Aerobatics arithmetic in the sky of Khalkhin Gol.

From the very beginning of the 30s of the last century, the Japanese authorities nurtured hostile plans regarding the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). In 1933, General Araki, the Minister of War of Japan, publicly demanded the capture of this country. In 1935, on all Japanese maps, the state border of the MPR in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River was moved inland by twenty kilometers. At the end of January of the same year, Japanese troops attacked a number of border outposts abandoned by the Mongols without a fight. To prevent the conflict that arose, negotiations began in the summer. However, they were soon interrupted, as Japanese representatives demanded that their representatives be allowed to reside permanently in various points of the Mongolian People's Republic. Mongolia rightly regarded this as a direct attack on its independence. In retaliation, Japanese diplomats promised to resolve all pressing issues at their own discretion.

Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern, Marshal of the Mongolian People's Republic H. Choibalsan and corps commander G.K. Zhukov at the Hamar-Daba command post. Khalkhin Gol, 1939


The spring of 1936 passed in minor skirmishes on the Mongol-Manchurian border. Trying to protect itself, on March 12 the Mongolian People's Republic signed a protocol on mutual assistance with the USSR. At the session of the Supreme Council on May 31, Molotov confirmed that the Soviet Union would defend the borders of the MPR in the same way as its own. In September 1937, thirty thousand Soviet soldiers, more than two hundred tanks and armored vehicles, and about a hundred aircraft arrived in Mongolia. The headquarters of the fifty-seventh special corps, under the command of N.V. Feklenko, was located in Ulaanbaatar.

However, this did not stop the Japanese, who continued to prepare for the attack. They chose the area near Khalkhin Gol for the invasion, since the distance from this river to the nearest Soviet railway station was more than 750 kilometers. From Manchuria, two railways passed here.

Unfortunately, the Mongolian leadership and the command staff of the Soviet corps showed unforgivable negligence by failing to prepare and study the area. The border across the river was not guarded, and there were no observation posts on the western bank. Our soldiers were engaged in wood harvesting. At this time, the Japanese carried out reconnaissance of the future site of hostilities, issued excellent maps, and conducted field trips by the officers of the troops assigned to the operation.

The calm ended in January 1939. In the river area there are attacks on guard posts and shelling of border guards. The full-scale invasion began in May. On the 11th, 14th and 15th, armed Japanese-Manchu detachments numbering from two hundred to seven hundred people, accompanied by several armored vehicles, violated the border and got involved in battles with border guards. Japanese planes bombed Mongolian border outposts, but the leadership of the 57th Corps still did nothing. It is known that on May 15 our entire command went to logging. Only on the 16th did Voroshilov’s order come, demanding that the troops be put on combat readiness.

The sixth cavalry division of the MPR sent to the river and the operational group of the eleventh tank brigade under the leadership of senior lieutenant Bykov on May 21 managed to push the enemy beyond Khalkin-Gol to the land of Manchuria. At the same time in Moscow, the Japanese ambassador received on behalf of Soviet government official statement: “Japanese-Manchu troops violated the border of the Mongolian People's Republic, attacking Mongolian units without warning. Among the MPR soldiers there are wounded and killed. Japanese-Manchurian aviation also took part in the invasion. Since all patience comes to an end, we ask that this no longer happen.” The text of the statement was sent to Tokyo. There was no answer to it.

Early in the morning of May 28, Japanese troops struck a new blow, crushing the Mongol cavalry and deeply enveloping the left flank of Bykov's detachment, threatening the crossing. Having barely escaped capture, the Mongol-Soviet units retreated to the hills a couple of kilometers from the crossing, where they were able to detain the enemy. The 149th Infantry Regiment came to the rescue in vehicles and immediately entered the battle. The firefight lasted all night, and in the morning the right flank of Bykov’s company was knocked out from its heights, mistakenly fired upon by friendly artillery. But flamethrower tanks on the left flank destroyed the Japanese reconnaissance detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma.

The battle died down only in the evening. Having suffered significant losses, the Japanese withdrew their troops to their territory, and the Soviet units left the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. Feklenko later reported to Moscow that this had to be done “under pressure from many times superior enemy forces.” Although the very absence of the Japanese was discovered by Soviet intelligence only four days later. As a result of the battles, Feklenko was removed from his post, and G.K. Zhukov arrived to replace him.

Since the May battles showed a significant superiority of enemy aviation, the first thing the Soviet command decided to do was increase its air force. IN last days May, the 38th bomber and 22nd fighter air regiments arrived to the 100th mixed aviation brigade already stationed on the territory of Mongolia. The struggle for air supremacy began.

From the memoirs of fighter pilot Hero of the Soviet Union Anton Yakimenko: “We were placed at the airfield in a yurt. In addition to the cold and lack of basic amenities, mosquitoes plagued us. Because of them, I couldn’t sleep; my bitten face was swollen and burning. One night a hurricane arose and toppled the yurt. In the morning we barely crawled out of the sand-covered hole. The U-2 plane was broken in half by the storm. There was so much sand packed into the fuselages of our I-16s that when we took off, the sand flew out like smoke, leaving a tail behind the plane.”

A Japanese officer conducts surveillance during the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River

On May 27, eight aircraft of the I-16 squadron located at the airfield near Mount Khamar-Daba received an order to take off on alert. This was already the fourth flight that day. There had been no meetings with the Japanese up to this point, but two pilots burned out the engines of their planes and remained at the base. Six I-16 fighters flew to the border one at a time, gradually gaining altitude. At an altitude of two thousand meters they encountered two flights of Japanese fighters flying in formation. Finding themselves in a losing position, after the first attack the pilots turned around and began to return, and the enemy above shot them before the airfield and even after landing. The result of the “battle” was disastrous - two of our pilots (including the squadron commander) were killed, one was wounded, two of the remaining ones burned out their engines. In the evening, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov very clearly explained to the command of the 57th Corps Moscow's position on the inadmissibility of such losses in the future.

However, May 28 was a truly “black” day for domestic aviation. Out of twenty aircraft, only three I-15 bis fighters managed to carry out the order to fly to a given area. The rest were taken by surprise by the new order to “stop the flight.” There was no radio contact with the flight that took off; the pilots did not even realize that they were alone. During a mission over the Khalkhin Gol River, they were destroyed by superior Japanese forces. Three hours later, another I-15 squadron of ten fighters was suddenly attacked in the clouds. Seven aircraft were killed very quickly, the enemy lost only one. After this day, Soviet aircraft were not visible over Khalkhin Gol for two weeks, and the Japanese dropped bombs on our troops with impunity.

From the story of fighter pilot Anton Yakimenko: “The war started unsuccessfully for us. The Japanese managed to seize air superiority. Why did it happen? We met Japanese veterans over Khalkhin Gol who had previously fought in China for two years. We had no combat experience and were not yet ready to kill.”

Nevertheless, Moscow's reaction to what happened was immediate. Already on May 29, the best Soviet aces, led by the deputy chief of the Red Army Air Force Smushkevich, flew to Mongolia. In just a few weeks, a huge amount of work was carried out: training of flight personnel was established, supplies were improved, and a network of takeoff and landing sites was created. The number of vehicles was increased to 300 units, against 239 for the enemy.

In the next air battle on June 22, the Japanese were confronted by a completely different enemy. The result of a grandiose fierce battle that lasted more than two hours was the retreat of the pilots of the Land of the Rising Sun, who lost 30 aircraft. Our losses were also huge - 17 vehicles did not return to their bases. However, this was the first air victory since the beginning of the war.

The next three days showed that the Japanese would not be able to cope with Russian pilots in the air, and then they decided to change tactics. On the morning of June 27, about thirty Japanese bombers, together with 74 fighters, attacked our airfields. In the areas of Tamtsak-Bulak and Bain-Tumen, they managed to detect the approach of the Japanese and scramble fighters to intercept them, thwarting the attacks. But in Bayin-Burdu-Nur everything turned out differently. The observation posts saw the enemy planes, however, presumably due to the actions of saboteurs, they did not manage to report to the airfield in time. As a result, sixteen of our aircraft were destroyed on the ground. Despite this, the Japanese no longer controlled the air, the constant bombing of ground troops ceased, and air battles until the beginning of August took place with varying degrees of success.

According to the Japanese military leaders, the second stage of this incident was to begin with a rapid attack by a strike group on the western bank of Khalkhin Gol in the rear of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. Its goal was to cut off the retreat routes for our wars from the eastern bank and at the same time prevent the approach of reserves. The pinning group, which included, in addition to infantry and cavalry, two tank regiments, was supposed to engage the Russians on the eastern bank of the river and prevent their breakthrough.

The offensive began on the night of July 2. Light Japanese tanks attacked Lieutenant Aleshkin's battery three times, but were unable to inflict significant damage. The next day, the first battle took place between our and Japanese tank crews. Having numerical superiority, the Japanese were unable to move forward a single step. Having knocked out three tanks, they lost seven and retreated. The reconnaissance battalion of the ninth motorized armored brigade inflicted even more significant losses on the enemy. Having taken cover, the BA-10 armored cars shot down nine tanks of the advancing enemy detachment with impunity. On July 3, the Japanese lost 44 tanks out of 73 on the eastern bank.

The strike group advanced much more successfully. Quickly crossing the river on the morning of the 3rd, she defeated the 15th Mongol Cavalry Regiment and headed south directly to the rear of the main forces of the Soviet troops defending the eastern bank. The following were advanced to meet the enemy: a detachment of Mongolian cavalry, the 24th motorized rifle regiment and the 11th tank brigade. However, the cavalry on the march was scattered by enemy aircraft, and the motorized riflemen got lost and reached their designated positions an hour and a half late. As a result, at noon, without conducting reconnaissance and without infantry support, the Japanese were counterattacked on the move by the 11th Tank Brigade alone. Having broken through the Japanese defenses, she suffered terrible losses. More than half of the tanks were disabled or destroyed. At 15:00 in the afternoon, the armored battalion of the seventh motorized armored brigade went straight from the march to battle. Having lost 33 out of 50 armored vehicles, he retreated. Interaction between the Soviet reserves was established only in the evening. By this time, all units had already suffered heavy losses during single uncoordinated attacks. Before darkness fell, another attack was carried out with joint forces, but the Japanese, pressed against the river, managed to dig in on Mount Bain-Tsagan within a day. Their layered defense repelled all attacks.

From the memoirs of sniper Mikhail Popov: “Preparing for war in the steppe, the Japanese painted all military equipment, vehicles, all support equipment down to the last telephone cable sandy yellow. Cotton covers were put on the helmets to protect them from the glare of the sun. The Japanese paid the closest attention to such details, which could not be said about us. Soviet commanders stood out by wearing field bags or tablets, binoculars, and gas masks. They wore caps with shiny stars, while the fighters wore caps. This was one of the main reasons for the large losses of our command personnel.”

The next day, the Japanese leadership seriously miscalculated. It decided to withdraw its troops back across the river, but there was only one single pontoon bridge nearby, created for the attack. Whole crowds of Japanese soldiers and officers died on it from the fire of our aviation and artillery. A huge amount of equipment and equipment remained abandoned on Mount Bain-Tsagan. When, without waiting for the final withdrawal of their troops, Japanese sappers blew up the bridge, thousands of Japanese began to jump into the water in panic, trying to swim to get there. Many of them drowned.

After this, the Japanese had no choice but to try to take revenge on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. Starting from July 7, the enemy continuously attacked our units. The battles took place with varying success, until finally, on the night of the 12th, taking advantage of our mistake, the Japanese were unable to break through to the crossing, taking it under machine-gun fire. However, already in the morning, Soviet troops surrounded the enemy units and, after a short fierce battle, destroyed them. After this, a temporary lull reigned on the eastern bank, which both warring sides used to build up forces, moving fresh reinforcements to the area.

At this time, our pilots felt more and more confident in the air. At the end of July, Soviet aviation took revenge for the attack in Bayin-Burdu-Nur by attacking enemy airfields in the Ukhtyn-Obo, Uzur-Nur and Jinjin-Sume areas with impunity. Great amount Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground, while trying to take off or while landing. And in early August, several outstanding Japanese aces were killed in a series of air battles. Taking this into account, as well as the twofold numerical superiority of Soviet aircraft in the combat area, one could talk about air supremacy of domestic aviation.

By mid-August, our command had developed an operation plan to defeat the Japanese. According to it, three groups were created - Central, Southern and Northern. The central group should have engaged the enemy along the entire front, pinning him down to the entire depth. The Southern and Northern groups were supposed to break through the defenses on the flanks and encircle all enemy forces located between the border and the Khalkhin Gol River. Large reserves were also prepared in case of assistance to the Southern or Northern group. A thorough reconnaissance of the Japanese front line was carried out with aerial reconnaissance, capture of “tongues” and photographing of the area. Much attention was paid to disinformation of the enemy. Leaflets were sent to the troops on how to behave in defense. There were false reports about the erected defensive structures. A powerful sound broadcasting station created the impression of defensive work, simulating the driving of stakes. Troop movements took place at night, and vehicles with mufflers removed drove along the front. All this turned out to be very effective, allowing us to take the enemy by surprise.

On August 20, at dawn, Soviet aviation consisting of 150 bombers, with cover of 144 fighters, targeted the enemy defenses before the artillery preparation, which lasted 2 hours 50 minutes. Fifteen minutes before the end the air raid was repeated. The offensive of Soviet troops along the entire front began at 9 am. During the day of continuous fighting, the Central and Southern groups completed their tasks. The northern group flew to a height called “Finger”, at which the Japanese created a powerful defensive point, underestimated by our command. Desperately resisting, the Japanese managed to hold out at altitude for four days.

Our fighters safely covered the bombers, while simultaneously storming Japanese airfields in order to force the enemy to remove their aircraft away from the front. Having failed to suppress Russian aircraft, Japanese pilots attempted to bomb the advancing ground forces, but the strike groups were intercepted by Soviet fighters. Then, on August 21, the Japanese tried to attack our airfields, but even here they were unsuccessful; all the planes were spotted on approach. The losses of the Land of the Rising Sun's aviation were enormous; all available reserves were brought into battle, including outdated biplanes.

On August 21, the Southern Group completed its task, cutting off the retreat to the east by the Japanese-Manchurian units located south of the small Khaylastyn-Gol River. In the northern direction, our troops, having bypassed the “Finger” height, threatened to close the ring. August 22 forces Southern group They defeated the Japanese reserves that appeared, and by the evening of the 23rd, the encirclement of the enemy group was completed. On August 24 and 25, the Japanese tried to break through the ring from the outside, but were repulsed. The surrounded units also escaped from the “cauldron”, coming under heavy fire from Soviet artillery. The liquidation of small groups and individuals dragged on until August 31. The Japanese, holed up in dugouts and fox holes, fought until last person. On September 1, 1939, the territory of Mongolia was cleared of invaders.

From the story of Vasily Rudnev, commander of the BT-5 tank: “We were not afraid of Japanese tanks. Ha-go's lungs were real coffins. Our “forty-five” punched through them. The samurai's 37-mm anti-tank guns were characterized by low armor-piercing projectile efficiency. Often our T-26s and BTs returned from battle with holes, but without crew losses and under their own power. The Japanese also dug cracks and waited for tanks in them, throwing Molotov cocktails. We sent forward a T-26 with a homemade flamethrower, which burned out the samurai. There were also suicide bombers with mines on bamboo poles. We suffered especially heavy damage from them. Only the chessboard battle formation during the attack and interaction with the infantry made it possible to reduce losses from “bottle makers” and miners.”

At the border, clashes with the Japanese lasted another half month. In addition to daily skirmishes, on September 4, 8 and 13 the Japanese unsuccessfully attacked our positions. Soviet pilots patrolling the border constantly engaged in battles with the enemy. Only on September 15 was a ceasefire signed; on the 23rd, Soviet troops allowed Japanese funeral teams to arrive on the battlefield. Removing the corpses took a whole week. The Japanese positions were covered in black smoke - the “samurai” set fire to the remains of fallen soldiers, and sent the ashes to their relatives in Japan.

Soviet and Japanese officers at ceasefire negotiations at Khalkhin Gol

The Soviet side announced that the Japanese lost about 22 thousand people killed and 35 thousand wounded as a result of the military conflict. The enemy calls much more modest numbers - 8.5 thousand killed and 9 thousand wounded. However, these values ​​raise serious doubts about their truth. Soviet troops lost about eight thousand people killed and sixteen thousand wounded during the military conflict. Also, the losses of the Soviet troops turned out to be very high in armored vehicles (133 armored vehicles and 253 tanks), since it was the tank units that had to bear the brunt of the fighting. This is confirmed by the large number of tankers who were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the battles at Khalkhin Gol.

The Japanese side gives completely different data on the losses of our troops. Moreover, they lie completely shamelessly; the figures cannot even be called fantastic. For example, according to them, 1,370 Soviet aircraft were destroyed at Khalkhin Gol, which is twice the number of aircraft we had there.

The reconnaissance platoon commander Nikolai Bogdanov wrote in his memoirs: “It was an excellent lesson for the samurai. And they learned it. When the Krauts stood near Moscow, Japan never dared to move to the aid of its ally. Obviously, the memories of the defeat were fresh.”

Japanese soldiers pose with trophies captured in the battles at Khalkhin Gol. One of the Japanese is holding a Soviet 7.62-mm tank machine gun of the Degtyarev system, model 1929, DT-29 (Degtyarev tank). Trophies could have been captured from both Soviet troops and the troops of the Mongolian People's Republic

Japanese Nakajima Ki-27 fighters (type 97 army fighter) at the airfield near the village of Nomonhan during the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River. The fighters in the photograph belong to the 24th Sentai (Regiment) of the 1st or 3rd Chutai (Squadron). There are two options for where the photo was taken. This is either the Ganchzhur airfield, 40 km from the Khalkhin Gol River, or the Alai airfield, 8 km north of Lake Uzur-Nur

Japanese pilots of the 24th Sentai at the airfield starter during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol

The headquarters tent of the forward command post of the Air Force of the 1st Army Group of the Red Army on Mount Khamar-Daba. The photo shows a group of Soviet aviators in a yurt near a brightly lit table with field telephones. Some of the military personnel are in flight uniform. Household items are visible on the table; above the table there is an electric lamp without a lampshade.

A group of Soviet pilots in flight uniform (leather raglans, helmets and goggles) against the backdrop of an I-16 fighter aircraft standing in the steppe. From left to right: lieutenants I.V. Shpakovsky, M.V. Kadnikov, A.P. Pavlenko, captain I.F. Podgorny, lieutenants L.F. Lychev, P.I. Spirin. Airfield near the Khalkhin Gol River

A Soviet officer and soldiers inspect the remains of a Japanese aircraft during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol

Soviet soldiers examine abandoned Japanese equipment after the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River. In the foreground is a light tank Type 95 "Ha-Go", armed with a 37 mm Type 94 gun, the exhaust system of a 120-horsepower engine is visible diesel engine Mitsubishi NVD 6120. On the left, a soldier inspects the 75-mm gun, “improved type 38,” the main field weapon of the Kwantung Army in the battles at Khalkhin Gol. Despite the archaic design, this weapon, due to its light weight, lasted in the army until the end of the war.

Mongolian cavalrymen during the battles at Khalkhin Gol. In addition to the warring Soviet and Japanese sides, Mongolian troops from the pro-Soviet Mongolian People's Republic and the pro-Japanese state of Manchukuo took part in the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River from May 11 to September 16, 1939

Japanese who were captured by the Soviets during the battles at Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet commander in the foreground has military rank major. Soviet military personnel wore cotton Panama hats for hot areas, which have survived to this day with minimal changes. Red stars with a diameter of 7.5 cm are sewn onto the front of the Panama hats; enamel stars are attached in the center

Soviet mortarmen at an 82-mm battalion mortar during shelling of Japanese positions of the 6th (Kwantung) Army

A modification appeared with two synchronized ShKAS machine guns installed in the upper part of the fuselage. This four-machine gun I-16, designated Type 10, became known in Spain as the "Super Mosca" or simply "Super". The urgency of the order led to the fact that this type continued to be refined during serial construction and in its final form, with a forced M-25V engine, landing flaps and retractable skis, passed state tests at the Air Force Research Institute only in February 1939.

Type 10 arrived in Spain for the first time in March 1938 in the amount of 31 copies. During the summer, another 90 of these four-machine gun vehicles arrived. These aircraft took part in air battles during the summer and autumn of 1938. During this period, 24 “smuggled” American Wright “Cyclone” F-54 high-altitude engines arrived in Spain. These engines were equipped with the aircraft of squadron No. 4, consisting of 12 I-16 type 10, commanded by one of the most successful Spanish pilots, Antonio Arias. The "Supers", equipped with an engine that developed maximum power at 7000 meters, had an excellent opportunity to take revenge on the German Bf.109 fighters. It must be said that already the first combat clashes of the I-16 and Bf.109 in the spring of 1937 showed approximately equal capabilities of these vehicles. However, this continued only up to a 3-kilometer altitude, where the power of the I-16 engine began to fall, and the Bf.109 engine retained power until it rose to a height of 5000 meters. This advantage allowed the Messerschmitt pilots to almost always take a more advantageous position.

This aircraft was a major modification of the I-16 after three years of serial production and had the following main differences:
- the M-25V engine of increased power was installed;
- the armament was supplemented with two upper synchronous machine guns "ShKAS", enclosed in protruding fairings;
-the sliding lantern is replaced by a fixed visor with a stainless steel frame;
-optical sight OP-1 (a copy of the British sight "Aldis") was replaced with a collimator sight PAK-1 (a copy of the French sight "Claire").

The airframe of the aircraft has undergone significant changes. The duralumin lining of the wing console has been increased to 44.5% at the top and 14.5% at the bottom. The number of ribs on the upper surface of the wing has been increased.

The aileron freezing mechanism has been removed. Reducing landing speed is achieved by installing landing flaps. In this regard, the aileron span has decreased. Most Type 10 aircraft were produced with landing flaps that could be opened using an air system. Beginning in the spring of 1939, aircraft No. 102175 was equipped with a mechanical release of landing flaps.

Strengthening the airframe in accordance with the strength standards of 1937 affected the strengthening of aircraft control. A new, more durable control handle has been installed.

The oil system was changed and an oil cooler with a diameter of 6 inches was installed. In this regard, a high-speed pressure inlet pipe for cooling the radiator appeared in the lower part of the hood.

Modification: I-16 type 10
Wingspan, m: 9.00
Length, m: 6.07
Height, m: 3.25
Wing area, m2: 14.54
Weight, kg
-empty: 1327
- takeoff: 1716
Engine type: 1 x PD M-25
-power, hp: 1 x 750
Maximum speed, km/h
-near the ground: 398
-on high: 448
Practical range, km: 525
Rate of climb, m/min: 882
Practical ceiling, m: 8470
Crew: 1
Armament: 4 x 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns.

I-16 type 10 fighter from the 70th Fighter Aviation Regiment during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol. July 1939.

Fighter I-16 type 10 on a ski chassis.

Fighter I-16 type 10 of the Navy aviation.

Squadron commander of the 7th Fighter Aviation Regiment Fyodor Ivanovich Shinkarenko (1913-1994, third from right) with his comrades at the I-16 type 10 fighter at the airfield. In the photo from left to right: junior lieutenant B.S. Kulbatsky, lieutenant P.A. Pokryshev, captain M.M. Kidalinsky, senior lieutenant F.I. Shinkarenko and junior lieutenant M.V. Borisov.

Fighter I-16 type 10. Mongolia 1939

Fighter I-16 type 10 from 1 squadron 70 IAP after an emergency landing in the Bayin-Tumen region.

Soviet pilots play dominoes near an I-16 fighter at the Mongolian Tamsag-Bulak airfield. 1939

A group of Soviet pilots in flight uniform (leather raglans, helmets and goggles) against the background of an I-16 type 10 fighter aircraft standing in the steppe. From left to right: lieutenants I.V. Shpakovsky, M.V. Kadnikov, A.P. Pavlenko, captain I.F. Podgorny, lieutenants L.F. Lychev, P.I. Spirin. Airfield in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River.

Republican pilots with I-16 type 10 “Supermoska”.

Fighter I-16 type 10 of the Republican Spanish Air Force in the parking lot.

Fighter I-16 type 10 of the Republican Spanish Air Force in the parking lot.

Fighter I-16 type 10 of the Republican Spanish Air Force in the parking lot.

Starting the engine on an I-16 type 10 of the Republican Spanish Air Force in the parking lot.

Fighter I-16 type 10 of the Chinese Air Force.

Pilot's instrument panel I-16 type 10.

I-16 type 10 of the Red Army Air Force. Drawing.

In June, on the sand dunes east of Khalkhin Gol, only occasionally

Rifle shots and machine gun fire were heard. Both sides, durable

Having dug in, they temporarily did not conduct active hostilities and accumulated forces.

Only occasionally, usually at night, did scouts conduct searches. Then darkness

was illuminated by the deathly light of rockets, the air shook with disorderly

shooting, loud explosions of hand grenades.

However, in the high Mongolian sky almost every day they tied

air battles. The first ones in May were unsuccessful for Soviet aviation...

At the beginning of the conflict, the Mongolian People's Republic was home to the 100th

mixed aviation brigade. The 70th Fighter Regiment had 38

fighters, and the 150th Bomber Command has 29 high-speed bombers.

Almost half of the fighters were out of order, and the bombers had only just

mastered by pilots.

Japanese aviation was located at well-equipped airfields in

areas of Hailar. It consisted of 25 - 30 fighters. In addition, there was

up to 40 reconnaissance aircraft and bombers. Japanese aviation personnel had

experience of fighting in China. Long before the attack on the MPR, the headquarters of the Kwantung

The army organized a series of flight exercises, the Japanese carried out reconnaissance

field airfields in the area of ​​future military operations, compiled special

aviation maps.

fighters met over Mount Hamar-Daba with five Japanese,

those who violated the border. On both sides the losses amounted to one fighter.

On that day, Soviet aviation in the Mongolian People's Republic received reinforcements. From

Trans-Baikal Military District the 22nd fighter arrived in Bain-Tumen

aviation regiment under the command of N.G. Glazykin consisting of 63 fighters

I-15 and I-16. Then the 38th high-speed bomber regiment arrived in the Mongolian People's Republic,

numbering 59 SB aircraft.

three started passenger aircraft. A group flew to Mongolia on them

experienced Soviet combat pilots who fought the enemy in the skies of Spain and

China. Among them were 17 Heroes of the Soviet Union. The senior was the deputy

commander of the Soviet military air force Corporal Commander Ya.V. Smushkevich.

He received the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union for personal courage and

skillful management of the actions of Soviet volunteer pilots who fought in

ranks of the Spanish Republican Army against the Francoist rebels and their

fascist German-Italian patrons. There Smushkevich - General Douglas

was a senior advisor on aviation issues.

Immediately upon arrival in Tamtsag-Bulak, the pilots of Smushkevich’s group

went to the airfields. Here they began to teach the young by personal example,

not fired air fighters. Instilled in them the need to fight

compact group, in close cooperation, reminded again and again about

the need for mutual gain. The number of airfields was sharply increased

and landing sites. Most of them were located much closer to

place of hostilities than before. Was organized almost from scratch

clear air surveillance, warning and communications service. All this was done in

extremely tight deadlines.

made reconnaissance flights.

The results of the great work done were immediate. In

In some places they started a battle with 120 Japanese fighters. The enemy is here for the first time

used its newest I-97 fighter. At first, accustomed to winning,

The Japanese moved aggressively. However, having met a skillful rebuff, they were somewhat at a loss.

When, leaving black ribbons of smoke, about two dozen

enemy vehicles, the Japanese began to withdraw from the battle. Soviet fighters

rushed to chase them. In total, the enemy lost more than 30 that day.

airplanes. Soviet aviation- 14 fighters and 11 pilots. In the same battle

The commander of the 22nd Fighter Regiment, Major N.G. Glazykin, died heroically.

Here is what writer V. Stavsky wrote about this fight:

Over 200 aircraft took part (95 of them were ours). Our heroes shot down 34

Japanese fighter; this victory is the result of a new spirit and new methods,

which appeared in our aviation here with the arrival of a group of experienced

hero pilots led by Corporal Smushkevich.

Orlov's unit met with seven samurai who had violated

border of the Mongolian People's Republic. The commander shook his wings, and the pilots, gathering closer to

him, rushed at the enemy... Orlov, aiming the entire body of the plane at

samurai, gave full fire from all his machine guns. And the samurai instantly

curled up...

unprecedented battle, which lasted three hours and twenty minutes... And it was his

the first air battle... Having caught the samurai in his sights, Yudaev gave a burst and

I saw the wings of the enemy plane catch fire... But another samurai had already

went into the tail of Yudaev's plane... Only on the ground, after the battle, did Yudaev find out

that he was saved by Hero of the Soviet Union Gerasimov..."

For the first time in the battles at Khalkhin Gol, victory in the air remained with the Soviets

pilots.

16 Japanese vultures, losing only two I-15 fighters.

air battle. It shot down 10 Japanese fighters and three Soviet ones.

Hero of the Soviet Union Major S.I. Gritsevets especially distinguished himself. He planted

his single-seat fighter on Manchurian territory and took it out from there

commander of the 70th fighter regiment, Major V.M. Zabaluev, who jumped out from

parachute from a burning plane.

Suffering heavy losses in air battles, Japanese aviation

the command decided to defeat Soviet aviation at airfields. Was

the order of the commander of Japanese aviation operating in the area was captured

said: “In order to put an end to the main air forces with one blow

forces of Outer Mongolia, who are behaving defiantly, I order surprise

attack with all forces to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields in

area Tamtsag-Bulak, Bain-Tumen, lake Bain-Burdu-Nur."

regiment in the Tamtsag-Bulak area flew 23 bombers and about 70

enemy fighters. Due to the delay in notification, the Soviet

The fighters took off unorganized, in singles and in teams. Also

They entered the battle unorganized. Two Japanese were shot down

bomber and three fighters. Our losses are three fighters and two

The commander of the 22nd regiment, Hero of the Soviet Union, did not return to the airfield

Major G.P. Kravchenko. He came only three days later, swollen from bites

mosquitoes He shot down his opponent already over the territory of Manchuria. Because of

lack of fuel, I had to land about sixty kilometers from the airfield and

get there on foot...

The situation was much worse in the 70th Fighter Regiment. Enemy

took him by surprise, as the saboteurs managed to cut the telephone lines

wires from observation posts. About seventy Japanese fighters

The regiment's airfields were attacked. Soviet pilots took off under enemy fire and

were forced to engage in battle without gaining sufficient height. Was shot down

Fourteen Soviet vehicles and two were burned on the ground. The enemy does not lose

This was the last success of Japanese aviation during the battles over

Khalkhin-Golom. And even then it’s quite relative. In July the initiative and

air superiority firmly passed to Soviet aviation. Tense

air battles occurred almost every day in the first half of the month.

Soviet pilots shot down 24 Japanese fighters, losing only one

car. On the 8th, 21 enemy fighters were shot down, losing two of our own. After two days

70 Soviet fighters stormed enemy positions on the right bank

Khalkhin Gol. They were attacked by about a hundred I-97s. More people came to our aid

30 cars. In the air in a relatively small space at the same time

180 aircraft fought! In this battle, the Japanese lost 11 fighters. Was

One Soviet was also shot down...

The Japanese fought stubbornly, but the skies of battle remained with the Soviet pilots.

The success was greatly facilitated by the clear interaction between

high-speed, but relatively unmaneuverable fighters I-16 and

maneuverable but slower I-15 biplanes. The enemy has already fought

not as skillfully as in previous battles, it was felt that his best pilots

are already out of order.

Then there were no air battles for 10 days. The enemy is not active

showed...

As it became known, the Japanese command was hastily bringing in new

again tried to hit our airfields. About 150 people violated the border

fighters. They were met by approximately the same number of ours. The enemy fought

skillfully. Used the clouds well. It was clear that in his ranks again

experienced pilots appeared. However, the courage and skill of Soviet pilots

won this time too. The enemy lost 12 fighters. Our losses

amounted to five I-15s.

The success of air battles was greatly facilitated by the arrival of a new

aviation technology. New fighters appeared at Mongolian airfields

I-16. By appearance they were almost no different from their predecessors.

However, their weapons were much more powerful: if the “old” ones had two

machine guns, these had two more 20-mm ShKAS cannons.

The latest fighters attracted particular attention from Soviet pilots.

biplanes I-153 "Chaika". The new aircraft were superior to the Japanese in both

speed and maneuverability.

Major S.I. Gritsevets was appointed commander of the first squadron of "Seagulls". IN

In the first battle, he decided to use military stratagem. Having taken off, the Seagulls did not

remove the landing gear. In this form they resembled obsolete I-15 fighters, with

which the Japanese willingly entered into battle.

Approaching the Japanese, Gritsevets slightly shook the wings of his car,

and the "Seagulls", picking up the chassis, quickly rushed towards the confused enemy.

Cars with red circles of the “rising sun” began to fall one after another.

on the wings. The rest began to quickly leave the battle...

In the July air battles, victory always remained with the Soviets.

SB bombers. The fighters covering them entered the battle. Was shot down

eight Japanese planes and two of ours. The next day in three big

25 fighters, two bombers and one

enemy scout. Soviet aviation lost seven aircraft, of which four

your first fight.

cars. On the last day of July, four I-97s were shot down without suffering any losses.

In July, the Soviet bomber force also began to operate actively.

aviation, its flights were banned in May - June. For the first time express

of the 150th and 38th Bomber Regiments bombed enemy rear lines

area of ​​Lake Yanhu, Lake Udzur-Nur, Namon-Khan-Burd-Obo heights. During

seven bombers were shot down. Such relatively large losses

were explained by the lack of anti-aircraft maneuver and poor interaction with

cover fighters.

This mistake was taken into account, and the very next day losses from fire

There was no anti-aircraft artillery at all. In an air battle, the Japanese managed to shoot down

two bombers. However, with the fire of their machine guns, the Soviet navigators and

The shooters destroyed five I-97s.

Subsequently, Soviet bombers in large groups carried out

raids on enemy rear lines, railway stations, troop concentrations, fire

artillery positions. The flights were carried out at an altitude of 7000 - 7500 meters, and

due to unclear actions of cover fighters, the Japanese shot down five Soviet

bombers, while losing 11 of their fighters.

Soviet heavy bombers TB-3. They usually flew alone

and bombed from a height of one and a half to two kilometers. Enemy aircraft at night

flew. His anti-aircraft artillery usually did not open fire either. Therefore for

during combat operations, a group of night bombers consisting of 23 vehicles

TB-3 had no losses.

In the skies of Mongolia, Soviet pilots showed selfless courage and

V.F. Skobarikhin noticed that two people boarded the plane of the young pilot V. Vuss

Japanese fighter. One of them was already behind the Soviet car.

Saving his comrade, Skobarikhin decided to ram him. Left plane

The "hawk" cut into the chassis, and the propeller into the tail and fuselage of the enemy vehicle.

Skobarikhin lost consciousness. Having come to his senses, he saw how from the ground, from the place

a Japanese plane crashed, a column of fire and smoke rose.

With great difficulty Skobarikhin managed to bring the crippled car to

airfield. Fellow pilots were quite surprised when they examined the plane: the propeller

bent, the wing is damaged and part of the wheel of a Japanese fighter sticks out of it.

Senior Lieutenant Skobarikhin repeated the immortal feat of the Russian

pilot Nesterov, who was the first to carry out an aerial ramming. However, now he

was done on collision courses and on planes that were approaching

speed of about 900 kilometers per hour - this is three times faster than in 1914

56th Fighter Regiment Captain V.P. Kustov. On this day the enemy wanted

launch a powerful air strike on the positions of Soviet troops. Japanese Armada

The bombers and fighters were intercepted by Soviet planes. Already

several enemy vehicles fell to the ground in flames. However, some

The bombers stubbornly rushed forward. One car was attacked by the captain

Kustov. At the decisive moment, the Soviet pilot ran out of ammunition.

In a few seconds, bombs could rain down on Soviet soldiers... With a screw

the captain of his fighter hit the fuselage of a Japanese bomber,

it flared up and, falling apart, fell down... Upon collision

Viktor Kustov also died, the first in the history of aviation to destroy a

strike by an enemy bomber.

fighter pilot A.F. Moshin. In the air that began over Mount Khamar-Daba

During the battle, Soviet pilots shot down eight enemy aircraft. One of them destroyed

Lieutenant Moshin. While chasing the second car, he got behind it. However,

Moshin ran out of ammunition. Skillfully maneuvering, he came close to

enemy aircraft and hit the stabilizer with the propeller. Japanese fighter

crashed into the ground!

Moshin landed safely at his airfield. Except a little

bent propeller, his I-16 had no damage.

bomber regiment, student of the Military-Political Academy named after

V.I. Lenin, battalion commissar M.A. Yuyukin.

The regiment was led to carry out a combat mission by its commander, Major

M.F. Burmistrov. Having dropped bombs on the target, the regiment turned around and went into reverse.

well. Suddenly the commissioner's plane shuddered: under the left engine it exploded

anti-aircraft shell. With enormous efforts, Yuyukin tried to keep the plane in

horizontal flight, but the altitude dropped quickly. Fellow pilots saw how

Yuyukin's bomber, engulfed in flames, went into a steep dive and

crashed into a Japanese artillery battery.

The Motherland highly appreciated the exploits of the pilots who rammed the enemy in battles

at Khalkhin Gol. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to Captain Victor

Pavlovich Kustov, Lieutenant Alexander Fedorovich Moshin and Sr.

Lieutenant Bit Fedorovich Skobarikhin was awarded the high rank of Hero

Soviet Union. Battalion Commissar Mikhail Anisimovich Yuyukin posthumously

awarded the Order of Lenin.

The unparalleled courage of Soviet pilots, high quality

domestic aircraft made it possible to firmly maintain air supremacy.

However, the Japanese air command did not want to accept defeat.

According to our aviation reconnaissance, by the beginning of August, in the areas closest to the Mongolian People's Republic

airfields in Manchuria, the enemy concentrated a large number of aircraft

various types.

There were new fierce battles ahead.

“I look at my I-16 with love. Thank you, my dear “donkey”! You turned out to be much better than the Japanese I-97 fighter. Both in speed and strength. You saved me more than once, took enemy bullets upon yourself. Thanks to your creator Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov!”

Vorozheikin A.V., pilot of the 22nd IAP

On March 1, 1932, the “independent” state of Manchukuo appeared on the territory of Manchuria, created by the Japanese as one of the springboards for a future invasion of Soviet Primorye and Eastern Siberia. After the unsuccessful conflict for the Kwantung Army on Lake Khasan, it was from here that it was decided to launch another strike.

The formal reason for the outbreak of the conflict was the claims of Manchukuo to the Mongolian People's Republic. The leaders of the first country (in fact, the Japanese behind them) in the spring of 1939 began to demand a revision of the state border between the states along the Khalkhin Gol River. The Japanese military began to lay a railway line directed to the USSR border. Due to the nature of the terrain, the road could only pass in an area close to the Mongolian border. Thus, in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, it could easily be blocked by artillery fire from the Mongolian side, which, naturally, was unacceptable for the Kwantung Army. Moving the border close to the Khalkhin Gol River, that is, several tens of kilometers deep into Mongolian territory, would solve the problems of the Japanese.

Mongolia refused to satisfy Manchukuo's demands. The Soviet Union, which concluded a Protocol on Mutual Assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic on March 12, 1936, declared that it would “defend the borders of Mongolia as its own.” Neither side was going to compromise.

The first shots were fired on May 11, 1939. By May 14, Japanese-Manchurian troops occupied the entire “disputed” territory up to Khalkhin Gol; the Japanese government did not react in any way to the actions of the Kwantung Army and did not respond to the note sent by the Soviet Union. The war has begun.

Composition of forces

At the beginning of the conflict in Mongolia, according to the Protocol, the Soviet 57th Special Corps was stationed, consisting of 30 thousand military personnel, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles and 107 combat aircraft. The fighter forces were represented by the 70th IAP, which had 14 I-15bis and 24 I-16 as of May 1939. All the “donkeys,” which were far from being the newest, belonged to the already outdated type 5 and did not have armored backs. The level of combat readiness of the fighters was low: by May 20, only 13 I-16s and 9 I-15bis could take off. The regiment's personnel consisted of inexperienced pilots who mainly knew only piloting techniques; They were not trained in either group combat or shooting. Discipline was seriously lame; due to poor living conditions, many fighter pilots wrote letters asking to be sent to the Union. The Japanese fighter force, numbering 20 vehicles Nakajima Ki.27(two squadrons), were equipped with experienced pilots, many of the Japanese had experience fighting in China. This balance of forces was not slow to affect the results of the first battles.

Air battles

The first loss of the Red Army Air Force was a liaison R-5Sh, shot down by Japanese fighters on May 21. And the next day the first air battle between fighters took place: 3 I-16s and 2 I-15bis met with five Ki-27s. One "donkey", which broke away from the group and rushed to attack, was instantly shot down (pilot I.T. Lysenko died), the rest did not enter the battle.

At this time, the Soviet Union began to move forces into the conflict area. On May 23, 1939, the 22nd IAP arrived in Mongolia, which, in addition to thirty-five I-15bis (one of them went missing during the flight), included 28 I-16 type 10, and the aircraft were in good technical condition. However, the level of training of the pilots of this regiment also left much to be desired, which did not allow, as it turned out later, to turn the situation in the air in their favor. In addition, the Japanese, in turn, transferred another 20 Ki-27s (two squadrons of the 11th Sentai) to Manchuria.

On May 27, a very unsuccessful “debut” of the I-16 of the 22nd IAP took place. Near Lake Buin Nur, a battle between six “donkeys” and nine Ki.27s took place. One Soviet pilot was killed, two were wounded; two I-16s were shot down, three were seriously damaged. The Japanese had no losses.

Khalkhin Gol, the beginning of hostilities of the 22nd IAP

“I must admit, the war at Khalkhin Gol started unsuccessfully for us. Essentially, we were not ready for it. The first fight took place on May 28 (more likely May 27 - author's note), our squadron lost outright - we did not yet know how to conduct an attack, and the material part turned out to be faulty ... "

If even the I-16, which was close in its characteristics to the Japanese fighter, suffered huge losses, then it can be reasonably assumed that there was no point in flying the I-15bis pilots at all. Actually, that’s almost what happened. Our pilots, accustomed to the exceptional maneuverability of their biplanes, were surprised to discover during battles with the Japanese that they no longer had an advantage in this characteristic (the maneuverability of the Ki.27 was no worse). So, on May 28, the I-15bis flight of the 70th IAP was completely destroyed in battle, all the pilots were killed. On the same day, in a battle between nine biplanes from the 22nd IAP and the 18th Ki-27, six of our aircraft were lost in the air, another was shot down on the ground after an emergency landing, five pilots were killed, one was wounded. The Japanese once again escaped without losses.

When it became clear to the Soviet leadership that it would not be possible to seize air supremacy with the existing forces, new aircraft and experienced pilots began to arrive in the battle area. On May 29, 1939, a group of forty-eight people arrived in Mongolia on three Douglas transport aircraft - the most experienced pilots and technicians, many of whom had visited Spain and China. The Japanese also strengthened their group, but were unable to achieve a numerical advantage.

At the end of July - beginning of August, the situation on the border territory of the Mongolian People's Republic near the Khalkhin Gol River was largely similar to June. Amid sporadic attacks on the ground and clashes in the skies, both sides were amassing forces for new decisive operations.

In the photo: Red Army soldiers and captured Japanese soldiers

Original taken from mayorgb in About Soviet-Japanese military conflicts. Part 3. Battles at Khalkhin Gol. II.

On August 4, 1939, by a special decree of the Emperor, the Japanese-Manchu forces in the conflict area were united into the 6th Military Group under the command of Lieutenant General Ogisu Ryuhei. Its total number, taking into account all collaborationist formations, reached 55 thousand people, but there were no more than 35 thousand on Mongolian territory, that is, in the immediate battle zone. On August 24, General Ogisu's headquarters planned a large-scale offensive with the goal of enveloping the right flank of the Soviet-Mongolian forces and defeating them.

However, the command of the Soviet 1st Army Group did not intend to wait for a Japanese strike. The forces of the Red Army in the combat area numbered about 57 thousand people, the total number of two cavalry divisions of the MPRA reached 5 thousand. Soviet troops had artillery of 542 guns and mortars, armored vehicles of 498 tanks and 385 armored vehicles, and an aviation group of 581 aircraft.

Soldiers of the 6th Cavalry Division of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army are conducting surveillance.


The Soviet command developed an operation plan that consisted of encircling the main forces of the Japanese and Manchus with converging flank attacks, followed by the defeat of the encircled enemy without crossing the state border. To implement this plan, the troops of the 1st Army Group were divided into three groups: Northern, Central and Southern. The central group was tasked with shackling the Japanese-Manchu group and depriving the Japanese command of the opportunity to regroup forces through maneuvering and castling; The Northern and Southern groups launched converging flank attacks, and the main one was considered to be the attack of the Southern group, which struck the enemy’s left wing. The Soviet command also left a reserve of the 9th motorized armored brigade, a tank battalion, 2 rifle and machine gun battalions and the 212th airborne brigade under Major Ivan Ivanovich Zatevakhin. The Mongolian troops united under the overall command of Marshal of the Mongolian People's Republic Khorlogiin Choibalsan.

Khorlogiin Choibalsan and Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.


While the ground Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese-Manchurian groups were preparing for large-scale offensives, pilots of the Red Army Air Force and the armed forces of the Japanese Empire were fighting for air supremacy.

Red Army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a downed Japanese bomber.


On August 2, 23 I-16s, covered by 19 new I-153 Chaika biplane fighters, launched an assault strike on one of the Japanese airfields; the result was the burning of 6 Japanese planes and damage to several more, and most importantly, the death of the commander of the 15th Sentai, Colonel Abe Katsumi. The Red Star planes returned without losses.

On August 3, the squadron commander of the 56th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Captain Viktor Pavlovich Kustov, died after ramming a Japanese bomber at the cost of his life. For his feat, Captain Kustov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. On August 5, the commander of an SB bomber hit by anti-aircraft fire, battalion commissar Mikhail Anisimovich Yuyukin, made a fiery ram, directing the plane to a concentration of Japanese troops, for which he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; another Soviet aircraft, the I-16 fighter, was shot down in an air battle.

Viktor Pavlovich KustovMikhail Anisimovich Yuyukin

The red pilots repaid the Japanese by defeating two Imperial Air Force aces on the same day: Kobayashi Taro, who had 10 victories, and Motojima Mineyoshi, whose score was 26 victories. And this event already clearly indicated the exhaustion of the Japanese aviators at Khalkhin Gol, who were forced to fight for more than two months against the numerically superior forces of the Red Army.

On August 12, 137 Soviet and about 60 Japanese fighters fought in a large-scale battle; The Red Army Air Force lost 2 aircraft, there is no information about Japanese losses in aircraft, but it is known that on this day another high-class Japanese pilot, Okuda Jiro, with 14 victories to his name, died. On August 13, a period of bad weather began. On August 19, conditions again became acceptable for flights, which was immediately taken advantage of by the pilots of the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment, who burned two Japanese planes at airfields during attack attacks, but on the same day one of the SB bombers did not return from a combat mission.

Preparations for the offensive required enormous efforts. To carry out the operation, two-week supplies of provisions, fuel and lubricants and ammunition were accumulated; All this was transported by more than 4 thousand trucks. At the same time, the troops carefully observed measures to maintain secrecy - Zhukov was generally distinguished by hypertrophied attention to this side of the preparation of operations. All troop movements were carried out exclusively at night, the enemy’s vigilance was dulled by continuous imitation of the noise of vehicles, artillery tractors and tanks using loudspeakers.

Red Army mortarmen in position.


On August 20, a quarter of an hour before 6 am, 150 red star bombers rained down bombs on Japanese positions from a height of 2.5-3 kilometers. At the same time, 46 I-16s, operating in several groups, crushed Japanese anti-aircraft guns. At the same time, not a single Japanese fighter took off into the sky, which Soviet pilots actively took advantage of: after carrying out an attack on one of the airfields, they destroyed 6 and damaged 9 Japanese aircraft. At 6:15 a.m., the guns of the Soviet-Mongolian troops opened heavy fire on enemy lines. After the artillery shelling, another 52 SB, under the cover of 162 fighters, bombed Japanese troops in the valley of the Khaylastyn-Gol River.

Then the Japanese pilots finally responded. About 50 bombers, accompanied by 80 fighters, took off to attack Soviet airfields, but the VNOS posts worked well, and in the vicinity of Tamtsak-Bulak they were met by 204 Soviet fighters. In the battle that took place, the Japanese were able to shoot down 6 Soviet fighters, and Japanese bombers even broke through to the airfield, but the Red Army pilots did not allow targeted bombing, and only one bomb was able to destroy the SB standing on the airfield. In total, on this day the losses of the Red Army Air Force were 7 fighters and 4 SB, the Japanese - 6 fighters.

Soviet soldiers are ready to attack.

The ground forces of the Red Army and the MPRA went on the offensive at 9 a.m. on August 20. The morning fog in a number of areas allowed the Red Army soldiers and Cyrics to secretly get close to the first line of enemy positions at a distance that allowed them to immediately rush to attack. The strikes of Soviet artillery and aviation were so strong that in the first hour and a half the Japanese and Manchus did not fire a single artillery shot in return. The Japanese were also unable to determine the direction of the main attack. It should be noted the successes of the 8th Cavalry Division of the MPRA, operating in the Southern Group - its warriors, discarding the Bargut units encountered on their way, reached the very state border. Meanwhile, by the end of the day, the troops of the Northern Group began fighting for the height of Fui, which the Japanese had turned into a powerful stronghold.

A group of Red Army soldiers in the battles at Khalkhin Gol.


Over the next two days, Japanese resistance increased decisively. The commander of the machine gun company of the 57th Ural Rifle Division, Vasily Ivanovich Davidenko, recalled: “In general, we must honestly admit: the fanaticism and dedication of the Japanese soldier was amazing. There was such a case in my company. Red Army soldier Tatarnikov, having discovered a wounded Japanese in a trench, decided to take him prisoner. He put a bayonet to his chest and ordered to surrender. But the samurai, grabbing the bayonet with both hands, he drove it into his stomach. Tatarnikov later made excuses: “Who knew that this crazy person would do that?”. Zhukov himself described the Japanese soldiers as follows: “The Japanese soldier who fought with us at Khalkhin Gol is well prepared, especially for close combat. He is disciplined, efficient and persistent in battle, especially in defensive combat. The junior command staff is very well prepared and fights with fanatical tenacity. As a rule, junior commanders They don’t surrender to captivity and don’t stop at hara-kiri.”; at the same time, the corps commander pointed out the following shortcomings in the Imperial Japanese Army: “The officer corps, especially the senior and senior ones, are poorly trained, have little initiative and are inclined to act according to a template”.

Already after the Great Patriotic War Zhukov told Simonov about the frantic tenacity of the Japanese soldiers, giving examples: “The Japanese fought extremely stubbornly, mostly infantry. I remember how I interrogated the Japanese who were sitting in the area of ​​​​the Khaylastyn-Gol river. They were taken prisoner there, in the reeds. So they were all so eaten up by mosquitoes that there was literally no living space on them happened. I ask them: “How did you allow mosquitoes to eat you up like that?” They answer: “We were ordered to sit on patrol and not move. We didn’t move.” Indeed, they were ambushed, and then they were forgotten about. The situation changed, and their battalion was pushed back, but they were still sitting for the second day and not moving , until we captured them. They were eaten half to death by mosquitoes, but they continued to obey the order."
A notable event on August 22 was the victory of Soviet aviators over another Japanese ace, Motomura Koji, whose number of victories was 14. Red Star aircraft firmly held the initiative in the air.

Red Army soldiers and armored car.


Fierce enemy resistance forced Zhukov to bring reserves into battle - the 9th motorized armored and 212th airborne brigades moved to help the Northern Group. The warriors of the latter, having entered the battle for the heights of Fui, where the enemy was helped not only by extreme rage, but also by the most powerful fortifications and the terrain itself, were able to occupy this stronghold with a decisive attack.

In their baptism of fire, which took place on the heights of Fui, the paratroopers demonstrated excellent combat training. The 9th Motorized Armored Brigade, with the support of two companies of border guards and a rifle and machine-gun battalion of the 11th Light Tank Brigade, reached the Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo heights, cutting off the Japanese escape route to the east by the end of August 23. At the same time, the Soviet-Mongolian troops of the Southern Group broke through the Japanese defensive lines in their entire offensive zone. On August 24, the 8th Motorized Armored Brigade of the Southern Group linked up with units of the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade. Finally, the encirclement ring was finally closed. Of course, it would be premature to consider the battle over at this point, especially considering Japanese fanaticism.

The Red Army soldiers are at their best.

And on August 25, in the air, the red pilots ended the lives of two more aces of the imperial air force: Suzuki Eisaku with 11 victories and Yajima Yoshihika with 16 defeated opponents to his name.


The command of the 6th Military Group tried to use external blows to break through the steel ring created by the soldiers of the Red Army and the MPRA, but these attempts only led to unnecessary losses in the Japanese units. At the same time, unprecedentedly intense battles were taking place inside the ring with surrounded Japanese troops, the main centers of resistance of which were formed in the areas of the Peschanaya hill, Remizov and Zelyonaya heights. In the last battles to finish off the Japanese, the Red Army soldiers and Cyrics had to face the special cruelty of the enemy, who did not show a shadow of self-pity. According to the memoirs of reconnaissance platoon commander Nikolai Grigorievich Bogdanov, “Even after making sure that they would not be able to escape from the encirclement, the samurai still did not lay down their arms and died in hand-to-hand combat until the last man. All the slopes were strewn with their corpses.”. Finally, at the very end of August, the last center of enemy resistance on the Remizov Hill was destroyed. After this, the Japanese launched a series of attacks on the ground, but all of them did not produce any results.

Red Army soldiers inspect a Japanese gun.


But if the fighting on the ground practically disappeared, the Soviet pilots still had to work a lot in September. On August 27, the Soviet fighter pilot, Senior Lieutenant Viktor Georgievich Rakhov, who had shot down up to 14 enemy aircraft, was shot down and died two days later from his wounds. The conflict at Khalkhin Gol became the first and last battle for the 25-year-old pilot, who died without knowing that the Kremlin had signed a decree awarding him the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But August 27 did not bring anything good to the Japanese Air Force either - the most successful Japanese ace at that time, Shinohara Hiromichi, who had as many as 58 victories, died.

Viktor Georgievich Rakhov.


Hiromichi was not the last Japanese ace to life path broke off over the banks of Khalkhin Gol. In these last days of the war, Soviet pilots achieved brilliant results. On September 1, a battle took place between 188 Soviet and approximately 120 Japanese fighters, ending with the downing of 3 Soviet and 5 Japanese fighters; another Soviet plane made an emergency landing near Tamtsak-Bulak. In this battle, the Red Army Air Force snatched two more aces from the enemy ranks: Kodama Takayori with 11 victories and Sudo Tokuyu with 10.

On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the USSR and the MPR on the one hand and Japan on the other, which prescribed the cessation of hostilities from 13.00 on September 16. And on the same day, the last, largest air battle of this military conflict took place. About 120 Japanese planes attacked the Tamtsak-Bulak air hub, where 207 planes with red stars took off to meet them. In the battle, 6 Soviet and 9 Japanese fighters were shot down, as well as 1 Japanese bomber, and among the 8 dead Japanese pilots were two more aces: Shimada Kenji with 27 victories and Yoshiyama Bunji, whose assets totaled 20 victories. They became the latest addition to the cemetery of the Mikado aces, set up by Soviet soldiers on the border Mongolian soil. In general, in the September battles, the aviation of the Kwantung Group of Forces lost 24 aircraft, while the irretrievable losses of the Red Army Air Force amounted to 16 aircraft.

The winners are photographed on the wreckage of a Japanese plane.


Data from the statistical study “Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Book of losses” indicate: during the conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River armed forces The Soviet Union lost 6,472 people killed on the battlefield and died during the stages of sanitary evacuation, 1,152 died from wounds in hospitals, 8 died from diseases, 2,028 missing and 43 died in disasters or as a result of other incidents, a total of 9,703 people; sanitary losses are estimated at 15,251 people wounded and 2,225 people sick (data regarding the latter is incomplete).

Considering the scale of the battle and the almost inevitable error in statistics, including statistics of military losses, the number of irretrievable losses should be rounded to 10 thousand people, and the number of wounded to 15.5 thousand. Since the number of those captured did not exceed 2-3 hundred people, almost all the soldiers classified as irretrievable losses at Khalkhin Gol can be considered dead. It should be noted that it is not known for sure whether the Japanese returned all Red Army prisoners of war to the Soviet side - there is even evidence that some of the captured Soviet soldiers were used in the experiments of Detachment 731. Mongolian losses, including casualties among border guards, according to available data, do not exceed a thousand people , of which no more than three hundred are lost irretrievably. However, even if these data are incomplete, it is unlikely that Mongolian losses exceed 1.5 thousand people, of which at most 0.5 thousand were killed and missing. Soviet losses in the main types of military equipment reached the following values: 249 aircraft, of which 42 were for non-combat reasons, 253 tanks and armored cars.

Red Army soldiers inspect a damaged Japanese tank.

In turn, regarding Japanese losses, the following data are available: 8629 killed, 1201 missing, 9087 wounded and 2350 sick. Thus, the total Japanese irretrievable losses according to these data amount to 9830 people. However, one should take into account the encirclement of a significant part of the Japanese troops in the final phase of the battles, which almost without a doubt negatively affected the completeness of the reporting. In addition, on the monument in honor of those killed during the “Nomonhan Incident,” opened by the Japanese in Hailar in 1942, the names of 10,301 soldiers and officers of the Imperial Japanese Army who died at Khalkhin Gol were carved. Considering that during the battles, the Soviet-Mongolian troops captured 226 enemy military personnel, of which 155 were Japanese, all of whom, or almost all of them, served in the Imperial Japanese Army, the irretrievable losses of Japanese troops in this case almost reach 10.5 thousand people.
Taking into account the error, this number should be rounded to 11 thousand. As with the Red Army, almost all of these people died. Thus, taking into account the 9 thousand wounded and minus the sick, the total Japanese casualties in the conflict at Khalkhin Gol are about 20 thousand people. In aviation, the Japanese lost 162 aircraft, including 74 that were written off due to various reasons, including combat damage.

As for the Imperial Army of Manchukuo, according to some data, its losses do not exceed 3 thousand people, but there is no exact certainty about this - it is impossible to even say for sure whether all these 3 thousand are rightfully attributed specifically to losses, because many of those counted as killed or the missing could in fact simply have deserted.
So, the main participants in the battles at Khalkhin Gol: the USSR and Japan - suffered total losses minus the sick of 25.5 and 20 thousand, respectively. At the same time, it should be noted that the Japanese suffered a very high proportion of irretrievable losses, obviously caused by the encirclement with the subsequent grinding of a significant part of the 6th Military Group. It was this environment that made it possible to practically equalize the final losses of the parties, while in general during the battles the Japanese suffered less damage, which is explained by the better training of Japanese soldiers who served a full 2-3-year military service, compared to the then Red Army soldiers, most of whom were military The service took place in the form of short-term training camps. The extensive combat experience they gained in China also played into the hands of the Japanese.

Japanese weapons captured by the Red Army

One way or another, the result of the battles at Khalkhin Gol turned out to be completely disastrous for the leadership of the Imperial Japanese Army. By staging the “Nomonhan Incident,” the Tenno generals were counting on a not-too-complicated, spectacular victory in a short-lived local conflict without the threat of a full-scale war with the USSR. In fact, the Japanese troops suffered a local, but no less painful defeat. Attempts to attribute it to the technical superiority of the Red Army only aggravated the situation - in response to the Yamato generals, reproaches immediately fell that they abandoned people almost with with bare hands fight against armored Soviet armadas. Because of this, the positions of those who called for trying their luck in the southern seas became absolutely stronger in the Japanese elite. And ultimately, in 1941, it was the “southerners” who would win.

Former Japanese artillery

However, there was another reason for the island empire’s turn to the south, which was just beginning. On August 23, a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany was signed in Moscow. In Japan, which was part of the Anti-Comintern Pact, many considered it a betrayal that the Germans concluded some kind of agreement with the Russians at the very moment when the armored wedges of the Red Army were about to close the ring around the Japanese troops on the Mongolian border. On September 4, 1939, the Japanese government stated that it did not intend to interfere in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on April 13, 1941, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke signed a Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty. The USSR received, albeit unsteady, a guarantee of Japanese non-interference in the coming war between the Soviet Union and Germany.