German aviation losses in the first year of the war on the Eastern Front. Air Force losses in World War II - a crafty figure

On the eve of the start of the war in the Soviet Union, there were several different (in structure and order of subordination) “aviation”, namely: front-line (or military), subordinate to the command of combined arms armies and districts (fronts), aviation of the Navy, long-range aviation (long-range aviation actions, long-range bomber aviation), subordinate directly to the High Command of the Red Army, air defense fighter aviation.

In this book, all these structures are presented under the general name “Soviet aviation”, “Soviet Air Force”, “Red Army Air Force”.

In Hitler's Germany, all military aviation (Luftwaffe) was a strictly centralized structure; All aviation units and formations (including problem solving Air defense of the country or interacting with the Navy), as well as anti-aircraft artillery, searchlight and radar units.

The minimum “cell” of military aviation (both in the Soviet Air Force and in the Luftwaffe) was a “link”. The flight usually consisted of 3 or 4 aircraft.

Several units (from 3 to 5) were united into a squadron, which consisted of 12 (in the Luftwaffe) or from 12 to 15 (as in the Soviet Air Force) aircraft.

The basic tactical unit of combat aviation was the military unit, called a "regiment" (in the Soviet Air Force) or a "group" (in the Luftwaffe). According to the staffing schedule, the Luftwaffe group should have had three squadrons and a headquarters unit, for a total of 40 aircraft; such a structure existed in all branches of German aviation. In the Soviet Air Force, fighter, attack and various bomber regiments had different structures, but according to the staffing schedule, all of them were supposed to have 62 - 64 aircraft (four or five squadrons and a regiment control link).

Several regiments (groups) were united into a formation called an “aviation division” (in the Soviet Air Force) or a “squadron” (in the Luftwaffe). On the eve of the war, the Soviet Air Force included “fighter” (IAD), “bomber” (BAD) and “mixed” (SAD) air divisions. Each division had its own number (for example, 9th SAD, 13th BAD, 43rd IAD). The regiments that were part of the division (usually from 3 to 5) had their own numbering, not related to the division number (for example, 127th IAP, 16th BAP, 61st ShAP). In documents from 1941, bomber regiments were often designated with an indication of their purpose, for example, SBP (high-speed bomber), BBP (short-range bomber), but in this book, a single designation system is used for front-line aviation regiments (only the abbreviation BAP); shelves Long-Range Aviation designated as DBAP or TBAP (respectively “long-range” or “heavy” bomber regiment).

In the Luftwaffe, squadrons were also divided into fighter squadrons (JG), bomber squadrons (KG), dive bomber squadrons (StG), and heavy long-range fighter squadrons (ZG). The squadron (with rare exceptions) consisted of three groups, with the groups designated by squadron number, for example II/JG-53 (second group of the 53rd Fighter Squadron).

Several Luftwaffe squadrons (usually 4 to 6) were combined into a large structure called an "air corps". Aviation corps were united into Air Fleets. In total, three Luftwaffe Air Fleets operated on the Eastern Front (1st V.F., 2nd V.F., 4th V.F.) consisting of five (1, 8, 2, 4, 5th) aviation corps (as well as some units and divisions of the 5th Air Force in the Arctic).

In the Soviet Air Force, the corps unit existed only in long-range bomber aviation. By the beginning of the war, four such corps were deployed in the Western theater of operations: the 1st DBAC in the Novgorod area, the 3rd DBAC in the Smolensk area, the 2nd DBAC in the Kursk area and the 4th DBAC in the Zaporozhye area. Each corps had two bomber divisions (another one, the separate 18th DBAD, was based in the Kyiv area). The planned inclusion of a fighter division equipped with long-range escort fighters into the DBAC was practically not implemented.

A few days before the start of the war, a decision was made to deploy three air defense fighter aviation corps (6th in Moscow, 7th in Leningrad, 8th in Baku), and these corps did not have a divisional link (i.e. fighter the regiments were directly subordinate to the command of the corps and air defense zone). The formation of the IAK air defense was carried out already during the war that began on June 22, 1941.

Air Force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet

Air Force of the Baltic OVO (North-Western Front)


Air Force of the Western OVO (Western Front)




Air Force of the Kyiv OVO (South-Western Front)

Air Force of Odessa Military District (Southern Front)

Air Force Black Sea Fleet


Long-range bomber aviation formations in the Western theater of operations

TOTAL:

– 4720 fighters, incl. 1030 MiG-3 and Yak-1;

– 3583 bombers, incl. 205 Pe-2 and 9 TB-7;

- a total of 8303 combat aircraft.

Note:

– the total number of aircraft is indicated, including temporarily disabled ones;

– combat-ready aircraft averaged 80-85% of the total;

– the number of “new types” of aircraft included in the total number (MiG-3 and Yak-1 fighters, Pe-2 and TB-7 bombers) is indicated through a fraction;

– about 25 emerging air regiments and the aircraft in their arsenal were not taken into account;

– the naval aviation does not include reconnaissance units and the seaplanes they were armed with;

– the composition of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front is indicated according to the report of the commander of the Front Air Force; it is given in other sources larger number airplanes.

TOTAL: 2275 / 1779

Fighters - 848 / 683 (633 Bf-109 F + 215 Bf-109 E).

Bombers - 935/732 (528Ju-88 + 281He-111 + 126Do-17).

Dive bombers (Ju-87) – 309 / 220.

Multipurpose (Me-110) – 183 / 144.

Notes:

– the first number is total aircraft, the second – including combat-ready ones; all aircraft of the 5th Air Fleet are counted as combat-ready;

– headquarters aircraft are included in the total number of the corresponding squadrons;

– in cases where the fighter group was equipped with Bf-109 aircraft of two modifications (E and F), all fighters were recorded as Bf-109 F; this led to a slight overestimation of the total number of Bf-109 F compared to data from other sources;

– the headquarters units of the bomber squadrons also included several Me-110s (they are not taken into account in this table).

Notes:

– Group III/JG-53 operated at the junction of the NWF and the ZF, it can be assumed that approximately half of all declared victories relate to air battles with units of the NWF Air Force;

– Among the declared downed fighters there are only 14 MiGs, including at least 6 shot down in the Northwestern Front.

Notes:

– the initial number is indicated taking into account faulty aircraft;

– the tables take into account irrecoverable (60% damage) losses of combat aircraft “from enemy influence and for unknown reasons”;

– total losses for July are indicated taking into account the losses of the 5th V.f. in the Arctic;

– according to other sources, in June 1941, 13 German aircraft were irretrievably lost at airfields.

Luftwaffe classification of losses:

up to 24% – small and medium damage that can be repaired by ground services;

25 – 39% – major repair work is required in parts;

40 – 44% – replacement of individual units or systems is required;

45 – 59% – numerous damages requiring replacement of many aircraft components;

60 – 80% – cannot be restored, some units can be used as spare parts;

81 – 99% – completely destroyed, debris fell on German-controlled territory;

100% missing, fell on enemy territory or in the sea.

From the Report on the combat work of units of the 6th SAD from 22.6 to 20.9.41.

“Quite often, even a superior group of enemy fighters avoids combat with our fighters, and if they engage in battle, they do not fight it for a long time and stubbornly. Especially at one time, the Me-109, as well as the Me-110, avoided combat with the I-153 of the 38th IAP...

The materiel in service with the enemy Air Force (Me-109, Me-110, Xe-113) is good in its performance characteristics, but due to insufficient training of the enemy flight personnel and their apparently weak moral fortitude, all capabilities of the materiel are not used, as a result of which the enemy suffers heavy losses even in battles when it significantly outnumbers our fighters.

Enemy bombers act intrusively only when they are covered by fighters and do not see organized resistance from the ground or in the air; when they resist, they leave very quickly. Cowardice and reluctance to engage in battle with our fighters is the main characteristic of the training of enemy air force flight personnel..."

(TsAMO, f. 221, on. 1374, building 16, m. 57-67)

From the Report on the combat work of the 57th SAD from 22.6 to 23.9.41.

Not a single case has been recorded of a pair of German fighters engaging in battle with a group of our fighters; in most cases, using speed, they avoid the battle...

Of the 125 air battles, 18 were very short-lived, because... the enemy, having in some cases superior speed, after the first attack by our fighters, left the battle using clouds or the sun.

During the three months of the war, the enemy never built up forces in an air battle. The battle began in the air with one group, and it ended with it. The main method used by the enemy in an air battle with our fighters is to not accept the battle if the forces are equal or have a slight superiority, to hide behind the clouds and wait for our individual aircraft to separate from the group in order to deal with them in an unequal battle...

If after the first blow to[our] at the airfield or before it, the enemy did not receive opposition from the ground or from the air, all his planes stood in a circle and continued bombing and machine-gun fire with individual aiming until the ammunition was completely used up, sometimes making up to 3-4 attacks. As a rule, the enemy did not make repeated attacks if at least 1 or 2 of our fighters were over the airfield...

The enemy, fearing the partisans, and at the same time due to the rapid advance, stationed his aviation in entire regiments or more at one airfield. I always placed planes in the center of the airfield in one or two lines. A better target for our aviation could not be found..."

(TsAMO, f. 221, on. 1374, d. 16, pp. 84-89)

“At your order, I am reporting the main techniques of enemy aviation tactics, identified by the flight personnel of the regiment during combat operations.

1. In clear sunny weather, both enemy fighters and bombers always try to approach the target from the direction of the sun. Enemy bombers are active during cloudy weather, using cloud cover to fly covertly.

2. In air combat, enemy fighters Me-109 and Xe-113(as the Messerschmitt-109 F series was called in the Soviet Air Force at that time) They always try to have an altitude advantage over our planes. They mainly attack from above and, after attacking with a combat turn, go up again. During an air battle, our planes are almost never below.

3. In air combat, enemy fighters actively fight only when they have a large advantage in strength. With an equal balance of forces and even with their double advantage, they often avoid battle or quickly withdraw from it. After the first attack, they gain altitude and during a second attack they try to attack our individual aircraft located on the flanks or at the end of the battle formation.

4. Avoid frontal attacks.

5. Often single fighters are “tied” to the tail of aircraft coming from a mission and attack them during landing.”

(TsLMO, f. 20076, on. 1, d. 8A, l. 16)

From the Report on the combat operations of the 11th SAD for the period from 22.6 to 19.12.41.

During the period of hostilities, the LaGG-3 aircraft established itself as one of the best fighters of the Red Army Air Force. In terms of its flight-tactical data and weapons, it far surpasses everything modern types enemy fighters. The enemy, even with significant numerical superiority, does not engage in battle with fighters. When attacking LaGG-3, enemy fighters, as a rule, evade combat. The LaGG-3 aircraft is equally maneuverable at all altitudes and has a wide speed range.

The MiG-3 aircraft has not proven itself in use as an attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft due to insufficient training of the flight crew. In air battles conducted mainly at altitudes of 500 - 1500 m, the MiG-3 turned out to be less effective than the old I-16 type. In addition to low maneuverability at low altitudes, the MiG-3 has insufficiently strong weapons, mainly cannons.(so the text may have meant that the absence of a cannon reduces the effectiveness of this aircraft’s weapons).

The I-16 aircraft, thanks to extensive experience in piloting techniques and combat use in the past, proved to be quite effective in the fight against the latest types of enemy fighters. The big disadvantage of the I-16 fighter is its relatively weak armament, and most importantly, the wear and tear of the weapon, which very often failed in air combat and during assault operations. With a more powerful engine and increased armament, the I-16 may well compete with new types of fighters, both friendly and enemy..."

(TsAMO, f. 20054-A, on. 1, d. 12, pp. 27-28)

Brief information: the 123rd IAP met the war at border airfields in the Brest-Kobrin area, on June 27 it was withdrawn for reorganization in Monino near Moscow; The regiment's pilots mastered the new Yak-1 fighter in 12 days; since July 15, the regiment as part of the 6th IAK Air Defense has been fighting in the skies of Moscow (480 sorties have been carried out); since September 21, as part of the 7th IAK Air Defense (Leningrad), it has been providing air cover The road of life. In total, in the first 12 months of the war, 3010 combat sorties were carried out with a total flight time of 2431 hours, 199 air battles were carried out, 102 enemy aircraft were reported shot down, and 27 aircraft were lost in the air. The regiment was later reorganized into the 27th Guards.

Captain Zhidov G.N., squadron commander, conducted 33 air battles, shot down 4 aircraft personally and 12 in the group, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner:

“What gives us the opportunity to emerge victorious? The first is that we are flying a Yak-1 aircraft, which is superior in its flight performance to the enemy Me-109 aircraft, with which we mainly have to engage in air combat. The second thing is that our pilots, skillfully using the machine, boldly enter into battle and win...

It is easy to conduct an air battle on a Yak-1 aircraft with Me-109 aircraft, because the Yak-1 aircraft is not inferior in speed, has a smaller turning radius, catches up with the Me-109 both in a dive and when climbing - in these cases it is only necessary to use the R-7 correctly(screw pitch regulator): When diving, it is necessary to make the propeller pitch heavier, and when climbing, lighten the propeller.

Pidtykan I.D., conducted 60 air battles, shot down 8 planes personally and 6 in a group, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (hereinafter - Hero Soviet Union):

Air combat on an I-16 aircraft can be successfully conducted with any type of enemy aircraft due to the good maneuverability of the I-16. True, air combat sometimes takes the form of defense (especially with enemy fighters at an altitude of over 2000 m), but defense can also be very active and successful. Air combat is almost safe if you have developed good powers of observation.

The most important moment in air combat is the beginning of the battle, i.e. we must be the first to detect the enemy or timely see the moment when the enemy wants to attack our planes, and the second particularly important point is exiting the battle...

The best combat altitude for the I-16 is an altitude of up to 3000 m, and a combat altitude is considered to be 1000 - 2000 m. At this altitude, the I-16 aircraft will have maximum maneuverability and speed... As soon as the enemy aircraft begins to attack, you must calmly go at that in the same direction, only with a slight slip(maneuver in the horizontal plane, carried out with minimal roll), in order to prevent him from conducting aimed fire. As we get closer, it is necessary to move from defense to offense, i.e. make a quick 180-degree turn and fire head-on...

Conducting air combat with enemy fighters in turns on an I-16 aircraft is successful because The I-16 turns better than any enemy aircraft... After the first successful attack, the German pilot gets lost and will “dangle” in the sight until you shoot him down.

"Junkers-87" has good maneuverability - the turning radius is almost equal to the turning radius of the I-16. The plane in the air does not go in a straight line, but seems to “dance”, thereby making it impossible to conduct aimed fire at it, but after the first attacks of our I-16s, all resistance almost ceases, and[enemy pilot] walks in a straight line and does not try to position his plane so that the pilot himself can fire from the cannon or allow the gunner-radio operator to fire. The Ju-87 is an easily shot down aircraft during skillful attacks...

Fight between I-16 and Me-110. As in any air battle, here you need to try to get to the tail, have an advantage in height and hit mainly from behind and at the tail, initially at the gunner, and then at the engines and cockpit. It is not advisable to turn into a turn, because The Me-110 turns very well on one engine, and its turn is equal to the turn of the Yak-1, and also because the gunner-radio operator will fire throughout the turn... With a well-functioning engine on an I-16 aircraft, you can successfully follow the Me-11 110, provided that it does not dive, but goes along the horizon...”

(TsAMO, f. 123 IAP, on. 459716, d. 1, pp. 1-3)

This report was written in the late 1940s. within the program American army on the study and systematization of war experience. The author of the report is Wehrmacht Colonel General Erhard Rauss.

“In terms of numbers, the Russian Air Force was greatly underestimated by the Germans before the start of the Eastern Campaign. But, despite their numbers, which increased significantly during the war, they were unable to have a decisive influence on the outcome of the battles in the East.

Russian Air Force tactics were inflexible and strictly limited to fixed patterns. They lacked tactical flexibility. Only at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 could the first germs of a strategic air war be observed. Russian long-range aviation, which German radio intelligence had been tracking since 1941, carried out primarily transport operations. Although the Air Force was an independent part of the Russians armed forces, they were used almost exclusively on the battlefield, in joint operations with the army.

The Germans identified impending Russian attacks, among other signs, by the early assembly and concentration of combat aircraft at airfields near the front line. In this regard, the Russians turned out to be great experts in the construction of auxiliary airfields. Ruthlessly exploiting labor resources from the local population and using the most primitive equipment, they could completely prepare airfields in astonishingly a short time. Neither winter, nor periods of rain or mud could interfere with their work. The Russian Air Force widely used decoy airfields and mock-up aircraft, as well as numerous camouflage methods.

In battle, the direction of air strikes and the degree of its participation were controlled by command posts located near the front line; one of the most well-executed operations in this regard was the control of fighters from the ground. On the other hand, the interaction between fighters and attack aircraft or bombers left much to be desired. Fighters rarely accompanied them during combat missions, and if there was an escort, it usually scattered at the first contact with the enemy.

The Russians have proven themselves to be excellent pilots in bad weather. Although their aircraft were not equipped for instrument flight, fighters and attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield in the worst weather. In order to take the enemy by surprise, they liked to take advantage of low clouds and snowstorms. Russian night fighters generally limited themselves to attacking only those targets they were ordered to destroy, and were equipped with instruments for only the most basic navigation. The Germans were surprised to discover that Russian night lights almost always flew with their side lights lit.

Air formations concentrated for operations always found a rapid decline in combat capability as soon as they entered combat. The number of combat-ready aircraft was rapidly declining, and it took quite a long time to bring them back into combat-ready condition.

The Russians made extensive use of artificial smoke for camouflage and to protect industrial plants, railway junctions and bridges against strategic air attacks. The rapid repair of bombing damage was particularly remarkable, especially in the case of railway structures. Once again, labor from the local civilian population was ruthlessly recruited for these purposes.

During the war, air supply operations reached significant proportions. The planes either delivered supplies to airfields or dropped them by parachute. A special role was played by the dropping of agents and saboteurs behind the front line.

At the beginning of the war, Russian ground forces were extremely vulnerable to air attacks. However, changes came very soon. Russian troops became less vulnerable to attacks by German dive bombers and attack aircraft. The Russians paid a lot of attention to preparing troops for defense against attacks from low altitude. All the weapons available to the troops were turned against the attacking aircraft, thereby forming a dense defense. When weather permitted, Russian troops avoided populated areas and skillfully took cover in the area. If, in exceptional cases, they found refuge in populated areas, then they received strict orders not to go out during the daytime.

As part of Soviet ideology, the Russians used increasing numbers of female pilots and other crew members as the war continued. Women not only flew transport aircraft, but also flew combat vehicles.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Russian Air Force, although large in number and built on a grand scale, was prepared in a very primitive manner. Their will to fight, aggressive spirit and mastery of technical aspects left much to be desired. Constantly outnumbered by the Luftwaffe, they always performed the worst when it came to combat. Usually a small number of German fighters was enough to clear the skies of Russian aircraft."

Translation by Evgeny Kovalev

One of the little-known fighter formations of the Luftwaffe was the 4th Fighter Squadron (German: Jagdgeschwader JG.4). And although, unlike many other elite squadrons, its combat record was not so impressive (only about 600 air victories), nevertheless, the pilots of the squadron deserve the attention of fans military history, since in the final battles of 1945 on the outskirts of Berlin they fought with the famous Soviet aces from the 2nd and 16th Air Armies.

The squadron was not created immediately; its groups were formed gradually. First, in August 1942, I./JG.4 was formed in Misile (Romania), whose task was to protect the oil-bearing region of Ploiesti. June 15, 1944 in Ansbach at the base of Jagdgeschwader z.b.V. The squadron headquarters (Stab/JG.4) was formed. On July 12, 1944, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 was formed from the remnants of I./ZG.1 in Salzwedel. This assault group (Sturmgruppe) was specifically intended for assault attacks on formations of heavy four-engine bombers of Anglo-American aviation. The armored and well-armed heavy Focke-Wulf groups were engaged in direct combat with enemy bombers, while the lighter Messerschmitts of other groups engaged the escort fighters in battle. Also on July 12, III./JG.4 was formed from the personnel of III./ZG.1 in Rothenburg. The last, on October 20, 1944, IV./JG.4 was formed from the former II./JG.5 in Finsterwald. The emblem of the squadron was a blue shield with the image of a “Silver knight’s helmet with red plumage.”

All groups of the squadron took part in bloody battles in Italy, in the defense of the Reich from attacks by Anglo-American aviation armadas and in the Ardennes counter-offensive. At the same time, the squadron pilots achieved tangible successes in the fight against enemy four-engine bombers, but they themselves lost many of their comrades. JG.4 suffered especially huge losses during the notorious Operation Bodenplatte on January 1, 1945 - 23 pilots were killed or missing, which amounted to almost 42% of the total number of squadron flight personnel!

But it would be better for Western historians to study the actions of the 4th squadron on the Western Front against the Anglo-Americans. We are traditionally much more interested in the actions of the Luftwaffe against our aviation and troops. And since later, from the end of January to the end of April 1945, JG.4 participated in battles on the Eastern Front over the Oder and in the Berlin region, we will pay attention to this period and section of the front. True, due to the lack of complete documentary data on the losses of the squadron’s aircraft fleet, we will have to limit ourselves to listing only the irretrievable losses of flight personnel and the successes of the squadron pilots, which, by the way, also need clarification. To begin with, however, let's get acquainted with the command staff of the 4th squadron at the time of its appearance on the Eastern Front.

So, the commander of the squadron from August 1944 was the famous ace holder of the Knight's Cross with oak leaves 27-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Michalski, who had 72 aerial victories previously won as part of the JG.53 “Ace of Spades” squadron.

The first group of the squadron was also commanded from August 1944 by 33-year-old Major Wilhelm Steinmann, who had recently been awarded the German Golden Cross for 35 aircraft shot down, most of which he shot down as part of JG.4. Later, in March 1945, he was awarded the Knight's Cross.

The commander of the second group from September 1944 was 33-year-old Major Gerhard Schröder, a former navigator of transport and bomber aircraft. Having become a fighter pilot, he managed to win only 3 aerial victories.

The third group was commanded since January 1945 by an experienced pilot, 28-year-old Captain Gerhard "Gerd" Strasen, who had 6 downed enemy aircraft, which he shot down while fighting as part of JG.26 "Schlageter" and JG.77 "Ace of Hearts" .

The commander of the last fourth group of the squadron from December 1944 was a veteran of the Condor Legion in Spain, 28-year-old Captain Ernst-Albert Laube, who scored 22 aerial victories, mainly with JG.26 Schlageter, JG.77 Ace of Hearts and JG.3 "Udet".

Unlike experienced commanders, most of the squadron's ordinary pilots were very young graduates of flight schools who had recently arrived at the front. Some of the pilots even consisted of retrained members of the crews of bomber, reconnaissance, naval and other aviation, who, however, had difficulty getting used to their new role as a fighter pilot. Of course, it was not because of a good life that these ersatz pilots were attracted to serve in fighter aircraft, but the Luftwaffe leadership at that time had no choice: in the hardest battles, in conditions of overwhelming superiority, German fighters suffered and continued to suffer devastating losses. And if the aviation industry still produced a sufficient number of aircraft, there were no longer enough qualified fighter pilots...

And this squadron, barely replenished hastily with youngsters, in mid-January 1945, after the start of a major offensive by Soviet troops, it was decided to send to the Eastern Front to the area southeast of Berlin. I./JG.4 was the first to arrive there - on January 22, Bf 109G/K aircraft of this group landed at Guben airfield. It was followed on January 23 by Stab/JG.4 and 11.(Sturm)./JG.4, which landed on Neuhausen airfield southeast of Cottbus on Fw 190A aircraft, as well as III./JG.4, but its Bf 109G/ K settled north of Cottbus - at the Drewitz airfield. At the same airfield three days later - January 26 - Bf 109G from IV./JG.4 landed. It is characteristic that the main task of the squadron pilots was assault raids on Soviet columns on the roads, although the squadron fighters were poorly suited for the role of attack aircraft, and the pilots were not trained for this. There were no massive air battles here, as on the Western Front, but the pilots had to make several sorties a day, which still ultimately led to heavy losses. Especially when very heavy and bloody air battles began over the Oder bridgehead...

Soon after the flight to the Soviet-German front, the squadron suffered its first loss: on January 24, during a flight to a new airfield, the Bf 109 G-14 785714 “Gelbe 7” of fanenjunker non-commissioned officer Klaus Ekard from 15./JG.4 caught fire in the air for unknown reasons reasons, the pilot jumped out with a parachute, but crashed and died 10 km from Halle northwest of Leipzig.

Two days later, on January 26, the squadron began fighting on a new front for her and carried out 82 attack and reconnaissance missions in the Scharnikau-Wolstein area. In this case, four pilots were lost at once:
The first - non-commissioned officer Wilhelm (Willy) Gausten from 1./JG.4 (who had 2 aerial victories), on a Bf 109 G-10 491177 "Weisse 1" was shot down in an air battle in the Neutomichel - Pinne - Posen area, ended up in captivity and later died in captivity.
The second is Lieutenant Ulrich Blase (06/09/1924) from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8 961138 “Weisse 8” during an attack on Soviet convoys on the roads, was shot down in an air battle and died south of Neutomichel.
The third was Oberfenrich Herbert Schön from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4, who, during an attack on Soviet troops on the roads, hit a tree with his Fw 190 A-8/R2 682665 (982665) “Weisse 16” and died in the Schlepzig area near Lübben.
And the fourth - Fahnejunker non-commissioned officer Günther Wahl from 7./JG.4 (or II.(Sturm)/JG.4) on Fw 190 A-8 961102 "Gelbe 5" crashed and died due to snowfall in the Görzig area near Grossenhain.
In addition, five more aircraft received minor damage.
Needless to say, the beginning was depressing...
On the same day, the pilots of the squadron recorded the first aerial victory on the Russian front - at 12:45 p.m., First Lieutenant Lothar Wolff from 15./JG.4 shot down a Soviet P-39 Airacobra fighter in the Scharfenort area. "Stalin's Falcon" made an emergency landing and disappeared into the forest...

The next day, January 27, the squadron made 72 sorties and was missing three of its pilots:
Sergeant Major Heinrich Kamel (12/14/1918) from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 during an attack on Soviet convoys northwest of Graz - Neutomichel near Kirchplatz, dropped too low in his Fw 190 A-8 696095 “Weisse 6”, hit the car on the road and crashed.
Killed in air combat on Fw 190 A-8/R2 682224 “Gelbe 4” in the Posen area, Fahnejunker non-commissioned officer Fritz Hopfenmüller from 7./JG.4.
Sergeant Major Arno Pochmann from 13./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-14 783989 “Weisse 2” during an attack on Soviet troops was shot down by fire from the ground (or died in air combat), fell and died 3 km east of Lake Bentschener.
Three aircraft were slightly damaged.
In turn, non-commissioned officer Völkel from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 reported the destruction of one Yak-9, although he was not credited with the victory...

On Sunday, January 28, JG.4 pilots carried out 36 attack missions, while four aircraft received minor damage, but there were no casualties.

Nevertheless, attack flights against Soviet troops, well covered by anti-aircraft weapons, were costly for German fighters. On January 29, the squadron made 104 reconnaissance and attack missions in the Scharnikau-Wolstein area, but two squadron pilots did not return from these murderous flights:
Ober-Fenrich Heinz Seeberger of 15./JG.4 was shot down by fire from the ground during the attack, and together with his Bf 109 G-14 413791 "Gelbe 14" fell and died in the Köpnitz-Unrustadt area.
Non-commissioned officer Maximilian "Max" Huber from 16./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-14 462756 "Blaue 9" also did not return from the attack on Soviet troops, this time in the Küstrin area.
Eight more aircraft were damaged, including five in air battles.

On January 30, the squadron pilots flew 121 times for reconnaissance and attack in the Scharnikau-Wolstein-Züllichau-Meseritz area, and three pilots were killed in air battles:
Lieutenant Hans Roscher from 1./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 130362 "Weisse 7" in the Züllichau - Bohmst - Wolstein area.
Non-commissioned officer Rudolf Seebacher from 3./JG.4 on Bf 109 K-4 332302 "Gelbe 4" in the Züllichau area west of Grünberg.
Fahnejunker Oberfeldwebel Joachim Holtzbecher of 7./JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8/R2 682767 "Gelbe 16" in the Vanden area.
In air battles in the areas of Niedritsa, Oderecka and Züllichau, three more aircraft were lost (the pilot escaped from one of them by parachute) and three aircraft were damaged in the areas of Guben, Drewitz and Frankfurt an der Oder.
But the persistent non-commissioned officer Voelkel from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 was finally lucky and was credited with the first aerial victory over the Yak-9, shot down that day.

The last day of January - the 31st - passed for the squadron without losses: having completed 22 reconnaissance and assault missions in the Küstrin area, all the pilots returned safely from their missions, only one Fw 190 was slightly damaged.

In total, during almost a week of combat operations on the Eastern Front, JG.4 pilots destroyed 395 vehicles, one tank, three Katyusha rocket launchers, one multi-barrel anti-aircraft gun, three aircraft at airfields and other military equipment during assault raids.

The losses of the squadron were very high: in just January, JG.4 lost (including in three weeks of fighting on the Western Front, before flying to the Eastern Front) 26 pilots killed or missing, as well as 14 wounded. 57 aircraft were irretrievably lost (20 Fw 190 and 37 Bf 109), 39 aircraft were damaged (14 Fw 190 and 25 Bf 109).

The squadron suffered even greater losses in February. Already on the first day of the month, Corporal Hubert Gesterkamp from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8/R2 682207 “Weisse 2” did not return from a flight north of Küstrin.

Two days later - February 3 - two pilots were lost:
Non-commissioned officer Walter Wagner (07/19/1911) from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8 960328, landing at Neuhausen airfield near Cottbus, fell into a crater, overturned and died.
And a fairly experienced pilot, Ober-Fenrich Heinz Kühne (had 3 aerial victories to his credit) from 10./JG.4 on a Bf 109 K-4 332651 “Schwarze 1” was shot down in an air battle in the Zullichau-Blumberg area and was captured . He later died in captivity.

Two more pilots were captured the next day, February 4:
Non-commissioned officer Walter Nigl from 7./JG.4 on Fw 190 A-9 205056 “Gelbe 13”, flying out to attack Soviet troops on the roads in the Zielenzig-Meseritz area, was shot down and captured. A few years later he returned from captivity and died on October 6, 1950 in Germany.
Another pilot - Fenrich Wilhelm Dim from 15./JG.4 - on Bf 109 G-10 490419 "Gelbe 1" as part of a pair flew out for reconnaissance, but due to engine failure he was forced to land on territory occupied by Soviet troops 3 km away northeast of Frankfurt an der Oder and was captured. Still, he was lucky, and on May 9, 1949 he returned from captivity.

On February 7, two pilots also did not return from missions:
The first - Ober-Fenrich Hans Till from 13./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 490169 "Weisse 1" stormed Soviet troops in the Aurit - Balko - Zibingen area, was shot down and captured. As it turned out later, he died in captivity.
Another - non-commissioned officer Helmut Neumann from 15./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 490428 "Gelbe 10" also stormed Soviet troops in the Kurtschow - Zibingen - Gross - Gandern area, was shot down and died.
One Yak-9 in the Fürstenberg area at 11:45 a.m. was shot down on the same day by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4, but against the backdrop of the squadron’s growing losses, this was little consolation...

The next day, February 8, the squadron stubbornly continued to storm the advancing Russian troops, but this cost the squadron three more pilots:
Ober-Fenrich Martin Otto Stegmann from 2./JG.4 was mortally wounded during an attack on Soviet convoys in the Eichberg area, 12 km northwest of Grossen; his Bf 109 K-4 332376 “Schwarze 6” made an emergency landing near the convoy and died.
Non-commissioned officer Walter Gebauer from 12./JG.4 in Bf 109 K-4 332912 "Blaue 4" was probably shot down by anti-aircraft fire in the Drebiszow area and was captured. He later died in captivity.
Non-commissioned officer Johannes Bintrim from 16./JG.4 in Bf 109 G-14 462777 "Blaue 11" stormed Soviet convoys in the Wollnitz area, was shot down and captured. The fate of this pilot was also sad, and he also died in captivity.

On February 9, the 2nd group of the squadron was relocated to the Guben airfield, where the 1st group of the squadron had already been located since January 22.
On the same day, Lieutenant Dietrich Bartsch (12/29/1923) from 11./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-14 465330 “Schwarze 6” stormed Soviet convoys in the Drewitz area north of Cottbus, was shot down in an air battle and died.

On Saturday, February 10, three pilots were lost:
Feldwebel Wilhelm "Willy" Becker (had 1 aerial victory) from 3./JG.4 on Bf 109 K-4 332897 "Gelbe 9" returning from armed reconnaissance, in the Szydlo area southeast of Frankfurt an der Oder was shot down and disappeared without a trace.
Non-commissioned officer Ernst Steingilb (had 1 aerial victory) from 12./JG.4 was unlucky, who, while taking off from the airfield in a Bf109 K-4 332485 “Blaue 6” with a bomb under the fuselage, fell and exploded 5 km east of Drewitz near Potsdam.
Corporal Harald Bankk from 13./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-14 785917 "Weisse 4" was hit and seriously wounded by anti-aircraft fire, made an emergency landing in the Kotzenau area and died of his wounds in hospital on February 14, 1945.
On the same day, at 14:15, in an air battle west of Luben, Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Messer from IV./JG.4 managed to shoot down one La-5.

The squadron lost its next three pilots on February 11:
The Bf 109 K-4 332858 "Schwarze 5" crashed and died during takeoff from Guben airfield, Corporal Robert Myrhofer from 2./JG.4.
Non-commissioned officer Franz Kaicher from 3/JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 491375 “Gelbe 3” was shot down, made an emergency landing on the fuselage in the Lübben-Steinau area near the Oder River, and then went missing.
The experienced commander of detachment 10./JG.4, Captain Bernhard Gasenberg (01/27/1913), who had 3 aerial victories to his credit, also died. The Bf 109 G-14 462968 “Schwarze 4” suffered an accident during takeoff, probably due to sabotage, and crashed 3 km northwest of Drewice.
And the commander of the 1st group, Major Wilhelm Steinmann, shot down one Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft on the same day.

On February 12, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 relocated to Berlin-Schönfeld airfield, having previously suffered heavy losses:
Non-commissioned officer Gerhard Grahl from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Bf 109 K-4 331336 "Blaue 2" exploded and died in an air battle south of Naumburg - Beaver.
Non-commissioned officer Herbert Brucksch from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A-9 980208 "Weisse 12" was shot down in the Naumburg - Sagan - Sprottau area and was captured, in which he died after the war on August 3, 1946 .
In an air battle east of Primkenau, Oberleutnant Heinz Schmeling (07.10.1911) from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 was killed. He was a very experienced pilot, having previously flown as a navigator in reconnaissance aircraft, and was awarded the German Golden Cross, the Silver Cup of Honor for excellence in air combat, the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class, as well as the Gold Badge for combat missions.
Sergeant Major Friedrich Bäre-Steingraf from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A-9 980570 "Schwarze 11" went missing in the Naumburg - Sagan - Sprottau area.
In the same area Naumburg - Sagan - Sprottau on Fw 190 A-8/R2 681356 "Schwarze 4" a very young Fenrich Karl Urban (06/19/1925) from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 went missing.

On Wednesday, February 14, almost the entire squadron relocated to other airfields. The squadron headquarters and the 3rd group were located at the Jüterborg-Damm airfield, the 1st group was located at the Berlin-Schönfeld airfield, and the 4th group was located at the Mark Zwuschen airfield. Despite the hassle associated with the relocation, the squadron continued to carry out combat missions and suffered heavy losses:
Ober-Corporal Wilhelm Falenti from 7./JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8 739202 "Gelbe 18" went missing in the area of ​​the Sommerfeld - Pförten highway.
In Bf 109 K-4 332658 "Weisse 7", non-commissioned officer Kurt Mendel of 11./JG.4 was seriously wounded and shot down in aerial combat. Despite lengthy treatment, he died of his wounds on April 20, 1945.
One of the best aces of the squadron, Feldwebel Erhard Mecca (02/26/1921) from 14./JG.4, who had 12 aerial victories and was awarded the Honorable Silver Cup for excellence in air battles and the Iron Crosses of the 1st and 2nd degrees, was fatally unlucky. On Bf 109 G-10 491440 “Schwarze 11” he was accidentally shot down by German anti-aircraft artillery 30 km west of Küstrin (according to other sources, he was shot down in an air battle in the Fürstenwalde area), jumped out with a parachute, but it did not open and the pilot died .
Ober-Fenrich Hans-Günther Lachmann (had 1 aerial victory) from 16./JG.4, on Bf 109 G-14 784988 “Weisse 7” stormed columns of Soviet troops in the Forst-Sommerfeld-Sorau area, was shot down and captured . Fortunately for him, he returned from captivity a few years later.
On the same day, the commander of the 1st group, Major Wilhelm Steinmann, distinguished himself again by shooting down one Yak-3.

Against the backdrop of depressing losses in the previous days, the results of the fighting on February 16 were more favorable for the squadron.
On this day, only one pilot, Corporal Günter Pöland from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4, was lost. In the Landsberg-Fitz area north-west of Leipzig, a shell from its own anti-aircraft artillery hit his Fw 190 A-8 738202 “Schwarze 2”, as a result of which the right wing came off, the pilot fell with the plane and died.
But in air battles, JG.4 pilots achieved significant success, shooting down four Soviet aircraft. One Yak-9 in the Küstrin area at 16:50 was shot down by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4, two Yak-9s were shot down by non-commissioned officer Kurt Scherer from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 and one by Po -2 was shot down by non-commissioned officer Gerhard Walter, also from II.(Sturm)/JG.4.

The results of the fighting on February 17 were equally favorable.
Only one pilot, non-commissioned officer Egon Kolias from 10./JG.4, was shot down during an attack by ground fire (or in air combat), fell together with his Bf 109 G-14 456317 “Schwarze 13” north of Seelow southwest of Küstrin and died.
But the JG.4 pilots scored three aerial victories over Soviet pilots. Having already shot down four Anglo-American aircraft, Fenrich Günther Wittbold from 1./JG.4 shot down one Russian Yak-9 at 10:21 a.m., and the next minute, the commander of the 1st group, Major Wilhelm Steinmann, immediately hit two Yak-9.

The day of February 18 was marked by heavy losses and decent successes. Three pilots were lost, including two experienced squad leaders:
The commander of 2./JG.4, Oberleutnant Werner Gerhartz (01/07/1921), who had 1 aerial victory, was hit in the radiator while attacking Soviet convoys in the Posen-Schwiebus-Steinberg area, on his Bf109 K-4 333886 “Schwarze 4” made an emergency landing on territory captured by Soviet troops and was captured. Later, in 1949, he returned from captivity.
Fenrich Hans-Joachim Schmidt from Stab III./JG.4 was also captured, who in Bf 109 K-4 332483 “Rote 1” was shot down in an air battle by Russian pilots in the Frankfurt-on-Oder area.
A heavy blow for the squadron was the death of the commander of 7./JG.4, Oberleutnant Ergard “Max” Niese (03/16/1910), who had 570 sorties and 23 air victories, for which he was awarded the German Golden Cross, the Honorary Silver a cup for excellence in air combat, Iron Crosses of the 1st and 2nd degree, a Golden Badge for combat sorties, a Badge for wounds (10/30/1942, 04/24/1944). During a stability test flight, his Fw 190 A-9 980576 “Gelbe 1” lost control at 16:12, the ace was unable to bail out, fell with the plane and died in the Schönfeld area southeast of Berlin.
In turn, the squadron pilots shot down seven Stalinist Falcons. Two Il-2 attack aircraft were destroyed in the Schwiebus-Steinberg area at 15:00 by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4, the remaining five aircraft were shot down by pilots whose names have not yet been found out. Including two Il-2s shot down by pilots from I./JG.4, one La-5 and one P-5 by pilots from II.(Sturm)/JG 4, and one Yak-9 was destroyed by a pilot from III./JG .4.

The results of the day on February 20 can be called a “combat draw.” The squadron lost one pilot:
Non-commissioned officer Eduard Jungwirth (12/27/1922) from 16./JG.4 was seriously wounded and hit by anti-aircraft fire, was forced to land his Bf 109 G-14/ASM 781174 “Gelbe 13” in the Mukbarup area north of Flensburg and was sent to hospital , where, despite the efforts of doctors, he died from his wounds on May 2, 1945. It is not clear how the pilot received his fatal wound in the indicated area, very far from the front line and the location of his group?
And the squadron’s combat account was replenished with one aerial victory: sergeant major Joseph Weichmann from 6./JG.4 shot down one Il-2...

In March, the number of losses decreased sharply; in addition to routine attack flights, completely unusual missions appeared. Thus, on March 6, the pilots of the squadron took part in a combat operation to destroy pontoon bridges on the Oder River. Two flights of four Bf 109s from I./JG.4 were accompanied by two groups of four He 111s from I./KG.200, with Hs 293 guided jet gliding bombs suspended under the fuselage. On approaching the target, the German planes were attacked by a group of Soviet fighters Yak-9. In the ensuing air battle, the Russians shot down one He 111, and Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4 at 17 hours 25 minutes and non-commissioned officer Walter Schola from I./JG.4 at 17 hours 37 minutes shot down one Yak-9. In addition, according to reports from Heinkel pilots, they managed to hit a bridge in the Göritz area, where the bridgehead of the Soviet 8th Guards Army was located. By the way, one of the missiles that fell into the water and did not explode aroused keen interest from the leadership of the Soviet Air Force. Army sappers were given the order to lift the missile and organize its delivery to Moscow...

The next day, March 7, nothing special happened, except that Sergeant Major Kurt Hoppe (1920) from III./JG.4 on a Bf 109 did not return from the air battle...

On March 8, JG.4 pilots again had to take part in a raid on crossings of the Oder in the area of ​​Göritz, Reitwein and Neu Manschnow. This time the group of German aircraft was even more impressive and unusual than the previous time. Along with conventional bombers - five Ju 188 and two Ju 88 from 5./KG.200 - the strike group also included four Mistel type aircraft from 6./KG.200. True, one plane filled with explosives, due to technical problems, immediately fell off the control plane and crashed into a field. The remaining aircraft were escorted by sixteen Bf 109s from III./JG.4 and two Fw 190s from Stab/JG.4, led by squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Michalski. At about 10:20 a.m. at an altitude of 3,000 meters, German planes approached the crossings. The anti-aircraft artillery guarding the crossings opened furious fire, and the Junkers, in turn, bombarded the positions of the Russian anti-aircraft gunners. However, another Mistel was hit by an anti-aircraft shell and, engulfed in flames, crashed to the ground far from the crossings. The remaining two Mistels disengaged as normal, but despite the impressive explosions, no significant damage was caused to the crossings. According to other German data, two direct hits were achieved on the bridge and one hit on the position of anti-aircraft batteries. The Germans also lost one Ju 188 to anti-aircraft fire, its crew was captured. And in an air battle, the Soviet Air Force lost one Yak-9, shot down at 10:27 a.m. by the commander of JG.4 himself, Lieutenant Colonel Michalski. This was his 73rd aerial victory...

On Monday, March 19, I./JG.4 located at the Berlin-Schönfeld airfield was disbanded, and its pilots were sent to other squadron groups.

On March 25, a young pilot in the private rank of pilot Manfred Werle (06/14/1925) from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 (by the way, he was characterized extremely negatively as a liar and a thief, which was a rare exception among Luftwaffe pilots) in an Fw190 issued out of repair, took off on a test flight, but fell along with the plane and died in the Wassmansdorf area south of Berlin. Well, as they say, I atoned for my sins with blood...
And the commander of IV./JG.4, Captain Ernst-Albert Laube, was awarded the German Golden Cross on that day.

A little later, on March 28, the former commander of I./JG.4, which had already been disbanded, Major Wilhelm Steinmann received the Knight's Cross, thus becoming the only ace of the 4th squadron to earn this highest award.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of accurate data, the dates of some of the losses of the squadron pilots in March are unknown. At least six irretrievable losses are known:
Private pilot Bernhard Fichte from III./JG.4 on a Bf 109 was shot down in an air battle by Soviet fighters in the Küstrin area and captured. He later died in captivity.
Corporal Veit from 11/JG.4 on a Bf109 G-14 “Gelbe 9” was also shot down in an air battle, but not by the Russians, but by American P-51 Mustang fighters in the Kyffhäuser area west of Leipzig and was captured by the Americans.
Oberleutnant (or Oberfeldwebel) Berg from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 on an Fw 190A crashed while landing at the Schönefeld airfield southeast of Berlin and burned out.
Non-commissioned officer Helmut Pirmann from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 in an Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle in the Werneuchen-Strausberg area near Berlin and went missing.
Sergeant Major Manfred Jolschlägel from III./JG.4 on a Bf 109 did not return from the flight and, as it became known later, was captured. According to some reports, he was in the Kharkov prisoner of war camp.
Hermann Klotz of IV./JG.4 in a Bf 109 G did not return from his flight to the Berlin area. There is information that he was later seen in a Moscow prisoner of war camp.

On April 4, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 positioned itself at Mörtitz airfield, northeast of Leipzig. And already in the evening of that day at 16:30, the group pilot, Lieutenant Wolfgang Gankner, shot down an American P-47 Thunderbolt fighter in the Halberstadt area.

The next day, Fenrich Karl Joseph Hyde of 15./JG.4 on a Bf 109 was shot down in an air battle by Anglo-American aircraft in the Sahn area southwest of Berlin and captured by American troops.

The fate of Chief Sergeant Fritz Störker from 7./JG.4 remained unclear, who on April 7, either on an Fw 190 or a Bf 109 K-4, participated in an air battle with Anglo-American aircraft in the Eisenach-Bad area Langensatza north of Erfurt. According to some sources, he did not return from the battle, according to others, he was only wounded in the Eisenach area.

At about 15-16 hours the next day, non-commissioned officer Kurt Blumenberg (04/00/1923) from 14./JG.4, who had 1 air victory to his name, was shot down in an air battle by American P-47 fighters in a Bf 109 G-14/AS "Thunderbolt" north of Günserode west of Leipzig and died.

On April 9, Stab/JG.4 began to be based at the Mark Zvushen airfield.
As of this day, Stab./JG.4 had 6 Fw 190s, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 had 50 Fw 190s, and III./JG.4 had 61 Bf 109s.

On the evening of April 11, the pilots of III./JG.4, Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach and non-commissioned officer Rudolf Kozlowski, distinguished themselves: at 19 o’clock they shot down one American P-51 Mustang fighter in the area of ​​Bücheln and Tilleda...

The next relocation took place on April 12: II.(Sturm)/JG.4 was sent far to the north-west of Germany and began to be based at the Glücksburg airfield in the Flensburg area, and III./JG.4 flew to the Mark Zwuschen airfield.
As of this day, Stab./JG.4 had 7 Fw 190s, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 had 50 Fw 190s, and III./JG.4 had 62 Bf 109s.
Captain Günther Schwaneke from Stab./JG.4 added to his combat account by shooting down a Yak-3 at 12:40...

On Black Friday, April 13, the squadron lost two pilots:
Non-commissioned officer Günther “Splinter” Gallas from 7./JG.4 in an Fw 190 A-9 was shot down in an air battle by Anglo-American aircraft in the Elbe-Elster area southwest of Jüterborg and went missing. True, there is evidence that he was only wounded in the Eisenach area.
In the evening, during an emergency landing in the Juterborg area, his Fw 190 “Schwarze 13” overturned several times and Sergeant Major Günter Eberhard from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 was killed.

Two days later, on April 15, non-commissioned officer Max Miller (03/12/1924) from III./JG.4 on a Bf 109 flew out to attack Anglo-American troops, was shot down in an air battle in the Glücksburger Heide area near Juterborg, and fell along with plane and burned down.

On April 16, the number of aircraft in the squadron was: Stab/JG.4 - 5 Fw 190, II./JG.4 - 55 Fw 190, III./JG.4 - 52 Bf 109.
On this day, a powerful offensive of Soviet troops began on Berlin (Berlin offensive troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts in order to complete the complete defeat of the German armies). Hundreds of Soviet aircraft were constantly in the air, and almost 200 air battles took place, in which the Germans and Russians suffered very heavy losses. In addition to the usual battles and attack missions, the pilots of JG.4 again had the opportunity to participate in a completely unusual Luftwaffe operation. This time German air Force, following the example of the Japanese “kamikazes”, they used the tactics of suicide pilots. About sixteen Bf 109 K-4s from JG.4 from 17:15 to 18:00 were escorted by eight Bf 109s and one Fw 190 with 500 kg bombs under the fuselage and suicide pilots in the cockpits, who were ordered to direct their aircraft to the crossings across the Oder and blow them up. At least one of these volunteers - Fenrich Ernst Beichl from SG.104 - managed to crash into one of the pontoon crossings in the Cellin area, in the 47th lane Soviet army, and at the cost of his life destroy it. True, in the documents of the 47th Army it was not possible to find any mention of the destruction of the crossing, but in the zone of the 69th Army that day a crossing with a carrying capacity of 30 tons was indeed destroyed.
A little later, from 19:15 to 20:30, several Bf 109s from III./JG.4 escorted several Mistel twins to the crossing area. There are no details of this raid, but it is known that there were no meetings with Soviet fighters.
And, of course, in several heavy battles that day with Russian pilots, as well as with Anglo-American aviation, JG.4 suffered significant losses:
Non-commissioned officer Hans Richter from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 on an Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle by American P-51 Mustang fighters in the Halbe area near Brandenburg, jumped out with a parachute, but died.
An Estonian volunteer (former pilot of the Estonian NSGr.11), Oberleutnant Karl Lumi from 7./JG.4 on an Fw 190 A-8, was shot down in an air battle by Anglo-American aircraft in the Mühlhausen-Leipzig area and went missing.
Also, in an air battle with Anglo-American aircraft in the Mühlhausen-Leipzig area, Fenrich Hans-Martin Delkmann from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 was shot down on an Fw 190 and went missing.
Lieutenant Gorst (Herbert) Peschel (02/15/1923) from 7./JG.4 (had 2 aerial victories) on an Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle by American fighters and went missing. True, according to other sources, he was only wounded.
At about 15:00, in a Bf 109 G in an air battle with a group of Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft and Yak-9 fighters in the Bukov-Seelow area, non-commissioned officer Max Kolb from IV./JG.4 was shot down and captured, who later died in captivity.
The fate of non-commissioned officer Günther Schneider from 11./JG.4 (had at least 1 aerial victory) was also sad. On a Bf 109, he was shot down by Russian pilots in an air battle in the Frankfurt-on-Oder area, captured and also died in captivity.
In battles on both sides with Soviet and allied aviation, the squadron pilots achieved some successes:
Captain Johannes Kaufmann from 9./JG.4 shot down one Soviet P-39 Airacobra fighter in the Küstrin area at 11:15, and non-commissioned officer Hans Sepunkte from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 at 12:15 - one American P-51 Mustang, although it was not credited with victory. One Yak-9 was destroyed at 15:15 in the Bukow-Seelow area by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4. One P-51 Mustang was shot down by non-commissioned officer Weber from JG.4...

April 17 also marked big amount battles and associated losses and successes.
The first aerial victory was won at 11:15 a.m. by Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Messer from IV./JG.4, shooting down a Soviet Boston bomber east of Podelzig.
At about 2 p.m., one Il-2 attack aircraft in the Oder area was shot down by Captain Günther Schwaneke from Stab./JG.4 and non-commissioned officer Heinz Zimmer from III./JG.4. Probably in the same battle, the former naval and bomber aviation navigator Captain Rudolf Schröder (1912) (1914) from 7./JG.4 (8./JG.4), who had 3 aerial victories, was shot down in his Fw 190 A air battle in the Gorghast-Lebus area near Kustrin and died. Although according to other sources, he remained alive.
It is quite possible that in the same battle in the Küstrin area, Fenrich Wünsche from 7./JG.4 was shot down and killed in an Fw 190 A. However, according to other sources, he died in the Elbe-Elster area southwest of Jüterborg.
Already returning from a mission, at 14:20, while landing at the Mark Zwuschen airfield southwest of Juterborg, a Bf 109 group from III./JG.4 was suddenly attacked by American P-47 Thunderbolt fighters, killing three pilots:
Sergeant Major Fritz Lehmann jumped out by parachute, but died.
Non-commissioned officer Karl Riepe fell with the plane and died (according to other sources, he remained alive).
Chief Sergeant Major Fritz Zarske (10/19/1922) from 9./JG.4, who had 1 aerial victory, also died heroically: while covering the landing of his commander, Captain Gunther Schwaneke, he shot down one American P-47 Thunderbolt fighter, but he himself was shot down by another Thunderbolt. I jumped out with a parachute, but the parachute did not open.
At about 7 p.m., several Bf 109s of the squadron again escorted about 30 aircraft with volunteer suicide bombers on board to crossings on the Oder. At the same time, in an air battle with Russian aviation, pilots of 9./JG.4 Captain Johannes Kaufmann and Fenrich Oskar Butenop shot down a Yak-3 and a Yak-9 in the Frankfurt-on-Oder area at 19:30.

Several air battles carried out by the squadron during April 18 cost it two pilots:
Fenrich Rudolf von Baumgarten from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 in an Fw 190 A-8 was shot down in the Obiesfeld - Magdeburg area, escaped by parachute and was captured by Anglo-American troops.
At about 2 p.m., Fenrich Rainer Klötzl from IV./JG.4 on a Bf 109 was shot down by Soviet pilots in an air battle in the Frankfurt-on-Oder area and went missing.
However, the pilots of the squadron also won several aerial victories:
At dawn at 06:50, while escorting a group of Ju 87 dive bombers, Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Messer from IV./JG.4 shot down one Yak-3 in the Seelow area.
At 13 o'clock in the Fürstenwalde area, Captain Johannes Kaufmann from 9./JG.4 shot down an Il-2 attack aircraft, and the pilot of the same detachment, Sergeant Major Ottokar Bente, shot down a MiG fighter, and noted that the Russian pilot did not jump out of the falling plane.
A little later, at 13:30, the same sergeant major Ottokar Bente shot down an American P-47 Thunderbolt fighter in the Juterborg area.
Other pilots from III./JG.4 also distinguished themselves: at 17 hours 45 minutes, Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach shot down a Yak-3 in the Bukow-Seelow area, and non-commissioned officer Rudolf Kozlowski shot down a Yak-3 in the Muncheberg area. One La-5 was shot down by Captain Gerhard Strasen.
On this day, 31-year-old Major Wilhelm Moritz, holder of the Knight's Cross, was appointed commander of II./JG.4, having shot down 44 aircraft, mainly when he fought with JG.51 "Mölders" and JG.3 "Udet" ...

Thursday 19 April was again a relocation day: Stab/JG.4, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 and III./JG.4 flew to the new Rechlin-Roggentin airfield northwest of Berlin. At the same time, the Estonian volunteer Oberfenrich Axel Meingart Kessler (05/28/1916) from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 deserted: at 10 hours 50 minutes he took off from the Mark Zwuschen airfield on Fw 190 A-8 961076 “Schwarze 10” he flew to Sweden, landed at Bulltoft airfield and was interned.
Two more pilots of the same squad died, having fulfilled their military duty to the end:
Non-commissioned officer Philipp Köhler in an Fw 190 did not return from an air battle with British Spitfire fighters in the Neuruppin area.
The former pilot of the Fw 189 in (H)/Aufkl.Gr.10, Lieutenant Franz Rohleder, who was awarded the German Golden Cross, Iron Crosses 1st and 2nd class, as well as the Golden Badge for combat missions, also died. When he, as part of a flight, stormed Soviet tanks north of Berlin on an Fw 190, the left wing of the plane was torn off by a direct hit from an anti-aircraft shell, and the plane and the pilot crashed to the ground.
Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from III./JG.4 won his fifteenth aerial victory, shooting down a Yak-3 near Berlin at 15:30.

On 20 April 1945, several Fw 190 D-9s from III./JG.4 escorted a group of He 111 conventional bombers and eight Ar 234 jet bombers from KG.76, which attacked Soviet troops in the vicinity of Berlin. All Ar 234s returned safely from the mission, but five He 111s and three Fw 190s were shot down.
In just one day, JG.4 lost two pilots:
Former bomber radio operator and participant in the intervention in Spain, Oberfeldwebel Herbert Rinkleb from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4, awarded the Cross for Spain, Iron Crosses 1st and 2nd class, as well as the Gold Badge for combat missions , flying an Fw 190, was shot down in an air battle near Berlin and went missing.
Fenrich Helmut Klapprott from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4, who was shot down in an Fw 190 in an air battle east of Bernau northeast of Berlin, was killed. He may have been a victim of the Soviet Yak-9 pilot Captain P.F. Lavrikov from the 812th Fighter Aviation Regiment.
In the battles, Lieutenant Gottfried Moriot from 7.(Sturm)/JG.4, non-commissioned officer Valentin Scheurmann from III./JG.4, and made emergency landings on downed planes, Fenrich Oskar Butenop from 9./ JG.4, sergeant major Franz Sischka from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4, non-commissioned officer Horst Heifrich from III./JG.4…
For their part, the pilots of III./JG.4 were able to shoot down four enemy aircraft in the Berlin area:
At 13:00, Captain Günther Schwaneke of Stab/JG.4 destroyed an English Spitfire.
Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from III./JG.4 scored his 16th and 17th aerial victories when he shot down a Yak-9 fighter and a Boston bomber at 13:45.
One La-5 was shot down by Captain Gerhard Strasen from III./JG.4...

On Saturday, April 21, the main task of the squadron was bombing raids on Soviet troops, as well as “free hunting” flights, while two more pilots were lost:
Non-commissioned officer Walter Gausdörfer from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 in an Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle near Berlin and went missing.
And Fenrich Erich Giefer from 7./JG.4, piloting an Fw 190 A-9, crashed and burned at the Rechlin airfield.
According to some reports, the pilots of the squadron won several air victories in the Berlin area, but only two of them were credited to Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from III./JG.4, who at 13 hours shot down first a P-39 Airacobra, and later at 17 hours 30 minutes and La-5.

The next day, the squadron pilots again scored several aerial victories in the Berlin area, but again only Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from III./JG.4 was credited with one Yak-9 shot down at 1 p.m.

On April 23, the main task of JG.4 was again bombing raids on Russian troops in the vicinity of Berlin. Together with attack pilots from SG.1, JG.4 pilots with bombs suspended under the fuselage attacked Russian equipment and infantry from low level flight, and also fought grueling air battles, which again cost them two comrades:
Fenrich Winfried Braehler from 7/JG.4 in an Fw 190 A-9 was shot down in an air battle in the Küstrin area and went missing. True, according to other sources, he died in the Eisenach area.
At 13:30 in the Oranienburg area northwest of Berlin, sergeant major Hans Hochleitner from IV./JG.4 on a Bf109 fighter was shot down in an air battle by Soviet Yak-3 fighters, escaped by parachute, but was captured. However, we can say that he was lucky, since a few years after the end of the war he returned from captivity.
Even more fortunate was Captain Johannes Kaufmann from 9./JG.4, who in the same battle in the Oranienburg area at 13:40 shot down one Yak-9. This was his 7th aerial victory...

On Wednesday April 25, Soviet troops completely surrounded Berlin, the capital of the Third Reich was doomed. However, the Luftwaffe pilots, including JG.4, continued to fight. In one of the flights, Sergeant Major Ahlers from 7./JG.4 in an Fw 190 A-9 was shot down in an air battle in the Berlin area. According to some sources, he went missing, according to others, he was only wounded in the Eisenach area.

On April 26, the squadron lost Lieutenant Friedrich Pullmann from 9./JG.4. A fairly experienced pilot, he already had 3 aerial victories to his name, and was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd degree, the Combat Flights Badge and the Wound Badge (09/12/1944, 12/05/1944). But the data on the reasons for his death vary: according to one information, he was shot down in a Bf 109 in an air battle in the Rossov area near Pasewalk, and according to another, he died in the Wittstock area while flying as a passenger on a Ju 52 transport plane.

The next day the weather in the Berlin area was unfavorable: rain and clouds. There were few sorties, and even fewer fights. In one of them, at 16 o'clock, Captain Johannes Kaufmann from 9./JG.4 shot down one Yak-3. Captain Gerhard Strassen of III./JG.4 scored his 9th aerial victory by shooting down a La-5...

On Sunday, April 29, aircraft of the Luftwaffe 6th Air Fleet were able to carry out a total of 74 sorties to support German troops in Berlin. Several JG.4 pilots stormed Russian troops in the central zone of the city and near the Reich Chancellery.
At 8 hours 45 minutes, non-commissioned officer Manfred Kudell (02.09.1924) from 8./JG.4 on an Fw 190 D with a suspended 250-kg bomb took off as part of a pair on his last 29th combat mission to attack tanks. After dropping a bomb on a target, in an air battle with Soviet fighters, he was set on fire and shot down, landed by parachute on one of the streets in the Weissensee district of Berlin and was captured by Soviet soldiers. After returning from captivity, he lived in Germany; he died quite recently - on April 17, 2012.
After some time, the pilots of III./JG.4, in a battle with a large group of Russian fighters, shot down three of them: at 11:30 am, non-commissioned officer Erwin Teske from 8./JG.4 shot down two Yak-9s in the Schönewald area, winning thus his first two aerial victories. And Captain Johannes Kaufmann from 9./JG.4 won his ninth aerial victory, shooting down one Yak-3 in the Berlin area at 11:45...

On April 30, Stab/JG.4, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 and III./JG.4 were relocated from the Rechlin-Roggentin airfield to the Parchim airfield northwest of Berlin. And again, during the flight, another case of desertion occurred: an Estonian volunteer, a former navigator in Aufkl.Gr.127, Chief Lieutenant Anatol Rebane (03/04/1915), by the way, a native of the glorious Ukrainian city of Poltava, from 6.(Sturm)/ JG.4 flew his Fw 190 A-8 739136 "Weisse 15" to Sweden, landed at Bulltoft airfield and was interned. After the end of the war, he lived first in the United States, then in Estonia, where he died on October 16, 2007.

On Tuesday, May 1, the pilots of JG.4, together with the pilots of JG.26 and SG.1, continued to attack Soviet troops on the streets of Berlin and even destroyed several tanks. In addition, the pilots of JG.4 reported several aerial victories, but were credited with only one Yak-9, which was shot down by non-commissioned officer Erwin Teske from 8./JG.4 at 16:40. Apparently, this was the last success of the squadron...

The next day, May 2, the last relocation was made by Stab/JG.4, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 and III./JG.4 - they moved even further to the West, to the Lek airfield northwest of Flensburg. This ended the squadron's stay on the Eastern Front. There were only a few days left until the end of the war and the surrender of the German armed forces. Finally, let's talk about last battles and losses of the 4th squadron.
During the day of May 2, JG.4 lost four pilots:
At about 8 o'clock, Sergeant Major Karl Eilitz from 9./JG.4 on a Bf 109 was shot down in an air battle by British Spitfire fighters in the Parchim area and died.
Chief Corporal Ernst from 7./JG.4 on an Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle with Anglo-American aircraft in the Dass area northeast of Lübeck and died.
In an air battle with Anglo-American aircraft in the Bad Godesberg area southeast of Bonn, non-commissioned officer Matthias van der Velden from Stab III./JG.4 was shot down and captured by parachute from his Bf 109 K-4 Americans. After the end of the war, he returned from captivity to Germany.
Lieutenant Franz Malsch of III./JG.4, who had 11 (14) aerial victories to his name, was awarded the Silver Cup of Honor for excellence in air combat, the Iron Cross of the 1st and 2nd class, as well as the Gold Badge for combat sorties, he was shot down on a Bf 109, made an emergency landing in the Prague area and was captured.
True, the places where the last two pilots were captured are surprising, since they are too far from the airfields from which the squadron operated at that time. It is possible that these data are erroneous.

The last loss The squadron became non-commissioned officer Helmut Lauer from JG.4, who was killed in a Bf 109 on May 5 in an air battle in the Landsberg an der Warth area. And in this case, as in the previous two, the place of his death is in doubt.

That’s practically all that is known about the actions of JG.4 on the Eastern Front...

In total, according to available data (far from complete!), during the hostilities against Soviet aviation, pilots shot down at least 50 aircraft, including 38 fighters, 8 Il-2 attack aircraft, 2 Boston bombers, 1 Po-2 and 1 R -5. In addition, they won at least 8 aerial victories in battles with Anglo-American aviation. The squadron's losses amounted to almost 90 pilots, however, these data, as mentioned above, need clarification. 12 pilots died in plane crashes. 12 pilots were also shot down by anti-aircraft fire. For unknown reasons, 26 pilots were lost. 2 pilots deserted. 39 pilots were lost in air battles, of which 23 were shot down by Soviet pilots and 16 by allied aircraft. There are no definitive data on aircraft losses, but given that on average there are two lost aircraft per lost pilot, it can be assumed that the squadron's losses amounted to at least 270 aircraft. The balance of victories and losses was clearly not in favor of the 4th squadron, but nothing else could have been expected in 1945: the multiple superiority of Soviet and Anglo-American aviation over the Luftwaffe was overwhelming. In the very first battles, many German poorly trained young “yellow mouths” became victims of experienced “Stalin’s falcons” and Allied pilots who had hundreds of hours of flight time and combat sorties. One could even say that the example of JG.4 is typical, because the rest of the Luftwaffe squadrons were in the same agony...
By the way, the appearance of ersatz newcomers from JG.4 on the Soviet-German front went unnoticed. In any case, in the memoirs of former Soviet pilots there is absolutely no mention of meetings in the air with Messers and Fokkers with the emblem of a “Knight’s helmet with red plumage”...

Igor, it is about kamikaze pilots that Oleg writes. Read his article carefully. As for the calls of Nazi propaganda, this is very doubtful. At least, this does not follow from the two-part film that you probably watched about the last days of the fascist regime. This is all a matter of conjecture as to what the defenders of Berlin were thinking.
I don’t sense any hatred from Western democratic citizens, either on TV, or on the radio, or in communication. But there is, indeed, plenty of hatred in Russian TV, the press, and even on Prose ru towards the West, towards those compatriots who live in other countries, towards those who do not share the ardent love for the president.

Vladimir, one can, of course, doubt how and what the defenders of Berlin were thinking. In such cases, if there is interest, you need to delve into the literature on this issue. We learn, for example, about direct appeals from the Fuhrer, recorded in documents. We learn that such a crazy idea was adopted, that this is a historical fact, confirmed many times.

The “yellow mouth pilots” of the Luftwaffe were “kamikazes” to a much lesser extent than the “Volkssturm” or the Wehrmacht soldiers on a Berlin street, than the thousands and thousands of military personnel and civilians faithful to the call - “Wir kapitulieren nie - Sieg oder Tod!” and hoping for a miracle.

The daily audience of the Proza.ru portal is about 100 thousand visitors, who in total view more than half a million pages according to the traffic counter, which is located to the right of this text. Each column contains two numbers: the number of views and the number of visitors.

Soviet pilots shot down the vaunted German aces, who scored 70 to 30 victories in European skies. Among the Luftwaffe pilots shot down in 1941, there are at least 60 aces who were killed, captured or written off after being shot down due to injury, including 13 German pilots who scored 25 victories or more: this is H.-F. Joppen (70 victories, shot down on August 25, at the time of his death he was the 4th Luftwaffe ace after W. Mölders, A. Galland and W. Oesau), H. Hofmann (63 victories, shot down on October 3), E. Wagner (57 victories , shot down on November 13), Eyu Schmidt (47 victories, shot down on August 31), H. Müterich (43 victories, shot down on September 9), K. Sochatsy (38 victories, shot down on August 3), X. Bretnitz (37, shot down on June 22 ), J. Hacker (32 victories, shot down on October 13), A.-V. Schumann (30 victories, shot down on September 6), F. Blazytko (29 victories, shot down on September 25), X. Kolbov (27 victories, shot down on July 16), V. Shelman (26 victories, shot down on June 22), A. Lignitz ( 25 victories, shot down on September 30).

In the Soviet historiography of the war of 1941-1945, there was a widespread myth that the Luftwaffe, having seized air supremacy with a sudden blow, retained it in the first period of the war (although in some areas Soviet aviation could temporarily gain operational supremacy in the air), however, after air battles “radical turning point” over Stalingrad, Kuban and Kursk, special air operations In 1943, “strategic air supremacy finally passed to the side of the Soviet Air Force.” The lack of air supremacy in 1941-1942 was explained by a combination of different reasons: large losses at the beginning of the war, lack of modern aircraft (“Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia". M., 1985. P. 147).

It was believed that in 1941, Soviet “falcons” flew on outdated “donkeys” and “gulls”, heavy MiGs, “varnished guaranteed coffins” LaGGs; in 1942 - on more or less competitive Yak-7 and La-5; since 1943 - on the Yak-3 and Yak-9, La-5FN and La-7, which surpassed the Fokkers and Messers. However, in recent decades, after the disappearance of the dictatorship of ideology over science, gaining access to a number of archival funds, including foreign ones, assertions about gaining air supremacy in the battles over Stalingrad, Kuban, Kursk and Orel, the success of large air operations in 1943, about superiority Yak-3 and La-5 over the latest modifications of the Bf. 109 and FW.190 were questioned or refuted.

Doubts also arose regarding the dominance of the Luftwaffe in 1941. For example, the destruction of 1,200 Soviet Air Force aircraft declared by the Germans on June 22 caused noticeable, but not critical damage to our aviation, since the Air Force of five border districts and three fleets should have remained more than 9.5 thousand aircraft without taking into account replenishment (at least another 3 thousand . combat vehicles by August 1). The Germans on the Eastern Front had 3,909 aircraft (including combat training groups, units assigned to army groups, air fleet directorates): 1,417 bombers, 1,067 fighters, 786 reconnaissance aircraft, 313 transport, 326 communications aircraft (including non-combat-ready ones). Another 1020 aircraft were provided by the allies (counting the Finns, Hungarians, Italians and Croats, who did not participate in the battles on June 22).

On the first day, the Germans lost 78 aircraft permanently (including 15 written off due to damage) and 89 damaged, including 24 Bf. 109 (another 24 damaged), 23 Ju.88 (17) and 11 He.111 (8).

According to the historian R. Larintsev, all the downed He.111s were from KG55 “Grif”, 17 downed Ju.88s were from KG51 “Edelweiss” (the 3rd group lost half of the vehicles shot down and damaged), 7 downed Bf.l09s were from II (Sch.)/LG2, 6 Bf.109 - from JG3 (future "Udet"), 5 Bf.109 - from JG51 (future "Mölders"). The losses on June 22, 1941 turned out to be the highest daily losses of the Luftwaffe in the war with the USSR.

In the following days, the level of daily losses of German aviation, although decreasing, remained high. According to Olaf Gröler, who relied on reports from the 6th Department of the Luftwaffe Quartermaster General, in the first week of fighting the Germans lost 280 aircraft permanently and 165 damaged; for two weeks - 429 and 247 vehicles, respectively (taking into account clarifications on the losses of the first week). Subsequently, the level of weekly losses of the German Air Force on the Eastern Front dropped to double digits and did not increase to triple digits until 1944.

By the end of the fourth week (taking into account clarifications on the previous days), Luftwaffe losses amounted to 719 irretrievably lost and 452 damaged aircraft, and by the end of 1941 - 2213 and 1435 aircraft, respectively.

Comparison of information about Luftwaffe losses on the Eastern Front according to reports from the 6th Department for different periods shown in the table.

Period Destroyed Damaged
22.06.1941-03.01.1942 2213 1435
04.01.1942-14.03.1942 474 375
01.01.1942-31.08.1942 2459 2201
01.09.1943-31.03.1944 1871 1520
01.04.1944-31.10.1944 2898 2311

As you can see, in 1941-1943, the highest average daily losses of the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front were precisely in 1941. And, although in this table there is no period from September 1942 to August 1943, which includes the Battle of Stalingrad, the battles in the Kuban, the attacks of the air armies in 1943 and the Kursk Bulge, available on this moment information about losses in those operations suggests that the average daily losses for these 12 months (at least for combat aircraft) will be lower than in 1941.

Some historians consider the reports of the 6th department incomplete. For example, the sum of losses according to daily reports for the third and fourth weeks of the war is 138 destroyed and 89 damaged aircraft, but the difference between the results of the first four and two weeks of the war is equal to 290 and 205 aircraft, respectively, that is, in two weeks the losses of another 154 and 116 cars, respectively, and there are no guarantees that these “clarifications” are final.

Therefore, experts double-check these figures with information from other sources. For example, according to Lieutenant Colonel Greffrath: “In the first 14 days of fighting, even more aircraft were lost than in any subsequent similar period of time. During the period from June 22 to July 5, 1941, the German Air Force lost 807 aircraft of all types, and during the period from July 6 to July 19 - 477.”

According to Klaus Reinhardt, citing the head of the technical department of the Luftwaffe, Field Marshal E. Milch, from June 22 to October 31, 1941, the Luftwaffe lost 5,180 aircraft on the Eastern Front, including 2,966 aircraft shot down and destroyed at airfields. To make up for losses, the industry delivered 5,124 aircraft to the front by November 10, 1941, with only 40 reconnaissance aircraft remaining in reserve.

The fighters suffered the heaviest losses: 1,527 aircraft (as of October 31), while the industry delivered only 1,079 aircraft, which meant a reduction in their number by 452 units. By the end of November, the total losses of the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front amounted to 5585 vehicles, of which 3189 were irrecoverable.

Thus, in six months, Soviet pilots flying outdated “donkeys” and heavy MiGs destroyed almost half of the enemy’s fighter aircraft and all of its reserves and replacements. If at the beginning of the war the Luftwaffe had 27 Bf.109 yagd groups on the Eastern Front (excluding the 5th Fleet), then by the beginning of November there were 16 yagd groups left, and by the end of 1941 - 13 yagd groups.

In addition to combat training groups aimed at replenishing their squadrons, the Germans had to withdraw from the front in 1941 the commands of four squadrons and nine yagd groups: in July - II./JG27, on August 5 - I./JG53 (with squadron headquarters), September 14 – I./JG27 and others. Instead, I./JG52 was introduced in October. The deployment of yagd groups to the rear was caused primarily by their losses. For example, JG53, in three and a half months of fighting, out of 170 Bf.109 (including replacements) lost 55 aircraft shot down, 41 written off, 23 damaged (data for the beginning of October do not take into account the aircraft restored by that time), which amounts to 70 percent of losses .

Among the fighters killed, captured, or written off due to injury in 1941, we see at least two squadron commodores, eight group commanders, and 25 squadron commanders. And this is not counting the officers who returned to flight work after being shot down (such as Major Karl-Heinz Greisert, commander of III/JG3, shot down on July 22, 1941).

All this generally refutes the thesis about the Luftwaffe seizing air supremacy in 1941. Indeed, the Soviet Air Force suffered heavy losses at the initial stage of the war, associated not only with the surprise of the attack, but also with the loss of airfields with a large number of damaged or uncombat-ready aircraft.

Systemic problems with control and communications, combat tactics, and unpreparedness of the aviation rear had a significant impact on the losses. Soviet fighters were outdated or inferior to the enemy in terms of combat performance, but, on the other hand, Soviet pilots before the war had mastered this technology well and knew all its advantages and disadvantages. It is in “mastery”, in a good degree of mastery of equipment and weapons, that the root of the success of our “Falcons” in 1941 is seen.

In light of this, it is understandable why our aviation in 1942-1943, having rearmed modern cars, was unable to gain air superiority. Veterans with pre-war training, partially knocked out in 1941, were replaced by graduates of accelerated courses with minimal flight hours and trained in the take-off-landing system. Under these conditions, the Soviet Air Force was unable to realize all the capabilities inherent in the new technology until 1944.

It is no coincidence that in 1942-1944, to fight the Soviet Air Force, the Germans had enough of one and a half dozen Jagd groups (about half of the Luftwaffe fighter forces on June 22), and the leading “experts” (with 200 or more shot down) greatest number victories on the Eastern Front were won in 1942 (X. Graf, X. Philip), 1943 (G. Barkhorn, V. Nowotny, E. Rudorfer, X. Erler, T. Weissenberger) or 1944 (E. Hartmann, G. Rall, W. Kittel, W. Batz, W. Schuck, A. Hafner, H. Lipfert).

When studying this topic, a natural question arises about the effectiveness of our aces of 1941, who, in the most difficult conditions, flying in machines inferior to the enemy in many respects, managed to withstand the pressure of the enemy’s most experienced experts, destroy half of his fighter aircraft, all his reserves and reinforcements. Previously, studying this phenomenon seemed almost impossible: the combat scores of most of the aces of 1941 were not high, and their biographies remained “in the shadow” of their more famous comrades and were unknown even to specialists. However, in Lately, thanks to active introduction into circulation archival sources both in the traditional way (through extracts) and by digitizing them (for example, award sheets of the OBD “Feat of the People”), a solution to this problem has become possible.

The reference book by M.Yu. became a great help in the work of aviation historians. Bykov is the result of many years of titanic work, in which the combat accounts of more than 3.5 thousand Soviet aces were compiled. However, it should be noted that this guide contains valuable information, but is not a definitive study and indisputable truth. A significant number of victories counted by the command to our pilots were not included in this reference book.

This is especially typical for 1941, when during the retreat and encirclement, documents of a number of units of the Red Army Air Force were lost. For example, A.I. Pokryshkin’s directory lists only 43 personal + 3 group victories (including 2+1 in 1941), and the final score of 52 victories is questioned. Meanwhile, a number of awards and characteristics clearly indicate that Pokryshkin won 6+6 victories in 1941-1942.

Despite the fact that the documents of the 55th Fighter Aviation Regiment for 1941 were mostly lost, historian A.V. Marchukov managed to find the missing victories using documents from higher-level formations and bring Pokryshkin’s victory count in 1941 to 4+3.

It is interesting to note that another pilot of the 55th Fighter Aviation Regiment, G.A. Rechkalov, the reference book counts an additional 3 victories for 1941 precisely on the basis of documents from the 20th Mixed Aviation Division. Account A.V. Alelyukhin is listed in the reference book as 28+6, but the award sheets clearly show that the command credited the ace of the 9th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment with 33+6 victories. On the other hand, for a number of aces, victories were included in the reference book only on the basis of awards, without confirmation by operational documents. The directory contains pilots whose account is compiled exclusively from the award list, without a breakdown by dates and types of downed aircraft, for example, I.P. Suvorov.

During the study, more than 300 names of Soviet Air Force pilots were copied from the directory, whose victories were then verified using award certificates. As a result, 130 Soviet pilots remained in the database, for whom the command recorded five or more personal aerial victories in 1941. It should be noted that victories that took place before June 22 (Spain, China, Khalkhin Gol, “Finnish”) and after 1941 are not taken into account here. Group air victories are indicated in the database, but are not converted into personal victories.
In some works there were statements that I.N. became the first ace of 1941 on June 22. Kalabushkin. However, according to award documents, he shot down the fifth enemy aircraft only on July 31.

The first Soviet ace of the Great Patriotic War was pilot V.F. Sirotin, who won his fifth and sixth personal victories on June 25.

In July, 20 Soviet pilots, including M.E., became aces. Chunosov, who shot down 7 planes in 8 days (and became the leader for several days), and N.V. Terekhin, who shot down 3 Non-111s in one attack.

However, V.A. became the leader among the Soviet aces. Figichev, who scored nine victories in 22 days in July.

Already on August 27, the ace of the 55th Fighter Aviation Regiment passed B.F. Safonov, who recorded his tenth victory.

Two days later V.G. Lazarev set a new record by shooting down 5 Ju.87s in one battle. In total, 22 more Soviet pilots became aces in August.

(According to German documents)

The calculation of the Wehrmacht command was clear: neutralize Soviet aviation, ensure air supremacy and switch the main efforts of the Luftwaffe to direct support of ground forces. The implementation of this plan led to the fact that, according to the Germans, on the first day of the war, 888 Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and 223 in the air. These data are not much different from the data contained in Soviet official sources: in total, about 1,200 aircraft were lost, 800 of them at airfields.

However, the intentions of the attacking side to destroy Soviet aviation in the border areas with one or two powerful blows and demoralize the personnel of the Air Force units and formations were not fully realized. On the first day of the war Soviet pilots carried out about 6 thousand combat missions, shot down dozens of enemy aircraft.

“Despite the surprise achieved by the Germans,” German generals and officers admitted, “the Russians managed to find the time and strength to provide decisive resistance.”

The command and headquarters of the Air Force of the Odessa Military District, for example, relying on intelligence data, on June 21 brought the aviation units into combat readiness and dispersed them to alternate airfields. During German air raids here on the ground and in the air, only 6 aircraft were lost, while many more enemy aircraft were shot down. And in other border districts, where combat duty and air combat operations were better organized, the attackers met stubborn resistance.

Between June 22 and July 5, the Luftwaffe lost 807 aircraft on the Eastern Front (this number includes those that were completely destroyed and those requiring major repairs). From July 6 to August 2 – another 843 aircraft. In total, from the morning of June 22 to December 31, 1941, combat losses of German aviation amounted to 4,543 aircraft, of which 3,827, or 82%, were on the Eastern Front. According to the flight personnel, the losses in killed, wounded and missing were 7,666 people, of which 6,052 or 79% were on the Eastern Front.

The Luftwaffe command noted in its reports that with the outbreak of the war in the East, the gap between the losses of aircraft, flight personnel and the replacements received was constantly increasing.

Here is data from original German documents. The commander of aviation at Army Group South informed the Luftwaffe headquarters about the losses of reconnaissance aircraft for the period from June 22 to October 4, 1941: “The enemy destroyed 97 of our reconnaissance aircraft. 92 flight crew were killed. 41 wounded. These losses were mainly from enemy fighters. In addition, 27 transport and communications aircraft that were subordinate to these squadrons were destroyed. Another 38 aircraft were killed or damaged without enemy exposure. Note: aircraft that were damaged in battle and restored in units are not included in the records.” Headquarters of Army Group South.

In fact, it was a failure of the “blitzkrieg” for aviation too.

Comparing the losses of the Luftwaffe in one month on the Eastern Front with those that occurred over the same period of time during the “Battle of Britain” and during Germany’s capture of European countries, we come to an unequivocal conclusion: in Russia the Germans lost more aircraft and pilots.

And two more tables from the report of the Wehrmacht leadership to Hitler in February 1945. The data is taken from Fritz Hahn’s book “On the Wehrmacht’s losses in men and equipment,” published in Germany.

Once again I received a comparative number of Air Force losses in World War II. I perfectly understand the desire to feel a sense of pride in one’s ancestors, but lying has never contributed to this. The numbers below appeared out of nowhere several years ago and are floating around the Internet, surrounded by guesses and fiction. I will provide “invigorating” figures at the end, as well as a table of US Air Force losses.

But first, there are no reliable facts about the losses of the Air Force of Nazi Germany. There are no primary data for 1944 at all. And the existing documents of different departments of the Reich differ from each other significantly.
Attack by an Il-2 attack aircraft on a German airfield

Here are some examples:

On the eve of the October holidays, the Lenfront command received intelligence data about the alleged German raid on Leningrad on November 7. It was decided to forestall the enemy by first striking the Siverskaya airfield.

At 11.25 on November 6, seven Pe-2s from the 125th BAP (leading regiment commander, Major V.A. Sandalov), accompanied by ten MiG-3 fighters from the 7th IAP, attacked German aircraft parking lots. The “pawns” dropped 28 ZAB-100, 210 8-kilogram fragmentation bombs and 280 2.5-kilogram bombs (fragmentation and incendiary) onto the airfield.

The Germans clearly missed the raid. According to a report from our pilots, anti-aircraft artillery fire was opened late and was conducted in a disorganized manner. At 10.40, nine I-153s from the 7th IAP stormed firing points on the outskirts of the airfield. During the retreat, our pilots fought with the Messerschmitts. Lieutenant Timoshenko and junior lieutenant Stoletov did not return from the battle, the first died, and the second was captured.

Pe-2 dive bomber of the Northern Fleet aviation at the airfield

From 10.50 to 10.55, six Il-2s accompanied by eight fighters launched a second strike. Ten ZAB-100s, ten high-explosive "fifty-fifties" and 30 rockets fell on the German parking lots. The “silts” of captain Anisimov and junior lieutenant Panfilov were shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

At 2:17 p.m., seven “loopbacks” repeated the raid. Again, 28 ZAB-100, 112 AO-15 and 140 ZAB-2.5 were expended. On the way back, Captain Rezvykh's Pe-2 crashed. The crew remained unharmed.

The GKL (Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe) reports paint the following picture of the results of our air raids. Two Junkers-88s were destroyed (100% loss) (serial number 2543 from III./KG77 and 1256 from KGr806), another one was damaged (60%) and had to be written off (serial number 3542 from III./KG77). Three aircraft from the 806th group were damaged (40%), but could be restored (production numbers 1081, 2501 and 4547). Thus, in the most favorable scenario, three enemy bombers were destroyed and three were seriously damaged. In addition, two pilots from the 77th squadron, one military construction worker and one anti-aircraft gunner** were injured.

And here is how the events of November 6 in Siverskaya are reflected in the “Journal of Combat Operations of the 18th Army”***.
“November 6, 1941, 15 hours 20 minutes.

The Luftwaffe liaison officer reports the results of today's raid on the Siverskaya airfield. At 10.15 nine enemy fighters flew over the airfield. At 10.30, at an altitude of 200 meters above the airfield, seven bombers passed under the cover of fighters and immediately behind this were seven attack aircraft. The planes dropped thirty bombs at low level. Six aircraft were destroyed, four were seriously damaged, and eight were slightly damaged. Personnel losses: two killed and two wounded. 20 thousand liters of gasoline burned.

Two fighters on duty took off on alert and shot down two enemy aircraft in pursuit.
It was later determined that the irretrievable losses amounted to five vehicles.

21 hours 35 minutes.
The Luftwaffe liaison officer informed the head of the army's operations department that in the afternoon the enemy carried out a second raid on the Siverskaya airfield. One aircraft was destroyed, one aircraft was seriously damaged and one aircraft was slightly damaged. The fiziler-shtorkh was also damaged.

Thus, according to the “Journal of Combat Operations of the 18th Army,” German losses in two raids amounted to six aircraft destroyed, five seriously damaged, and ten aircraft slightly damaged (see table)!

German Ju-88A bombers from the "Lion" squadron KG30 in flight over the Banak airfield

Now fast forward to 1942. Far North, a very successful raid by Il-4 bombers on the Banak airbase in Northern Norway as part of the operation to escort the infamous PQ-17 convoy.

On June 30, five Ilyushins from the 35th Mine-Torpedo Aviation Regiment, which had recently arrived in the Northern Fleet, dropped thirty high-explosive "hundreds" of aircraft onto the parking lot of a German airbase. According to the crews' reports, the entire airfield was covered with explosions. The Severomorets suffered no losses, and upon their return they reported the destruction of two enemy aircraft, which were identified as Messerschmitt Bf-109s, as a result of a bomb attack. However, this is a rare case when their undoubted successes were underestimated in their reports “to the top.”

GKL reports, on the contrary, report the destruction of four “Junkers” (serial number 0051, 3717, 2125, 1500, all 100%) from the 30th “Eagle” bomber squadron*. One more bomber from KG30 was seriously damaged (70%) and had to be written off (serial number 1753) and one (serial number 2060) could be repaired on site (30%)**. If the number of burned-out aircraft in different documents coincides, then the situation with the number of damaged aircraft varies and varies very noticeably.

Here's what you can glean about this from the Kriegsmarine documents:
“June 30, 9 hours 1 minute/9 hours 3 minutes.

Air raid on Banak airfield. Five aircraft dropped 15 bombs from an altitude of 5800 meters. Four aircraft were destroyed and 17 damaged. Two seriously and two slightly wounded.” ***

The enemy learned from the events of June 30, so the next raid on Banak on July 2 was not so successful. On this day, two groups of Il-4s took off to bomb the airfield. The first five returned from the Varde area due to an engine malfunction on the lead plane. Of the four Ilyushins of the second group, one aircraft took off in cloud cover and also returned to the airfield. The remaining three DB-3fs continued their flight to the target, dropping thirty FAB-100s onto the airfield from an altitude of 5500 meters. At the moment our bombers departed from the target, a pair of Messerschmitts appeared in the air. Within a few minutes, they successively shot down the DB-3f of the commander of the 35th MTAP, Major A.A., who had just arrived in the North. Krylov and flight commander of the 2nd Guards Regiment, Captain P.D. Zubkova. The third crew, despite numerous holes in their Ilyushin, managed to escape.

Now let's fast forward to 1943, to the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. This is what was reported to the headquarters of the 6th Field Army of the Wehrmacht about the results of the Soviet air raid on the Kuteinikovo airfield, in a report on the air situation of the 15th Luftwaffe anti-aircraft artillery division dated July 14, 1943*****:
“Preliminary loss report.
Nine vehicles were slightly damaged: four Focke-Wulf 189s, one Me-110, one W34, one Klemm and two Fisiler-Storchs.
Two vehicles were seriously damaged: Me-110 and Fw-189.
One "physicaler-shtorch" was destroyed.
One soldier was killed, two were seriously wounded, two buildings were destroyed.”

What, in turn, can you learn about this by looking at the reports of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe? The GKL report, dated the fifteenth, indicates that as a result of the bombing of the Kuteinikovo airfield, one Fw-189A-2 (serial number 0125, 15%) and one “physician” (serial number 5074, 40%) were damaged** ****.

As you can see, the overlap between these two documents is minimal. The Fw-189A-2 from the GKL report can only be classified as a lightly damaged vehicle, and the “stork” is not at all clear which category to put in. On the one hand, it was damaged quite seriously and required factory repair. On the other hand, he was not listed in the army report as seriously injured. As the only possible justification for the German staff officers, it can be assumed that information about the raid on Kuteinikovo eventually migrated to reports for 1944, which were later lost. But this is just a guess.

And here is the figure floating around the network:

In first place is Japan: 60,750 killed pilots (well, that’s understandable, “kamikaze”, traditions of honor, etc.)
In second place is Germany: 57,137 killed pilots.
In third place is England: 56,821 pilots killed.
In fourth place is the United States: 40,061 pilots killed.
And in FIFTH and last place is the USSR: 34,500 killed pilots.

Losses are even less than those of the USA! Why?

Maybe Soviet military leaders hesitantly used aviation, “save” it? No! The USSR used aviation THREE times more intensively than Germany: during the war years on the Eastern Front, German aviation made 1,373,952 combat sorties, and USSR aviation - 3,808,136 sorties!

This fact alone shatters to smithereens the legends about the “bastard Vanka”, who, they say, is stupid, stupid and narrow-minded to fight on an equal footing with the “civilized Aryans” - for military aviation is always, then and now, the technical elite of the army. And a combat pilot is a unique fighter, combining the knowledge and intelligence of an engineer with the skills and reflexes of a professional Olympic-level athlete. Therefore, the main thing is to save the pilot, because compared to the cost of his training, the plane itself is pennies...

However, the USSR is also not in first place in terms of “material losses”:

During the Second World War, the aviation of the warring countries lost:

And some other statistics:

For the losses of Red Army Air Force pilots. During the war years, 44,093 pilots were trained. 27,600 died in battle: 11,874 fighter pilots, 7,837 attack pilots, 6,613 bomber crew members, 587 reconnaissance pilots and 689 auxiliary aviation pilots (V.I. Alekseenko. Soviet Air Forces on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War).

Various historians have a lot of very different data. Mukhin also has a table of losses by military branch as of January 1, 1945. True, not the pilots, but the entire Luftwaffe, without allies. I won’t cite them simply so as not to force a discussion on the party.

But any more or less reliable figures prove two facts

1 - the victory was very expensive for the USSR;
2 - we did not throw any corpses at Nazi Europe.

* - The documented maximum time interval between the event and the moment it was recorded is about a year
** - Military archive of Germany VA-MA RL 2 III/1179 S. 321, 327, 329
*** - US National Archives NARA T-312 roll 782 frame 8433368, 8433374
More examples - https://topwar.ru/29659-chudesa-nemeckoy-statistiki.html

Original: Brophy, A. The Air Force: A Panorama of the Nation's Youngest Service. - New York: Gilbert Press, 1956.