNPMEFPCH VSHMP NBMP YBOUPCH DPMEFEFSH DP UCHPYI BTPPDTPNPCH, B CHUE UVYFSCH RYMPFSCH YMY RPZYV BMY, YMY RPRBDBMY CH RMEO. ъB 22 YAOS 1941 Z. FPMSHLP CH ULBDTE JG3 YEUFSH "NEUUETYNYYFFPCH", OEUNPFTS ABOUT RPCHTETSDEOYS, UKHNEMY UPCHETYYFSH RPUBDHLH ABOUT UCHPEK FETTYFPTYY. BOBMPZYYUOSHE UMKHYUBY RTPYIPYMY Y CH DTHZYI UPEDYOEOSI.

h IPDE CHPKOSCH ABOUT chPUFPLE, CHPNPTSOP, VSHMY PFDEMSHOSHE DOY, ULBTSEN, CH DELBVTE 1942 Z. YMY YAME 1944 Z., LPZDB MAJFCHBZHZHE FETSMY CH UHFLY RP 50–60 UBNPMEFPCH. OP FY RPFETY RTYIPDIYMYUSH PUOPCHOPN ABOUT BTPPDTPNSCHY RPUBDPUOSCH RMPEBDLY; CHTSD MY LPZDB-MYVP EEE 57 OENEGLYI UBNPMEFPCH HDBCHBMPUSH KHOYUFPTSYFSH CH CHPDKHIE UB PJO DEOSH. (dBOOSCH P UVYFSHCHI 120 OENEGLYI UBNPMEFBI 23 BCHZKHUFB 1942 Z. OBD uFBMYOZTBDPN, 145 NBYOBI 2 YAOS OBD lHTULPN, FEN VPMEE 400 H OBYUBME VPECH OBD lHTULPK DKHZPK CHPPVEE OE R PDFCHETTSDBAFUS LBLYNY-MYVP DPLHNEOFBNY.) fBL UFP PFDEMSHOSHE UPCHEFULYE MEFUYULY HCE U RETCHSCHI YUBUPCH UTBTSEOYS RPLBBBMY CHTBZKH, YuFP U OINY OBDP UYUYFBFSHUS. UPPFOPYEOYE RPFETSH CH CHP'DKHYOSCHI VPSI (VEЪ HUEFB RPFETSH PF ЪООФОПК BTFYMMETYY) RTYVMYYYFEMSHOP TBCHOSMPUSH 50 ABOUT 250, YuFP UPPFCHEFUFCHBMP VPECHPNH PRSHCHFH, KhTPCHOA ME FOPK RPDZPFPCHLY Y DTHZYN ZBLFPTBN, UMPTSYCHYYNUS L OBYUBMKH CHPKOSHCH.

CHETOENUS UOPCHB L OENEGLINE BTICHOSCHN DBOOSCHN. PLBBSHCHBEFUS, SING LPTTEMYTHAFUS UP NOPZYNY OBYNYY PGEOLBNY. fBL, TBUYUEFSHCH, RTPY'CHEDEOOSCH RPMLPCHOILPN b. O. NEDCHEDEN YЪ chPEOOP-CHPЪDKHYOPK BLBDENYY YN. O. e. tsKHLPCHULPZP RP YOFETRPMSGYPOOSCHN ZHTNKHMBN, RPLBYUSHCHBAF, YuFP "FEPTEFYUUEULY" MAJFCHBJZHE DPMTSOSCH VSHMY RPFETSFSH 67 UBNPMEFPCH HOYUFPTSEOOSCHNY Y UETSHOP RP READER. h RETCHPN UPPVEEOOY UCHPDLY UPCHEFULPZP yOZhPTNVATP (POB FPZDB EEE OBSCHCHBMBUSH UCHPDLPK zMBCHOPZP lPNBODPCHBOYS lTBUOPK bTNYY) KHLBSCCHBMPUSH, YuFP "OBNY UVYFP 65 UBNPME FPCH RTPPHYCHOILB", B ABOUT UMEDHAEIK DEOSH CHOPUYMYUSH HFPYUOOYOS KHOYUFPSEOP 76 OERTYSFEMSHULYI NBOYO. eUMY UYUYFBFSH, YuFP RTYNETOP 11 THNSCHOULYI UBNPMEFPCH TBDEMYMY HYUBUFSH 63 UVYFSHI OENEGLYI (UFEREOSH TBTHYEOYS OE NOOEE 60%), FP RPMKHYUBFUS CHEUSHNB VMYOLYE YUYU MB.

rPRTPVHEN UPRPUFBCHYFSH OENEGLYE RPFETY RP DBOOSCHN RTPFYCHOILCH. about ABYVPMSHYYE TBUIPTSDEOOYS, LBL HCE PFNEYUBMPUSH, YNEMY NEUFP ABOUT ъBRBDOPN ZHTPOFE. dBOOSCHE P 143 UVYFSHCHI ЪDEUSH UBNPMEFBI UP UCCHBUFYLPK OE RPDFCHETTSDBAFUS OH TSKHTOBMBNY VECHSHHI DEKUFCHYK UTBTSBCHYIUS OENEGLYI ULBDT, OH DPRTPUBNY RMEOOSCHI, OH LBLYNY-MYV P DTHZYNY OENGLYNY DPLHNEOFBNY. rPFPNH EUFSH PUOPCHBOYS UYYFBFSH DPLMBDSCH UPCHEFULYI UPEDYOEOYK PV HOYUFPTSEOYY DEUSFLPCH CHTBTSEULYI UBNPMEFPCH OEDPUFPCHETOSCHNY (SLPVSH PDOB FPMSHLP 9-S UNEYBOOBS BCHYBDYCH YЪYS UVYMB 85 OENEGLYI UBNPMEFPCH.rTY LFPN DBEFUS UUSCHMLB ABOUT ZhPOD PRETBFYCHOPZP KHRTBCHMEOYS chchu.dayyys RTELTBFYMB UCHPE UKHEEUFCHPCHBOYE Yuetej FTY DOS RPUME OYUBMB CH PKOSHCH, Y LBLYI -MYVP BTIYCHPCH UPEDYOEOYS OE UPITBOOMPUSH, RPPFPNH ZPCHPTYFSH P DPUFPCHETOPN HUEFE RPVED OE RTYIPDIFUS.) uMEDHEF RTYOBFSH, YuFP CH FYI HUMPCHYSI DPOUEOOYE “PV PZTPNOPN HT POE, OBOUEOOOPN CHFPTZYENKHUS CH OBUYE OEVP OERTYSFEMA» OETEDLP YNEMP ЪBDBUKH UZMBDYFSH ZPTEYUSH RPTBTTSEOYS.

chPPVEE, RETCHPYUFPYUOYLPCH, LPFPTSHCHE VSHCHMY OBRYUBOSCH "RP ZPTSUYN UMEDBN", HGEMEMP OENOPZP, Y FEN GEOOEE POY DMS RPOINBOYS YUFPTYY. rTYCHEDEN MYYSH PDYO RYЪPD. h RTBCHDYCHPK h GEMPN LOYSE "rP GEMSN VMYTSOIN Y DBMSHOIN" NBTYBM o. u. ULTYRLP RYYEEF:

“...about ChPKOE CHUSLPE UMHYUBMPUSH. lПЗДБ Л БТПДТПНХ, ZDE VБЪТПЧБМУС 16-К ULPTPUFOPK VPNVBTDYTPCHPYuOSCHK BCYBRPML, RTYVMYYMYUSH ZHBIYUFULYE UBNPMEFSHCH, LPNBODYT ULBDTYMSHY LBRYFBO b. u. rTPFBUCH OENEDMEOOOP CHUMEFEM ABOUT UCHPEN VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLE (BY RYMPFYTPCHBM lv. rTYN. BChF.) Y OEPTSYDBOOP DMS ZYFMETPCHGECH CHTEBMUS CH ZPMPCHOPE ЪCHEOP YUFTEVYFEMEK Bf110. chPURPMSHЪPCHBCHYYUSH ЪBNEYBFEMSHUFCHPN, TBVYCH YI UFTPK, LBRYFBO rTPFBUPC RKHMENEFOSCHN PZOEN UVYM PDYO “NEUUET”. b TBUUFTEMSCH CHUE RBFTPOSH, ZETPYUUEULYK LYRBTS FBTBOYM UCHPEK NBYOPK CHFPTPK UBNPMEF ZYFMETPCHGB Y RPZYV.”

dPLHNEOF DBEF VPMEE UHTPCHHA Y OERTYHLTBYEOOHA FTBLFPCHLH OENEGLPZP OBMEFB:

“...h RPML YЪ zTPDOP RTYVSHHM RTEDUFBCHYFEMSH YFBVB chchu 3-K BTNYY. according to UPPVEIM, YuFP OBD zTPDOP YDHF CHP'DKHYOSCHE VPY, Y RPDFCHETDYM RTETSOEEE KHLBBOIE: OBDP TsDBFSH VPECHPZP RTYLBYB. ch 6 Yu 50 NYO LPNBODYT RPMLB TEYM RPDOSFSH CH CHPDHI ЪCHEP UBNPMEFPCH uv DMS TBCHEDLY. OP EDCHB UDEMBCH LTHZ OBD BYTPDTPNPN, ЪЧЭП ВХЛЧБМШОП ЦТЭБМПУШ Ш ЛПМПУХ Bf 110 SING ABOUT VTEAEN RPMEFE ULTSHFOP RPDPYMY L BTPDTPNH. yFKHTNPCHYLY CHCHYMY L RPMA yuETMEOSCH, ZDE VBYTPCHBMUS RPML, YEUFSHA DECHSFLBNY.

lBRYFBO rTPFBUPC, MEFECHYYK ABOUT CHEDKHEEN uv, CHTEBMUS CH RTPPFYCHOILB Y RPZYV CHNEUFE U OYN. UTBH TSE VSHCHMY UVYFSCH CHEDPNSHCHE rTPFBUPCHB. yFKHTNPCHLB RTDPDPMTSBMBUSH RTPFYCHOILPN 32 NYO. Bf110 ЪBUSHRRBMY BTPDTPN NEMLYNY VPNVBNY Y TCHEM OERTETSCHOSCHK PVUFTEM ЪBTSYZBFEMSHOSHSHNY RKHMSNY. UFPSEYE ABOUT BTPPDTPNE UBNPMEFSCH UZPTEMY, CHTSCHCHBMYUSH RPDCHEEOOOSCH RPD OINY VPNVSH. chTBTSEULYE YFKHTNPCHYLY DEKUFCHPCHBMY VE'OBBLBBOOP, FBL LBL OYLBLPK RTPFYCHPCHP'DKHYOPK PVPTPPOSH OE VSHMP PTZBOYPCHBOP.

chПЪДХИЕ РПЗИВПЧ 9 УЭМПЧЛ ЪЧЭП ЛБРИФБОБ rТПФБУПЧБ (Ч EЗП ЛЛИРБЦ CHIPDIMY YFKHTNBO UV. MEKFEOBOF sTHMYO Y UFTEMPL-TBDYUF UETSBOF VEUBTBVPCH. rTYN. BChF.), B ABOUT JOIN RPZYVMP 6th TBOEOP 15 YUEMPCHEL. MYUOSCHK UPUFBCH ULTSHMUS ЪB FPMUFSHNY UPUOBNYY CH OBYUYFEMSHOPK UFEREOY UKHNEM URBUFYUSH PF MYCHOS RKHMENEFOPZP PZOS.

lPNBODYT RPMLB NBKPT ULCHPTGPCH RTYLBYBM OENEDMEOOOP CHPPTHTSYFSH MYYUOSCHK UPUFBCH RPMLB CHIOFPCHLBNY Y ZTBOBFBNY Y ЪBOSFSH PVPTPOH BTPPDTPNB. VSHM PTZBOYPCHBO NEDRHOLF..." .

CHETPSFOP, CH TE'KHMSHFBFE FBTBOB PLPMP 7 Yu KhFTB RPZYV U LYRBTSEN Bf110E (No. 3767) JЪ II/SKG210. URKHUFS FTY YUBUB VSHM UVYF DTHZPK DCHHINPFPTOSHK "NEUUUETYNYFF" (No. 4291) FPK TSE YUBUFYY CH FPN TSE TBKPOE, P YUEN RYUBMB ZBJEFB "ltBUOBS ъCHEDB" 9 YAMS 1941 Z.:

“at DECHSFSHA UBNPMEFBNY ​​RTPFYCHOILB CHUFKHRIM CH VPK ЪBN. LPNBODITB ULBDTYMSHY RP RPMYFYUBUFY UV. RPMYFTHL BODTEK dBOYMPCH (PO RYMPFYTPCHBM "YUBKLH". rTYN. BChF.). URKHUFS OUEULPMSHLP NZOPCHEOIK DHB YI OYI VSHMY UVYFSCH. tBUUFTEMSCH CHUE RBFTPOSHCH, VEUUFTBUOSCHK MEFUYIL OBRTBCHYM UCHPA NBYOKH RTSNP ABOUT CHTBTSEULYK UBNPMEF, BODTEK dBOYMPCH RPZYV UNETFSHHA ITBVTSCHI.”

h LFPN CE OPNETE ZBEBEFSH VSHM PRHVMYLPCHBO hLBЪ rteYYDYKHNB chETIPCHOPZP UPCHEFB uuut P OBZTBTSDEOOY b. u. dBOYMPCHB YЪ 127-ZP YBR RPUNETFOP PTDEOPN MEOYOB, B ABOUT EZP TPDYOH CH DETECHOA hSTSMS UBTBFPCHULPK PVMBUFY VSHMP PFRTBCHMEOP YYCHEEEOYE P ZYVEMY ZETPS. OP MEFUIL OE RPZYV. u FSCEMSCHNY TBOEOYSNY EZP RPDPVTBMY LPMIPYOILY DETECHY yuETMEOB Y RETEDBMY UBOYFBTBN PFIPDYCHYEK UBRETOPC YUBUFY. ЪБФЭН по ПЛБББМУС Х ФШЧПЧПН ЗПУРИФБМЭ І РПУМЭ ДПМЗПЗП МЭУЕОYС OBKHYUMUS IPDDYFSH VEЪ LPUFSHMEK, B ЪБФЭН CHETOKHMUS Ch UFTPK. b. u. dBOIMPCH UTBTSBMUS DP UEOFSVTS 1945 Z., ЪBLPOYUYCH CHPKOKH CH ъBVBKLBMSHE LPNBODITPN BCHYBGYPOOPZP RPMLB; ABOUT EZP UUEFKH OBYUMPUSH 8 UVYFSCHI MYUOP CHTBTSEULYI UBNPMEFPCH Y PDYO CH RBTE.

eUMY L ULBUBOOPNKH DPVBCHYFSH, YuFP EEE PDYO Bf110e No. 2333 TBCHEDYUYL Y PFTSDB 2(F)/33 VShchM UVYF FBTBOOSCHN HDBTTPN NM. MEKFEOBOFB d.ch. lPLPTECHB TBOOYN HFTPN (P YUEN HCE ZPCHPTYMPUSH), FP RPMKHYUBEFUS, YuFP YUEFSHTEI DCHHINPFPTOSH "NEUUETYNYFFPPCH", RPFETA LPFPTSCHI RTYOBMY OENGSCH CH VEMPTHUU YY, FTY RPZYVMY RPUME FBTBOPC. bFP ZPCHPTYMP P NHTSEUFCHY UBNPRPTSETFCHBOYY UPCHEFULYI MEFUYYLPCH Y CH FP TSE CHTENS UCHYDEFEMSHUFCHPCHBMP PV YI OEKHNEOY HOYUFPTSBFSH OERTYSFEMS PZOEN VPTFPCHPZP PTHTSYS. ZETNBOULPNH LPNBODPCHBOYA EEE RTEDUFPSMP UDEMBFSH CHCHCHPDSH P TKHULPK FBLFYLE CHEDEOYS CHPDHYOSCHI PECH, RPUFBTBFSHUS OBKFY RTPPHYCHPDEKUFCHYE.

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Victory is, of course, absolutely important in war, but the face of the victorious state depends on the price that was paid for it. In this case, the price of victory in the air can be determined primarily by the number of lost crews and aircraft during the period of hostilities. The price of victory in the air is the most important criterion for the level of combat skill and military art of command personnel and aircrews, which determines the winner as having achieved victory with much less losses than the enemy.

Unfortunately, we have to reckon with the fact that the price for the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was paid very, very high. Victory in the air did not become a completely separate indicator in this regard. Judge for yourself.

If on the part of the Red Army Air Force on the Soviet-German front 129,400 aircraft took part in combat operations, which carried out 3.8 million sorties (29 on average per aircraft), then on the part of the German Air Force - 48,450, which carried out 1. 8 million sorties (37 average per aircraft).

During the war years on the Soviet-German front, the ratio of aircraft losses was 1 to 1.15. If the combat losses of the Space Forces Air Force amounted to 46,100, and non-combat losses - 60,300, then the German Air Force on the Soviet-German front lost 52,850 aircraft, and in total since 1941 - 85,650 aircraft on the Eastern and Western fronts.

According to Germany itself, losses in German Air Force aircraft, taking into account damage from 10% to the complete destruction of the aircraft, for the entire Second World War, from 09/01/39, amount to 71,965.

Moreover, if the USSR aircraft industry produced only 122,100 aircraft from 1941 to 1945, then the German aircraft industry produced 100,749. According to other data, 113,514. Therefore, we can talk about a larger number of aircraft produced and fewer combat losses by the Soviet Union .

However, we must not forget that Germany fought on two fronts: from 1939 - 64 months, and its non-combat losses were several times less than the losses of the Air Force, which can indicate a generally high level of aircraft equipment and an equally high level of training Luftwaffe flight personnel.

If the irretrievable losses of the air force crew of the spacecraft from 1941 to 1945 amounted to 48,158, including 28,193 pilots, then Germany lost more than 66 thousand flight personnel in the same period killed and missing on two fronts. According to other sources, the Luftwaffe from 1939 to 1945 lost only about 24 thousand killed and 27 thousand missing.

Even based on these figures, one can imagine the cost of victory in the air for the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.

The results of the combat operations of the Soviet Air Force in the initial period of the war were negatively affected, first of all, by the predominance of obsolete types of aircraft in their composition, the crowded deployment of aviation units and formations, and the cumbersome and sluggish organizational structure of front-line aviation. In addition, the level of training of the flight personnel did not meet the requirements imposed by the war.

The acceleration of the growth in the number of aviation personnel occurred to the detriment of the quality of their training, which, in turn, resulted in a decrease in the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of air units and air formations. On the eve of the war, the Air Force command staff found itself unsure of itself. The flight personnel were slowly retrained for new combat equipment and were poorly prepared for flights in difficult weather conditions, at night, and for the combat use of complex types of maneuver. The acquired combat experience in military conflicts of the interwar period was poorly suited to the conditions of modern warfare, and in addition, when generalized, it led to incorrect conclusions, primarily in the tactics of the aviation branches.

All this led to high losses of Soviet aviation in the first two years of the war, increasing the “price of victory” for the Red Army Air Force.

While the size of the Air Force spacecraft fleet was constantly increasing due to the growth in the volume of aircraft received from the aircraft industry and under Lend-Lease, the composition of the German Air Force group on the Soviet-German front was actually consistently decreasing. As a result, this led to a twofold or more numerical superiority of the Soviet Air Force air group starting in 1943 in all strategic operations. By the end of the war, the number of new types of aircraft had increased to almost 97%.

During the war years, the Air Force received a number of modern aircraft that were not inferior to similar aircraft in Germany. The Soviet aviation industry managed to seriously improve the combat qualities of aircraft without increasing their weight.

In addition, Soviet aircraft, born just before the war, had reserves for modification, while German aircraft, created much earlier, had actually exhausted such capabilities already at the beginning of the war. At the same time, shortcomings in combat use, organization of interaction and control of aviation in individual operations contributed to an increase in unjustified losses of spacecraft aviation and certainly affected the cost of victory.

One of the reasons for the high losses can also be called the lack of centralized leadership of the Soviet Air Force. The division of aviation, before the creation of air armies, into army and front-line aviation prevented the massing of front-line aviation in the main directions.

A huge role in the Air Force personnel training system was played by the formation of reserve and training air regiments, the continuous pilot training system and the reduction of training time in aviation schools and colleges. In essence, on the one hand, these measures were justified under those conditions. On the other hand, they can also be considered a factor in increasing losses.

Researchers of Air Force spacecraft losses point out that many of them resulted from significant shortcomings in the theory and practice of the combat use of the Air Force. The lack of initiative in the spacecraft air force in the initial period of the war led to its huge losses. In addition to errors in the theory of the construction and use of the Air Force, one can also pay attention to the neglect of the experience of the war taking place in the West. This is especially true for air supremacy and the practice of distributing the main Luftwaffe efforts among tasks.

The most important is the fact that the fight against enemy aviation was carried out, as a rule, by fighter aviation, covering the most important groupings of front troops and providing support for other types of aviation.

At the same time, for a number of reasons, such active actions as hunting, blocking airfields, imposing air battles, unlike the enemy, were carried out extremely rarely. It can be said that radar sights and electronic warfare equipment were almost completely absent in Soviet aviation, which, in turn, imposed significant restrictions on the use of the air force both at night and in difficult weather conditions. And this also led to unjustified losses...

Thus, it can be argued that the spacecraft air force suffered significant combat losses and even more significant non-combat losses.

N. Bodrikhin considers the amazing results of the Luftwaffe aces to be untenable. He's writing: “After all, the results of the combat work of more than 40 thousand fighter pilots alone who fought on the side of Germany during the Second World War are described by the law of normal distribution, and if we assume that the best of them actually won the declared number of victories (352 - E. Hartman, 301 - G. Barnhorn, 13 more pilots - over 200.88 - over 100, etc.), then the total number of aircraft shot down in air battles will exceed the actual number several times.” He claims, “that the losses of Allied aircraft in World War II, according to American data, consisted of non-combat losses (40-50%), losses from anti-aircraft artillery fire (15-20%), the number of those shot down in air battles (20-30%) and lost at airfields. (7-12%).

In this case, the losses of aircraft from the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in air battles in the European theater should not exceed 30-35 thousand aircraft, and the estimated number of those shot down by Luftwaffe pilots exceeds 60-80 thousand.”

Of course, patriotism is a good and necessary thing. Today it is just not enough. But as far as the historical past is concerned, in this regard the truth is still more valuable. Studies show that Germany, by the nature of Air Force losses, lost 57%, or 30,125 aircraft in air battles on the Soviet-German front, 17% were aircraft losses at airfields (8984) and 26% from anti-aircraft artillery fire.

Consequently, in this case, American data are not suitable for assessing the criterion for losses of both the German Air Force and the Space Force.

It should be noted that the method of destroying enemy aircraft in the air became most widespread during the war. This method accounts for 96% of all sorties carried out by Soviet aviation in the struggle for air supremacy. In this case, Luftwaffe pilots during the Second World War could well have won about 70 thousand victories, including 25 thousand on the Western Front and 45 thousand on the Eastern Front. However, some researchers claim that the real numbers of victories of Luftwaffe pilots are 19 thousand on the Western Front, and about 32 thousand on the Eastern Front. In total, about 5,000 German pilots had five or more victories to their credit.

The list of Soviet aces includes more than 2,000 names, of which about 800 pilots achieved 15 or more victories, another 400 - from 10 to 15, and about 200 pilots shot down 20 or more enemy aircraft.

In no case should we forget that after the First World War in the young Republic of Soviets, and then in the Soviet Union, there was no continuity of generations in the field of fighter aviation. There was no school... We started from scratch. In Germany, on the contrary, much attention was paid to the training of fighter pilots. They perfectly understood their value in a future war, which means they valued them. And the question of continuity as such did not arise at all. It is not surprising that in this case the German ace was first and foremost an individualist and, if you like, a “hunter.” He was not afraid to improvise tactics in the name of aerial victory.

The spacecraft air force carried out the smallest number of combat missions for “hunting.” For example, in the 28th IAP, in which I had the opportunity to serve as a lieutenant after college, only 86 sorties were carried out for this task (in 1944 - 48, in 1945 - 38). Of 14,045 combat missions, this is only 6%.

According to the authoritative opinion of Hero of the Soviet Union, General G.A. Baevsky, “the Luftwaffe was not only a group of outstanding pilots, they, and leading German aces A. Galland and E. Hartmann agreed with this, also had “thousands of young, unknown German pilots who died without winning a single victory.” battle!

This once again shows how difficult the profession of a fighter pilot is.” French fighter pilot Pierre Yuesterman shares this opinion in principle: “There seemed to be no “middle” in the Luftwaffe, and German pilots could be divided into two very clear categories.

Aces, who made up 15-20% of the total number of pilots, were indeed superior to the average Allied pilots. And the rest didn't deserve much attention. Brave, but unable to get the most out of their aircraft. The reason for this was primarily a hasty selection due to heavy losses in the Battle of Britain and in the Russian campaign. Their training was very short and not very well balanced; paramount importance was given to the cultivation of morale, devotion to the great German idea and adherence to military theories, while underestimating technical instruction. From the end; In 1943, these mistakes were compounded by an acute shortage of fuel. So there existed, gradually suffering huge losses in difficult trials in the skies of Europe, a heroic detachment of “experienced people” of the Luftwaffe, real veterans with three or four thousand hours of flight behind them. These pilots, who had gone through the school of the Spanish Civil War and survived successful Luftwaffe campaigns since 1940, knew their job thoroughly and in every detail - careful and self-confident flying masters, they were very dangerous.

On the other hand, there were young fanatics with a high fighting spirit and bound by iron discipline, who could be sent into battle with relative ease in many difficult circumstances.

Overall, in late 1944 and early 1945 the average standard of German fighter pilots was much higher than at any other time since 1940. This can be explained - apart from the importance of battle morale and a sense of patriotism - by the fact that the elite fighter pilot units had unsurpassed authority and primacy in everything - until the distribution of fuel and lubricants.”

During the war, the 28th IAP destroyed only 511 aircraft and lost 56 pilots.

During the war, the 5th Guards IAP scored 539 confirmed victories and lost 89 pilots (36 in air battles, 23 did not return from a combat mission, 7 died from anti-aircraft artillery fire, 7 during bombing, attack and shelling, 16 - in disasters).

The 32nd IAP destroyed 518 enemy aircraft during the war and lost 61 pilots.

The 9th IAP shot down 558 enemy aircraft in total.

The most effective regiment in the Red Army Air Force was the 402nd Red Banner Sevastopol IAP, which destroyed 810 enemy aircraft in battle.

So why couldn’t the most successful Luftwaffe fighter squadron (52nd) destroy 10,000 aircraft during the war? After all, it is necessary to divide into three groups, in our opinion - into three regiments. And it will turn out to be more than three thousand per group, per regiment. Moreover, only one squadron in the Luftwaffe was so effective, and not all. Why not agree... For example, in another elite fighter squadron (“Green Heart” - 54th) from June 22, 1941 to 1945, 416 pilots did not return from combat missions. In 1942, 93 pilots were lost there, in 1943 - 112, and in 1944 - 109. And during the very first month of the war in Russia, from June 22 to July 22, 1941, 37 pilots of this squadron (out of 112 those on the list) were killed or went missing. That is, in each regiment or group there is an average of more than ten per unit.

For example, in 1943, Major Hans Hann (108 victories) was captured from this squadron on February 21, Oberleutnant Hans Beisswenger (152 victories) was shot down and died on March 17, Major Reinhard Seiler (109 victories) was also shot down on July 5 , and Lieutenant Max Stots (189 victories) bailed out and was captured on August 19. We still believe that if a German pilot with so many victories was shot down, then he could not have had so many.

In the Soviet Union, only 2,332 pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Of these, 810 (35%) are in fighter aviation. Total twice - 61. Of these, 22 (36%) in fighter aviation. A total of three times - 2, and all in IA.

In Germany, 1,730 pilots became holders of the Knight's Cross. Of these, 568 (33%) are in fighter aviation.

192 pilots were awarded the Oak Branch. Of these, 120 (63%) are in fighter aviation; “swords” - 41, including 25 (61%) in fighter aviation; “diamonds” - 12, including 9 (75%) in fighter aviation.

And here, in the awarding of ace pilots of both sides, we see similar restraint. And here and there they didn’t hang high awards on just anyone. This means that Goebbels’s propaganda was not completed, since in the Third Reich Knight’s Crosses should have been poured out several times more. At two or three! But no. In the two countries, awards were awarded, as a rule, for a certain number of victories, and each victory, as is known, had a high price.

(According to German documents)

The calculation of the Wehrmacht command was clear: neutralize Soviet aviation, ensure air supremacy and switch the main efforts of the Luftwaffe to direct support of ground forces. The implementation of this plan led to the fact that, according to the Germans, on the first day of the war, 888 Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and 223 in the air. These data are not much different from the data contained in Soviet official sources: in total, about 1,200 aircraft were lost, 800 of them at airfields.

However, the intentions of the attacking side to destroy Soviet aviation in the border areas with one or two powerful blows and demoralize the personnel of the Air Force units and formations were not fully realized. On the first day of the war, Soviet pilots carried out about 6 thousand combat missions and shot down dozens of enemy aircraft.

“Despite the surprise achieved by the Germans,” German generals and officers admitted, “the Russians managed to find the time and strength to provide decisive resistance.”

The command and headquarters of the Air Force of the Odessa Military District, for example, relying on intelligence data, on June 21 brought the aviation units into combat readiness and dispersed them to alternate airfields. During German air raids here on the ground and in the air, only 6 aircraft were lost, while many more enemy aircraft were shot down. And in other border districts, where combat duty and air combat operations were better organized, the attackers met stubborn resistance.

Between June 22 and July 5, the Luftwaffe lost 807 aircraft on the Eastern Front (this number includes those that were completely destroyed and those requiring major repairs). From July 6 to August 2 – another 843 aircraft. In total, from the morning of June 22 to December 31, 1941, combat losses of German aviation amounted to 4,543 aircraft, of which 3,827, or 82%, were on the Eastern Front. According to the flight personnel, the losses in killed, wounded and missing were 7,666 people, of which 6,052 or 79% were on the Eastern Front.

The Luftwaffe command noted in its reports that with the outbreak of the war in the East, the gap between the losses of aircraft, flight personnel and the replacements received was constantly increasing.

Here is data from original German documents. The commander of aviation at Army Group South informed the Luftwaffe headquarters about the losses of reconnaissance aircraft for the period from June 22 to October 4, 1941: “The enemy destroyed 97 of our reconnaissance aircraft. 92 flight crew were killed. 41 wounded. These losses were mainly from enemy fighters. In addition, 27 transport and communications aircraft that were subordinate to these squadrons were destroyed. Another 38 aircraft were killed or damaged without enemy exposure. Note: aircraft that were damaged in battle and restored in units are not included in the records.” Headquarters of Army Group South.

In fact, it was a failure of the “blitzkrieg” for aviation too.

Comparing the losses of the Luftwaffe in one month on the Eastern Front with those that occurred over the same period of time during the “Battle of Britain” and during Germany’s capture of European countries, we come to an unequivocal conclusion: in Russia the Germans lost more aircraft and pilots.

And two more tables from the report of the Wehrmacht leadership to Hitler in February 1945. The data is taken from Fritz Hahn’s book “On the Wehrmacht’s losses in men and equipment,” published in Germany.