Soviet pilots against the Israeli Air Force. Win with a clean sheet? State of Israel

Leading aviation experts have compiled a list of the five strongest air forces in the world, which was published by the National Interest. These are the USA, China, Russia, Israel and Great Britain.

According to analysts, the aviation of these countries will, until 2030, as it does today, dominate in various conflict scenarios - from isolated actions against terrorists (the number of which will grow) to a full-scale war in a particular geographic space.

These countries have a large amount of equipment of high or relatively high quality, modern methods of rapid response, air reconnaissance and global control means.

The king of the air, who has already taken his throne, is the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter, made using Stealth technology. This is a set of methods for reducing the visibility of combat vehicles in radar, infrared and other areas of the detection spectrum through specially designed geometric shapes and the use of radar-absorbing materials and coatings.

The F-35 manufacturing consortium, led by Lockheed Martin, includes world leaders in technology, avionics and aircraft engines. These are the American companies Northrop Grumman Corporation, Pratt & Whitney, Rolls-Royce, Allison and the British British Aerospace (BAE Systems).

The F-35 ensures the independence of tactical operations from enemy ground assets - not a single radar in the world sees these fighters. The level of automation of the aircraft is such that the pilot practically does not monitor the instruments and flight characteristics of the aircraft, but is focused on completing the task. Thus, flight reliability increases sharply and its dependence on the so-called human factor is significantly reduced.

The Israeli company Elbit Systems also participated in the development of the F-35; Lockheed Martin opened a technology center in Israel to interact with it. Israeli researchers and engineers created the F-35's original wing, composite materials, avionics components and a high-tech pilot's helmet, many of which are classified. The adoption of the Israeli version of the helmet is all the more pleasing because Elbit won this championship against one of the world leaders - the British concern BAE Systems.

It is in this regard, according to analysts, that the cost of fighters for Israel has dropped to $90 million, while for other countries it costs, on average, 30% more.

At the end of June 2011, the Israeli Air Force sent its specialists to the United States, where they headed a team developing the Israeli version of the fighter, the F-35I. Together with engineers from the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin, they integrated Israeli technologies into the new aircraft.

By agreement with the Israelis, the Americans for a long time hid the “Israeli elements” of the F-35 - until Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, purchasing these fighters worth tens of billions of dollars, demanded that they be equipped not with “native”, but with Israeli avionics, adapted for combat operations in the Middle East .

US Air Force have a full range of the highest indicators of air power: these are aircraft of all types without exception, and their own elemental base, which allows them to produce everything necessary for wars in the air, global reconnaissance, and waging network-centric wars with the participation of the Air Force.

The United States differs from the rest in that it produces its own aircraft, practically without the help of foreign companies. The only exceptions are 2 countries - Great Britain and Israel, which supply their developments for American fighters - avionics, weapons, helmets, accessories.

All other countries are significantly inferior to the United States in all respects, especially in terms of high technology and quality of equipment.

The US has been criticized for the high cost of fighter jets. But critics are disingenuous: it is not the cost that determines the purchase of a weapon - it is chosen according to the “efficiency/price” criterion, according to which the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II are significantly ahead of their competitors, which are also not cheap, but much less effective. However, they do not yet exist in nature.

The use of modern fighters, due to their efficiency, saves money on waging wars, as it reduces the duration of a military conflict.

By 2030, the US Air Force will have 187 F-22 generation V multirole fighters, 178 generation IV++ F-15C all-weather fighters with radar systems and infrared sensors.

But the main force of the US Air Force will be 1,800 fifth-generation F-35 fighter-bombers - “invisible” fighters that enemy radars cannot see.

The service will also include Boeing KC-46 Pegasus tanker aircraft and 100 B-21 stealth bombers.

It is also important that the United States (together with Israel) is significantly ahead of its competitors in the field of creating unmanned aerial vehicles.

Well, and of course, experts take into account the fact that the United States already (judging by many events) has a prototype of a VI and even VII generation fighter - both piloted and unmanned.

Chinese Air Force, according to experts, are progressing - the number of aircraft in the air fleet is decreasing, but the quality is increasing.

However, by 2030, China's air force will consist primarily of generation IV and IV+ fighters, significantly lagging behind the United States. We are talking about Su-30 and J series aircraft with numbers 10, 11 and 15.

China's plans include the creation of a fifth generation fighter, announced as the J-20 and J-31. However, the level of technology development in China does not yet allow the creation of a modern fighter.

China also has the Y-20 - a heavy military transport aircraft, very mediocre - from the point of view modern technologies, as well as a group of tanker aircraft.

China is expanding and diversifying its fleet of support aircraft - developing its own early warning and reconnaissance aircraft, air tankers and unmanned aerial vehicles, the most interesting of which is the Divine Eagle. But all of them are still deprived of the main thing - a technological perspective for combat use.

Russian Air Force, which after World War II were the strongest in the world for a long time, and then lost primacy to the Americans and Europeans, are today experiencing a “rebirth.” It is defined as quantitative - the army regularly receives new fighters. But in terms of quality, it should be noted that they were developed back in the late 90s, although they are being modernized.

Experts from the National Interest publication believe that if events develop according to the optimal option for Russia, then the country’s Air Force by 2030 could become second only to the United States in terms of firepower.

Experts named the best conditions for the Russian economy as rising oil prices, recovery from recession, lifting of sanctions and increased exports of goods.

But even in the worst-case scenario, experts are confident that the Russian Air Force will be among the top ten.

Two major developments have been announced in Russia - the T-50 fifth generation fighter and a new generation strategic missile-carrying bomber.

Possessing the best aerodynamics among fighters in the world, the T-50 so far only meets the requirements of the fourth generation - this is due to the lag in technology and elemental base. Aerodynamics are important for an aircraft, but today there are no more dogfights between fighters, where aerodynamic characteristics played a vital role. Today, the decisive role, as mentioned above, is played by the effectiveness of the use of fighter aircraft, and this depends on its “intelligence,” determined by the level of technology development.

There is no need to talk about a new generation Russian missile carrier, which will be stealthy and capable of carrying nuclear warheads - it doesn’t exist yet. However, there is also no doubt that it will be created. It will have to replace the supersonic strategic missile-carrying bomber Tu-160 Blackjack and the missile-carrying bomber Tu-22M (BACKFIRE - according to NATO classification).

But a characteristic detail is that the word “bomber” in the aviation of the advanced countries of the world today is used only in combination with the words “smart bombs”, and their production also requires technology. The footage where the Tu-160 in Syria opens the compartment and drops a rain of bombs flying under its own weight on the al-Nusra Front terrorists is historical, you will not see them in the future - bombs in the old sense are becoming a thing of the past as inaccurate weapons.

Regarding the Russian Air Force, experts note the negative impact on its development of a modest defense budget, aggravated by sanctions, bureaucracy and corruption.

Israeli Air Force experts put it in 4th place, believing that this is the most combat-ready aircraft in the Middle East, which in a few years will be the most powerful in the region. Expert opinion - by 2030, Israel will move up in the air force “table of ranks.”

But if Israel today lags behind the United States both in the number of aircraft and in their quality, then it lags behind China and Russia only in quantity, outpacing their aircraft fleet in terms of technology - avionics and weapons. However, it should be noted that Russia itself produces its own aircraft, and Israel flies mainly on American technology, which, however, as already mentioned, contains many Israeli patents and developments.

Today, the Israeli Air Force consists of 58 F-15A and F-15C fighters, 25 F-15I fighters and 312 F-16 multirole fighters.

For the future technological leadership in the air force predicted by experts, Israel will need to rearm its air force, since by then most of the fighters will be more than 40 years old. And this process has already begun: the F-15s are being replaced by the F-35s.

In October 2010, Israel signed an agreement to purchase 50 F-35 fighter jets at an average price of $90 million, and received permission to install a number of additional systems from its own avionics and weapons developments. Those that the Arabs later asked to install on their planes.

A new qualitative stage in Israeli fighter aviation began on December 12, 2016: on this day, the first 2 fighters landed at the Nevatim military airbase. By this time, a group of Israeli pilots and technicians had been trained at the Pentagon base in the United States.

On the night of January 13, 2017, several powerful explosions occurred at the Mezze military airfield, an important strategic air base for the Syrian government forces, 5 km from the presidential palace in Damascus. As a result of the missile strike, a strong fire broke out, which could not be extinguished for a long time, and high-ranking officers of the Syrian army and Hezbollah were killed. And this did not happen by chance.

In recent years, Israel has been closely monitoring the supply of Iranian missiles to Hezbollah. Lebanon prohibits doing this through its territory, and therefore the Shiites use Mezze airport for these purposes - and the action of the new Israeli F-35s, and this, according to military experts, was exactly them, turned surface-to-surface missiles, as well as anti-aircraft and Hezbollah anti-ship missiles into a pile of iron.

Noteworthy is the fact that the actions of the “invisible” missiles were not detected by the Syrian missile defense radars.

RAF- Royal air Force, in 5th place in the ranking, and they will maintain their place by 2030.

By this time, 160 powerful Eurofighter Typhoon multirole fighters equipped with laser-guided Paveway series guided bombs manufactured by the American corporation Rockwell Automation will fly under the British flag.

The RAF's current Panavia Tornado combat jets will be replaced by 138 F-35Bs by 2030.

2030 era unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with artificial intelligence, “smart” weapons, including laser ones. They are the future of the world's air forces.

Today, the rating of this class is led by the USA and Israel by a large margin from their pursuers. The leader in the export of military UAVs is Israel. The main importers are European countries, India, Arab countries, Australia, Japan, Russia.

The rival of the UAVs, which they are designed to displace, is the F-35, the operation of which throughout the coming years should tune the intelligence of the best UAVs in 2030.

STATE OF ISRAEL. ISRAELI ARMED FORCES

Operationally, the armed forces are divided into three territorial districts (Northern, Central and Southern), and by branch of service - into ground, air and naval forces.

Nationwide Army. The Israeli army has a relatively small number of career military personnel and consists primarily of conscripts and reserve personnel (the number of career military personnel is relatively large in the Air Force and Navy). For this reason, the Israeli armed forces, unlike most other armies, do not form a closed professional corporation, but are in the full sense of the word a national army. The consequence of this is the interest of the Israel Defense Forces in raising the professional and general educational level of the country's population. Those mobilized receive in army technical schools the knowledge and skills necessary in modern military affairs; special educational programs aimed at expanding and deepening the knowledge of soldiers in the field Jewish history, geography, archeology of Israel, etc.; the Army ensures that new returnees and recruits whose formal education remains incomplete acquire better reading and writing skills; The army is sending specially trained female instructors to development cities to eliminate educational inequalities.

Tsakhal has a number of special service programs, including:

Yeshivot x ha-h esder- a special version of conscript service, in which service is combined with study at the yeshiva. This service is intended for students of yeshiva high schools ( yeshivot tikhoniyot), Tsakh al conscripts. The duration of such service is 4 years, including 16 months of combat service, and the rest of the time is study in the yeshiva. In August 2005, the number of soldiers and officers serving in Tsakhal under this program reached six thousand people, of which 88% were in combat units.

The tasks of air defense include:

• Providing air defense for the country. This task is performed by Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems and advanced HAWK systems in cooperation with the command and control system and fighter aircraft.
• Ensuring the country's missile defense. The warning about the launch of ballistic missiles towards Israel comes from a network of American early warning satellites. The interception is carried out by specialized Hets-2 anti-missile missiles, and in case of failure - by Patriot missiles.
• Defense of individual military and civilian facilities (for example, Air Force bases, nuclear center in Dimona).
• Air defense of ground forces. This task is performed by mobile air defense systems; their divisions are armed with the Stinger and Chaparral anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as the Makhbet missile and artillery systems.
• Security and ground defense of Air Force bases.

The first air defense systems (40-mm L-70 anti-aircraft guns) were supplied to Israel by the German government in 1962; in the same year, the first HAWK anti-aircraft missile systems arrived in Israel from the United States. It was Germany and the United States that supported the development of Israeli air defense throughout the subsequent years. As of 2002, Israel had 22 batteries of heavy anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as approximately 70 man-portable light anti-aircraft missile systems.

Israeli Navy for a long time remained the least developed branch of the military. However, after unprecedented successes in 1973 (19 destroyed enemy ships without losses on the Israeli side), a period of rapid development began, and currently the Israeli Navy is considered not only one of the most operational in the world, but also the dominant naval force in the Eastern Mediterranean basin.

The Israeli Navy has approximately 9,500 personnel; during mobilization, the number of naval personnel reaches 19,500 people. The Israeli Navy (data for 2002) has six submarines (three of the obsolete Gal model, laid down in 1973–74, commissioned in 1976–77) and three of the Dolphin model, laid down in 1994–96, commissioned in 1999–2000), fifteen (according to other sources - twenty) corvettes of the Eilat type and missile boats of the Hetz, Aliya and Reshef types and thirty-three patrol boats boats.

Several units have been created in Tsakhal and the police, the main task of which is opposition to terror. Among them: Yamam - a special police unit for the fight against terror, responsible for anti-terrorist operations in Israel; Saeret Matkal (General Staff Intelligence), responsible for anti-terrorism operations outside the country; Shayetet-13 (13th Flotilla, Navy special forces, responsible for anti-terrorism operations abroad involving naval forces); Lothar Eilat (Lotar - lokhma be-terror/fight against terror/, unit 7707, responsible for anti-terrorist operations in Israel near the city of Eilat; due to the geographical remoteness of Eilat and its proximity to the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, it was decided to create a separate unit for it). In addition, anti-terrorist special forces were created in each of the military districts: Sayeret "Golani" (reconnaissance unit of the Golani infantry brigade) - in the North, Sayeret Tsankhanim (reconnaissance unit of the parachute airborne brigade), Sayeret Nahal (reconnaissance unit of the Nahal infantry brigade) and Sayeret " Duvdevan" (special unit of the so-called mistarvim, operating in Arabic camouflage in controlled territories) - in the Central and Sayeret "Giv'ati" (reconnaissance unit of the "Giv'ati" infantry brigade) - in the Southern Military District. In 1995, Sayeret “Egoz” (disbanded in 1974 along with Sayeret “Kheruv” and Sayeret “Shaked”) was re-established to counter the “guerrilla war” in Lebanon; Subsequently, the fighters of this detachment made an invaluable contribution to the fight against Palestinian terror in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza.

Nuclear potential. The existence of a constant threat to national security from its Arab neighbors forces Israel to maintain powerful armed forces in the country, equipped modern means armed struggle, including weapons of mass destruction. Although Israel has never conducted an open nuclear test, it is estimated that Israel is now the world's sixth-largest nuclear power, behind the United States, Russia, England, France and China. Israel's nuclear program dates back to the 1950s; D. Ben-Gurion and S. Peres stood at its origins. Scientific support for the nuclear program was carried out by a team of scientists from. In 1952, under the control of the Ministry of Defense, the Nuclear Energy Commission was created, headed by E. D. Bergman. In 1956, Israel entered into a secret agreement with France to build a plutonium nuclear reactor. Construction of the reactor began in a remote corner of the Negev Desert, near Dimona. The installation for reprocessing irradiated fuel was created in 1960, and the 26 MW reactor was put into operation in 1963 (Now the reactor power reaches 150 MW, which, according to experts, makes it possible to obtain weapons-grade plutonium in quantities sufficient to produce more than ten bombs average power per year.) By the Six-Day War, the first two nuclear devices had already been assembled; starting in 1970, Israel began to produce from three to five nuclear charges per year. At the same time, Israel refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, having reached an understanding with the US administration (and personally with President Richard Nixon), according to which it was “assumed, but not recognized,” that Israel is a state possessing nuclear weapons. Only on July 13, 1998, at a press conference in Jordan, Sh. Peres, who was then the Prime Minister of Israel, publicly admitted for the first time that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, but neither he nor any other Israeli leader either then or later have not released any details related to this area. According to various estimates, Israel could potentially have by now from one hundred to five hundred nuclear warheads, the total TNT equivalent of which could be up to fifty megatons. Since 1963, Israel has been creating ballistic missile systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Back in 1989, the Jericho-2B ballistic missile with a range of up to 1,500 km, capable of hitting targets, including throughout Libya and Iran, was successfully tested. The Israeli Armed Forces also have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons (including American-made F-16, F-4E Phantom and A-4N Skyhawk aircraft). Israel is the only power in the Middle East with a high degree of probability of having nuclear weapons systems based on land, sea and air.

Israeli defense spending in 2002 amounted to $9.84 billion (1984 - $4.3 billion). Although Israel's defense spending has been steadily increasing, on a per capita basis it has remained relatively stable, albeit quite high - approximately $1,500 a year.

The military assistance Israel receives from the United States makes a major contribution to maintaining Israel's defense capabilities. Israel first received free military assistance from the United States in 1974 (worth one and a half billion dollars). For the period from 1974 to 2002. Israel received gratuitous military assistance from the United States totaling $41.06 billion. At the same time, Israel is obliged to spend most of its military assistance funds in the United States to purchase military equipment, spare parts, ammunition and equipment, which hinders the development of defense industry enterprises in Israel itself.

Procurement, production and export of weapons. The first large purchases of weapons were made in 1948 in Czechoslovakia (rifles, machine guns, and later Messerschmidt-type fighters). At the same time, Israel bought weapons from France and other countries, and also acquired surplus American military equipment. In 1952, Israel signed a military procurement agreement with the US government, but during this period the share of Israeli military purchases from the US was insignificant. First jet planes Israeli Air Force - "Meteor" - were purchased from Great Britain, which over time became the main supplier of naval equipment, primarily destroyers and submarines. In the 1950s France is gradually becoming the main supplier of weapons to the Israel Defense Forces (primarily jet aircraft) - right up to the embargo on arms supplies to Israel imposed on June 2, 1967 by President de Gaulle. In the 1960s The role of the United States as a supplier of weapons to the Israel Defense Forces is increasing, but the United States becomes the main supplier only after the Six-Day War.

The strength of the IDF is determined not only by modern weapons purchased abroad, but largely depends on the industrial infrastructure with which the Israeli armed forces form a single military-industrial complex: the armed forces pose technical tasks for the Israeli military industry, and the military industry enriches the arsenal Tsakh ala with its technical achievements, opening up new operational capabilities. The high level of the Israeli military industry is the result not so much of economic factors as of political decisions, since from the very first days of the existence of the Jewish state it became obvious that in emergency circumstances one could not rely on the delivery of weapons and equipment ordered abroad. Today, the products of Israeli industry cover virtually all major branches of military production and include electronic and electrical equipment (in particular, radar and telecommunications equipment - an area in which Israel is among the world's best producers), precision optical equipment, small arms, artillery and mortars, missiles, some of which are the most advanced in their class, tanks, aircraft (light - for operational communications and maritime patrol, transport, unmanned, fighters and fighter-bombers), combat ships, ammunition, personal equipment, military medical equipment and etc.

By the beginning of 2002, the total number of enterprises of the military-industrial complex (MIC) of Israel was about one hundred and fifty, and the total number of people employed in defense enterprises exceeded fifty thousand people (of which about twenty-two thousand people are employed in three state companies: the Aviation Industry concern ", the association "Military Industry" and the Department for the Development of Armaments "Rafael").

The total production volume of Israel's military-industrial complex in 2001 exceeded $3.5 billion, and Israeli defense enterprises signed contracts to export their products in the amount of $2.6 billion (Israel accounts for 8% of world arms exports). The Israeli military industry not only provides a significant part of Tsakh Al's needs for weapons, equipment and supplies, but also exports hundreds of millions of dollars worth of its products to the South (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru) and Central (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico ) America, South Africa, East Asia(Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand) and many other countries that avoid publicity of their military purchases in Israel, as well as in NATO countries, including the United States. In recent years, Israel has been successfully developing military-technical cooperation with China, India, Turkey, and Eastern European countries.

The products of the Israeli military industry are in demand on the world market due to their high quality. Aircraft converted by Israeli enterprises in recent years are in service with Croatia, Romania, Turkey, Zambia, Cambodia, Burma, Sri Lanka and other countries. Israel controls 90% of the global market for unmanned aircraft, with the US being the main buyer; Many other countries are also acquiring this equipment. Among the important objects of Israeli exports of military equipment, communications equipment should also be noted (for example, systems for searching and detecting ejected pilots of airplanes and helicopters, as well as reconnaissance officers and special forces soldiers, allowing their location to be determined with an accuracy of 10 m); sights and night vision devices for both small arms and armored vehicles and helicopters; electronic combat control systems for units of various levels; radar installations for different types of weapons; means of searching and detecting mines and unexploded ordnance (which is very important for many countries in Asia and Africa); robots for safely detonating detected explosive devices; small arms and many other types of military equipment and supplies. The advantage of Israeli weapons and military equipment supplied to the foreign market is that almost all of it has been tested in real combat operations, modified in accordance with the requirements of the field conditions of its operation, and therefore is characterized by very high reliability. Income from the export of Israel's military industry serves its further development.

AN UPDATED VERSION OF THE ARTICLE IS PREPARING FOR PUBLICATION

Soviet military pilots, who entered into an air battle with Israeli fighters, lost 5 aircraft without shooting down a single enemy aircraft.

For forty years now there have been legends about this fight. 100 Soviet aces. 50 deadly MiG-21 interceptors, the best modification of the MF at that time. The Russian “legion of death”, urgently transferred to the Middle East, was supposed to radically change the balance of power in the air.

Youth and anger. The desire to fight to the last drop of blood - as bequeathed by the fathers who took Berlin. The Motherland will provide you with the best equipment and teach you all the necessary skills of a fighter pilot. The winning squad. Thunderstorm of the air ocean.

We were preparing for this fight. The best of the best were selected for the decisive battle - the 135th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the USSR Air Force, which underwent special training at training grounds in the southern regions of the USSR. While the Soviet “falcons” were making turns over the Crimea and the Caspian Sea, trying to get behind each other, the Israelis were swallowing the blood of a “war of attrition” and studying, studying, studying, practicing their own air combat techniques.

Only old men go into battle - the best Soviet pilots against Amos Amir, Asher Snir, Abraham Shalmon and Avi Gilad. Only these four aces had a total of more than 20 aerial victories. The Israeli Air Force command rightly believed that there was no second unit in the world equal in quality of training and capabilities to the squad of “air killers” under the command of Amos Amir.
Two teams of professionals. Two scorpions locked in one vessel. Only one should remain alive. Bolivar can't stand two.

There is a painful unknown ahead. With a shield or on a shield. Internationalist warriors, our country has given you a great honor - the right to represent the interests of the Soviet Union in the region of the Middle East conflict. I have no right to order. Volunteers gathered here. Please, do everything right there and come back alive.
Leaving the room, he added in a stern voice: “Keep in mind, comrades: if you are shot down beyond the Suez Canal line, we don’t know you, get out yourself...” (from the pilots’ recollections of a meeting with USSR Defense Minister A. Grechko)

A secret mission in one of the most dangerous hot spots on the planet. On the wings and fin are the insignia of the Egyptian Air Force. In the forward part of the fuselage there is a tactical number, written in fancy Arabic script. The personnel of the unit, all pilots and technicians are “ana khabir rusi” (translated as “I am a Russian specialist”). The MiGs were based at the air bases of Kom Aushim, Beni Suef, Janaklis, and the forward airfield in Katamiya was periodically used.

The all-seeing intelligence service Mossad has already reported the arrival of the Russians. These are not ordinary instructors, these people came here to fight. There was a brief moment of confusion on the other side of the Suez Canal: A direct existential threat to the State of Israel? But what about maintaining neutrality? How justified is shooting at planes with Russian crews? Could this be the spark of the Great War?
“No, we must fight,” Prime Minister Golda Meir took the initiative into her own hands – “if necessary, immediately engage in battle.”

They carefully prepared for the general duel - from the first half of April 1970, weekly meetings between Russians and Israelis began. Alas, each time the opponents dispersed in different directions, never daring to engage in combat. Israeli pilots carefully observed the behavior of their potential opponents, tracked all their maneuvers and formation patterns during sorties, and studied the control style of Soviet fighters.

If you saw a Mirage, don’t take a turn!

Our pilots view the enemy with no less interest. Here he is! Literally a couple of tens of meters away, to the side, the thick-bellied carcass of the Phantom slides. The American-made two-seat fighter is simply gigantic - 20 tons of continuous speed and fire - versus 8 tons of the MiG's maximum take-off weight! The McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom's suspensions are studded with multiple air-to-air cruise missiles, two engines, and a sophisticated array of on-board electronics. An exceptionally dangerous enemy.

Israeli Air Force F-4E Phantom II

Instead of a deadly and senseless “carousel” with French cars, Soviet pilots were recommended to “keep their distance”, using their trump card - the high thrust-to-weight ratio of the MiG-21. The main thing here is the position at the beginning of the battle and a portion of sharp, energetic maneuvers that allow you to save energy while constantly remaining in a more advantageous position.

...By June 1970, Soviet pilots had flown about 100 sorties to intercept intruders in the skies of Egypt, alas, every time Israeli aviation refused to engage in battle - if there was the slightest danger of a military clash, the enemy immediately retreated deep into their territory. The game of hide and seek continued until June 25, 1970 - on that day, a pair of Soviet MiGs (pilots Krapivin and Salnik) secretly went out to intercept a flight of Skyhawk attack aircraft - one of the R-3 homing missiles fired by the MiGs hit the engine of an aircraft with a Star of David on the fuselage . However, the tenacious Skyhawk managed to stabilize its flight and, smoking with its torn nozzle, disappeared into the sky beyond the Suez Canal.

The heady taste of victory demanded immediate continuation - an ambush on Israeli Mirages was planned for June 27: Egyptian MiG-17s launched a provocative strike on Israeli positions on the eastern side of the canal - then, according to the plan, a flight of Mirages was to rise to intercept the impudent MiGs . Egyptian planes, used as bait, will lure them into their territory, where three groups of MiGs with Soviet crews will enter the battle. Next, the enemy will simply be smashed into the air.

The plan didn't work. Apparently sensing something was wrong, the Israelis refused to rise to intercept. Having ironed out the Israeli stronghold, the Egyptian planes calmly returned to their airfields. The trouble happened in the evening of the same day. The Egyptians repeated the strike - this time four Mirages fell out of the hot haze of the Sinai air. They managed to lure them into Egyptian territory, however... Russian fighters are nowhere to be found! The disgusting interaction between the Russian and Egyptian commands did not allow the interceptors to be raised in time. The Israelis shot two MiG-17s, as in a training exercise, and withdrew beyond the canal line with impunity. The beating of the Egyptian MiGs was observed by four “Russian” MiG-21s, but the ground control command prohibited entering into battle until the arrival of the other two units.

On July 30 a general battle was fought. That battle that they had been waiting for so long and for which they were preparing so hard. In a number of Russian sources, this event takes place under the designation “Battle of El Sokhna.” Official Israeli name: Operation Rimon 20.

Over the course of 40 years, this story has become overgrown with such an unimaginable number of myths and legends that it is almost impossible to establish the exact details, nature and chronicle of the brutal air battle between the USSR Air Force and Hel Haavir (Israel Defense Forces Air Force) that took place on July 30, 1970. The only thing we can talk about with some degree of confidence is: the approximate composition of the forces, the names of some participants and, most importantly, its tragic results - several MiGs with Soviet crews were actually shot down that day. As a result of the air battle, the following were killed:

Zhuravlev Vladimir Aleksandrovich - captain, senior pilot. He was awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Banner and the Egyptian Order of Star of Military Valor.

Yurchenko Nikolai Petrovich - captain, flight commander. He was awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Banner and the Egyptian Order of Star of Military Valor.

Yakovlev Evgeniy Gerasimovich - captain, flight commander. He was awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Banner and the Egyptian Order of Star of Military Valor.

One thing is absolutely clear - this was an organized ambush by the Israeli Air Force (it’s called Operation Rimon-20). But how did it happen that the Soviet pilots ended up trapped? And why couldn’t they get out of it?

There are many answers. According to Israel's jingoistic version, twenty Soviet MiG-21s attacked a "defenseless" pair of Mirage reconnaissance aircraft (bait). Alas, to their surprise, the Russians discovered four fighters flying closely in front of them, so that only 2 marks were displayed on the screens of Egyptian ground radars. Realizing that this was some kind of setup, the Russians twitched and SUDDENLY found themselves surrounded by 12 more Israeli Air Force planes.

20 MiGs against 16 Phantoms and Mirages. As a result, experienced Israeli fighters shot five Soviet aces like partridges and, without losing a single aircraft, returned to their airfields. That night, a feast was buzzing at the Khel Haavir air bases - happy pilots drank away their bonuses for the Russians they killed...Happy end!

The version is vulgar and, naturally, very far from the truth. For example, one of the noteworthy versions from the Ukrainian researcher V. Babich is as follows:

There was no trace of any 20 vs 16 battle. That day there were several battles, separated in time and space - and each time the MiGs fought with many times superior enemy forces - when one Soviet four entered the battle, the other four MiGs were already leaving the battle with a critical remaining fuel. The Israelis calculated everything and were able to achieve a concentration of forces in the right place at the right moment.

Captain Yurchenko was the first to be shot down - his MiG exploded in the air when hit by a Sidewinder missile. A few minutes later, captains Yakovlev and Syrkin had to eject - alas, upon landing, captain Yakovlev fell into a crevice and fell to his death (there is a version that the canopy of his parachute was burned by the jet stream of a fighter flying nearby).

It is still unknown exactly how Captain Zhuravlev died - according to eyewitnesses, he fought alone against four enemy aircraft until he was shot down by a stray cannon fire from the Mirage. It is believed that two Israeli pilots, Ifta Spektor and Abraham Salmon, almost became his victims, as they barely managed to reach Israeli territory in their damaged aircraft.

Mirage explosion

Yurchenko - shot down, killed; Yakovlev - shot down, killed; Syrkin - shot down, survived; Zhuravlev - shot down and killed.
But what about the fifth Russian plane shot down? And he disappeared! Nothing is known about the downed plane or its pilot.

According to rumors, the Israelis managed to shoot down Captain Kamenev’s plane, but there is no evidence of this. In addition, Captain Kamenev himself subsequently continued to serve in the ranks of the USSR Air Force. Rumors, rumors... sometimes they say that one of the MiGs made an emergency landing at one of the Egyptian airfields. Nobody knows what really happened.

At the same time, there are witness statements according to which, after the battle, Israeli search and rescue helicopters circled over the battlefield - did the “unbreakable” Khel Haavir really suffer any losses? It's possible. The operation involved many Mirages from the 101, 117 and 119 squadrons, as well as multi-role Phantom fighters from the 69 squadron of the Israeli Air Force. There is a high probability that the fact of the loss of one (or several) vehicles was carefully hidden, and the results of the battle were falsified.

Without resorting to dubious conspiracy theories, the following reliable facts can be established:
As a result of the battle on July 30, 1970, 4 MiG-21s were shot down, killing three Soviet pilots.
Reliable losses of the Israeli Air Force - the shot down Mirage of Asher Snir, which landed at the Refadim airbase.

After battle

Sad and instructive story. Without wanting to “falsify the facts” (it wasn’t us who shot down, but we shot them down!) or “find the culprits” (there were more of them! It’s not fair), I’ll note that the Israeli pilots actually had a number of serious advantages.

1. The Israeli Air Force had the opportunity to thoroughly study the MiG-21 fighter.
On August 15, 1966, Iraqi pilot Munir Redfa hijacked a MiG-21 to Israel (Operation Penicillin). The plane was carefully studied, disassembled and even flown - the Israelis received a complete understanding of the design, combat capabilities and secrets of the Soviet fighter. Soviet pilots, alas, did not have such an opportunity - their acquaintance with enemy Mirages and Phantoms took place directly in air combat.

2. The Israelis used the latest tactics - excellent organization of the battle, the use of electronic warfare - barrages of electronic interference “clogged” all Soviet communication lines, completely disrupting battle control.

3. Combat experience. The Israeli Air Force really had an impressive practice of conducting air combat - every day, for many years, Khel Haavir fighters flew out to intercept air targets - regular air battles over the entire range of altitudes, dashing chases and exchanges of missiles, sorties to escort strike groups... Similar things leave their mark on the organization of aviation combat work.
One of bright examples- meticulous coverage of the situation in the air: not only the current courses of the aircraft, but also their radio communications were plotted on the combat tablet - this made it possible to understand the situation in a matter of seconds and redirect the aircraft to where they were especially needed.

4. The most important thing. Pilot training and combat control system.
In one interview, the commander of the Israeli Air Force, Lieutenant General Mordechai Hot, said: “We just tell the squadron commander what needs to be done, and he decides how to do it.” Analyzing the results of combat sorties, the Israeli Air Force shifted the center of gravity of preparation for combat to the flight level. The squadron commander independently planned the scenario for the upcoming operation, using “home preparations” and accumulated data on the behavior of enemy aircraft in the air.

Unlike Israeli pilots, Soviet fighters were shackled by a monstrous chain of prohibitions, recommendations and regulations. It is no coincidence that immediately after the tragic events of July 30, 1970, the commander of the Soviet aviation group in Egypt, General Grigory Ustinovich Dolnikov, gathered all the participants in the battle:

The meaning of what was said was that all prohibitions and restrictions on aerobatics and combat maneuvering were lifted. We had to start air training from scratch and be guided in it by our common sense, and not by someone else’s conscience. The General encouraged us to trust our own instincts and intuition, and he himself pledged to believe in our common good fortune.

“Egyptian fighters in the “war of attrition”,” History of Aviation, No. 2/2001

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"Fire in the Sky" by Amos Amir (brigadier-general). UK: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2005

From the very beginning of its existence, Israel was involved in a long history. The Jews' refusal to accept the UN-approved international plan for dividing Palestine into Arab and Jewish states worsened the situation. In the first stage, from November 30, 1947 to May 14, 1948, Jewish and Arab paramilitary forces fought for control of the territories of Palestine. After the United Nations mandate to govern Palestine expired on May 15, 1948, Israel declared independence, signaling the start of a full-scale war. In it, Israeli armed forces and settlements were opposed by troops from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen, whose goal was the elimination of Israel as a state.

In combat, Israel needed strong aviation like air, but it had to be collected bit by bit, hastily purchasing military aircraft from Europe. On May 31, 1948, the creation of Heil Ha'Avir, the Israeli Air Force, was officially announced, which was almost immediately used in battle. Within less than six months, Heil Ha'Avir became a significant fighting force, so that the numerical ratio of aircraft was 1 :4 in favor of Israel.

The First Arab-Israeli War (according to the Israeli version - the “War of Independence”) ended on July 18, 1949 with the victory of the Israelis. The latter managed to defend the independence of their state and expand its territory. However, this was only the beginning of many years of bloody confrontation.

SUEZ CRISIS (NOVEMBER, 1956)

In 1952, King Farouk, who ruled Egypt, was overthrown as a result of a military coup, and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power. Determined to end the British military presence in his country, he achieved this goal by 1956. That same year, he nationalized the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company, taking control of the most important waterway and thereby threatening trade ties between France and Britain with their colonies in the Middle and Far East. As a result, these countries came to the conclusion that a military solution to the problem was necessary. For this purpose, Operation Musketeer was planned.

In this case, Israel was assigned the role of “instigator.” His troops were to capture the Mitla Pass in the western Sinai Peninsula, ostensibly in retaliation for Palestinian guerrilla attacks on Israel carried out from the Gaza Strip. On October 24, 1956, Great Britain, France and Israel signed the Sevres Agreement, according to which an Israeli raid was planned on October 29, after which Egypt was supposed to present an Anglo-French “ultimatum” to withdraw troops from the Suez Canal zone. In this operation, Israel pursued its own interest - to establish control over the Sinai Peninsula, driving out Egyptian troops from there.

By the beginning of hostilities, the Egyptian Air Force had approximately 70 units of first-line military equipment. The most combat-ready units were equipped with Soviet aircraft: two squadrons of MiG-15 fighters and a squadron of Il-28 bombers. In Fayid, one squadron of Vampire and Meteor aircraft was based, which were planned to be removed from service, but for now they were still on combat duty and could use forward-based airfields on the Sinai Peninsula. These forces were provided by three transport squadrons (60 aircraft at the Almaza and Deversour bases). Six other units (having 84 piston and jet aircraft different types) were either in the stage of rearmament or liquidation and therefore were not considered combat-ready. Having learned about the concentration of Anglo-French troops in Malta and Cyprus, the Egyptian command, in order to counter this threat, redeployed a number of units from the Sinai Peninsula to the Nile Delta, as a result of which the number of Egyptian forces in Sinai was halved. Most of the aircraft were also aimed north rather than east, towards Israel.

To attack Egypt, the British and French assembled an impressive tactical air armada, which included fighter-bombers, medium bombers, as well as cover fighters and reconnaissance aircraft. They were based in Malta and Cyprus, as well as on five aircraft carriers and one airborne landing ship. Allied ground forces included paratroopers and marines with tanks.

France had at its disposal four wings of fighter-bombers (100 aircraft), three air wings of transport aircraft and two aircraft carriers, Arromanches and Lafayette, with F4U-7 Corsair fighters on board. On October 23, three squadrons of French fighters arrived in Israel - their “Misters”, along with F-84 fighters, were supposed to defend Tel Aviv. F-84s later supported the Israeli army in the Sinai Peninsula. Noratlas transport aircraft were used to deliver supplies to Israeli paratroopers in the Mitla Pass and Central Sinai. All vehicles intended for operations over Egyptian territory were marked with Israeli identification marks. Thus, Israel was able to concentrate the bulk of its air force in the Sinai direction. These included 69 jet and 45 piston fighters, as well as B-17 bombers and transport aircraft. Mister fighters formed an air defense system, and Meteors, Hurricanes, P-51 and Mosquito stormed ground targets. B-17s flew bombing missions at night.

The British had the most modern aviation. Their Royal Air Force (RAF) allocated four squadrons of Valient heavy bombers and six squadrons of Canberra medium bombers, which were based on the island of Malta, for Operation Musketeer. The main air power of the RAF was concentrated in Cyprus: 10 squadrons of Canberra bombers, four squadrons of Hunter and Meteor fighters performing air defense missions, four squadrons of Venom aircraft for ground attack and six transport squadrons of Hasting and "Valetta". The British Fleet Air Force had three aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea - Albion, Bulwark and Eagle. They carried 11 squadrons of Wyverns, Sea Venoms and Sea Hawks. The Suez War began in the late afternoon of October 29, 1956, when Israeli troops invaded the Sinai Peninsula in two places. Some 1,600 paratroopers were then dropped by C-47s at the eastern end of the Mitla Pass, while Israeli Mister fighters patrolled over the central Sinai Peninsula, awaiting a response from the Egyptian Air Force. By 20:00, Egyptian troops began to cross the Suez Canal towards the Mitla Pass. An hour later, six French transport aircraft dropped heavy weapons on the Israeli paratroopers.

At dawn on October 30, four British Canberra bombers attempted to reconnoiter the Egyptian air defense system in the canal zone. All of them were intercepted by MiG-15 fighters, and one bomber was damaged. Early in the morning of the same day, the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim al-Awwal attempted to shell the port of Haifa, but was attacked by Israeli Hurricane fighter-bombers, suffered serious damage and was forced to surrender to the Israeli destroyers. Almost at the same time, a flight of four Egyptian Vampires was conducting reconnaissance of Israeli positions in the areas of Mitla and El-Thamed and to the east of them. Behind them, two hours later, MiG-15s appeared, which destroyed six cars and one Piper “Cub” plane that did not have time to take off. More large quantity The equipment was destroyed during subsequent raids by Egyptian "Vampires" accompanied by "MiGs". As a result, the Israeli command decided to organize constant patrolling of the canal zone with its Mister fighters. The first air battle began at the end of the day, when six MiGs pulled away six Misters patrolling over the canal, and at that time two Egyptian Meteors launched an effective bombing attack on the positions of Israeli paratroopers east of Mitla. Soon reinforcements arrived on both sides, and a real battle began in the air, as a result of which two MiGs were shot down and one Mister was seriously damaged.

The Egyptian Air Force was taken by surprise by the Israeli invasion. Nevertheless, on October 30, their planes managed to carry out about fifty combat sorties. The Israeli Air Force carried out over 100 combat missions, the greatest effect of which was achieved against Egyptian troops entering the western part of the Mitla Pass. The Egyptians lost almost all of their vehicles, but were still able to take advantageous defensive positions at the heights commanding the Heitan Gorge.

On October 31 at 6.00, the British and French presented an ultimatum demanding that both sides, Egypt and Israel, withdraw their troops from the Suez Canal zone, which Israeli units had not yet reached. As expected, the Egyptians rejected this ultimatum. At dawn, four Egyptian Vampires, taking advantage of the temporary absence of Israeli air patrols, attempted to strike Israeli positions in the Mitla area. As they began approaching the target, six Mister fighters arrived. The “Vampires” still managed to bomb, but two of them were then shot down by fighters. This raid again led to serious losses of Israeli troops.

To the east, Israeli planes attacked a convoy of Egyptian armored vehicles moving south towards Bir Jifgafa, but were intercepted by Egyptian Meteors, one of which was shot down. Israeli aircraft continued strafing attacks on this column but were unable to stop it, and at the same time the Egyptian Air Force took similar action against Israeli forces advancing towards Bir Hama.

On October 31, the Israeli army suffered its only major setback of the entire campaign, suffering heavy losses after a series of unsuccessful attacks on Abu Ajaila. The Israeli Air Force was now under such a huge burden that French planes based in Israel were forced to come to their aid and attacked another Egyptian column advancing on Abu Ajeila from the canal zone.

In anticipation of an attack after the expiration of the Anglo-French ultimatum, the Egyptian air defense system in the Nile Delta and in the Suez Canal zone was put on full alert early in the morning of October 31. By this time, Soviet and Czech pilots had already flown 20 Il-28 bombers and 20 MiG-15 fighters to Syria, intended for Syrian Air Force. They were escorted by twenty unarmed Egyptian MiGs. Meanwhile, both active and reserve Il-28s of the Egyptian Air Force flew south to Luxor, where the Egyptian command believed they would be safe.

Until the very last moment, the Egyptians believed that the British and French were bluffing, and so when the first wave of Allied bombers appeared over Almaza shortly after dark, there was no blackout in the city, and the population and military personnel did not take refuge in air-raid shelters. Military equipment was not dispersed. RAF aircraft, tasked with destroying Egyptian aircraft, carried out a series of bombing attacks. Three waves of Canberra and Valient bombers, taking off from Cyprus and Malta, carried out raids on Almaza, Abu Suer, Kabrit and Cairo International Airport. The bombing was carried out from a height of 12 km. At the same time, only 14 aircraft were destroyed or damaged. The Egyptian Air Force made two attempts to intercept the enemy, but only once was the Meteor NF.Mk 13 night fighter able to get within firing range of the Valient bomber.

Early in the morning of November 1, a pair of Canberras on a reconnaissance flight were attacked by MiGs, which damaged one aircraft. Returning from reconnaissance, the pilots reported the low effectiveness of night raids, and therefore the allied command switched to new tactics. Anglo-French ground and carrier-based aircraft attacked all Egyptian airfields west of the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptians urgently dispersed their MiGs throughout the delta, but it turned out that taking off was very dangerous, since every runway was under almost constant enemy surveillance. On November 2 and 3, the Air Force Academy in Bilbeis and aircraft repair shops in Helwan were bombed. On November 6, Allied aircraft attacked railway communications, barracks and air defense facilities.

On November 2, the French Corsairs, taking off from the aircraft carrier Arromanches, headed for Alexandria, but the ship itself was, in turn, attacked by the Egyptian destroyers El Nasr and Tarek. When the Corsairs returned and attacked the destroyers, they laid a smoke screen and left. The raids continued on November 4 and 5. British carrier-based aircraft attacked airfields near Alexandria, trying to divert the attention of the Egyptians from Port Said and Port Fuad, where parachute landings were planned to be dropped. In the Luxor area on November 3, one Canberra was damaged by a MiG, and in general Egyptian air defense began to operate more effectively. On November 5, the Egyptians shot down three Allied aircraft: one Wyvern over Port Said, one Sea Hawk and one Mister over Cairo.

With the Anglo-French air offensive tying up Egyptian air power, the Israelis were able to throw large armored forces forward without fear of air strikes. As a result, the Egyptians were forced to leave the Sinai Peninsula, crossing the Suez Canal in the opposite direction on November 2.

The intensity of fighting on the ground decreased, with only isolated skirmishes taking place. In the air, things were different. Israeli and Egyptian Air Forces, or rather that. what was left of them grappled in a fierce fight. The Vampires flew from El Arish to Bir Jifgafa and Bir Rod Salim. Late on the morning of November 1, they attacked Israeli paratrooper positions near Mitla, losing one vehicle to an Israeli interceptor. Despite daytime raids by Anglo-French aircraft, three Egyptian Meteors NF.Mk 13 with an escort of MiGs appeared at noon over the Sinai Peninsula. In a battle with two Israeli Mister fighters, one MiG was shot down.

Since November 2, there have been fierce battles in the Sharm el-Sheikh area. A parachute assault force with heavy weapons was dropped on El Tor, on the western shore of the peninsula, while other Israeli units advanced along the eastern shore. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force bombed the British frigate Crane, which was blockading Sharm, mistaking it for an Egyptian ship. On November 3, Mustangs and B-17s destroyed two heavy guns of the Egyptian battery guarding the Straits of Tiran at Ras Nasran. The remaining guns were blown up on the night of November 3–4 by the Egyptian gunners themselves, who then left for Sharm el-Sheikh. The night attack failed, but a repeated assault, supported by Mustangs that dropped napalm, broke the perimeter of the Egyptian defense. After the approach of Israeli paratroopers from El Tore, the Egyptian garrison of Sharm el-Sheikh capitulated at 9.30 on November 5th.

By this time, active operations on land by the Anglo-French troops began. At dawn on November 5, carrier-based aircraft attacked Egyptian defensive positions, and at 8.20 British paratroopers had already landed at Gamil airfield on the outskirts of Port Said. Fifteen minutes later, French paratroopers also found themselves on Egyptian soil south of Port Said. The previously planned helicopter landing with the aim of capturing bridges across the canal was canceled, but reinforcements were sent to the paratroopers who had already managed to gain a foothold. At dawn the next day, after artillery barrage from naval artillery, a naval landing force, under the cover of fighter-bombers, captured the port area. Two aircraft, a Sea Hawk and one Venom, were shot down by fire from the ground. And yet, aviation provided cover for the paratroopers who made a rapid dash along the banks of the Suez Canal and reached El Cap.

According to the British and French, during the entire operation they destroyed or damaged 260 enemy aircraft in battle, including 207 jets. The Egyptian Air Force command refuted this claim, reporting the loss of only eight MiG-15 fighters, seven Il-28 bombers, nine Harvards, six S-46s, four S-47s, three civilian Dakotas and one Avro Lancaster, destroyed on earth. 62 aircraft were damaged. The Il-28s were destroyed in Luxor, where they seemed to be safe. However, French F-84Fs, equipped with additional tanks, took off from bases in southern Israel and destroyed this illusion. Near Abu Suer, about a dozen MiG-15 and MiG-15UTI aircraft from the Syrian training squadron were also destroyed.

Over the Sinai Peninsula, the Egyptian Air Force lost four MiGs, four Vampires, one Meteor and a Falcon reconnaissance aircraft. The Israeli Air Force admitted the loss of one Mister fighter, two Hurricanes, ten Mustangs and two Piper Cubs. Five more planes were shot down and crashed to the ground before reaching their bases. The French lost only one F-84 aircraft, which took off from the airfield in Lydda. The British lost four aircraft: one Canberra, which crashed on landing, two Sea Hawks and one Wyvern. To this list should be added another Canberra PR.Mk 7, shot down over the Syrian-Lebanese border.

Politically, the Suez operation turned out to be a fruitless adventure, since both world superpowers intervened: the USSR and the USA. The latter, threatening direct military intervention, separated the warring parties and forced the “winners” to return what they had captured. For Great Britain and France this was a serious political defeat. Israel also had to clear the territory of the Sinai Peninsula from its troops, but before that they removed a large number of captured weapons plus destroyed all of the Egyptians' buildings of any value.

SIX DAY WAR (JUNE 1967)

Antagonism in the Middle East had already escalated into a full-scale war twice before: in the late 40s and in 1956. Tensions began to increase again in early April 1967, when military clashes occurred in the Golan Heights, which belong to Syria. The UN's decision to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from the Egyptian-Israeli border on May 17, 1967 only added fuel to the fire. It prompted Egypt to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships.

At the end of May, the Egyptian-Jordanian-Syrian defense agreement was signed, which led to the creation of the United Arab Republic Air Force. These air forces were equipped with modern types of Soviet combat aircraft: MiG-19 and MiG-21 front-line fighters, Su-7 fighter-bombers and Il-28 and Tu-16 bombers. The main problems experienced by the Arab Air Force at this time were the poor operational reliability of the aircraft and a chronic shortage of trained crews. Only 126 out of 500 pilots could fly the MiG-21 or MiG-19. There was no pilot reserve.

Marshal of the Egyptian Air Force Sidqi and his staff feared a preemptive attack by Israel already in early June and put the air units on high alert. However, President Nasser was convinced that Israel would not dare to fight. He canceled Sidqi's order, and the Arab Air Force returned to its previous state. This was a big mistake.

At first light on June 5, 40 Israeli Mirage IIICJ and Super Mister fighters took off to the west. They were followed by two more waves of aircraft, totaling 120 aircraft. As usual, the Israeli pilots were flying at low altitude, and the Egyptian radars lost them. Since they had practiced this tactic many times in training, this did not raise suspicion among the Egyptians, and the Egyptian air defense interceptor fighters of the morning shift were relieved from patrolling as usual. This time, however, the Israeli fighters turned south to cross the Egyptian coast undetected.

At 8.45 Cairo time, when the morning patrols of the UAR Air Force had landed and most senior officers were still traveling from home for duty, the airfields at El Arish, Bir Gifgafa, Cairo West, Jebel Libni, Bir Tamada, Abu Suer, Kabrite, Beni Soueif, Inkhasa and Faytde were subject to air raids. Ten flights of four aircraft each made one bombing approach, and then several low-level approaches, firing cannons and machine guns, as well as NURS, at the parking areas of Egyptian aircraft. The first wave was followed at ten-minute intervals by the second and third. Having used up their ammunition, the Israeli pilots returned to their bases in an extremely short time. The attack by eight waves of aircraft took 80 minutes. After a ten-minute lull, air raids resumed and continued again for 80 minutes. Only 12 fighters were left to guard Israel's air borders during this operation. Sixty training "Masters", converted for attacking ground targets, did not take part in it, as they were supposed to support the actions of Israeli ground forces.

During this three-hour air attack, over 300 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed or damaged, most of them on the ground. The primary targets of the Israeli pilots were the Tu-16 long-range bombers, which posed a great potential danger to Israel, since they could carry air-to-ground missiles capable of reaching Israeli cities and towns. Both Tu-16 squadrons were destroyed. Israeli losses during these air raids amounted to 19 aircraft.

In the air, the UAR Air Force lost four unarmed trainer aircraft near Imbaba - the first losses of the war - and one MiG-21 when it took off from the airfield in Abu Suair. Another MiG-21 was destroyed when it tried to land on a cratered runway after driving off four Israeli Super Misters. The three surviving MiG-21s took off from the base in Inkhasa during a break between Israeli raids. This happened at 8.56. There was no control from the ground, but over the Cairo West base they managed to shoot down a Hurricane, which, falling, crashed into a Tu-16 standing on the ground. Perhaps the Israeli pilot did this on purpose. Another MiG-21, taking off from the airfield in Abu Sueir, shot down a Mister at 10.01, which fell at the outer border of the airfield. The last two MiG-21s that could fly were destroyed when they taxied onto the runway a few minutes later, and it was the same Mirage III that did it.

MiG-19 and 21, based in Kherghad, flew north to help their comrades, but when trying to land in Abu Suair at 10.30 they were attacked by sixteen Mirages. Four MiGs were shot down immediately, but in the air battle that ensued, neither side managed to shoot down a single aircraft. Nevertheless, all the MiGs died. They either crashed trying to land with their landing gear retracted near the cratered runways, or simply crashed to the ground when they ran out of fuel. Only at El Arish the airfield remained undamaged, because here the Israeli pilots relied mainly on cannon fire and guided bombs, similar in design to the American Bullpups, used only against parked aircraft. There was now only one Egyptian aircraft left in the air - the Il-14, on board which were Air Marshal Sidqi and other senior officers of the Egyptian armed forces. They had been flying around the battle zone since the beginning of the Israeli attack and were unable to take any immediate action to save the situation, because the Israelis did not allow them to land. Thus, Egypt's ability to launch a counterattack was eliminated.

A few hours later, in response to the Israeli attack on Egypt, Israel's other Arab neighbors also got involved in the battle. In the morning, Jordanian long-range artillery damaged at least one runway at the Ramat David airbase. However, by the time 16 Royal Jordanian Air Force Hunters struck Netanya and Kfar Sirkin, the Israelis had already advanced on Jerusalem.

At 1430 Tel Aviv time, the Israeli Air Force shifted its focus of operations from the UAR Air Force to the Jordanian Air Force and carried out raids on air bases in Mafraq and Amman and on the strategically important radar station in Ajlun. Of the 18 Jordanian Hunter fighters on the ground, 17 were destroyed. The Israelis lost only one aircraft. The remaining Hunter was then damaged, killing the two pilots. King Hussein ordered the surviving Hunter pilots to be placed at the disposal of the Iraqi Air Force command. On this first day of the war, Israeli aircraft also struck Iraqi and Palestinian units moving west from Mafraq, defensive positions around Jerusalem, the Jordanian army headquarters in Jericho, a convoy east of the Mount of Olives, and the royal palace in Amman.

The list of Israeli air targets on June 5 also included Syrian Air Force targets. At 11.45 (Tel Aviv time), 12 Syrian MiG-21s bombed an oil refinery in Haifa and attacked the Mahanaim airfield in a low-level flight. Within an hour, there was a powerful response from the Israeli Air Force, which bombed Syrian air bases in Damascus, Merj Rial, Dumeir and Seikal. The more distant T-4 airfield was raided in the middle of the day, shortly after three Israeli planes also attacked the Iraqi H-3 airbase. Although the Syrian Air Force did not suffer such catastrophic damage as the Egyptian or Jordanian ones, they still lost two-thirds of their first line vehicles.

During the day, the Israeli air force again attacked Egypt and struck Cairo international airport and at airfields in Mansoura, Helwan, El Minya, Bilbeis, Kherghad, Luxor and Ras Banas, as well as at the positions of 23 radar stations.

On the second day of the war, June 6, the Israeli Air Force concentrated its main efforts on supporting the actions of its ground forces in the Sinai Peninsula and west bank Jordan River. A strike on enemy artillery positions west of Rafah allowed the Israelis to break through the layered defense of the Egyptians. That night, a helicopter landing of Israeli commandos was landed behind Jordanian troops, east of Jerusalem. Another helicopter landing preceded the fall of Abu Ageila, the most important Egyptian fortified area near the Sinai border. On June 6, combat sorties were carried out in the Gaza and Bir Lahfan areas to support the infantry, but early in the morning all Egyptian units had already begun to withdraw from the Sinai.

Noticing this, the Israelis decided to send forward a mobile detachment to capture the Mitla and Jiddi passes. This detachment broke through the crumbling Egyptian defenses and completed its task. A significant part of the Egyptian army was trapped east of the mountains, where they were mercilessly destroyed from the air by Israeli aircraft. Just before the Mitla Pass, the entire area was littered with the mangled wreckage of thousands of Egyptian trucks, vans and jeeps.

The UAR Air Force command, in turn, decided to put together a quick fix at least some strike air group to strike from the air at the Israeli units straddling the passes, shoot them down from there and rescue a group of thousands of its troops from encirclement. On the night of June 5-6, the Egyptian command managed to somehow assemble a motley formation of 50 aircraft, mostly those that received minor damage and were immediately repaired. The Egyptians suffered the greatest damage in the flight crew: 70 pilots were killed and 200 were wounded. The first sign that they still existed came from the UAR Air Force at 5:36 a.m. on June 6, when two MiG-21s attempted to attack an Israeli convoy at Bir Lahfan. Both planes were shot down. The same fate befell a pair of Su-7 fighter-bombers, which at 0600 challenged Israeli fighters in the El-Arish area and were destroyed. Then Egyptian Su-7 and MiG-21 twice tried to shoot down Israeli helicopters. All these attacks were pinpricks compared to the beating that the Israeli Air Force inflicted on the Egyptian army.

On the night of June 5–6, Iraq and Jordan joined forces to strengthen the defenses of the H-3 airfield. At dawn on June 6, an Iraqi Tu-16 dropped bombs on the Israeli industrial complex in Netanya, but was then shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire.

Shortly thereafter, the Israeli Air Force carried out another strike on the N-3 airbase and met fierce air resistance from Iraqi and Jordanian fighters. The Arabs claimed to have shot down nine enemy aircraft, but the Israeli Air Force admitted the loss of only two aircraft. The Israelis, meanwhile, shot down one or two Lebanese Hunter reconnaissance aircraft over the Galilee. On June 6 and 7, the Israeli Air Force carried out crushing strikes on Jordanian positions in the West Bank of Jordan.

Israel also reported eight air battles that took place on the eastern front from June 6 to 7, mostly over the H-3 airbase. There, by the end of the war, one Jordanian pilot, Captain Ihsan Shardom, chalked up one Mirage, two Misters and one Süd-Cueste Vautour.

During the remaining period of the war, the UAR Air Force continued to launch small-scale, but each time more and more effective strikes against Israeli troops in the Sinai Peninsula, although this could no longer affect the outcome of the war. At dawn on June 7, four MiG-19s destroyed an Israeli convoy on the road along the Mediterranean coast. True, shortly after this, three MiGs were shot down by an Israeli air patrol. The subsequent three raids by the UAR Air Force and artillery fire from Egyptian ships slowed the Israeli advance in this sector. At El-Arish, Israeli fighters shot down one Il-18 and one MiG. Several flights of MiG-17s sent to attack the Mitla Pass and southern Sinai suffered serious losses, but also had successes. For example, a MiG-17 shot down a “Super Mister” east of Ismailia.

On June 8, reports appeared that volunteers from Algeria were fighting side by side with the Egyptian pilots. In addition, pilots from UAR Air Force units stationed in Yemen arrived in Egypt. At the same time, the combat successes of the Israeli Air Force began to decline. On June 8, they shot down only nine UAR aircraft. Late in the evening of the same day, the Israelis attacked the American reconnaissance ship Liberty from sea and air and caused serious damage to it. It is still not clear how this could happen. Military operations in the Sinai Peninsula practically ceased, and Egypt accepted the UN proposal for a ceasefire at 4.35 am on June 9.

Now the Israeli Air Force began to prepare for the next campaign, this time against Syria. But since Israeli aircraft had previously carried out a number of serious attacks on the Syrian fortified area in the Golan Heights, Syria, which found itself alone after the defeat of Egypt and Jordan, on the evening of June 8 announced its agreement to accept the UN ceasefire proposal.

Israel, however, did not give such consent, and at 11:30 on June 9, the Israeli army launched a full-scale offensive on the Golan Heights.

The Israelis initially met fierce resistance, but then, after vigorously protesting at the UN Security Council, the Syrian government withdrew its troops to defend the capital. In the air, both sides did not show much activity, although the Syrian Air Force and the UAR shot down one Mister and, possibly, one Vautour near Damascus. Some Israeli planes were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire. The Israeli air force said it shot down 12 Syrian jets in dogfights during the six-day war. The main emphasis of Israeli aviation was on supporting ground troops who fought for the capture of the Golan Heights and the city of Quneitra. They managed to complete their task before the ceasefire scheduled by the UN Security Council for 6.30 on June 10.

The so-called Six Day War ended, and Israel won a victory that had a deafening resonance throughout the world.

The Israeli Air Force destroyed 286 UAF aircraft (60 of them in air combat), 22 Jordanian Air Force aircraft, 54 Syrian aircraft, 15 to 20 Iraqi aircraft and one Lebanese. The Israeli Air Force lost at least 45 aircraft, or even more. 12 of them were shot down in air battles. 20 pilots were killed and 13 were captured.

However, lasting peace did not reign in this region. There was no reconciliation between Jews and Arabs, even for a short time. Both sides simply began to build up their forces before starting the next, inevitable, round of confrontation.

WAR OF ATTRACTION (1969-1970)

The ceasefire at the end of the six-day war brought only a brief respite in the fighting between Israel and its neighbors. Periodic artillery shelling, airspace violations (which often ended with the intruder being simply shot down) and raids by commando groups that preceded the war continued to take place after it. For example, on July 1, 1967, Egyptian troops ambushed an Israeli patrol on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. For ten days after this, artillery duels took place across the canal, which soon provoked air clashes. Israel claimed that its air force shot down 4 Egyptian MiG-17s and 3 MiG-21s in July, and 4 Syrian MiG-19s in October.

France's embargo on the supply of 50 Mirage 5J fighters, imposed even before the start of the Six-Day War, forced Israel to look for other aircraft suppliers to compensate for combat losses and modernize materiel. The United States ordered 50 F-4E fighters and 6 RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft, as well as 25 A-4E attack aircraft, previously in service with the US Navy Air Force, in addition to 48 A-4H attack aircraft (and two TA-4H) ordered even before the war. In 1968, the Israeli Air Force also received 20 Bell UH-1 multi-role helicopters.

In September 1968, artillery exchanges across the canal resumed, and in October Israeli commandos carried out several raids deep into Egyptian territory.

In March 1969, Nasser announced the start of a war of attrition. Just at this time, Israel completed the construction of the fortified Bar Lev line on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. Israel also responded to the barrage of Egyptian artillery with artillery shelling and powerful air raids. By the end of May, 21 Egyptian aircraft had been shot down. Israeli losses amounted to three vehicles. By November, the number of Egyptian aircraft destroyed had increased to 51. Of these, 34 aircraft were shot down in air combat. In January 1970, the Israeli Air Force carried out powerful strikes on “military” targets in the Cairo area, after which the Egyptian government turned to the Soviet Union with a request for help. This request was soon granted. The USSR sent five MiG-21 squadrons to Egypt, of course, along with volunteer pilots who turned out to be more prepared for battles with Israeli aces. By the end of that month, the Israelis had dropped 8,000 tons of bombs on Egypt. Since April, Egyptian fighter-bombers began carrying out short-lived air raids on Israeli fortified positions in the Sinai. In the air, Israel met serious resistance. During July alone, Soviet MiGs shot down five Israeli Phantoms. Finally, on August 8, 1970, a truce was declared.

DOOM DAY WAR (OCTOBER 1973)

In 1967, the unprecedented destruction that Israel inflicted on its historically hostile Arab neighbors created a dangerous complacency among Jews. Israel was a country of 2.5 million people surrounded by one hundred million potential enemies. The leaders of Egypt and Syria vowed to restore Arab glory by planning a campaign that would take Israel by surprise. In order to take revenge on Israel, the Arabs managed to create a powerful military coalition, the main participants of which were Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. This coalition was also supported by other Arab countries, including Algeria and Libya. Even Pakistan, not being an Arab country, came out in support of it.

As a result of a brutal war of attrition, the material base of the Israeli Air Force was largely worn out. When the countdown to the next conflict began, Israel had only 370 first-line aircraft versus 730 for Egypt and Syria. Jordan was still too weak to take part in the next war, but could tie up Israel's forces with a simple act of mobilization and would then send only a token contingent of its troops. By October 1973, everything was ready for a war that was destined to have a profound impact on the theory and tactics of air combat.

Previous victories reinforced the view in Israel that the Arabs were disorganized by nature and incapable of effective military action, despite their varied arsenal of Soviet military equipment. However, Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat adopted a plan in which the Arabs could win the war without winning on the battlefield. Its basis was to be a surprise attack on two fronts simultaneously: Syrian troops in the north and Egyptian troops in the south. While the Syrians were to liberate the Golan Heights and advance into Israeli territory, Egypt planned to launch a gradual offensive through the Suez Canal.

The Arab troops, brought forward under the pretext of exercises, went on the offensive at 14.00 on October 6, 1973. On this day, the religious holiday of Yom Kippur (Judgment Day) was celebrated in Israel, and vigilance in the country was naturally weakened. Wave after wave of Egyptian planes swept over the Suez Canal to deliver powerful attacks on Israeli airfields, anti-aircraft missile launchers, radars and many other military installations in the Sinai Peninsula. In addition to 222 fighter-bombers, Egypt used 25 KSR-2 air-to-surface missiles fired from Tu-16 bombers and tactical surface-to-surface missiles.

In the north, Syrian aircraft supported the push of its ground forces across the Golan Plateau. MiG-17 and Su-7 attacked ground targets from extremely low altitudes. Despite its relatively short range and lack of modern avionics, the Su-7 was an excellent fast fighter-bomber capable of hitting targets with great accuracy. Algerian Su-7s were stationed in Egypt and took part in the war against a common enemy, being under the operational control of the Egyptian command. MiG-17s have proven themselves to be effective in strafing attacks on enemy columns. At the beginning of the war, Egypt had 110 MiG-17s in 6 squadrons, and the Syrian Air Force had 100 aircraft of this type in service.

They were covered from above by MiG-21s. MiG-21 aircraft formed the backbone of Egyptian and Syrian fighter aircraft. Israeli propaganda tried to downplay the threat posed to the Israeli Air Force by the MiG-21, although it is now clear that this type of Soviet fighter was an unpleasant surprise for the Israelis. The Egyptian and Syrian air forces had about 300 MiG-21 aircraft, which were equipped with 18 squadrons.

Mi-8 helicopters landed assault units, which were tasked with capturing important targets in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. The first Israeli planes took off within 30 minutes, but it took two hours to bring all parts of the Israeli Air Force to full combat readiness. A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft were used in the attack role, accompanied by more modern F-4 Phantom aircraft. Of the 40 helicopters carrying troops, the Israelis managed to intercept only 5.

In general, the F-4s did most of the combat work in the air in this war. Thus, out of 28 Egyptian MiG-17 and MiG-21 fighters that took part in the first raid on the Ophir air base on October 6, 1973, a pair of Israeli Phantoms on combat duty were able to shoot down seven aircraft. Other F-4s were busy intercepting Egyptian Mi-8 helicopters that were trying to land special forces at key points in the Sinai Peninsula. Of the 40 helicopters, 5 were shot down.

"Mirages" IIICJ, together with "Nashers", manufactured in Israel analogues of the French attack aircraft "Mirage" 5 (there were, however, a few of them), were used against ground targets. It should be said, however, that both the Mirages and the F-4 brought considerable benefits, also performing air defense tasks. Even the outdated “Super Misters” B2 were thrown into the battle. There were about a dozen of them. Helicopter support was provided by Super Frelon and UH-I Iroquois vehicles.

If on the southern front such a factor as the Sinai Desert, which served as a buffer zone, acted in favor of Israel, then in the north such a factor was absent. Thus, military actions against Egypt have faded into the background for now. Israeli troops operating on the southern front were tasked with containing the Egyptians and exhausting their forces in defensive battles. Priority was given to the northern front, where Syrian troops were only a few kilometers from Israeli towns and villages. The Israeli army still managed to hold out and gain time to mobilize reserves. Heavy fighting, during which there was a fierce tank battle with heavy losses on both sides, lasted three days. In the end, the Syrian troops were exhausted, unable to take advantage of the advantage they gained in the first hours of the war, which they gained at a high cost. As a result, the Syrians were forced to begin retreating. At the same time (October 9), the Israeli Air Force responded to rocket attacks on Israeli territory by bombing the Syrian army headquarters in Damascus and an oil refinery in Homs.

On October 7, Iraq sent a squadron of Hunters to help the Syrian Air Force and, some time later, a MiG-21 unit. Jordan's contribution to the air war was limited to launching missiles at Israeli aircraft that flew into the range of Jordanian air defense systems. Since the Syrian units were now retreating, the air defense system became vitally important for Syria, because Israeli planes carrying out the strategic bombing operation flew almost to the Syrian-Turkish border. By October 12, the Syrian air defense system was in a deplorable state. Many MiG-21s were either destroyed or permanently disabled as a result of serious damage. And the role of interceptors had to be assigned to the outdated MiG-17.

Meanwhile, on the Egyptian front, things were not going well for the Israelis. Two days after the start of the offensive, Egyptian troops captured the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and firmly held it, despite 23 Israeli counterattacks. True, the Israeli Air Force managed to prevent further operations of the Egyptian commandos by shooting down 10 Egyptian Mi-8 helicopters on October 10, but the shield from the Egyptian air defense systems turned out to be extremely effective, as well as the anti-tank guided missiles with which the Egyptians defended the bridgehead they had captured. On October 7, Israeli aviation attempted to act directly against the air defense system, but this led to serious losses.

Six Phantoms were shot down, two pilots were killed and nine were captured. Another F-4E was shot down, but was able to return and, engulfed in flames, landed at Ramat David airbase. The raids on Egyptian airfields did not entail large losses for the Arabs. On October 8, Phantoms carried out raids on Syrian airfields and Egyptian pontoon crossings across the canal, and also patrolled the airspace. Four MiG-17s were shot down while attempting to attack Om Khasiba. One F-4E was included in the list of losses. Apparently he was shot down by a Syrian MiG-21.

To understand how serious the situation was for the Israelis, it is best to look at the figures for Israeli casualties.

During the first four days, the Israeli Air Force lost 81 aircraft, accounting for two-thirds of the total losses that Israeli aviation would suffer during the 19 days of the conflict. This was mainly due to the overconfidence of the Israelis, who, based on the experience of the 1967 war, treated the Egyptian S-75 air defense systems with contempt. But the Israelis paid for their frivolity - this time the Arabs had much more advanced air defense systems. Along the entire length of the canal on its western bank there are new air defense systems: S-125, Kub, Strela-1 and portable hand-held anti-aircraft systems Strela-2.

The 2K12 “Cube” air defense system was an unknown quantity for the West, and no one knew how to deal with its combined radar and electro-optical guidance system or target search radar. The missile defense batteries were placed according to the classic Soviet scheme of a multi-level air defense system. Trying to avoid being hit by any one known type of missile defense system, Israeli fighters inevitably fell into the range of other air defense systems. At the same time, the Kub air defense missile system turned out to be an unexpected gift for the Israelis, since it often could not distinguish its own aircraft from someone else’s and hit the wrong target. According to some reports, 40 Egyptian and 4 Iraqi aircraft were mistakenly shot down by missiles of this type. Even before the end of the war, 6 9K12 “Cube” launchers fell into the hands of the Israelis, which were sent by plane to the USA, where specialists carefully studied them and developed the necessary countermeasures.

On October 8, as both sides continued to bomb each other's airfields, a squadron of Algerian Su-7 fighter-bombers arrived to help the Egyptians. In contrast to the 1967 war, when the Arab air force was destroyed on the ground, not a single Egyptian vehicle was now lost in a similar manner, and the Israeli attempts to achieve this cost them dearly. Syria is less fortunate in this regard. For example, on October 8, during Israeli raids on three Syrian airfields, it lost a dozen aircraft. Since October 14, the Libyan Mirage squadron Sh/5 also took part in air battles, which, according to some sources, carried out about 400 sorties. These Mirages were piloted by mercenary pilots, mostly Pakistanis.

Despite serious opposition from Arab air defenses, the Israelis continued to attempt to attack. On October 9, 16 Phantoms set off for Damascus, tasked with striking the Syrian army headquarters, but due to bad weather conditions, only eight aircraft reached the target. Several hits were recorded at the cost of the loss of one vehicle. Its pilot was killed and its navigator was captured. Another Phantom barely made it home. During Israeli air raids on power plants and Egyptian airfields, another Phantom was shot down.

The next day, the Phantoms attacked various Egyptian and Syrian air bases and suffered no losses, but in similar operations on October 11, two F-4s were shot down by Egyptian MiG-21s over Banbah airfield. The day of October 12 passed without losses, but the next day one F-4 received serious damage from anti-aircraft artillery fire during a raid on the El Mazza airfield near Damascus. The campaign against Syrian airfields ended on October 14, but raids on targets in Egypt continued. During the bombing of Mansur, according to unconfirmed reports, two MiG-21s were shot down. In turn, the MiGs offered decent resistance, as a result of which two F-4Es ran out of fuel on the way back and were forced to land on unprepared airfields in Balway and Rephidim.

On October 15, 12 Phantoms attacked the Tanta airfield and shot down one MiG-21, but they themselves suffered losses - one F-4 was destroyed, the vehicle’s navigator was killed, and the pilot was captured. Another Phantom was seriously damaged, but somehow flew back. On October 16, anti-aircraft missile systems were attacked in the Port Said area. On October 17 and 18, these raids were repeated. During these attacks, three Israeli Phantoms were shot down and a fourth was heavily damaged. On October 18, four Syrian MiG-17s were intercepted and, according to the Israeli side, destroyed. At least one of them was shot down by the new Israeli-made Rafael Shafrir missile. On October 20, Egyptian missile defense systems destroyed the next two Phantoms.

For both sides, the moment had come when they had to replenish their units, pretty battered in battle, with supplies of new equipment from the arsenals of the superpowers. Already from October 9, two air bridges with different senders of military cargo, but with the same geographical address (USA/USSR - Middle East), were in full swing. Some American transport planes landed directly at airfields located on the Sinai Peninsula. The Soviet VTA made 934 flights to Syria alone, delivering 15,000 tons of military equipment there. American military transport aircraft C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy performed 566 missions until November 15, transporting 22,395 tons of cargo to Israel, including disassembled CH-53D helicopters. In addition, Israeli Boeing 707 and 747 delivered another 5,500 tons of equipment. A lot of cargo arrived by sea.

Egypt and Syria quickly replaced their losses in aircraft. From October 14 to October 20, their air force received 100 Soviet fighters. Israel, pretending to be a Kazan orphan, issued a desperate cry for help, declaring that by October 13 it allegedly had military supplies left for only 4 days of war, and this led to an acceleration in the pace of American supplies. Phantoms and Skyhawks were urgently removed from US Air Force and Navy squadrons and sent to the Middle East. The first 28 vehicles were there in combat readiness by October 17, and another 50 by October 22. US insignia was painted over. These aircraft were taken from the 4th and 401st TIAC and flew 200 combat missions in the Middle East War. During the battles, four Phantom squadrons (69, 107, 119 and 201st) destroyed 115 enemy aircraft and also attacked enemy ground targets.

However, the victory for Israel was brought not by additional supplies of fighters, but by US Air Force transport aircraft, which delivered new electronics and weapons: electronic countermeasures devices to combat the S-75 and S-125 air defense systems, smart bombs such as "Whaley" and HOBOS, AGM anti-radar missiles -45 Shrike, AGM-65 Maverick tele-guided missiles, Rockey cluster bombs and Toy anti-tank guided missiles for the ground forces. Stocks of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and AIM-9 and AIM-7 air-to-air missiles were also replenished.

Having received new weapons, Israel was now ready to take advantage of the tactical mistake the Egyptian command made on October 14. Egyptian troops violated the original plan and came out from under the wide and reliable shield of the air defense system. Combat operations now acquired a maneuverable character with a rapidly changing situation, which was very beneficial for Israel. The result turned out to be quite predictable. On the night of October 15-16, with the support of helicopters, units of the Israeli Navy attacked the Egyptian coast well west of the front line. At the same time, Israeli units, taking advantage of the gap in the Egyptian defense line, penetrated through it to the opposite bank of the Suez Canal.

At the same time, the fighting in the sky intensified to such an extent that the northern front was left with almost no air cover, giving the Syrians a rare opportunity to use MiG-17 and Su-7 aircraft to attack Israeli bases and an oil refinery. The Egyptian command even sent Aero L-29 jet trainers into battle as attack aircraft, which, however, did not achieve much success.

As a result of the successful actions of the Israeli units, the situation for the Egyptians became close to critical, and then, in a vain attempt to disrupt the Israeli crossing of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian command used Mi-8 helicopters as bombers on October 19. They dropped napalm from cargo bays at low altitude. When Israeli troops crushed the enemy’s defenses with a flank attack and walked through the air defense missile systems along the canal, capturing 12 of 40 anti-aircraft systems, the powerful defensive umbrella of the Arabs fell apart, leaving Egyptian aviation at the mercy of the enemy.

With Israeli troops firmly entrenched in a bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal, it became clear that Egypt, not Israel, would lose the territory. The time has come for the Arabs to use their last weapon: on October 20, Saudi Arabia stopped supplying oil to the West. At the same time, Egypt requested a ceasefire. Through mediation and pressure from the superpowers, it was decided that the truce would take effect at 18.52 on October 22. However, Israel had its own opinion on this matter, and it continued its offensive south towards Suez, trying to encircle the Egyptian 3rd Army, and only on October 24 the United States forced it to stop its troops.

In the north, there was also a struggle to have time to take more advantageous positions before the start of the truce. Backed by fighter jets, Syrian troops and Israeli helicopters flew reinforcements to mountaintop posts. In the final hours of the war, Israel managed to capture an important observation post on Mount Hermon. Helicopters and parachute troops played the main role in this operation.

To this day, each side refutes the enemy’s data on the number of air losses. What is certain is that they were stunning. Egypt and Syria lost 220 vehicles each. This should be added to 21 Iraqi Hunters and MiG-21s and 30 Algerian and Libyan fighters.

Israel lost 120 aircraft. Almost half of the losses were A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft - 53 units. These vehicles had to bear the brunt of the fight against powerful air defense systems of Arab countries and enemy ground forces.

37 Phantoms were lost. Another six of these vehicles were so badly damaged that they had to be written off. Thus, in terms of the number of losses, the Phantoms were second only to the A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft. This was explained by the specifics of the combat missions assigned to the Phantoms, in carrying out which they had to overcome heavy anti-aircraft artillery fire and enter the air defense missile defense zones. At the same time, Israeli pilots who fought on the F-4E had 115 victories in air battles.

The Arabs also shot down 11 “Mirages” or “Nashers” - unlicensed copies of the Israeli-made Mirage.

About 40 Israeli aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles, 31 by anti-aircraft artillery fire, with most of these losses occurring in the first days of the war.

The total Arab losses from air defense systems and air defense systems amounted to only 17 and 19 vehicles, respectively. About 400 air battles took place in the air. Israel admits to the loss of only 21 aircraft and claims that its pilots shot down 335 Arab aircraft, two-thirds of this number with cannon fire, and the rest with AJM-9 Sidewinder missiles or their equivalents of the Israeli production IAI Shafrir, fired at close range . Israel's own missiles destroyed two aircraft, while the Arabs destroyed 58.

Helicopters constitute a separate loss item. The Egyptians lost 42 rotorcraft, the Syrians - 13, and the Israelis - 6.

Yom Kippur ushered in a new era of air warfare, and Egypt's sophisticated, multi-layered air defense system nearly defeated Israeli air power.

This war and its results became the subject of comprehensive analysis by specialists from different countries, who made appropriate conclusions. Due attention was paid to Soviet air defense systems. The role of radar countermeasures in increasing the likelihood of successfully completing a combat mission has become more obvious. Laser-guided or television-guided missiles, which were successfully tested in Vietnam, have received much wider acceptance due to the clear effectiveness they showed in precision strikes by the Israeli Air Force in the second phase of the war. , used by Israel to collect information, have become an integral part of any modern army.

LONG LONG AIR RAIDS OF ISRAEL (1976-1985)

In four major Middle Eastern wars, Israel has shown that it has a fairly effective air force. However, in 1976 it turned out that he also had the means to transport his troops over long distances.

On June 27, 1976, an Air France plane took off from Athens to Paris. On board the Airbus A300 were the crew and 258 passengers, including four tourists who had transferred from the plane that arrived in Athens from Bahrain. 8 minutes after takeoff, “tourists”, threatening with pistols and grenades, seized the airliner. First, they forced the pilots to head for Benghazi, and then the plane flew to Uganda, where President Idi Amin gave the terrorists refuge.

The kidnappers, members of the Baader-Meinhof and PLO organizations, demanded the release of 53 prisoners held in prisons in several countries. The terrorists released several passengers, but all the Jews, who made up the majority, were left as hostages. The French crew of the plane decided to share the fate of the latter and stayed with them.

Israel, which had long been a target for terrorists, immediately launched a rescue operation. However, having flown to Entebbe, the terrorists found themselves beyond the range of most types of Israeli aircraft. Nevertheless, preparations for the operation were in full swing. It was given the code name Operation Thunderbolt (translated from English as “lightning strike”).

On Saturday, June 3, three C-130 Hercules transport aircraft took off from Afir airbase, located in the very south of the Sinai Peninsula, occupied by Israel. A Boeing 707 flew with them, providing control and communications during the operation. This formation of Israeli aircraft flew over Ethiopia and Kenya. Having passed Nairobi, where the second Boeing 707 (ambulance) had already landed, this flight approached the Ugandan airport in Entebbe. Israeli intelligence officers who had entered the airport in advance had already reported that the hijacked plane was parked at the old terminal where the hostages were kept.

The key to the success of the Israeli rescue operation in Entebbe, according to the plans of the Israeli command, was the element of surprise. In order to easily get to the place where the hostages were being held, the Israeli paratroopers dressed in the uniform of PLO fighters.

Three Boeing C-130s landed just after midnight. The first plane taxied openly to the terminal building, and a black Mercedes, the same, down to the license plate, as President Amin’s, rolled out of it through the tilted hatch-ramp. Following him were Land Rovers with people in PLO uniforms armed with AK-47 assault rifles. The Ugandan guards saluted the man in the black Mercedes, whom they took to be their president, and immediately fell, mowed down by bursts of AK-47 fire. Israeli special forces in disguise were shooting. A second wave of Israeli special forces rushed out from another plane. The soldiers burst into the terminal building shouting: “Get down! We are Israelis! A shootout ensued with the terrorists, right over the heads of the hostages.

The second unit captured the control tower and destroyed the radio transmission equipment, but the special forces commander, Colonel Yehonatan Netanyahu, was killed by a sniper’s bullet. To completely eliminate any possibility of an air pursuit, Israeli paratroopers destroyed eleven MiG fighters - almost all the combat equipment of the Ugandan Air Force.

Within a few minutes the terrorists were dealt with and the hostages were quickly put into the fourth, empty C-130, which had just landed. Unfortunately, three hostages died in the shootout.

The C-130s took off, leaving the corpses of the hijackers on the ground, as well as 20 killed and over 100 wounded Ugandan soldiers. After landing in Kenya, the Israeli planes refueled, while the wounded were transferred to a waiting ambulance plane, and then continued their flight. A triumphant meeting awaited them at Tel Aviv Ben Gurion Airport.

As a result of the successful operation, the lives of more than 100 hostages, as well as members of the crew of the Air France airline, were saved. This was achieved at the cost of the lives of three hostages and the special forces commander, Lieutenant Colonel Netanyahu, whose younger brother was later destined to become Prime Minister of Israel.

Five years later, Israel conducted another long-distance raid, but of a different nature.

Iraq has long been suspected of secretly pursuing its own nuclear weapons program, in which the Osirak nuclear center played a major role. This plant was built with the help of French and Italian specialists in the desert, 19 km southeast of Baghdad.

Israeli intelligence reported that the power plant would be operational by September 1981, and production of enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium would begin shortly thereafter.

This caused great concern among all Iraq's neighbors. But the greatest danger threatened Israel, and therefore in this country it was decided to strike a nuclear reactor from the air. This was not easy to do, since Baghdad is located more than 1,100 km from Israel. However, shortly before this, Israel acquired American-made F-15 and F-16 fighters, which were up to the task.

After careful preparation, which included building a life-size mock-up of the reactor to conduct mock attacks, the command gave the go-ahead for the operation.

On Sunday, June 6, 1981, six F-15 Eagles, which were supposed to provide fighter cover, and eight F-16 Fighting Falcons, each carrying two 1,000 kg bombs, took off from the Air Force base. Etzion.

Flying at low altitude over the desert regions of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the Falcons reached their target 80 minutes later. Having climbed steeply, the F-16 pilots saw the reactor dome clearly standing out against the desert background and immediately began approaching the target. There is reason to believe that all 16 bombs hit the facility, although one of them did not explode. The Iraqi air defense system was put on alert, but it was too late. When the Iraqi anti-aircraft guns opened fire, the Israeli planes were already flying home.

This air raid caused much anger in the Arab world, but at the same time it demonstrated that the Israelis have both the ability and the desire to launch powerful strikes against distant targets if it serves their interests. This became clear again in 1985.

On September 2, 1985, three Israelis were brutally murdered on board a yacht in Larnaca, Cyprus. The investigation established that the criminals belonged to Unit 17, a terrorist organization associated with the PLO. Israel decided to respond by striking the PLO headquarters in Tunisia.

The flight distance was significant - almost 2000 km there and back. This raid was to be the furthest in Israeli history. For this operation, F-15 Eagle fighter-bombers were allocated, which were supposed to be refueled in the air from a Boeing 707 refueling aircraft.

The target of the flight was the PLO complex of buildings in Hamam al-Shatta, where the offices of Yasser Arafat and his closest advisers were located, as well as the operations and propaganda departments and the communications center. Unit 17 was also located in this complex of buildings.

The raid was carried out on October 1. The in-flight refueling went smoothly and according to schedule. The only concern was the weather: the Gulf of Tunis was completely covered with thick clouds. However, as the planes approached the coast, the weather improved, and the F-15 pilots were able to recognize their targets on the ground. The raid was unexpected and very destructive. All targets were either destroyed or seriously damaged. There were direct bomb hits on Arafat's headquarters and the barracks of Unit 17. Israel has once again shown that, if it wishes, it can act, regardless of any political consequences and world public opinion.

OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE - BATTLE OVER THE BEKAA VALLEY (FIRST LEBANE WAR, JUNE 1982)

After Egypt's rapprochement with the West, which followed the signing of the historic Camp David Agreement, Syria automatically became Israel's main Arab enemy. The Arab country has for years championed the cause of the Palestinians, who have continued to fight to create their own, officially recognized state. Rejection of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was expressed in attacks by PLO fighters on the Israeli border area, which were carried out from bases in southern Lebanon. In response, Israeli strike aircraft launched missile and bomb attacks on these bases.

With the obvious goal of stopping the civil war in Lebanon, Syria sent its troops into this neighboring country on May 31, 1976. They were not to be considered as occupation, and therefore air cover and anti-aircraft missile units remained in Syria. Syrian air defense systems were located in the border area, from where they could counter any attempts by Israeli aircraft to strike Damascus. In March and April 1978, part of southern Lebanon, up to the Litani River, was occupied by Israeli troops. The Israeli Air Force periodically carried out strikes on targets on Lebanese territory, which caused opposition from Syrian aviation.

Parallel to the border, from Rayaq to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, the Bekaa Valley stretches south. Israel made significant efforts to gather information about Syrian positions in the area and lost several Firebee RPV unmanned reconnaissance aircraft to Syrian anti-aircraft fire.

During air battles with Israeli aircraft, the Syrian Air Force lost at least 12 of its MiGs from 1979 to June 1982, including two MiG-25s shot down while trying to attack an RF-4E Phantom reconnaissance aircraft.

In the late 70s - early 1980s. The Israeli Air Force has a serious trump card - more modern aircraft than their opponents - especially the extremely maneuverable F-16 Fighting Falcon and F-15A Eagle. Israel was among the first buyers of these types of aircraft, adopting them almost at the same time as the United States.

Israeli F-16 fighter-bombers began flying combat missions as soon as they arrived in Israel in 1980. From the very beginning, F-16s were used as fighter-bombers to escort bomb-laden F-4E Phantoms and destroy enemy ground targets and aircraft.

The F-15A has become the main Israeli air defense fighter. Although this aircraft has good speed and maneuverability, its main advantage is its excellent electronic equipment, which also consists of an APG-63 pulse Doppler radar. Israeli F-15As can carry the same range of missiles as their American counterparts: AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow, as well as Israeli Shafrir or Python missiles with infrared seeker.

To eliminate the threat from the PLO, Israel planned an invasion of Lebanon with its armored formations. This operation was scheduled for mid-1982. In order to reduce unwanted international protest, this attack should have been presented as revenge for the “atrocious” crimes of the PLO. The desired cause for war soon presented itself. This was the assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London on June 3. The attempt on the life of the Israeli ambassador in London was used as a pretext to justify Israel's invasion of neighboring Lebanon in 1982. The Israeli command pursued the goal of depriving the PLO of its bases in Lebanon, from which PLO saboteurs carried out raids on Israeli territory and from which artillery and mortar attacks were fired. Israeli settlements. Lebanon has already been shaken by spasms civil war between Christian forces, supported by Israel, and an alliance of various Muslim organizations and the PLO, backed by Syria.

The next day at 15.15, seven waves of A-4, F-4, F-16 aircraft of the Israeli Air Force rushed to Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. They attacked Palestinian refugee camps. The next morning, Beirut, the coastal highway and PLO bases were hit. At the same time, one Skyhawk was shot down by the Strela missile, which became the first loss of the Israeli Air Force.

Israel's plans only became apparent to the world on June 6. His ground forces, supported by helicopters, began a rapid advance north along the coast, which should have led the troops almost to the gates of Beirut. Israel has said the purpose of this full-scale invasion is to create a demilitarized zone along its northern borders. PLO units attempting to resist were repulsed, forcing Syria as an ally to provide assistance to Lebanon. On June 7, the Syrian Air Force attempted to intercept F-16 aircraft over Beirut and Damour, but ended up losing two MiGs. To protect its flanks, Israel deployed large forces on CH-53 heavy transport helicopters to the Chouf Mountains, southeast of Beirut. This operation, carried out the next day, threatened the Syrian positions in the Bekaa Valley from the flank. In addition, Israeli troops were now in danger of cutting off communications between Beirut and Damascus, so Syria responded by attacking with its Gazelle fire support helicopters. Syrian attack aircraft penetrated deep into Lebanese airspace and struck Israeli tanks near the port of Sidon.

As a result, it became clear to the Israeli command that the Syrians could interfere with operations against the PLO that were being carried out on the coastal plain. Taking countermeasures became an urgent need. In addition, the Israeli Air Force was constrained in its actions by the Syrian air defense system in the Bekaa Valley. The situation was further complicated by the fact that, according to intelligence reports, additional air defense systems had arrived there. There was an urgent need to act. At this moment, there were 19 SAM positions in the Bekaa Valley.

On June 9, after preliminary reconnaissance of the location of their positions using UAVs, the Israelis carried out a false attack by a specially designated group of aircraft. It provoked the activation of the radar of the Syrian air defense systems, which is what the Israelis wanted. Immediately, Israeli attack aircraft armed with anti-radar missiles and cluster bombs rushed into the attack in waves.

90 vehicles took part in these raids. First, shortly after 1400, a unit of 26 F-4s fired AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missiles and AGM-45 and AGM-78 Standard air-to-surface missiles against the SAM and control radars. In addition, Israeli ground forces launched their Zeev surface-to-surface tactical missiles against the same targets. As a result, 10 SAM positions were put out of action within 10 minutes. The almost completely paralyzed Syrian air defense was then dealt another heavy blow. 40 F-4s, A-4s and Kfir aircraft attacked the anti-aircraft missile launch sites themselves, using Maverick missiles with tele-guided missiles, cluster bombs and laser-guided bombs. This second phase of raids ended at 14.35. After a short break, the third phase of the operation began. Another wave of Israeli aircraft attacked other Syrian targets along the front, as well as surviving SAM sites.

The cover group included F-16s and F-15 Eagles, which engaged Syrian fighters. The battle soon split into dozens of separate aerial duels. The MiG-21 units were badly battered. The Israeli Air Force, according to their data, shot down 22 enemy fighters and caused heavy damage to seven aircraft, without losing a single aircraft. Syria admitted the loss of 16 aircraft but claimed 26 Israeli aircraft were shot down, most of which were likely unmanned spy planes.

However, the most important result of the battle on June 9 was that in four raids, Israeli aircraft disabled at least 17 missile launchers, leaving Syrian troops with virtually no ground-based air defense systems.

On June 10, the last two missile defense launch sites were destroyed, and now Syria could rely only on its Air Force in the fight against Israeli aircraft. Fierce fighting broke out in the sky, as a result of which the Syrians reported 10 air victories. Israel claimed that its pilots shot down 25 Syrian planes and three helicopters. The latter tried to stop the advance of the Israeli column into the Bekaa Valley, to which the Israeli command responded by introducing AN-I Cobra and Hughes 500MD Defender fire support helicopters into the battle.

The next day, June 11, similar air battles took place when Syrian troops attacked Israeli units, which, as it seemed to the Syrian command, intended to cut the road leading from the Bekaa Valley to Beirut. According to Israeli data, this cost the Syrian air force another 18 aircraft downed just before the temporary ceasefire came into force. The air war was essentially over, although Israeli planes continued to carry out occasional strikes. The work of the Israeli helicopter pilots did not decrease, since over the next months they had to support their troops occupying the southern part of Lebanon from the air.

The superiority of Israeli aviation over the Syrian Air Force was overwhelming, and this was largely due to the elements of ground support, the main one of which was the Israeli multi-level air combat control system. One of its main components was the recently acquired E-2C Hawkeye AWACS aircraft. During the fighting, two of the four operational E-2Cs were on air patrol near the coast. The Syrian command later admitted that all of its planes were detected by the enemy almost immediately after takeoff, which deprived them of any chance of a surprise attack. In addition to the E-2C, Israel had Westinghouse low-altitude surveillance radar systems (this system was an AN/TPS-63 tactical radar suspended under a balloon). Close-in reconnaissance was carried out by RF-4E Phantom reconnaissance aircraft. One RF-4E was shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire, and due to the exceptional value of its avionics and electronic reconnaissance equipment (some of which was Israeli-made), the Israeli command sent a special search team behind enemy lines with the task of finding and destroying the wreckage of the aircraft. Search engines discovered not only the crashed plane, but also a group of eleven Soviet specialists who were removing “black boxes” from the plane. The Israelis forced them to retreat. During the fighting over the Bekaa Valley, unmanned RPV aircraft were widely used for both reconnaissance and deception purposes. These were devices of the Firebee and IA1 Scout type, the latter being equipped with a piston engine and, having television cameras and panoramic cameras, transmitted information about the results of air raids in hot pursuit.

All operations to destroy air defense missile systems were carefully planned. The planes of the first wave launched missiles from a distance of 35 km - outside the range of the air defense system. These missiles were supposed to hit the “nervous” centers of the air defense systems with pinpoint strikes and therefore were Maverick-type weapons with a television seeker and AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-78 Standard anti-radar missiles. After the air defense control centers were disabled, Israeli aircraft were able to attack air defense missile launch positions from a closer range and using cluster and high-explosive bombs. Most of this work was done by the Phantoms.

Boeing 707s, converted from ordinary civil airliners, also took part in the battles. Equipped with side-view radars and electronic warfare equipment, they interfered with enemy radars and their guidance systems of fighter-interceptors.

In the battles over the Beqa Valley, Syria admitted the loss of 60 aircraft and “less than 30” air defense systems. Israel claimed that its air force shot down 92 Syrian planes and helicopters, including 85 fighter jets and 5 Gazelle helicopters. 40 downed Syrian aircraft (20 MiG-21 and 20 MiG-23) accounted for 37 F-15 Eagle fighters. In total, the Needles shot down 58 enemy vehicles. Another victory won by the F-4E should be attributed to McDonnell Douglas. The remaining 44 Syrian Air Force aircraft shot down accounted for 72 F-16s, again split almost equally between MiG-21s and MiG-23s.

Syria, after initially inflating the number of air victories, then settled on 19 Israeli planes and helicopters shot down. Israel admitted the loss of only one Skyhawk and two helicopters. These data are underestimated. In fact, Israel lost 13 fighters and attack aircraft, including several F-15As. Two helicopters (AN-1 Cobra and Bell 212) were shot down by PLO fighters. The Israeli command claimed that all of its lost planes and helicopters were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles.

The inevitable dispute over the number of aircraft shot down does not deny the fact that Israel won a complete victory in the air battle over the Bekaa Valley, in which fighters from both sides took part. Even the numbers of Israeli losses cited by the Syrians cannot diminish its significance, calling into question only the degree of Israeli air superiority.

Thus, the good training and skill of Israeli pilots, as well as constant military-technical assistance from the United States, provide the Israeli Air Force with a clear advantage in the fight against hostile neighbors.

After the events described, the Israeli air force was used in the Second Lebanon War (2006) and Operation Cast Lead (2008). However, in these conflicts, Israel was opposed by militants from the Hezbollah and Hamas movements, who did not have serious air defense systems. Under conditions of absolute air supremacy, Israel used aviation only to launch missile and bomb attacks on enemy targets. But it seems that in the near future the Israeli Air Force will again meet with serious opponents - Iran and Syria...

The original was taken from a colleague oleggranovsky Are there not enough pilots being trained in Israel?

After the F-16A/B (“Nets”) was removed from service on 12/26/16, the F-16C/D (“Barak”), F-16I (“Sufa”), and F-15A/B/C/D remain in service. (“Baz”), F-15I (“Raam”) and F-35I (“Adir”). The number of aircraft is as follows:

• “Adir” - 9 (41 more ordered);


• "Raam" - 25;


• “Baz” - 89 were received, but 8 were lost in accidents and disasters, 14 were written off or dismantled for parts, another 5 will be written off instead of the currently modernized F-15Ds, 62 remain (89-(8+14+5));


• “Sufa” - 102 received, 4 lost in accidents and disasters, 98 left;


• “Barak” - 135 received, 4 (at least, more likely more) were lost in accidents and disasters, 131 remain. In the near future, it is possible to sell 12 aircraft to Croatia, and even if this deal does not take place, this means that the Air Force is not interested in these aircraft .


• Result: 9+25+62+98+131=325. In fact, there are slightly fewer planes, no complete information about the losses of the Barak and the decommissioning of the Baz, and 4 of the recently received F-15Ds have not yet been put into service.

How many pilots are needed per aircraft? In the past I have read statements that Israel practices having 2 crews per aircraft, in practice this is nothing more than a myth. For example, there are exact figures for the presence of aircraft and pilots (including reservists) in a particular squadron in 1967. Here are data on squadrons of single-seat fighter-bombers of that period (“Votour” and “Fuga-Magister” I omit):

• 101st (“Mirage-3”) - 22 aircraft, 32 pilots, 1.4 pilots per aircraft;


• 117th (“Mirage-3”) - 24 - 31 - 1.3;


• 119th (“Mirage-3”) - 22 - 20 - 0.9;


• 105th (“Super Mister”) - 35 - 26 - 0.7;


• 109th (“Mr. 4”) - 16 - 26 - 1.6;


• 116th (“Mr. 4”) - 17 - 23 - 1.3;


• 107th (“Hurricane”) - 16 - 17 - 1.1;


• 113th (“Hurricane”) - 35 - 28 - 0.8.

Of course, changes in technology over the years may have altered these proportions. For example, in the past, airplanes operated almost exclusively during the day, and night flights were rare. Nowadays, most Air Force fighter-bombers are capable of operating effectively at night. It would seem that this increases the need for pilots; on the other hand, breakdowns and the need to eliminate them are unlikely to allow one or another aircraft to be operated around the clock, i.e. Some squadrons will be more active during the day, others at night.

In general, I don’t have an exact answer to the second question, but in my opinion 1.4 pilots per plane will be enough. Those. 434 pilots are needed for 310 aircraft.

What is the nature and duration of a pilot's service?

As part of participation in flight course must commit to 7 years of service upon completion of Flight School (from 2015, previously 9 years). Of these 7 years, one year is operational training courses (KAAM and KAAMAM). Next begins service in one of the Air Force squadrons.

Squadron pilots can be divided into 3 categories:

• those who constantly serve in a given squadron (“Sadir”);


• reservists (“Miluim”); here it should be added that pilots who decided not to renew their contract after the mandatory 7 years or who left service after the 2nd, 3rd, etc. contracts, continue to fly in the reserves, and unlike ordinary reservists, who serve for several weeks a year without a break (say 3-4 weeks without a break, or 2 times for 2 weeks, there are many variations), reservist pilots fly once a week - two, accruing at least 40 days of service per year; often serve much more, 60-90 and even 100 days a year;


• regular positions in case of war (hATSAKH, “hatsavat Hirum”) - pilots who transferred to staff positions, instructor positions or went to study return to one of the squadrons during the war; to maintain flight training, they continue to fly regularly in squadrons, much like reservists; Of course, there are staff positions that must be filled during the war, but there are few of them, and sometimes to fill them there is a reservist who is not a pilot, or a former pilot who has already stopped flying.

Thus, termination of a contract, leaving for training, staff or instructor work does not reduce the number of Air Force pilots in case of war. Average age Flight School graduates are 22 years old, i.e. 23 after KAAM/KAAMAM, the approximate length of service as a pilot (including reserve) is at least up to 45 years, but often much longer, say Yehuda Koren flew until 58 years old, Giora Epstein - up to 59, Amir Nahoumi and Israel Baharav - 60 (usually in In the last years of such a long service, pilots received only instructions).

So, from 23 to 45 years of service plus 20 pilots per year, we have 440 pilots. The catastrophic rate in recent years in Israel is very low (1 catastrophe or severe accident per year for all types of aircraft), there are, of course, write-offs due to illness, road accidents and other accidents not related to the Air Force, other cases of flight cessation up to 45, but all of them are more than are compensated by those who continue to fly after 45. Thus, 10 fighter pilots in the graduating class of each flight school class is enough.

1. Shmuel Gordon “30 Shaot Be-Oktober” (“30 hours in October”, 2008), p. 484.


2. Dani Shalom, Ki Raam Be-Yom Bahir (Like a Bolt from a Clear Sky, 2002), pp. 621-622, 626.